"Realistic Attrition"

[Gray_Lensman]

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[lodilefty]

I'm still thinking that there's a 'more benign' opportunity here by adjusting the frequency of mud/snow/blizzard/frozen in the 'weather regions', rather than adjusting the effects.

[runyan99]

I don't see a problem with mud. Movement in clear weather seems to be the issue here.

[Clovis]

I think movement in any terrain with any weather to be slighty too slow currently.

[Gray_Lensman]

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[Gray_Lensman]

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[Jagger]

I bring this to light to show that it did not take weeks of rain to cause MUD to have a major impact as presupposed earlier in this thread. Don't misunderstand this to be any sort of opposition to finding a better solution to the "attrition" effects, but rather a validation of my earlier point about MUD (even the amount caused by normal rain) being a major movement inhibitor in the Civil War.

I believe you are still missing my point.

Yes, mud has a significant impact on marching armies. However the point is whether an entire 15 day turn is affected by mud conditions. Only prolonged and heavy rain will result in bad mud conditions for an entire 15 day turn.

Prolonged and heavy rain producing mud conditions for a full 15 day turn is not common. Yet mud conditions are extremely common within the game dependent on the time of year. Since mud is such a common game condition and enough rain to produce 15 days worth of mud conditions is so rare, then mud cannot represent 15 days of poor mud conditions. Mud must represent poor marching conditions for only a few days of the 15 day turn considering the widespread occurance of mud within the game.

Not to say that rain doesn't occur over an extended time frame with a stalled front. But we only have one mud condition in the game. And it can't be heavy mud for an extended time frame considering how common mud conditions are in the game.

So now, how does 2 or 3 or 4 days of poor mud marching conditions plus 11 to 13 days of good marching compare to a full 15 days of snow, frozen or blizzard conditions in terms of marching? I believe 15 days of cold with snow on the ground will have more impact on a marching formation than 3 days of heavy rain followed by 12 days sun and no rain.

One day of marching in heavy mud will bog down an army more than one day of marching in snow. But we have to consider a 15 day period rather than a single day.

[runyan99]

*shrug*

If the game is currently skewed towards 'heavy rain', your proposed solution is equally skewed towards 'light rain'. Since we only have one mud state, it has to be one or the other.

Looks like a design decision to me. I don't have any problem with the way AGEOD went here.

[bigus]

I actually agree with Jagger that the application of attrition to movement in the game is rather overhanded at the moment, but basically, by taking away just the penalties for MUD movement to correct for this and not balancing it with a proportional change in Frozen, Snow, conditions a new ahistoric imbalanced condition has been installed in the attempt to eliminate the first one.

I agree with this. If your going to change the movement by a percentage in clear terrain then change everything else by the same percentage.
Then play with the percentages until the correct movement-(attrition/cohesion) losses are found.

IMHO Jagger is on to something good here. I think the attrition/cohesion losses are O.K but the movement rates need to be adjusted.

bigus

[Jagger]

I actually agree with Jagger that the application of attrition to movement in the game is rather overhanded at the moment, but basically, by taking away just the penalties for MUD movement to correct for this and not balancing it with a proportional change in Frozen, Snow, conditions a new ahistoric imbalanced condition has been installed in the attempt to eliminate the first one.

Bigus, I am glad you pointed out this paragraph. I had meant to respond but had forgot.

This statement is reaching a definitive conclusion, "a new ahistoric imbalanced condition has been installed ", based on several weak or incorrect assumptions.

First is the assumption that the initial proportions were correct in the first place. I don't agree and my previous arguments explain why.

Second is the assumption that a proportional change to snow and mud will produce a correct result. If the proportions were not correct in the first place, a proportional change is not going to improve the results.

Third is the assumption that "a new ahistoric imbalanced condition has been installed" within the mod. This assumption is only correct if the previous unsupported assumptions are correct which is highly doubtful in my mind. I have yet to see a substantive argument to the key concepts behind the new movement costs used. So I would disagree strongly with the unsupported conclusion that "a new ahistoric imbalanced condition has been installed".

Grey if your tests are demonstrating ahistorical results, please bring them up. Some concrete examples would help.

Personally, my tests are suggesting cavalry may be a bit too active in clear conditions and may need some tweaking upwards of movement costs. But infantry/ artillery/ supply trains are working well in clear and better than the previous numbers. Mud is better for all troop types but again, I am watching cavalry closely.

So troops continue campaigning in mud although at a substantive increase in costs vs clear conditions. Troops have great problems campaigning in snow or frozen conditions such that I only do it if there is a compelling reason. Just like history.

[runyan99]

Attrittion, cohesion, mud, snow, clear, infantry, artillery, cavalry, weather modeling. There are too many variables at play in this discussion.

[LMUBill]

Just to throw in my 2 cents worth about mud....

Having ridden and driven on many dirt roads in national forests/parks/wildlife management areas around here that have little or no maintenance (like would have been during the war) including one that was used by Braggs troops after Perryville, I agree that a heavy rain and heavy usage can churn up a road pretty quickly. What I haven't seen mentioned here is how LONG it takes for those kind of roads to dry. I can show you some roads here that get heavy 4-wheeler use and some sections are almost NEVER dried out, usually becasue the churning up of the road creates deep puddles. Then people try to go around the puddles which churns up more of the road and so on.

So you could have large areas of muddy road with only one or two periods of heavy rain, or a lot of days with your typical summer afternoon showers.

[Jagger]

Attrittion, cohesion, mud, snow, clear, infantry, artillery, cavalry, weather modeling. There are too many variables at play in this discussion.

Hehe...I agree.

The AGEOD engine is very, very good because so many factors are modeled in a logical manner. And we can tweak and mod extensively.

As players, AGeod is depending on us to report any inconsistencies or abnormalities which we can spot as we put in the hours playing the game. It is very difficult with such a complex product to devote the time to find oddities with such a small team especially as all the new features are added to the game. But many players do exactly that.

And the end result is a constantly evolving product continuously improving as we provide feedback and the engine is tweaked to work with new features.

It is great!

[berto]

So far, I've conducted limited tests of Bragg's 1862 Kentucky Campaign. I've begun tests of the Gettysburg Campaign. If I can find the time time, I will test Lyon's 1861 Missouri campaign also.

Aside from Sherman's March to the Sea, and subsequent march northward through the Carolinas, can players cite other historical exceptionally fast infantry marches?

Off the top of my head, I can think of several more:

--Hood's 1864 Franklin Campaign.
--Early's 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign.
--Jackson's 1862 Valley Campaign.

Speculation and debate are great, but prove nothing. Actual testing is needed.

[Jabberwock]

Rosecrans march to Chattanooga ... once he finally got started.

Jackson's march to 2nd Manassas.

Sherman's march through the Carolinas wasn't all that fast, it was just remarkably fast for the weather and terrain conditions.

[lodilefty]

AP Hill from Harper's Ferry to Antietam.

[berto]

AP Hill from Harper's Ferry to Antietam.

I was thinking more of large-scale corps or army marches over several regions lasting a month or longer--situations that would make for interesting in-game tests.

[lodilefty]

I was thinking more of large-scale corps or army marches over several regions lasting a month or longer--situations that would make for interesting in-game tests.

OK, but it would be interesting to see if an independant division could move a region or two that quickly [but you're right: it was actually more like a 'Division sized' march to the guns event.....]

[berto]

Sherman's march through the Carolinas wasn't all that fast, it was just remarkably fast for the weather and terrain conditions.

From Foote's The Civil War, volume 3, p. 836:

Fifty days out of Savannah, ten of which he had had his troops devote to halts for rest or intensive destruction, he had covered well over four hundred miles of rough terrain in wretched weather, crossing rivers and plunging full-tilt through "impenetrable" swaps, ... what he [Sherman] called "one of the longest and most important marches ever made by an organized army in a civilized country."

Four hundred miles in fifty days--that's remarkably fast under any weather or terrain conditions.

Along the way, Sherman's army fought the engagements of Kinston, Averasboro, and Bentonville, and still had not suffered cohesion and attrition loss to the point of nothingness. On the contrary, his army (albeit reinforced by Schofield's command up from Wilmington) was in fine shape to confront Johnston and help close out the Confederacy.

What are we to make of this outlier?!

[runyan99]

Four hundred miles in fifty days--that's remarkably fast under any weather or terrain conditions.

8 miles a day seems well within the normal 'cruising speed' of most civil war marches. The only thing extraordinary here is that they kept it up for so long, with less than 10 days of rest.

Game translation - low cohesion loss for veteran troops, or Sherman in particular.

[Clovis]

8 miles a day seems well within the normal 'cruising speed' of most civil war marches. The only thing extraordinary here is that they kept it up for so long, with less than 10 days of rest.

Game translation - low cohesion loss for veteran troops, or Sherman in particular.

From Atlanta to Savannah the rate was around 15 miles a day ( source Hagerman The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command, from Osterhaus reports).

Sherman reduced drastically 2 things essentially: supply carts and... artillery. Indeed the ratio gun/men was 2 for 1,000, rather than 4 as it was practiced in the first years of this war) and it seems Sherman 's artillery didn't had any heavy gun, like siege artillery.

The difference in speed between the march to savannah and the latter comes from weather and terrain conditions.

On the contrary, Grant's march between Henry and Donelson in winter 62 with rather untried troops: 20 miles in seven days...

[berto]

Following the route that Sherman took, one passes through at least ten regions from Savannah, GA to Goldsboro, NC. How can any in-game infantry force achieve that in fifty days, even in the best of weather, and even with clear terrain all the way (note the marshy regions north of Savannah and the many rivers that Sherman had to cross)?

[berto]

I have been running some in-game tests, attempting to achieve Lee's fast rates of march in the Gettysburg Campaign.

In the Real Game, Lee's forces left the Culpeper, VA area in early June and fought the Battle Gettysburg in early July. It took Lee & co. about a month (in fair weather) to march to Gettysburg, and arrive there in as fine a shape as the ANV ever was to fight a major battle.

Unfortunately, the AACW Gettysburg scenario does not begin in early June, with Lee's forces around Culpeper, VA. Instead, the Gettysburg scenario begins with Lee poised to the west, north, and east of Gettysburg. In a second-best, reverse simulation, I am attempting to fast march southward from the Gettysburg vicinity back to Culpeper, VA.

I am making sure that it's fair weather all the way, and that all forces are in Passive Posture.

Results: Lee and Longstreet are able to reach Culpeper in 32 days, with little or no cohesion loss, and zero attrition. In line with historical performance, so far, so good.

But A.P. Hill is taking 47 days to reach Culpeper. His cohesion is down by almost half. Ewell, beginning at Cumberland, PA, eight days east of Lee & co.'s starting region at Franklin, PA, is taking 55 days to reach Culpeper. His forces are also nearing 50% cohesion.

A big problem with A.P. Hill and Ewell is that they suffer from inactivation, and can't keep up with Lee & Longstreet. (Hill does when synchronized moving with Lee, however.)

My preliminary conclusions from these tests are that, here too in the Gettysburg scenario, it is difficult to impossible to achieve historical rates of march and cohesion.

[Jabberwock]

Game translation - low cohesion loss for veteran
troops, or Sherman in particular.

I agree with both. Also:

1. A stack's impact on military control should be applied on a day-to-day rather than a turn-to-turn basis. I think that is already how it is done (but I don't know). Sherman's large armies were marching virtually unopposed, gaining military control very rapidly, not losing cohesion to marching through enemy territory.

2. NM should also have a big impact on cohesion loss while marching.

3. Pontooneers/pioneers should continue to speed any stacks in any wet conditions. There are too many pontooneer units in the game, artificially lowering marching times for too many stacks. If most were removed, and average marching speed increased, it would go a long way towards explaining this particular kind of outlier i.e. Sherman had the pontooners/pioneers available to speed his march, but others didn't.

4. The more I think about it, the more the proposed unforced-march special order sounds like a good idea; the one where a stack automatically stops if cohesion drops below a certain average level, and starts again if cohesion rises above a certain average level. Since Sherman's troops weren't losing much cohesion, they didn't have to rest much.

[Walloc]

I have been running some in-game tests, attempting to achieve Lee's fast rates of march in the Gettysburg Campaign.

In the Real Game, Lee's forces left the Culpeper, VA area in early June and fought the Battle Gettysburg in early July. It took Lee & co. about a month (in fair weather) to march to Gettysburg, and arrive there in as fine a shape as the ANV ever was to fight a major battle.

Unfortunately, the AACW Gettysburg scenario does not begin in early June, with Lee's forces around Culpeper, VA. Instead, the Gettysburg scenario begins with Lee poised to the west, north, and east of Gettysburg. In a second-best, reverse simulation, I am attempting to fast march southward from the Gettysburg vicinity back to Culpeper, VA.

I am making sure that it's fair weather all the way, and that all forces are in Passive Posture.

Results: Lee and Longstreet are able to reach Culpeper in 32 days, with little or no cohesion loss, and zero attrition. In line with historical performance, so far, so good.

But A.P. Hill is taking 47 days to reach Culpeper. His cohesion is down by almost half. Ewell, beginning at Cumberland, PA, eight days east of Lee & co.'s starting region at Franklin, PA, is taking 55 days to reach Culpeper. His forces are also nearing 50% cohesion.

A big problem with A.P. Hill and Ewell is that they suffer from inactivation, and can't keep up with Lee & Longstreet. (Hill does when synchronized moving with Lee, however.)

My preliminary conclusions from these tests are that, here too in the Gettysburg scenario, it is difficult to impossible to achieve historical rates of march and cohesion.

Arent u saying if u inactive u cant do it and if u active u can?

The primer being activated. Would u have started such an adventure it u werent activated. Yes, u could discuss if activation is to hard, but thats another discussion.
Ur point as i understand it, is u cant do the march, which u show u can. It just requries u being active. I dont think that is an unreasonble expectation for an long rang invasion, IMO.
Also in translating what happend in RL translating the actions into game terms. They moved when wanted. Wasnt any of the unexpected events that would suggest they by game terms was unactivated, IMO.


Kind regards,

Rasmus

[berto]

Arent u saying if u inactive u cant do it and if u active u can?

Aren't you implying therefore that we can forget about emulating historical invasions like the Gettysburg Campaign, the 1862 Maryland Campaign, Bragg's 1862 Kentucky Campaign, etc., because any step along the way one or more of the subordinate commands might become inactive?

Are we to suppose that AACW is the true historical standard, that the Real Game was just, one after another, a series of improbable outliers?

[Jabberwock]

Four hundred miles in fifty days--that's remarkably fast under any weather or terrain conditions.

Ten miles per marching day, marching almost unopposed. Nothing to get excited about, until you look at the geography and weather.

Along the way, Sherman's army fought the engagements of Kinston, Averasboro, and Bentonville, and still had not suffered cohesion and attrition loss to the point of nothingness. On the contrary, his army (albeit reinforced by Schofield's command up from Wilmington) was in fine shape to confront Johnston and help close out the Confederacy.

Schofield fought Kinston. Only had to march from Wilmington. (about 85 miles)

Averasboro & Bentonville weren't exactly along the way, they were the confront/close out.

[berto]

Ten miles per marching day, marching almost unnopposed. Nothing to get excited about, until you look at the geography and weather.

Or until you look at the historical record. How many campaigns had large-scale forces marching that far that "fast" for so long?

[Jabberwock]

Or until you look at the historical record. How many campaigns had large-scale forces marching that far that "fast" for so long?

I agree, not many. It was a remarkable achievement. Just trying to analyze it for what it was, without going overboard.

So, do we call it an outlier and ignore it, or do we continue to look for explanations and translation to game terms? I think posts 110 & 114 have some pretty good game translations.

EDIT: Considering the concurrent discussion about activation, Sherman as a *** should have a durned high strat rating, that he passes down to subordinates. Slocum, although solid, had a prior reputation for hesitating. Howard & Schofield were also solid, but no military marching geniuses. It was the Sherman effect, right down the command chain.

[Franciscus]

Aren't you implying therefore that we can forget about emulating historical invasions like the Gettysburg Campaign, the 1862 Maryland Campaign, Bragg's 1862 Kentucky Campaign, etc., because any step along the way one or more of the subordinate commands might become inactive?

Are we to suppose that AACW is the true historical standard, that the Real Game was just, one after another, a series of improbable outliers?

Maybe one solution to your "historical realism" quest is to just play with activation rule turned off (beautiful, isn't it, to have such an array of options ? And yes, we can use them )
I must confess that to me this is no big problem. Now, if just the AI could build proper armies...