New Leader Mod for 1.07

[The Wolf]

Reality was, just as with Johnston, he was a great general but he was not aggressive. He was not one to move forward.

That's a commonly held mistake. Johnston simply didn't believe in attacking with too few troops because when you do so the results are always in doubt. Lee did believe in doing that, and he got predictably mixed results; sometimes his attacks resulted in a Chancellorsville, and sometimes they resulted in bloody disasters like Malvern Hill, Gettysburg or Antietam. When Johnston did attack, whether at Bull Run, Seven Pines, or even with a scratch force at Bentonville, his objectives were met.

http://www.civilwarhome.com/johnston.htm

[runyan99]

Well, you tried, but you failed.

Okay. I'm done with this particular argument now.

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[AndrewKurtz]

Johnston didn't have any children.

I would like to point out that you could still be related to him however Although it seems obvious from your reply you are not.

I am related to George Pickett. I have no quarrel with his rating.

Seriously? That is actually very cool.

[AndrewKurtz]

Well, you tried, but you failed.



Let's see, should I believe a man with an obviously blatant bias against Joe Johnston or history professors who write scholarly analytical works on the subject? Hmm, easy call.



Not at all. If I had a special place in my heart for any CW generals, they would be Grant, Sherman, Hancock, Thomas, Lee, Jackson, Mahone and Forrest. What happened here is that you misrated Johnston, one of the South's historically best generals, because of blatant personal prejudice, and I find that appalling.

Ohh goodness. This is now getting emotional it seems.

I thought it was a good arguement for increasing Mac's ratings. What in the arguement he made did not make sense? I believe every statement was true. I must admit, I agree with the rating for Mac, but also agree with his arguements about, perhaps, why they could be higher.

[tagwyn]

Not without the blessing of Pocus/Phil. Sorry. Larry3

[The Wolf]

That is actually very cool.

Trust me, it's not.

[veji1]

Actually I would be fine with a 3-2-4 Johnston with a propensity to disengage in battles. This is actually a question : Johnston has the Skirmisher trait which gives it the ability to disengage more easily depending on a number of criteria, I guess how the battle is going, Pwr odds, etc..

Could it be possible to create a trait that would lead a force commanded by a general to seek disengagement even if the odds are even or they are winning the battle (even not too much) ?

With the actual ROE that would be to force a general to prevent a general affected by the trait from using the red and orange ROE's on attack and the red ROE on defense ?

That way Ol'Johnston would tend to never press ahead his attacks and defend firmly but always ready to disengage...

[McNaughton]

The problem here is that Johnston, and many other generals, are being 'designed' to repeat their behaviours given certain situations.

Johnston during the Peninsula knew that his command was too untested to do a major attack, and was biding time to organize, and he shortened his lines of communication. When Lee attacked, it was a bloodbath for the Confederates. Technically, Johnston's attack stopped McClellan, while Lee pushed him back at great cost.

Johnston attempted to merge with the Army of Vicksburg, but the commander refused to abandon the city. A well stated plan of his is that the merged army would outnumber Grant, and he would attack and push him out of the Mississippi area (hardly an unaggressive plan). This failed because his army was never allowed to grow to suitable size to be a threat (due to the failure to merge).

Johnston commanded the Army of Tennessee after Chatenooga (major defeat). He managed to defeat Sherman in just about every engagement inspite of being outnumbered about 2:1. Who knows what would have happened should he not have been removed?

Johnston was later given command of the force Hood destroyed, and counterattacked Sherman at Bentonville against all odds. Is this unaggressive?

To me, being unaggressive, or have a low strategic rating, means that you cannot get your commander to attack until they have decided to, regardless of the situation. Johnston didn't attack primarily because the situation for attacking was bad (as was seen by the 'failure' of his replacements at the Peninsula and at Atlanta). It wasn't as if incompetence, pride, irrationality, etc. were getting in his way (as in McClellan, Burnside, Patterson, etc.).

To me, a low strategic rating represents lack of ability. Johnston had a lack of will to attack in a strategically poor situation. Unfortunately, stats are static, and cannot reflect a commander under certain situations. Under good conditions, with a viable chance of success, Johnston would attack. To me, that is more competence than cowardice.

[AndrewKurtz]

To me, a low strategic rating represents lack of ability. Johnston had a lack of will to attack in a strategically poor situation.

And this gets to the crux of the issue. The real life situation was that JJ did _NOT_ attack often, for whatever reason. Other than a low strategic rating, how would you model this reality? Otherwise, JJ in the game would act with the personality of the player (aggressive or not), not JJ.

Same issue actually applies to Grant and Lee in reverse. Grant and Lee may be active every turn due to a high strategic rating, but a non-aggressive player will not have them attack.

My vote is to have the ratings result in the generals being likely to be aggressive vs defensive based on what we know for sure...what they did in real life. Not what we think they might have done had circumstances been different.

[McNaughton]

And this gets to the crux of the issue. The real life situation was that JJ did _NOT_ attack often, for whatever reason. Other than a low strategic rating, how would you model this reality? Otherwise, JJ in the game would act with the personality of the player (aggressive or not), not JJ.

Same issue actually applies to Grant and Lee in reverse. Grant and Lee may be active every turn due to a high strategic rating, but a non-aggressive player will not have them attack.

My vote is to have the ratings result in the generals being likely to be aggressive vs defensive based on what we know for sure...what they did in real life. Not what we think they might have done had circumstances been different.

Hmm... Based on Lee's performance as a commander, his attack rating should be 0, and his defence rating should be 2. Lee was aggressive, therefore will allow his subordnates to be aggressive, but, did he really get his commanders to fight 'better'? Even still, Lee 'allowed' his generals to be aggressive, he wouldn't push them (re: Ewell at Gettysburg), so maybe even a high strategic rating wouldn't be accurate for Lee either? Jackson was as superb as an independent force commander as he was under Lee. Maybe his success was because he was a great commander, and Lee had very little to do with it, other than give him his freedom? Same can be said of Longstreet (who was more of a 'solid' than 'superb' commander). However, we are all happy to give Lee massive bonus' to Attack and Defence... Puzzling.

Same can be said of Grant, and other 'great' commanders. We seem to forget the chain of command when creating these stats of generals. Why was Hancock so good at Gettysburg? How much of it was Meade's influence, how much was it of his own?

Unfortunately, a lot of stats were created in a vacuum, where you figure out Jackson, based on his success, then you figure out Lee based on his success, little realizing that the true level of success is Jackson + Lee, not Jackson on his own, or Lee on his own...

What should be done, in order to get a good understanding of generals, is to figure out a Corps commander's ability under different generals. If Jackson didn't perform much better under Lee as an independent commander, then we can really assume that Lee's influence wasn't that great.

This is the problem of looking at a history book, and searching for Lee, or Johnston, or Jackson in the Index, we ignore the failures and successes are based upon more than just this one person, but the chain of command, subordinates, and their actual combat situation. With the reductions of Johnston, Bragg ends up being the 'better' general when you factor in what is best for an army commander (all that matters is your combat ratings are above zero, and your strategic is above 2, hands down, Bragg is the better army commander in the Leader Mod...). Bragg was a horrible army commander, and like Hood, lost numbers equivalent to the largest size of the Army of Tennessee countless times.

Also, it isn't quite as black and white as you make it. It isn't 'aggressive' or 'not aggressive'. However, as I said, in 'comparison' Johnston was not aggressive, compared to other CSA leaders. However, he fit into the aggression level of the 'average' USA leader (the CSA tended to be more aggressive with it's high command)...

It is like sticking a B+ student with a lot of Gifted kids. In comparison, this B+ student looks like an idiot, but, you shouldn't give them a D- because of it as the comparison is truely unfair...

Based on this change for Johnston, any general who didn't attack at every opportunity should have a rating of 2 or less...

[McNaughton]

In the end, it is impossible to model generals correctly.

Ewell, within a matter of the same month proved to be a brilliant commander (2nd Winchester) and a completely incompetent one (Gettysburg). He acted quickly, with bravery and intelligence, then soon after was slow, sluggish and a poor strategist. How do you model this? Which Ewell do you choose?

It is a very difficult subject. One thing I am toying with is having doppelgangers. A good version (at their peak) and a poor version (at their worst). Events are in place throughout the game that seek out this general (at a low %) and change the model. One month you may be lucky and get the good Ewell, the next month, maybe the event will trigger and you get the bad Ewell, this may last for two months, then the good Ewell appears again...

To me, this is the only way to represent the variation of quality in every major general. It can be done, but, requires a lot of work.

[veji1]

When we change the units in the leader mod, do we lose the benefit of named brigades with named elements ? i don't want to go back to 3rd Alabama composed of infantry, infantry and artillery...

[Clovis]

an "ability" consisting in some random stat variations during the game could be interesting for modelling uneven leaders...

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[runyan99]

It might be more helpful to see these ratings in a list, side-by-side, in relation to the other generals, especially if we are to judge its merits for "officialization".

I think I'm seeing the can of worms being opened again, and I'm not crazy about the prospect.

Debating how best to quantify personal traits of human beings is subjective. As such, the discussion can easily go on indefinately without any satisfactory concensus. If 'officialization' is going to mean starting all over from square one and reevaluating every aspect of every leader in the game, I would be much happier to crank out the mod on my own unofficially. I never wanted to run the mod by committe (sp?). The numbers and traits used in this mod were originally Hancock's, and in most cases I preserved his choices. Whatever numbers I have changed have been the result of my own thought and study. While I am willing to hear all sides, and defend my choices, I have never asked anybody else for their opinion on what numbers to use while I updated the mod. I believe in enlightened dictatorship, not democracy when it comes to modding.

If the community is going to take the mod out of my hands, and create a new official scenario that resembles it, that's fine. It would probably benefit the game.

That said, I don't want to spend the next three months debating all of these numbers over again, and going round and round about what the Strategic rating means. I'm here primarily because I like to play BoA and AACW, and not because I want to spend all my time making spreadsheets and arguing history. My motivation in updating the mod was always simply to be able to play it, and get rid of Charles Hamilton corps commander and to finally get poor Robert Ransom's name spelled correctly.

If AGEOD wants to work with me to use my numbers for a new scenario, that's fine. I'll work with AGEOD and Lensman to get that done.

If AGEOD decides not to officialize the mod at all, that's fine with me too. In fact, that would be the least work for me. I'll be able to update it on my own as I have been doing.

[Dogrobber]

Runyan99

You have my thanks and appreciation for your efforts in updating the leader mod. The historical appearance of leaders in both time & location greatly enhances the gameplay for me. I hope this discussion of appropriate numerical ratings for traits that are inherently unsusceptible to quantification will not have a chilling effect on your mod work.

[The Wolf]

Under good conditions, with a viable chance of success, Johnston would attack. To me, that is more competence than cowardice.

Finally somebody gets it!

And not only would he attack, he would attack and win.

[The Wolf]

The unaddressed problem with Johnston being disrated in this mod is that he winds up spending most of the game being statistically penalized. As he was historically one of the South's best generals and was usually in command of a major Southern force, the disrating is going to be a severely unbalancing handicap for any Southern player.

[AndrewKurtz]

In the end, it is impossible to model generals correctly.

Ewell, within a matter of the same month proved to be a brilliant commander (2nd Winchester) and a completely incompetent one (Gettysburg). He acted quickly, with bravery and intelligence, then soon after was slow, sluggish and a poor strategist. How do you model this? Which Ewell do you choose?

It is a very difficult subject. One thing I am toying with is having doppelgangers. A good version (at their peak) and a poor version (at their worst). Events are in place throughout the game that seek out this general (at a low %) and change the model. One month you may be lucky and get the good Ewell, the next month, maybe the event will trigger and you get the bad Ewell, this may last for two months, then the good Ewell appears again...

To me, this is the only way to represent the variation of quality in every major general. It can be done, but, requires a lot of work.

Cool idea.

[Jagger]

I put the leader mod into XLS format. In the process I found a small number of errors which would prevent those particular leaders from functioning properly in the game.

Leader Unit files with invalid strings-alias:

Gregg
Maury2
JAnderson
Smith

Leader Model files with improper alias (mispelled) in tech upgrade.

Rodes mispelled as Rhodes
Schofield mispelled as Shofield

Hamilton had a problem with alias as well...I am not sure if with model or unit.

BTW, Hamilton served in the west commanding 3 divisions under Grant until 1863 after McClellan relieved him of command in the east. So in my XLS, Hamilton has a one star early war model with potential upgrade to two star for his service with Grant.

[runyan99]

Leader Unit files with invalid strings-alias:

Gregg
Maury2
JAnderson
Smith

Can you expand on this? I checked Dabney Maury and I don't understand what would cause a problem.

[runyan99]

I found some little issues with M. Gregg, GW Smith and Maury, but not JP Anderson.

[jeff b]

For those that think very highly of Joe Johnston, they really need to read Steven E. Woodworth's command studies - Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West (Modern War Studies) and Davis and Lee at War. These pair deal with CSA command in the West and the East.

But to briefly discuss Johnstons role in his victories. At Manassas, Johnston's role was one of traffic cop. He ensured that Southern reinforcements were shuttled to the front as soon as they arrived at Manassas Junction. While he must garner credit for understanding that that role was essential, it wasn't really an exhibit of his campaign or battlefield leadership. Manassas was more a failure of McDowell to turn the confederate flank than any other cause.

At Fair Oaks, I would question that this was a big day for Johnston. McClellan had a chunk (Heintzelman & Keyes) of his army sitting on the wrong side of the Chickahominy waiting for McDowell, and Johnston had the opportunity to attack 2/5 of the Union Army with the 4/5s of the Confederate. Johnston's attack should have destroyed that portion of the Union Army, but it did not. According to Stephen Sears, "Fair Oaks was a battle in which neither commanding general exercised much control of events in the field". Johnston suffered a tactical defeat at Fair Oaks, losing 6100 causulties to 5000 of the Union. When the battle was over, the Federals still held the field. I would not say that Fair Oaks stopped McClellan's advance. After the battle Little Mac shifted his forces to the South of the River and continued with his seige plans. Little Mac wanted the Battle for Richmond to be a seige, he did not want to fight a series of open field battles that Lee forced upon him. Hardly a victory for Johnston.

Finally at Bentonvile, Johnston's position had been turned by Mower, but Sherman ordered that the attack be halted and Johnston allowed to slip away. Bentonville really was a "gimme" that Sherman gave up, knowing that the war was just about over he was reluctant to press the battle and lose lives.

So when you get right down to it, Johnston did not win many battles. His claim for competence had much to do with Sherman's style of command than it did on his defensive genius. Johnston could manuever his Army, and Sherman hated to fight a pitched battle if he could avoid it.

With the death of AS Johnston, the south did not have many options for commanders in the West. Beauregard was even more toxic to Davis than JE Johnston, Van Dorn who had proven not capable of Army command (not to say he wasn't a good cavalry general), Bragg - who could "snatch defeat from the jaws of victory" Pemberton who lacked the imagination to deal with Grants final attack, and trusted to the ability of Johnston to releive Vicksburg. Hardee - who refused to take the command. And last but least John Bell Hood. As aggressive as Lee, but no where near as competent.

Davis and the South continually turned to Johnston because they had no other choices. The South unlike the North did not develop Generals as the War progressed. The South did not produce Thomas's, Shermans, Meades, Sheridans like the North managed.

[Clovis]

For those that think very highly of Joe Johnston, they really need to read Steven E. Woodworth's command studies - Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West (Modern War Studies) and Davis and Lee at War. These pair deal with CSA command in the West and the East.

But to briefly discuss Johnstons role in his victories. At Manassas, Johnston's role was one of traffic cop. He ensured that Southern reinforcements were shuttled to the front as soon as they arrived at Manassas Junction. While he must garner credit for understanding that that role was essential, it wasn't really an exhibit of his campaign or battlefield leadership. Manassas was more a failure of McDowell to turn the confederate flank than any other cause.

At Fair Oaks, I would question that this was a big day for Johnston. McClellan had a chunk (Heintzelman & Keyes) of his army sitting on the wrong side of the Chickahominy waiting for McDowell, and Johnston had the opportunity to attack 2/5 of the Union Army with the 4/5s of the Confederate. Johnston's attack should have destroyed that portion of the Union Army, but it did not. According to Stephen Sears, "Fair Oaks was a battle in which neither commanding general exercised much control of events in the field". Johnston suffered a tactical defeat at Fair Oaks, losing 6100 causulties to 5000 of the Union. When the battle was over, the Federals still held the field. I would not say that Fair Oaks stopped McClellan's advance. After the battle Little Mac shifted his forces to the South of the River and continued with his seige plans. Little Mac wanted the Battle for Richmond to be a seige, he did not want to fight a series of open field battles that Lee forced upon him. Hardly a victory for Johnston.

Finally at Bentonvile, Johnston's position had been turned by Mower, but Sherman ordered that the attack be halted and Johnston allowed to slip away. Bentonville really was a "gimme" that Sherman gave up, knowing that the war was just about over he was reluctant to press the battle and lose lives.

So when you get right down to it, Johnston did not win many battles. His claim for competence had much to do with Sherman's style of command than it did on his defensive genius. Johnston could manuever his Army, and Sherman hated to fight a pitched battle if he could avoid it.

With the death of AS Johnston, the south did not have many options for commanders in the West. Beauregard was even more toxic to Davis than JE Johnston, Van Dorn who had proven not capable of Army command (not to say he wasn't a good cavalry general), Bragg - who could "snatch defeat from the jaws of victory" Pemberton who lacked the imagination to deal with Grants final attack, and trusted to the ability of Johnston to releive Vicksburg. Hardee - who refused to take the command. And last but least John Bell Hood. As aggressive as Lee, but no where near as competent.

Davis and the South continually turned to Johnston because they had no other choices. The South unlike the North did not develop Generals as the War progressed. The South did not produce Thomas's, Shermans, Meades, Sheridans like the North managed.

I wouldn' be so harsh with him. Manassas and Peninsula campaigns are really special things as neither leaders or troops were experienced. Any leader in the first 2 years made errors or displayed bad command control at large scales. Lee himself wasn't that genious during the Peninsula affair and part of his credit comes from the pusillanimity of McClellan ( a nd a large credit to Lee must be made for the changes in command he introduced after this campaign to strenghen his army).

During the 1863-1865 period, Johnston was outnumbered and outgunned, with a so poor supply offensive was really difficult. That's not to say he would have attacked under better circumstances but Bentonville is IMHO showing that he was resolute even with an almost shadow army ( Army of the Tennessee being yet suffering of Hood's total failure) to face an enemy largely superior in number and weapons...

Now on the tactical side, wasn't he too in search of the perfect attacling situation ( which never occur) to really win? I really don't know.

[McNaughton]

For those that think very highly of Joe Johnston, they really need to read Steven E. Woodworth's command studies - Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West (Modern War Studies) and Davis and Lee at War. These pair deal with CSA command in the West and the East.

But to briefly discuss Johnstons role in his victories. At Manassas, Johnston's role was one of traffic cop. He ensured that Southern reinforcements were shuttled to the front as soon as they arrived at Manassas Junction. While he must garner credit for understanding that that role was essential, it wasn't really an exhibit of his campaign or battlefield leadership. Manassas was more a failure of McDowell to turn the confederate flank than any other cause.

At Fair Oaks, I would question that this was a big day for Johnston. McClellan had a chunk (Heintzelman & Keyes) of his army sitting on the wrong side of the Chickahominy waiting for McDowell, and Johnston had the opportunity to attack 2/5 of the Union Army with the 4/5s of the Confederate. Johnston's attack should have destroyed that portion of the Union Army, but it did not. According to Stephen Sears, "Fair Oaks was a battle in which neither commanding general exercised much control of events in the field". Johnston suffered a tactical defeat at Fair Oaks, losing 6100 causulties to 5000 of the Union. When the battle was over, the Federals still held the field. I would not say that Fair Oaks stopped McClellan's advance. After the battle Little Mac shifted his forces to the South of the River and continued with his seige plans. Little Mac wanted the Battle for Richmond to be a seige, he did not want to fight a series of open field battles that Lee forced upon him. Hardly a victory for Johnston.

Hmm... Realistically, Lee was no more successful than Johnston based on your logic... 6000 to 5000 is irrelevant (Lee lost 20000 to 15000 union during the Seven Days battle). The fact is, McClellan stopped his attack, and gave initiative to the South. That is a strategic victory. Controlling the field is one thing, and not necessarily a victory, what is critical is the all important initiative, which was won for the South by Johnston's attack. Hardly a defeat for Johnston.

Finally at Bentonvile, Johnston's position had been turned by Mower, but Sherman ordered that the attack be halted and Johnston allowed to slip away. Bentonville really was a "gimme" that Sherman gave up, knowing that the war was just about over he was reluctant to press the battle and lose lives.

Hmm... Amazing that every victory that Johnston has, it is all due to the fault of the Union, rather than his success... What of Lee at Sharpsburg, or Lee at Chancellorsville, or Lee at Fredericksburg, or Lee at Second Bull Run... All major victories for Lee, but, also due to major Union blunders...

So when you get right down to it, Johnston did not win many battles. His claim for competence had much to do with Sherman's style of command than it did on his defensive genius. Johnston could manuever his Army, and Sherman hated to fight a pitched battle if he could avoid it.

So, when you come down to it, Lee was just as reliant on Union blunder as Johnston was, so, by your logic here, Lee needs to have majorly slashed statistics as well... Also, in every 'battle' with Sherman, Johnston proved the victor, even though massively outnumbered. Pitched or not, you cannot deny that these are battlefield victories.

With the death of AS Johnston, the south did not have many options for commanders in the West. Beauregard was even more toxic to Davis than JE Johnston, Van Dorn who had proven not capable of Army command (not to say he wasn't a good cavalry general), Bragg - who could "snatch defeat from the jaws of victory" Pemberton who lacked the imagination to deal with Grants final attack, and trusted to the ability of Johnston to releive Vicksburg. Hardee - who refused to take the command. And last but least John Bell Hood. As aggressive as Lee, but no where near as competent.

Davis and the South continually turned to Johnston because they had no other choices. The South unlike the North did not develop Generals as the War progressed. The South did not produce Thomas's, Shermans, Meades, Sheridans like the North managed.

They turned to Johnston because he was a troubleshooter. He was able to make a horrid situation stable. While not glorious like Lee in his victories, he was also NEVER faced a defeat as devestating as Lee in his defeats... Johnston was cautious, but calculated. Babe Ruth was known for his series of home runs, but, he was also known for his series of strikeouts. Ruth and Lee have the benefit of history glorifying their victories, and glossing over their defeats (Which were just as substantial), while Johnston suffers for being supremely competent in his role, but not taking massive risks (therefore not getting the credit).

Lee was a disaster when left to his own devices. His campaign in West Virginia was horrible, and was kicked out on his butt by McClellan. The same faults you cite Johnston at the Peninsula battles were the same faults Lee experienced. Horrendous casualty rates for little gain. The fact was, the soldiers and generals were not accustomed to such large numbers, and complicated manoevers. Lee was just as pathetic as Johnston in these battles, but, was more reckless with the lives of his men.

[jeff b]

Hmm... Realistically, Lee was no more successful than Johnston based on your logic... 6000 to 5000 is irrelevant (Lee lost 20000 to 15000 union during the Seven Days battle). The fact is, McClellan stopped his attack, and gave initiative to the South. That is a strategic victory. Controlling the field is one thing, and not necessarily a victory, what is critical is the all important initiative, which was won for the South by Johnston's attack. Hardly a defeat for Johnston..

One major complaint about McClellan is that he had the "Slows". I would not say that Johnston's attack did anything more than reinforce the goblins in the Young Napoleon's mind. McClellan was not a total dolt. He was well aware of the danger that having his army divided along the Chicahominy meant. He spent the next several days after Fair Oaks rearranging his army. (the need to reorg is Something I think this game reflects admirably.)

Hmm... Amazing that every victory that Johnston has, it is all due to the fault of the Union, rather than his success... What of Lee at Sharpsburg, or Lee at Chancellorsville, or Lee at Fredericksburg, or Lee at Second Bull Run... All major victories for Lee, but, also due to major Union blunders....

YOu are correct. The defeat at Fredericksburg was all about problems on the Union side. Pemberton would have managed to win Fredericksburg just as handily. Lee has often been faulted for giving battle at Sharpsburg at all. (See "How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War" by Ed Bonekemper) Chancellorsville and Second Manassas are examples of the team of Lee & Jackson at their best. I am afraid that Johnston never managed a campaign like those. Unlike Grant, Sherman was much more concerned about what the enemy was doing. A Lee like offensive would most likely have set Sherman back. Think the Mine Run campaign. Johnston should have been able to accomplish something along those lines, without risking his army.

So, when you come down to it, Lee was just as reliant on Union blunder as Johnston was, so, by your logic here, Lee needs to have majorly slashed statistics as well... Also, in every 'battle' with Sherman, Johnston proved the victor, even though massively outnumbered. Pitched or not, you cannot deny that these are battlefield victories.

I don't deny that in the Atlanta campaign Johnston manuevered his army well. But just as equally you can't deny that he failed to keep Sherman away from Atlanta. As Lee tried desperately to keep Grant away from Richmond knowing that once the war turned to one of seige that the South's days were numbered. So too should Johnston at Atlanta. The problem with Johnston's manuevering was that if he would not fight in N. Georgia where the terrain was favorable, where would he fight? Johnston needed to do more than beat Sherman to every crossroad. One real question is, could the North have afforded 2 Virginia campaigns? Could Lincoln have lasted if Johnston had fought for every inch of Georgia soil like Lee did for Virginia? Would this have caused Sherman to have another breakdown?

I will concede that Ga is not VA, and that it might not have been possible to do so. But it was what was expected of Johnston.

[quote="McNaughton"]

My assessment of Johnston was that he was a competent general but one that would not fight unless the odds were in his favor. Unfortunately they were rarely in his favor.

In game terms, I agree that Johnston should have low Strategic rating, Low Offensive rating and high defensive ratings.

My order of ranking for Confederate Generals who held significant command would be as follows:

Lee
Jackson
AS Johnston
Beauregard
Johnston
E. Kirby Smith
Bragg
Taylor (at Port Hudson)
Pemberton
Longstreet (Knoxville & Suffolk)
Hood
Van Dorn

Off the top of my head that is the list, but I am sure I have missed some.

I would submit that Beauregard was the real troubleshooter. He served at Charleston, Manassas, Shiloh, Corinth, the Carolina's again, and then at Petersburg. For Davis's number 1 foe as a general, that is quite an accomplished list.

[Clovis]

You're forgeting Army of the Tennessee wasn't of the same quality than Army of Northern Virginia. And Frankly, the 1864 overland campaign achieved the same result than the Atlanta one under Johnston, ie Lee pushed back to Richmond Petersbrug aera without any chance to lift the siege without retreating.

[jeff b]

You're forgeting Army of the Tennessee wasn't of the same quality than Army of Northern Virginia. And Frankly, the 1864 overland campaign achieved the same result than the Atlanta one under Johnston, ie Lee pushed back to Richmond Petersbrug aera without any chance to lift the siege without retreating.

I am not forgetting the quality differences between the AoT and ANV. The major differences between the 2 armies was in their top level command. At the corp level the ANV was superior to the AoT. Polk was a bad corp commander. Hood (at the start of the Atlanta campaign) was a conniver ala Hooker. At the division level, the AoT was well served, Pat Cleburn was probably the best division commander of the War. Johnston also had the services of Forrest and Wheeler, both excellent cavalry leaders.

The main difference between the results were that by the 1864 election, Atlanta had fallen and Richmond had not. I would argue that even if Johnston had remained in command, he would have lost Atlanta prior to the election. It was Johnston's percieved unwillingness to fight for Atlanta that got him releived.

What was needed was keeping the North out of Atlanta before the election. Preferably with the greatest number of Northern casualties. By 1864 the best Southern strategy was impacting the election. If the electorate had perceived that the North was bleeding to death without any tangible result it may have cost Lincoln the election.