Mon Oct 08, 2007 12:55 am
Probably. While it is lots of fun to play "phantom raider" with brigs and cavalry, or to drop off a division in Macon that heads straight for Atlanta, it feels gamey.
Looking at the rivers in the Carolinas and New York, most of which I am somewhat familiar with, they seem fairly accurate. (Except that the Mohawk should be navigable to river traffic, along with the Erie & Welland Canals; and the Neuss & Tar should both extend one region further for navigability).
The Tennessee was not navigable to Knoxville. The fact that it was often not navigable as far as Chatanooga caused enormous supply problems for Buell, Rosecrans, Grant, and Sherman. It is in large part the explanation for Buell and Rosecrans' reluctance to move forward without secure railroads. There are numerous letters from various naval commanders to various army commanders that say - Yes, yes, I will send gunboats and supplies and transports up the Tennessee River, as soon as there is enough water in it . . . The problems generally seem to start in the east/west portion of the river, the north/south section was fairly consistent.
The Old/Atchaflaya/Western Branch River is an odd case. From my reading, seems like it was impassable (narrow & brush choked) about 40% of the time, normal about 40%, and in flood (hazard to troop crossing: 1.5-2 miles wide) about 20%. It was very dependent on the weather far upstream the Red and Mississippi rivers.
The James was also weather dependent: The Galena was definitely able to get as far as Drewry's Bluff, which would be in the Henrico Region. If you read the article about the Trent's Reach battle, you can see that ironclads and river ships had a very tough time in the same stretch of river that the Galena passed through two years before.
I'm not familiar with the Sabine River system. The historical records aren't as readily available as other areas, because the Federals never made a concentrated effort to invade the region. They would land at the river mouth, take the fort, evacuate to New Orleans, and repeat.
More details:
Farragut ran the batteries at Baton Rouge and Port Hudson and sailed up the Mississippi all the way to Vicksburg after taking New Orleans.
Porter's gunboats and ironclads very nearly got mired in the Red River due to falling water levels. Their lack of maneuverability definitely affected their combat abilities vs. land forces.
I think the level of abstraction is too great. I have three proposals to complicate Pocus and PhilThib's (or some modder's) lives:
1. Tie navigability more closely to weather. During the spring, when the surrounding regions are all mud, a river is likely to be navigable for deeper draft ships than normal. During the summer, the opposite applies.
2. Introduce obstructions and torpedoes (mines) into the game. More federal ships were sunk by mines during the Civil War than by any other means. They're not much fun to game, but they are effective. If the ship vs. shore values were brought back to reasonable levels, I'd still be hesitant to sail into Charleston with three forts, plus obstructions and mines. I'm guessing that it was mostly obstructions that kept the Union navy out of inland Georgia.
3. Create a series of events similar to the cavalry raid events that give a defending player free entrenched artillery when a river force appears. Alternately, but in the same vein, add fixed shore batteries in various places along rivers to the scenarios.
[color="DimGray"] You deserve to be spanked[/color]
) and gameplay-wise because it allows the Union a very ahistorical exploit (which to have used myself I'm quite sorry in retrospect 
leure:
