How can river crossings and the blocking of them best be portrayed in AACW?

[Fern]

You are taking the combat between the Gunboats and a crossing force in consideration, but IMHO that was not the only element in the equation.

Think you are a General who want to cross a huge river with an army corps. You don't have full knowledge of the game rules. How much time does take to ferry 25.000 men with their logistic tail, guns, horses etc?

If gunboats are present there is always a danger. You don't know for sure if more gunboats or an ironclad will reinforce the already existing enemy force, interrupting the ferry process at the worst moment (maybe chosen by the enemy with full knowledge of it) and leaving you with half your force in one bank and the other half in the other. The presence of just ONE ship means that the enemy knows you are there trying to cross the river and can reinforce it, so the menace of stopping the ferry process when you have half your army in one bank and the other half in the other bank does exist. Players know that riverine units in a river sector cannot be reinforced by riverine units in an adjacent river sector, but that was not the case at the time. A lone gunboat could turn into 6 or 7 gunboats and/or ironclads in 6 or 8hours.

If I was a CSA or US General I would not risk my army by crossing a river in front of enemy naval units. I would prefer to chose a river crossing which could not be watched by enemy naval units. That's what Hood did. In that case just ONE gunboat could be a powerful deterrent because it could forecast the presence of more enemy units in a sort time leaving you with your army split in two in both river banks and unable to reinforce either one.

[Jabberwock]

You are taking the combat between the Gunboats and a crossing force in consideration, but IMHO that was not the only element in the equation.

Think you are a General who want to cross a huge river with an army corps. You have not full knowledge of the game rules. How much time does take to ferry 25.000 men with their logistic tail, guns, horses etc?

If gunboats are present there is always a danger. You don't know for sure if more gunboats or an ironclad will reinforce the already existing enemy force, interrupting the ferry process at the worst moment (maybe chosen by the enemy with full knowledge of it) and leaving you with half your force in one bank and the other half in the other. The presence of just ONE ship means that the enemy knows you are there trying to cross the river and can reinforce it, so the menace of stopping the ferry process when you have half your army in one bank and the other half in the other bank does exist. Players know that riverine units in a river sector cannot be reinforced by riverine units in an adjacent river sector, but that was not the case at the time. A lone gunboat could turn into 6 or 7 gunboats and/or ironclads in 6 or 8hours.

If I was a CSA or US General I would not risk my army by crossing a river in front of enemy naval units. I would prefer to chose a river crossing which could not be watched by enemy naval units. That's what Hood did. In that case just ONE gunboat could be a powerful deterrent because it could forecast the presence of more enemy units in a sort time leaving you with your army split in two in both river banks and unable to reinforce either one.

OK - so one corps fights its way through, and one retreats ... An ugly situation. If gunboats are moving around, which I expect they would tend to do more under these proposed rules, they would also tend to get slowed down and congregate in areas where there is combat.

Crossing a river in the face of gunboats would usually be a very bad choice, but IMO it should be a choice.

[Brochgale]

OK - so one corps fights its way through, and one retreats ... An ugly situation. If gunboats are moving around, which I expect they would tend to do more under these proposed rules, they would also tend to get slowed down and congregate in areas where there is combat.

Crossing a river in the face of gunboats would usually be a very bad choice, but IMO it should be a choice.

Plenty of examples from history of Armies making mistake of splitting Army on crossings.
Moral - dont cross or cross unobserved and undetected?

[Jagger]

I get the feeling that people are not using the proper tactics against Union gunboats.

A single entrenched Columbiad or Coastal artillery shreds Union gunboats to pieces. Even an entrenched CSA force with regular artillery can hurt gunboats. Which means that gunboats can only operate in friendly controlled waters while it requires strong forces of ironclads to operate in non-friendly rivers.

In addition, gunboats have very low supply. They cannot stay on station for more than a few turns. The numbers of Union gunboats required to block all friendly Union river sections and rotate them for resupply is immense.

With the 4 boat requirement, it is going to require 24 gunboats just to block the Cumberland river...plus more when you have to rotate gunboats out of the line for resupply. It would take another 36 gunboats to block the Tennessee River...plus more to rotate out for resupply. So if the Union captures Fort Donaldson is there any reason for the CSA to abandon Nashville or Bowling Green? Not unless the Union has a 60 gunboat fleet plus backups. Although a single Columbiad or Coastal gun will prevent river blockades even if the Union had all those gunboats. Then of course, there is the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers needing gunboats as well. Way too many ships are going to be necessary with a 4 ship blockade. IMO, 4 ship blockade requirement is going to result in most rivers, including friendly rivers, no longer existing as obstacles to rebel movement. It will be a godsend for reb cavalry raids.

Although in game play, the rivers are never completely blocked except for short term objectives. I keep a small number of ships available in the Ohio and Mississippi strategically placed to respond to raids. Often they are pulled off the river for resupply. I will concentrate gunboats when a raid is threatened or occurs. Gunboats don't move into unfriendly water. I only use strong fleets primarily of ironclads to move past forts or entrenched guns for short term operations.

I use gunboats almost exclusively in safe water because they are so easy to sink. I tried blockading the Cumberland crossings from Nashville south with 5 or 6 gunboats in one on-going PBEM. My opponent immediately placed a coastal/Columbiad gun at Nashville. Every single gunboat was sunk in a few turns when I had to move them for resupply. I was willing to accept the loss for the short term blocking of the river but it demonstrates the ease of countering gunboats.

I have added 8 free gunboats to the PBEM mod but the reality is I probably need to add another free 50 or so. I have not read anywhere of the total number of Union gunboats in the brown water navy operating along the Ohio, Missississippi, Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers but I doubt if it were more than 50 or so. I don't thing the brown water Union navy was large at all. If anyone knows, I would be curious.

IMO, a 4 gunboat blockade requirement was a solution to a non-existent problem. Experienced CSA players did not have problems with Union gunboats unless on long distance cavalry raids into Union territory. Then Union gunboats were a problem. But then long distance CSA cavalry raids are way too easy anyway. Gunboats were a good counter to the easy cavalry raids.

I personally don't agree with the 4 boat requirement. It is hard enough and expensive enough requiring a single ship to blockade movement.

[Fern]

Crossing a river in the face of gunboats would usually be a very bad choice, but IMO it should be a choice.

You, Americans, obviously have a better knowledge of the ACW than we, foreigners, no matter how interested we are on it.

Did an ACW army ever try to cross a huge river (i.e. Misissippi, Ohio or Tennessee) in the face of enemy gunboats?

If there is no case, then game over. If the ACW Generals never did it, then I guess they had strong military reasons for not doing it. OTOH if there was a case, then we could study what happened, what resistence had to face the crossing force and what the strenght of the crossing force and the riverine one was.

[Jagger]

Did an ACW army ever try to cross a huge river (i.e. Misissippi, Ohio or Tennessee) in the face of enemy gunboats?

Throughout all of history, I don't think any army has ever crossed a water obstacle in the face of an enemy navy without their own navy destroying or driving off the enemy navy first. If a navy controls the water, armies do not cross the water.

Crossing a river is not that easy unless it is very shallow. You have to get horses, artillery, wagons, ammo, food and non-swimmers across. It is a very, slow tedius project requiring lots of boats unless you have a bridge or shallow ford. And unless the boats are fighting ships, they are completely vulnerable to enemy warships.

In addition, you have to get resupply over the river to support the force. Every day, supply has to cross the river.

[Jabberwock]

It is fairly simple to set up multiple batteries both upstream and downstream from a ford. It didn't take months. The Mississippi or Ohio do not have a lot of fords. I have made a case for the Mississipppi River being considered Coastal at least as far as Vicksburg, and I agree with Jagger as far as saying that rules for interaction in coastal waters should be different from those in shallow water.

[Jabberwock]

You, Americans, obviously have a better knowledge of the ACW than we, foreigners, no matter how interested we are on it.

Did I imply that? I can can make snide comments too, if I choose to.

Did an ACW army ever try to cross a huge river (i.e. Misissippi, Ohio or Tennessee) in the face of enemy gunboats?

If there is no case, then game over. If the ACW Generals never did it, then I guess they had strong military reasons for not doing it. OTOH if there was a case, then we could study what happened, what resistence had to face the crossing force and what the strenght of the crossing force and the riverine one was.

Did they not do it because it was physically impossible, or did they not do it because it would have been a stupid thing to do, even for Hood? This is not a lockstep, every move must exactly follow history situation.

There are cases of gunboats getting attacked by shore forces. There are cases of shore forces getting succesfully attacked by gunboats, something I've been fighting for a realistic solution to for a long time. If you would like to play a game where the navy must stay on one side of the line and never touch the army, and vicy-versy, fine. Please don't make that ahistorical kludgefest out my of my favorite game.

[Rafiki]

Did I imply that? I can can make snide comments too, if I choose to.

[color="Blue"]Let's not. Nor should we invite them. Play nice, people [/color]

[pepe4158]

Did they not do it because it was physically impossible, or did they not do it because it would have been a stupid thing to do, even for Hood? This is not a lockstep, every move must exactly follow history situation.

There are cases of gunboats getting attacked by shore forces. There are cases of shore forces getting succesfully attacked by gunboats, something I've been fighting for a realistic solution to for a long time. If you would like to play a game where the navy must stay on one side of the line and never touch the army, and vicy-versy, fine. Please don't make that ahistorical kludgefest out my of my favorite game.

Exactly well said....the problem was practicality where an army crossed, why would you bother to build pontoon bridges, unlimber artillary, and shell gunboats when you could march a few miles either way and cross at a much shallower point....whether it was convient or expedient is the main problems when you look at the historical situation.
In the game the situation might be a must, and purely theoretical, where history had more realistic constraints as to what was needed.

[Brochgale]

Exactly well said....the problem was practicality where an army crossed, why would you bother to build pontoon bridges, unlimber artillary, and shell gunboats when you could march a few miles either way and cross at a much shallower point....whether it was convient or expedient is the main problems when you look at the historical situation.
In the game the situation might be a must, and purely theoretical, where history had more realistic constraints as to what was needed.

You could always ask Burnside why he waited for the Pontoons to arrive at Fredricksburg? When he had other options open to him?

[pepe4158]

Thats actually has been asked....why he wanted to cross in Lees face....n didnt cross at a better point and try flanking Lee...but it was asked in hindsight by the northern pappers as I recal too. (who made him out to be the bungalling idiot he was)

[Brochgale]

Thats actually has been asked....why he wanted to cross in Lees face....n didnt cross at a better point and try flanking Lee...but it was asked in hindsight by the northern pappers as I recal too.

I guess if it had been Bragg on the other side then his battering ram tactic might have worked.

[Fern]

Did I imply that? I can can make snide comments too, if I choose to.

Sorry Jabberwock. I am a Spaniard, so I don't command English. I did not want to sound harsh. I wanted to say just what I said. You, Americans, as a whole, know the history of your Civil War better than us, foreigners. I think it is a hard fact. You have acces to more books, memories etc publishede in the States, than we, Europeans, do. I have the official Atlas of the war (a large book that I bought in New York a few years ago) and some books, but not Sherman's memories and other useful books which may help people to make the game better than it already is.

[Jabberwock]

Then I should be the one apologizing. I invite debate on this issue. I don't know everything.

BTW:
Sherman's Memoirs Vol. 1
Sherman's Memoirs Vol. 2

[Fern]

Exactly well said....the problem was practicality where an army crossed, why would you bother to build pontoon bridges, unlimber artillary, and shell gunboats when you could march a few miles either way and cross at a much shallower point....

It would be right if there was a ford every few miles. What if there was no one a few miles away, but lot of miles away?

Anyway, what was the right reason for chosing the ford? Do you think a general has ever been worried about making their men work in a Pontoon bridge or unlimber their artillery if it makes military sense? Or was it better to avoid the problems originated by the enemy gunboats?

I already asked it. Is there a case of an ACW army crossing a big river in face of enemy gunboats? If so, how many guns had the army, how many gunboats faced it and how was the river (how wide, how shallow etc.)

[Jabberwock]

In all the historical CW instances I can think of where land forces attacked gunboats, the gunboats were the objective, not crossing the river. AFAIK, It was always Confederates. The Union never had to bother.

I don't think it changes the point of the debate, but I'm willing to go along.

[Fern]

Then I should be the one apologizing.

You should not. My sentence sounded really harsh, but, please, be sure it was not my intention to offend you.

I invite debate on this issue. I don't know everything.

No one knows everything, but I am sure we are able to get mucho more info from you, Americans, than from any other people

Btw, thanks for the links

[lycortas]

I think i mentioned something about this pages ago, but infantry crossing at fords is easy. Getting guns, wagons and to a lesser extent horses, is difficult to impossible. In December i would not ford a river in North Virginia because there is a good chance i would die afterwords unless i immediately huddled around a fire.

Also, in December rivers in the central tier states are going to be at high stage. The Potomac doesn't have more than half a dozen fords in the summer, i doubt if in November or April if any of them are usable.

Horses crossing icy water have a fair chance of dying if you ride them hard, or work them hard before letting them warm up and dry off.
Fords, if rocky are going to impede wagons and cavalry and sandy fords will impede wagons.

I seriously doubt if anyone was going to cross at a ford in December '62 in force.

Mike

[Jabberwock]

You could always ask Burnside why he waited for the Pontoons to arrive at Fredricksburg? When he had other options open to him?

A more pointed question. If the Confederates had gunboats on the Rappahanock, could they have gotten anywhere near the pontoons without being blown out of the water?

[pepe4158]

It would be right if there was a ford every few miles. What if there was no one a few miles away, but lot of miles away?

Anyway, what was the right reason for chosing the ford? Do you think a general has ever been worried about making their men work in a Pontoon bridge or unlimber their artillery if it makes military sense? Or was it better to avoid the problems originated by the enemy gunboats?

I already asked it. Is there a case of an ACW army crossing a big river in face of enemy gunboats? If so, how many guns had the army, how many gunboats faced it and how was the river (how wide, how shallow etc.)

Yeah this is really of the cuff, but Burnside didnt want to wait (march up the river and cross) because something about he thought Lee was going to be reinforced more (north always over-estimating southern numbers)
Every arm chair general has asked in hindsight why he didnt cross at an earlier point or counter march back and flank Lee, I dont know the exact distance, but it was certainly was do-able.

No army wanted their back to a river, Mac misses his golden opportunity at Sharpsburg to destroy Lee.....lots of historians conclude because Lee put his back to a river, and there werent even gunboats present.

The question really is is where do you have two armies present and gunboats in the area, and one army needs to cross, off the cuff I just cant think of too many examples other then Jabber's Sherman situation.

Hmm where there were only gunboats present and one army had to cross....not supported possibly by other forces....well off the cuff again I dont think the gunboats stayed, but just a quess.

[Jabberwock]

The Potomac doesn't have more than half a dozen fords in the summer, i doubt if in November or April if any of them are usable.

In general, you're absolutely right, but look up McNeill's raid into Cumberland, MD. Feb '65. Maybe not the perfect example, but it's something I've been researching for other reasons. They may have had access to a sympathizer's house to warm up.

[pepe4158]

A more pointed question. If the Confederates had gunboats on the Rappahanock, could they have gotten anywhere near the pontoons without being blown out of the water?

Lol ...Lee shelled him at every opportunity, every chance he had, but remember Burnside has those big howitizers....that surely would have been quite a match eh?
Also in hindsight Lee was too scared of hitting the town too (something the gentleman Lee would consider unthinkable)
Not to open up another pandoras box....but some things the confederates are allowed to do in the east, the east southern command just wouldnt do, too ungentleman like, but the game mechanics allow it.

[lycortas]

In February the water levels are fairly low, it is the spring thaw in the Appalachians and the fall rains that make the fords unusable.

Boy, i tell you i would not want to ford a river in February! I will have to check up on the raid, but i would guess that there was no direct opposition so they had time to dry the horses and men.

My father always had two or three horses and if i learned one thing it is that horses are more delicate than a human.

Hmm, it could have been 50 or so during the day on a warm day, so if you cross quickly at the warmest part of the day.

It is always my mistake in designing games is that i overcomplicate rules to cover every possible contingency, but it could be interesting to have rules for crossing rivers that take several more factors into account.

Mike

[Jabberwock]

Sorry, edited while you were posting. On the way in they had access to sympathizers. On the way out the pursuit was hours behind, so they probably stopped.

[Fern]

In all the historical CW instances I can think of where land forces attacked gunboats, the gunboats were the objective, not crossing the river. AFAIK, It was always Confederates. The Union never had to bother.

It means that no crossing in face of enemy gunboats is recorded for a sizeable force, doesn't it? If no CSA General dared to cross a big river facing Union Gunboats, then there are only two reason:

1. There was a less dangerous, easier way to do (a downstream or upstream ford), so it did not make sense to try and opposed crossing. Even the aggressive Hood agreed to do it.

2. It was thought that it was too dangerous, so they gave up to try it.

If the CW Generals thought it was too dangerous, so they never attempted it, I don't know why we should allow players to do it, because we must think and act like CW generals. In that case gunboats seems enought deterrent to avoid enemy armies to cross a river. Even a few ones could do it because most of the time the effect was more psychological than real.

A different matter would be to simulate the existing fords.

I think the emplaced artillery attacks to enemy gunboats or the gunboats ones to emplaced artillery are already simulated by emplacing artillery batteries on level 5 entreenchments (IIRC)

[Jabberwock]

Lol ...Lee shelled him at every opportunity, every chance he had, but remember Burnside has those big howitizers....that surely would have been quite a match eh?
Also in hindsight Lee was too scared of hitting the town too (something the gentleman Lee would consider unthinkable)
Not to open up another pandoras box....but some things the confederates are allowed to do in the east, the east southern command just wouldnt do, too ungentleman like, but the game mechanics allow it.

They built the pontoons out of the effective range of Lee's artillery. There were Barksdale's sharpshooters in town, and some Confederate guns at the north end of the line tested the range on two bridges, but mostly they saved their ammo for those brilliant frontal assaults.

[pepe4158]

2. It was thought that it was too dangerous, so they gave up to try it.
If the CW Generals thought it was too dangerous, so they never attempted it, I don't know why we should allow players to do it, because we must think and act like CW generals. In that case gunboats seems enought deterrent to avoid enemy armies to cross a river. Even a few ones could do it because most of the time the effect was more psychological than real.

(IIRC)

A very good point, but off the cuff again I just dont think that was the case. More of a case of the gunboats actually leaving in the face of an army, when not supported by their own forces.

[pepe4158]

They built the pontoons out of the effective range of Lee's artillery. There were Barksdale's sharpshooters in town, and some Confederate guns at the north end of the line tested the range on two bridges, but mostly they saved their ammo for those brilliant frontal assaults.

Lol....but didnt Stuart run down n try to shell them once I thought...lol brillant assault lol
Point being that might simulate (well crudely a southern gunboat) Stuarts concern would be those big Howitzers that Burnside has positioned which would be problamatic too.

[Jabberwock]

It means that no crossing in face of enemy gunboats is recorded for a sizeable force, doesn't it? If no CSA General dared to cross a big river facing Union Gunboats, then there are only two reason:

1. There was a less dangerous, easier way to do (a downstream or upstream ford), so it did not make sense to try and opposed crossing. Even the aggressive Hood agreed to do it.

But that is not how the game simulates it if gunboats physically prevent crossing large stretches of river for substantial periods of time.

2. It was thought that it was too dangerous, so they gave up to try it.

If the CW Generals thought it was too dangerous, so they never attempted it, I don't know why we should allow players to do it, because we must think and act like CW generals. In that case gunboats seems enought deterrent to avoid enemy armies to cross a river. Even a few ones could do it because most of the time the effect was more psychological than real.

And my point is that gunboats wouldn't stop them. They would've stopped themselves. A gunboat cannot physically prevent an army from attempting to cross a river unless it can beach itself on the only path leading to the only possible ford. Even in that case, it wouldn't have delayed them long, they would have broken it up and crossed as soon as they finished jumping up and down on the pieces. It is the guns of the gunboat, combined with its superior maneuverability in the river, that make it a deterrent.

I think the emplaced artillery attacks to enemy gunboats or the gunboats ones to emplaced artillery are already simulated by emplacing artillery batteries on level 5 entreenchments (IIRC)

Yes, but how often did an army that had determined to cross a river when not directly opposed by other land forces, wait three months or more in one place in order to do it?