"Realistic Attrition"

[runyan99]

85 and Above : Very efficient and High morale force
70 to 85 : Efficient and good morale force
55 to 70 : Average quality and morale
40 to 55 : Tired/Worn force, mediocre efficiency in battle, likely to rout if attacking a strong force, needs some rest, still able to put up a good fight on defensive conditions.
25 to 40 : Badly shaken force, needs to rest behind the frontline, could not withstand any strong fight
25 and below : This force is a mess, one determined attack and it will desintegrate, not in combat condition at all.

Except for the worse kind of campaign in the Russian winter, movement alone should not be able to drop a force below 40. The process should be slower, forces should drop pretty fast to around 50 and stabilize there somewhat, only campaigning combined with actual battle damage should bring it below 40... except supply problems of course.

I think you are overemphasising the morale component of the cohesion factor. There is a morale component, because high NM can raise maximum cohesion, but cohesion mostly represents the physical condition of the force. Are the men all in the right places and rested, or are they tired hungry and spread out for miles on the roads?

[Clovis]

I thought cohesion loss/recovery was the simulation of stragglers lost/recovered. Attrition is losses due to disease, desertion, etc. and they don't rejoin the units.

Sorry to disagree but stragglers are "hit points" who leave and come back. Cohesion level is for me more a way to simulate tireness and disorder in an unit which have had to make a great effort before the battle, like a march.

[Walloc]

To be honest I think the problem here isn't the number of men lost but the Cohesion loss.

When a fresh, rested division of 9000 starts campaigning, it doesn't strike me as abnormal that it should fairly quickly go down to 7500 men or so, but what I find and have always found excessive in this game is the way the cohesion factor is handled.

when a division goes from 75 cohesion to 15, this to me indicates a routed demoralised rabble of a force on the verge of surrender, ie Appomatox or Prussians after Iena, not a force that is a bit worn down by campaigning...

the loss of cohesion due to move should be far slower, If the division had gone from 9000/75 to 8400/69 and 7800/60 in those two turns I would have said brilliant, but from 9000/75 to 6000/15 in two turns without a fight this is ludicrous.

The cohesion parameter is fantastic, plays and should play a central role in the way the game is played, but its changes are way wacky sometimes... A grid should be :

85 and Above : Very efficient and High morale force
70 to 85 : Efficient and good morale force
55 to 70 : Average quality and morale
40 to 55 : Tired/Worn force, mediocre efficiency in battle, likely to rout if attacking a strong force, needs some rest, still able to put up a good fight on defensive conditions.
25 to 40 : Badly shaken force, needs to rest behind the frontline, could not withstand any strong fight
25 and below : This force is a mess, one determined attack and it will desintegrate, not in combat condition at all.

Except for the worse kind of campaign in the Russian winter, movement alone should not be able to drop a force below 40. The process should be slower, forces should drop pretty fast to around 50 and stabilize there somewhat, only campaigning combined with actual battle damage should bring it below 40... except supply problems of course.

I would have to agree with Runayn, but it seems cohesion is much more than just moral. Both quality, attritional issues are blended into cohesion. In NCP some units start with a base of 40-50 in cohesion.

I like ur idea, but as i see it, it would require splitting cohesion up into more seperate factors. 1 for battle moral where ur suggestions as i see would work perfectly.
A actual quality factor and last but not leased an attritional factor.
If not in the case of the latter the system as is would penalize units with high cohesion as they can lose more cohesion than lower. Giving them more attritional casulties than lower based cohesional units. The opposite of how think it should work.

/On historical blabber u can skip

All the date from Nappy age goes to show if exclusing battles, and right after which i more see represented in game by retreat casulties that the number attrition, is much more a factor of quality of the troops. Naturally extrem weather plays a huge part.
If u look at both the spring and fall campaigns in 1813 and into 1814 the attritional losses in %'s of the army for the french army, those are higher in 1813 on average per day than 1812. Yes, thats right.
Thats not to say that the attritional losses wasnt catastofical in 1812 and more so than in 1813, but thats cuz the campaign lasted longer and the last remaining men certainly fell to the dead of winter. The death jolt sorta speak.
In the comparibly short amount of time of the 1813 fall campaign, u had 7 french corps exiting with 0% strength. Excluding the 3 which was surrounded in garrisons and eventually "surrender" and was 100% "casulties" too. The overall casulty rate being 83% for all french forces, including surrendered garrisons.

1813 while it rained alot in the fall of 1813, compared to 1812 u have to discount as the weather factor in 1813. So extrem weather cant be said to be the major factor in 1813, so why are the attrition higher.
What is markedly different is the quality of troops and the in general lack of food through out 1813, where as it was more concetrated to same extend in the latter part of 1812.
Like wise if u compare prussian landwehr to prussian line or reserve units in 183. The landwehr units being of much inferior quality training, as well as "human" quality. Older and so on. U see the same numbers show up. Only around 10% of prussian landwehr made it to the Rhine while the number for line and reserve where many times that. Again suggesting that quality is the major factor.
My point being that lower quality troops is a huge factor in the actual attrition losses, but far from the only one.

/Off historical blabber u can skip

Kind regards,

Rasmus

[runyan99]

Stragglers would always rejoin their units within a day or two, so I would simulate that loss of combat power via cohesion. They are combat ineffective temporarily, but not leaving the unit. I would reserve attrition losses for guys who get sick or desert, and ain't coming back.

[lodilefty]

Stragglers would always rejoin their units within a day or two, so I would simulate that loss of combat power via cohesion. They are combat ineffective temporarily, but not leaving the unit. I would reserve attrition losses for guys who get sick or desert, and ain't coming back.

+1

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[berto]

To be honest I think the problem here isn't the number of men lost but the Cohesion loss.

I think I agree.

In Real Life, Braxton Bragg left Chattanooga on August 27, 1862, marched the Army of Mississippi to central Kentucky, arriving there in early October. This was in fair weather, ~200 miles through Tennessee's Cumberland Mountains, then through the southern Kentucky hills. On October 8, Bragg's army fought to a tactical victory a Union force (Buell's Army of the Ohio) more than twice its size at the Battle of Perryville. I am not aware that the Army of Mississippi fought the major engagement of Perryville in much if any less than fine shape.

Using bigus' Kentucky scenario (a battle scenario and work-in-progress, but reflective of general game mechanics nonetheless):

In AACW, departing from Chattanooga the second half of August (i.e., as early as August 16), and marching through mountainous and hilly regions, in fair weather, passive posture, retreat if engaged, the fastest that Hardee's Corps of the Army of Mississippi can reach the Perryville vicinity, the Mercer, KY region, is late October--i.e., one to two weeks after the historical Battle of Perryville. Due to inactivations, Polk's Corps is somewhat late, reaching Perryville only by early November--i.e., about a month after historical Perryville.

In general, the fastest that Bragg's force can march the ~200 miles from Chattanooga to central Kentucky takes about one month longer than what happened in Real Life (in both cases in fair weather conditions).

The cohesion figures for the Army of Mississippi:

In the Perryville area, Mercer, KY, Late October:

--Army of Mississippi: 35/78
--Anderson's Division, Hardee's Corps: 18/92
--Buckner's Division, Hardee's Corps: 14/82

A region short of Perryville, Marion, KY:

--Cheatham's Division, Polk's Corps: 43/94
--Withers' Division, Polk's Corps: 46/96

In the Perryville area, Mercer, KY, early November (one month later than historical Perryville; Hardee's Corps resting in Mercer, KY for two weeks, Polk's Corps marching just four days into Mercer in early November):

--Army of Mississippi: 39/78
--Anderson's Division, Hardee's Corps: 24/92
--Buckner's Division, Hardee's Corps: 21/82
--Cheatham's Division, Polk's Corps: 56/94
--Withers' Division, Polk's Corps: 56/96

Even allowing for the several weeks added time that the game Army of Mississippi is reaching central Kentucky, are those cohesion figures reflective of the historical Army of Mississippi, victorious at Perryville?

(Attrition is evident for all forces, but doesn't seem to be too badly out of whack.)

I have tried running through this scenario several times before, and although I didn't scrutinize force posture, weather, etc. every step of the way, the cohesion figures as I recall them are similar to my latest test. (In all earlier tests, the fastest Bragg can reach the Perryville area is likewise late October to early November.)

(Although I was not as experienced at the time, in my January testing of bigus' Trans Mississippi scenario, I tried to recreate Lyon's march across Missouri to the battle of Wilson's Creek (southwestern Missouri) at historical rates of march. My recollection is that the Lyon force reached southwest Missouri "late" and also with extreme cohesion loss.)

Doesn't cohesion loss seem to be quite too high?

[runyan99]

Doesn't cohesion loss seem to be quite too high?

You make a compelling case. If a historical march in good weather like this cannot be recreated in the game, then yes, it appears the marching speeds are a bit too slow and the cohesion loss is too high.

[Clovis]

Stragglers would always rejoin their units within a day or two, so I would simulate that loss of combat power via cohesion. They are combat ineffective temporarily, but not leaving the unit. I would reserve attrition losses for guys who get sick or desert, and ain't coming back.

Sorry to disagree, but there 2 problems here:

1) representing stragglers by cohesion loss isn't the real mechanism the new option uses: stragglers are now represented by step losses. I was myself against such an implementation and I would have prefered to keep a system based on cohesion loss which is simpler and in some ways more accurate than the ever creating new bugs search of more details seen like the parangon of realism.

2) desertion wasn't made of guys departing because of a too long march or bad weather. Desertion was tied to morale and a large part of desertions occured with unmobile armies. It could be simulated but the problem we have to face is to find the right percentage losses an army must suffer on movement with the new options, ie deserters and stragglers...

[Clovis]

I think I agree.

In Real Life, Braxton Bragg left Chattanooga on August 27, 1862, marched the Army of Mississippi to central Kentucky, arriving there in early October. This was in fair weather, ~200 miles through Tennessee's Cumberland Mountains, then through the southern Kentucky hills. On October 8, Bragg's army fought to a tactical victory a Union force (Buell's Army of the Ohio) more than twice its size at the Battle of Perryville. I am not aware that the Army of Mississippi fought the major engagement of Perryville in much if any less than fine shape.

Using bigus' Kentucky scenario (a battle scenario and work-in-progress, but reflective of general game mechanics nonetheless):

In AACW, departing from Chattanooga the second half of August (i.e., as early as August 16), and marching through mountainous and hilly regions, in fair weather, passive posture, retreat if engaged, the fastest that Hardee's Corps of the Army of Mississippi can reach the Perryville vicinity, the Mercer, KY region, is late October--i.e., one to two weeks after the historical Battle of Perryville. Due to inactivations, Polk's Corps is somewhat late, reaching Perryville only by early November--i.e., about a month after historical Perryville.

In general, the fastest that Bragg's force can march the ~200 miles from Chattanooga to central Kentucky takes about one month longer than what happened in Real Life (in both cases in fair weather conditions).

The cohesion figures for the Army of Mississippi:

In the Perryville area, Mercer, KY, Late October:

--Army of Tennessee: 35/78
--Anderson's Division, Hardee's Corps: 18/92
--Buckner's Division, Hardee's Corps: 14/82

A region short of Perryville, Marion, KY:

--Cheatham's Division, Polk's Corps: 43/94
--Withers' Division, Polk's Corps: 46/96

In the Perryville area, Mercer, KY, early November (one month later than historical Perryville; Hardee's Corps resting in Mercer, KY for two weeks, Polk's Corps marching just four days into Mercer in early November):

--Army of Tennessee: 39/78
--Anderson's Division, Hardee's Corps: 24/92
--Buckner's Division, Hardee's Corps: 21/82
--Cheatham's Division, Polk's Corps: 56/94
--Withers' Division, Polk's Corps: 56/96

Even allowing for the several weeks added time that the game Army of Mississippi is reaching central Kentucky, are those cohesion figures reflective of the historical Army of Mississippi, victorious at Perryville?

(Attrition is evident for all forces, but doesn't seem to be too badly out of whack.)

I have tried running through this scenario several times before, and although I didn't scrutinize force posture, weather, etc. every step of the way, the cohesion figures as I recall them are similar to my latest test. (In all earlier tests, the fastest Bragg can reach the Perryville area is likewise late October to early November.)

(Although I was not as experienced at the time, in my January testing of bigus' Trans Mississippi scenario, I tried to recreate Lyon's march across Missouri to the battle of Wilson's Creek (southwestern Missouri) at historical rates of march. My recollection is that the Lyon force reached southwest Missouri "late" and also with extreme cohesion loss.)

Doesn't cohesion loss seem to be quite too high?

I agree. I remember cohesion losses in regions where enemy loyalty was high was upped in a patch in order to restrain the long range cavalry raids. Unfortunatly, such a system should take into computation the size of the unit: a small group should lose more cohesion than a large army in such a condition. As the more an unit loses cohesion the slower it becomes, its speed is now inferior to real standards.

A temporary solution could be to raise the speed level of all units and lower the cohmove value to compensate in the model files. I will try by raising and lowering by 20%

[Green Howard]

If you want some idea of what the pre-World War One U.S.Army Staff College was teaching its cadets, try -

www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/archival/lectures.asp

Under "Miscellaneous",
"The Army On The March"

[berto]

On second thought, I must also observe:

After Perryville, Bragg marched his Army of Mississippi 250+ miles over mountains and hills through increasingly bad weather during the months of October-December to central Tennessee. December 31, 1862 to January 2, 1863, Bragg's (renamed) Army of Tennessee tactically won the Battle of Murfreesboro (aka Stones River), one of the major battles of the Civil War.

So, from late August through the end of December, 1862, a little over four months time, Bragg marched his forces 450+ miles over mountains and hills, initially in fair weather then increasingly wintry weather, and fought two major engagements (Perryville, Murfreesboro), both to tactical victory.

In AACW, continuing my experiment, I've tried to recreate Bragg's retreat march from Perryville, on the way to Murfreesboro. My experiment is ending late December, with forces not even halfway to their Murfreesboro destination--because Polk's Corps has essentially attritted away to nothing, Hardee's Corps has nearly attritted away to nothing, and has cohesion of <10%. (I am playing on historical attrition (the middle option).) And this is with no fighting at all along the way.

My conclusion, based on this one limited test, but also on my general impressions of the game so far:

--Rates of march are too slow.
--Cohesion loss rates are way too high.
--Attrition rates are also (probably) way too high.

[veji1]

I think you are overemphasising the morale component of the cohesion factor. There is a morale component, because high NM can raise maximum cohesion, but cohesion mostly represents the physical condition of the force. Are the men all in the right places and rested, or are they tired hungry and spread out for miles on the roads?

Well I used the word morale but what I mean by cohesion is the general battle readyness of a force.

2 factors affect directly how an element will perform during battle : his specific characteristics (elite infantry has better stats than regular line) and his cohesion (battle readiness).

I think cohesion should better emulate that : a force that marches with enough supplies will lose some cohesion, but not too much, and will certainly stabilise around a satisfying level (say 50-60). It needs to suffer battle damage or supply issues to become less battle ready.

That's what I meant by my scale.

[runyan99]

I agree. I remember cohesion losses in regions where enemy loyalty was high was upped in a patch in order to restrain the long range cavalry raids. Unfortunatly, such a system should take into computation the size of the unit: a small group should lose more cohesion than a large army in such a condition.

I don't think size should be the factor, but instead the fragility of cavalry units. Deep cavalry raids were difficult because the horses needed a lot of care, and keeping them on the move for 2 or 3 days straight of rapid movement would quickly break down the horses. I recall that Stuart's ride around McClellan's army was only a few days long, but his force was totally fagged out by the end of it.

It seems to me that cavalry can move fast but should lose cohesion quickly, while infantry moves slower but should lose cohesion more gradually. I think that would best capture the difference between the two arms.

[Clovis]

I don't think size should be the factor, but instead the fragility of cavalry units. Deep cavalry raids were difficult because the horses needed a lot of care, and keeping them on the move for 2 or 3 days straight of rapid movement would quickly break down the horses. I recall that Stuart's ride around McClellan's army was only a few days long, but his force was totally fagged out by the end of it.

It seems to me that cavalry can move fast but should lose cohesion quickly, while infantry moves slower but should lose cohesion more gradually. I think that would best capture the difference between the two arms.

The AACW 15 days turns has to be considered here: acavalry raids to be useful must last 2 turns at minimum to be productive ( rail destruction or other action...) If cavalry loses fast his cohesion, it will become a slow moving fgorce easily catched by enemy...

So we need to get a rule maybe unhistorical in essence but giving historical outcome...

[Walloc]

Interesting results of ur tests Berto.

As a having been part of designing rules before i would like make one observation.
I usually call it the 90% vs 10% rule.
Lets say some thing happens 10% of the time, but the other 90% it happens differently.

If u base the design on what is possible and every one agrees can happen, but only happen the 10% of the time, players will make it happen near 100% of the time.
That throws of historical balance too. So one has to "isolate" the 10% and make sure that, not that it cant happen but that it doesnt always happens.
At leased that my design philosophy.

What i mean in this particular case. If speed is raised generally u will, testing would have to show this, might have a situasion where the games goes way to fast cuz troops moves to fast, generally.

An example during the 1805 campaign Davout marches his corps 55km per day over several days with out much rest.
If u use that example to base ur march speed u will end up with armies that march in generally aka the 90% of time much much to fast.

If u remove examples which certainly did happen that the french out marched the allied by far in the early periode of NCP. The general for all armies also for french later on and in many cases in the early periode, operational march speed is much close to 15-20-25km per day. This would be the 90% category.

Now we all agree Davouts marches happend how do we deal with this. If we make it possible armies for to march 55km per day players will use it. So the campaigns will unfold way to fast.
If u dont make it happen players validly complain i cant make X do what he did at X time.

My concern here is whether Braggs marches are in the 10% category or the 90% category. I very much suspect the 10%, considering that it was rare, but no unheard off of armies marching far from its base of operations and at that pace. The march to the sea and the late CSA forray from the Shennandoah valley in '64 being other examples. So it clearly happens, but if its made possible to happen generally it will be used all the time, and campaigns might get unbalanced.

One brilliant thing about the engine is the use abilites IMO. It can make the 10% thing happen with out it being generally availble.
What if Bragg had, had the very fast mover ability instead. As some thing would suggest he had in this case. Wouldnt that make his marches possible in alotted time and with fewer casulties as there might even have been time to rest and simply by making the march go faster. With out making it generally avaible.
By logic of that argument Polk should have had it too, question is whether or not in game terms he should be considered having been in Braggs army and benefitted for his fast paced march.

As far as i remember Bragg makes 2 long range advances into KY so some thing would suggest he could use abilties to show that. Possibly also the forage ability like Sherman to cut down on attrition too lack of food, as Sherman is given to make march to the sea possible.

At leased I think its worth considering and esablishing if the historical situasion is a 10% or a 90% situasion.


Kind regards,

Rasmus

[runyan99]

The AACW 15 days turns has to be considered here: acavalry raids to be useful must last 2 turns at minimum to be productive ( rail destruction or other action...) If cavalry loses fast his cohesion, it will become a slow moving fgorce easily catched by enemy...

So we need to get a rule maybe unhistorical in essence but giving historical outcome...

Based on the discussion so far, and berto's observations, I would simply leave cohesion loss for cavalry as-is, but decrease cohesion loss for marching infantry.

[berto]

Rasmus,

Your 90-10 observation is a good one.

But, Buell left Nashville September 7, raced northward to Louisville, then turned back south to engage Bragg at Perryville on October 8--that is, also nearly 200 miles in about a month's time. Buell hardly has the reputation of being a "fast mover", far from it.

Looking then at the recreation of Bragg's attempted indirect march southeast to Knoxville, thence to Chattanooga, finally to Murfreesboro--given that by the end of 1862, the historical date of the Battle of Murfreesboro, not only has Bragg not yet made it half way (not even yet to Knoxville), and has virtually disappeared due to extreme cohesion and attrition loss--I think these results are so out of whack that overall adjustments need to be made.

If I can find the time, I will playtest Lyon's 1861 fast marches across Missouri. It would be interesting, too, to playtest other historical extended infantry marches. Are there other scenario and campaign starts that would present this sort of situation?

I'd like to suggest that a systematic study of the whole march/cohesion/attrition rate issue be done. It seems to me that something is not quite, or at all, right here.

[lodilefty]

Based on the discussion so far, and berto's observations, I would simply leave cohesion loss for cavalry as-is, but decrease cohesion loss for marching infantry.

In the 'vanilla' database, infantry generally is set to lose 1 cohesion point per day moving. Cav ranges 0.75 to 1.0 [conscripts higher]

Interestingly, all 'state militia' models are set at 0.2 !!! They start with lower cohesion and lose it slower!!!!

Mounted raiders are set at 0.3, on foot at 0.5....

Plenty of opportunity to improve this.....

I think leader attributes is a vast land of opportunity here too, especially if we can 'port in' the new ones from NCP.

[Walloc]

But, Buell left Nashville September 7, raced northward to Louisville, then turned back south to engage Bragg at Perryville on October 8--that is, also nearly 200 miles in about a month's time. Buell hardly has the reputation of being a "fast mover", far from it.

Agreed.
I have a question here i suppose i should ask which conditions u made ur test with Bragg in. Buell would be in game terms moving at leased in large parts in friendly territory. Since the movement some times is up too 2 times as fast in friendly territory i would expect, underlining expect, in game his march to be faster than Braggs which i assume was made through "enemy" controlled territory.
Or am i wrong in that assumption?

Problem in historical view is ofc this rigid, but understandble distinction between controlled or not controlled territory in the game, that makes all the difference.
What was Braggs/ Buells marches in. Enemy or not controlled historicly and does it matter. In game it does.

I guess a test of Buells march are in order
Plus in game term some of Buells march could be made by RR which is attrition and cohesion loss free.
It may sound like im just trying to dodge the issue, but its more to play devils advocat in trying to translate what is possible in game to history terms.

I agree very much with u its some thing to look throughly at. Just trying to point out that some times one should be carefull what u "allow" ppl to do. Cuz players tend too use what they given and that might not be what u overall actually wants.

Looking then at the recreation of Bragg's attempted indirect march southeast to Knoxville, thence to Chattanooga, finally to Murfreesboro--given that by the end of 1862, the historical date of the Battle of Murfreesboro, not only has Bragg not yet made it half way (not even yet to Knoxville), and has virtually disappeared due to extreme cohesion and attrition loss--I think these results are so out of whack that overall adjustments need to be made.

If I can find the time, I will playtest Lyon's 1861 fast marches across Missouri. It would be interesting, too, to playtest other historical extended infantry marches. Are there other scenario and campaign starts that would present this sort of situation?

I'd like to suggest that a systematic study of the whole march/cohesion/attrition rate issue be done. It seems to me that something is not quite, or at all, right here.

I certainly agree that its some thing to look at.
Funny cuz i'ver been arguing the opposite in NCP. Marches is there IMO generally to fast. U can march in 3 days in the 90% category toke a week to 10 days. Again if u use Davout example its perfectly fine and doable. Problem to me is, u can do so near constandly. Which IMO alters the way the campaigns play out. Especially the later ones.

Kind regards,

Rasmus

[Clovis]

In the 'vanilla' database, infantry generally is set to lose 1 cohesion point per day moving. Cav ranges 0.75 to 1.0 [conscripts higher]

Interestingly, all 'state militia' models are set at 0.2 !!! They start with lower cohesion and lose it slower!!!!

Mounted raiders are set at 0.3, on foot at 0.5....

Plenty of opportunity to improve this.....

I think leader attributes is a vast land of opportunity here too, especially if we can 'port in' the new ones from NCP.

State militia have a move ratio of 0...

Abilities: why not? but it will be too a real limitation to the real number of usable leaders, as those without this abilities will move slower. As Berto's examples poits out, even lader seen as slow and cautious made quick march from time to time...

[lodilefty]

...of course if we slow them down, maybe forced march will get more use!!!

When talking about how far an army could march, remember the generally debilitated state in which the troops existed. Their diet was a nightmare, sanitation marginal to poor, clothing and portable shelters shoddy, medical care almost barbaric.... The whole modern attitude about care of the troops was rare..... or even impossible for the CSA....

The exceptions [Bragg for example] need to remain exceptions [Bragg's leader attributes, forced march, etc.] or we'll end up running all over the map with panzerblitz tactics.

If you must have forces arrive in the same condition that they left base, take a train!!!! ... or play chess....

[Clovis]

Rasmus,


If I can find the time, I will playtest Lyon's 1861 fast marches across Missouri. It would be interesting, too, to playtest other historical extended infantry marches. Are there other scenario and campaign starts that would present this sort of situation?

I've for long had the same feeling about Lyon's operations. I didn't care of this point because of others priorities but I wouldn't be surprised systematic test would confirm the impossibility to get historical results.

[berto]

In my rereading of Foote's Civil War trilogy, I am at the point of Hood's late 1864 invasion of Tennessee. The original plan was to launch a lightning-quick strike northward, but various things--including the unexpectedly rain-swollen Tennessee River--kept driving Hood farther and farther westward. When Hood's army finally made its Tennessee River crossing, it was over eighty miles westward and a week later than where and when originally intended. (Other things that could hinder planned river crossings are unexpected bridge destruction; the late arrival of promised pontoon bridges--think Fredericksburg; etc.)

I'm sure we all could provide plenty of other examples of "the best-laid plans of mice and men aft gang agly [awry]." To me, this suggests a solution to this conundrum.

Increase overall rates of march, but give them greater variance, especially downward.

That is to say, on average an army can move 5 or 10 (or whatever) miles per day, but random chance sometimes--maybe often!--decreases that.

Some generals, Forrest being one, Jackson being another, should almost never be impacted by chance reductions in march rates, because they always manage to find a way around obstacles and circumstances. Other generals (pick your favorite) are always looking for excuses to crawl at a snail's pace.

In a way, this is an added dynamic dimension to the idea of activation/inactivation.

Maybe the overall "fix" should be to:

--Increase the upper bound for march rates.
--Increase their variance (greater chance of reduced march rates).
--Give greater weight to the "fast mover" and "slow mover" leader attributes.
--Ratchet down cohesion loss.
--Maybe ratchet down attrition loss.

[berto]

...of course if we slow them down, maybe forced march will get more use!!!

Why not?!

When talking about how far an army could march, remember the generally debilitated state in which the troops existed. Their diet was a nightmare, sanitation marginal to poor, clothing and portable shelters shoddy, medical care almost barbaric.... The whole modern attitude about care of the troops was rare..... or even impossible for the CSA....

Except in situations where, like Bragg invading Kentucky, the civilian's gave them a warm reception. Or, like Grant's Vicksburg Campaign or Sherman's March to the Sea, where the foraging was so exceptionally rich and fruitful.

The exceptions [Bragg for example] need to remain exceptions [Bragg's leader attributes, forced march, etc.] or we'll end up running all over the map with panzerblitz tactics.

Agreed!

[W.Barksdale]

Some generals, Forrest being one, Jackson being another, should almost never be impacted by chance reductions in march rates, because they always manage to find a way around obstacles and circumstances.

After Mechanicsville, at a little place called Beaver Dam's Creek, Jackson was supposed to show up to hit the flank of Porter's Division posted on the ridge beyond the creek. From Foote's CWN, Vol. II, p.209 :

"It was over and it was lost, primarily because of the absence of the 18,500 troops whose arrive had been intended to unhinge the Federal line along the ridge. The persistent daylong question, Where was Jackson? still obtained."

[runyan99]

Increase overall rates of march, but give them greater variance, especially downward.

That is to say, on average an army can move 5 or 10 (or whatever) miles per day, but random chance sometimes--maybe often!--decreases that.

Getting realistic march rates and reasonable cohesion loss should be the priority. Coding variance adds complexity.

[runyan99]

After Mechanicsville, at a little place called Beaver Dam's Creek, Jackson was supposed to show up to hit the flank of Porter's Division posted on the ridge beyond the creek. From Foote's CWN, Vol. II, p.209 :

"It was over and it was lost, primarily because of the absence of the 18,500 troops whose arrive had been intended to unhinge the Federal line along the ridge. The persistent daylong question, Where was Jackson? still obtained."

Different march speeds for active and inactive leaders accounts for this kind of thing.

[berto]

After Mechanicsville ..., Jackson was supposed to show up..."

Right, which is why I wrote almost never. Jackson was in a funk (or incredibly exhausted?) at the Seven Days, to be sure.

[Clifford]

This is all great info and I love the direction you are all going in, but.... the main issue I have now is that the "current" system penalizes the Union considerably more the the Confederates. I'm all for making it more realistic, but, I feel realistic attrition potentially unbalancing the game right now.