Can the CSA actually win?

[akmatov]

Was considering buying and the discussion of better balance sounded promising. However, it seems to have just stopped and nothing accomplished. As I understand the history, the CSA's best chance of winning was to be militarily successful enough to break the shaky consensus in support of the war. One promising sounding mod that as far as I can tell was never released involved tweaks to NM and VP so as to make this possible.

As I understand it, many experienced players consider this game unwinnable by the CSA, possibly due to a strong pro-USA bias built into the game. Is this correct?

[Gray Fox]

I think that a CSA player can certainly defeat an AI Union. This is because Athena (our name for the AI) hasn't read any of my CSA strategy posts.

In PbeM, a veteran Union player should of course be able to use the numerical advantages that are historically accurate over a novice CSA player. A veteran CSA player should be able to give a novice Union player a run for his money. Some mod might "balance" things for a battle of veterans, but I'm sure that experienced players would just use "house rules" to get the best play. The horse doesn't win the race, the jockey does.

[Durk]

The CSA can certainly win. As an experienced player, I would disagree with akmatov assertion that experienced players think the CSA position is unwinnable, it is not. The game has been nicely balanced without making it so 'historical' that the CSA will never win.
Occasionally, I win as the CSA. More frequently I lose as the USA due to excellent CSA play.
This is not a game of repetitious Union wins. Both sides must play well in order to win.

[1stvermont]

The CSA wins as often as the us wins in my time playing. The better player is the one who wins. I would add historically the csa almost did win before atlanta fell. I do think the vps make it to easy for the north to win on vps. The key as the south is not to sit back and dig in, but be aggressive, win on the field, use internal lines and line of sight etc

who would want a game balanced and both sides equal? we want history. So adjust the winning conditions. I say do that, and make the south slightly weaker, especially navel.

[Straight Arrow]

Yep, it's doable; the CSA can win against a talented and experienced Union player.

But to do so, they must keep mistakes to a minimum and be blessed with solid doses of luck.

[grimjaw]

Like the others have said, versus the Ai the CSA can win. Playing against a human opponent, even one who isn't that experienced, is much more of a challenge.

[ArmChairGeneral]

I can't speak to PBeM, but the game is quite winnable as the CSA against the AI, even on the hardest settings. Beat the Union Army in the field (just like Lee intended) and the USA rolls over. (Well, maybe not "rolls over," but it isn't that difficult once you can string a few major victories together.)

[ArmChairGeneral]

However, there are certain strategies that will always fail as the CSA: turtling is a surefire loser. The CSA has advantages in the early game that can be converted to a win. If you haven't won by 1864 you probably aren't going to.

[Captain_Orso]

But if the South prevents itself from losing until the end of '65, which ever side has the most VP's gets a marginal win.

[ArmChairGeneral]

Sure, but that's a big if, since the Union can overwhelm the CSA in 63/64 if the CSA hasn't done something to whittle them down before they can build the Blue Wave, put Grant in charge of it, and roll south.

Yes, good players can probably sucker Union Athena into enough mistakes to hold out, and eke out a VP win by running out the clock, but if you are a good enough player to do that you are good enough to have gone for DC and the Major Victory in 62/63 and won outright 20 hours sooner.

My overall point though is that, given active play the CSA has a more than adequate opportunity to win the game.

If you are worried about buying the game, worry about whether you have the stamina to master one of the most complex and difficult to master games you will ever play (a selling point in my book) rather than whether it is "unwinnable" as one side or the other.

[Captain_Orso]

I was just pointing out the other possible outcomes

[Stauffenberg]

who would want a game balanced and both sides equal? we want history. So adjust the winning conditions....

Exactly. The major draw of this ACW model is the rich historical detail, leaving room for vastly different strategies and varied results every full campaign game. I've never been a stickler for simplistic *victory conditions* in a situation as nuanced as this. Play this out 1861 to 1865/66 and both players will have a strong feeling about who actually won.

[1stvermont]

who would want a game balanced and both sides equal? we want history. So adjust the winning conditions....

Exactly. The major draw of this ACW model is the rich historical detail, leaving room for vastly different strategies and varied results every full campaign game. I've never been a stickler for simplistic *victory conditions* in a situation as nuanced as this. Play this out 1861 to 1865/66 and both players will have a strong feeling about who actually won.

amen.

[Captain_Orso]

This is very true. Imagine if Lee had managed to escape with his army from Richmond and Petersburg, and not be caught and forced to surrender. The game, so to say, would not have ended then. Maybe he would have been able to resist, or at least force the Union to fight on. The Confederacy would still be in a dire state. But if in game terms it went on until the end of '65, would VP's really tell the story?

In many tournaments the South manages to resist to the end of the game and yet pull out a victory on points alone, although the Confederacy is on the verge of collapse. It is far more difficult to assess such a situation using algorithms, than it is to assess it using human intellect; and that in itself is difficult to do correctly.

[Stauffenberg]

Yes and a Confederate victory often involves finally moving the capital out of Richmond later in the war and fighting on. When Lee capitulated the CSA still controlled a huge area and a more effective strategy would have been that of trading some of this space for time; i.e.moving the capital back to Montgomery and having Lee fall back to defend the Deep South before getting surrounded and pinned up north.

[Captain_Orso]

True, tactically that would have been a more viable direction. But would it be historically correct? What is difficult for people to grasp, is that 150 years ago the Confederacy was not comparable to the Union. The Union was not even comparable to the Union as we know it today.

One of the most poignant expressions of this was that before the Civil War, we spoke "The United Stated of America are... ", indicating a union of independent states. After the Civil War, we spoke, "The United Stated of America is... ", intoning a singular entity being the United States.

The Confederacy's purpose was to politically underline the politics of independent states. Their unity was conditional on the benefit each state would gain from the actions of all, which was why at the beginning of the war, Davis could not agree to tactically withdrawing from any territory within the Confederacy. He could not argue for rescinding control over a part in order to strengthen the whole, because a state losing 'a part' stopped thinking about the whole, which spurred disunity. Only when there was no other choice, could such loses be accepted.

So moving the capital from Richmond before being forced to do so, by the threat of the imminent loss of Richmond, would not be operating within the historical facts of the politics of the Confederacy.

[hanny1]

"A Government of Our Own — The Making of the Confederacy" (1997) by William C. Davis:

"Debate over whether Montgomery should be the permanent capital commenced, in fact, from the very time the delegates first gathered there back in February. Advocates suggested a host of cities, starting with Tuscaloosa in March. Thereafter, Atlanta; Huntsville; Selma; Pendleton, South Carolina; Nashville; Memphis; Spring Hill, Alabama; and even Alexandria, Virginia, right within sight of Washington, found their advocates. A host of arguments bolstered their claims. The capital should be out of the high heat and yellow fever district. It should be no more than a day from the seacoast, have excellent rail and telegraphic communications, and at least some stature and society of its own to support the national headquarters. Montgomery met some of these conditions, but not others. The secession of Virginia, however, completely threw all considerations out of balance. While Richmond had been mentioned occasionally as likely earlier, now it rapidly came to be the only spot discussed. It was all because of the war."

Davis writes about a dinner between Jeff. Davis and Thomas Cobb on May 16, 1861:

"Over that dinner, Davis and Cobb inevitably talked about Virginia, Richmond, and moving the capital. For all of Montgomery's exemplary efforts in behalf od the cause, there no longer remained a logic for keeping the capital there. Even if Davis did not take the field himself, still Virginia would be the scene of the crisis, and to react quickly, the government needed to be there, both to direct events and to serve as spiritual support for the Virginians who would bear the brunt of campaigning."

"...As yet, only Congress faced a move. The expectation that the armies would fight in Virginia, and that Davis would likely command in person, suggested therefore that Congress ought to be close to the President. Te rest of the government, however, need not necessarily leave Montgomery. They referred the measure to the judiciary committee."

"...Judiciary returned the resolution May 15, reporting that it found no legal obstacles to moving the Congress. That done, the measure passed and went to Davis. Two days later he took many of them by surprise when he returned it with his second veto. The bill did not go far enough, he said, and he was quite right. It was foolishness to move the executive and the Congress to one place, while leaving the rest of the government in another."

"...After the delegates left the hall for the day, Montgomery hummed with rumors of the veto, of the desperate measures being taken by some to relocate the capital, and of the advancing prospects of some other cities. Huntsville looked promising again, and now Nashville offered itself, as well as Opelika, Alabama."

"...The debate lasted for hours. First they addressed one more a resolution simply reconvening Congress in Richmond, and it failed, not a single state voting in favor. Then they went to (Charles M.) Conrad's resoluton covering the entire government, and another one similar, and after amendment reduced them to a single bill specifying that they would adjourn on Tuesday, May 21, reconvene in Richmond on July 20, and that the entire government should move with them."

"That was it, the best they could do, and if it failed, the issue was dead, at least for this session. Louisiana demanded the yeas and nays, and when the vote ended Arkansas, Georgia, Texas and Virginia agreed, while Alabama, Florida, Mississippi and South Carolina did not. Louisiana, with the deciding vote, split, and thereby cast no vote. With no majority, the bill died. They went on to other business, but during the next half hour or so two things happened. Many of the members were absent, some having already left for home without waiting for adjournment. Only Alabama, Texas and Virginia had full delegations in the hall. Friends started applying pressure to (George) Ward, the new member from Florida, who thus far had voted with (James B.) Owens to decide their state against the single voice of (Jackson C.) Morton. And noble old (Alexandre) DeClouet, late arriving, now entered the hall, or someone hurriedly went to find him. Then South Carolina, at the insistence of (Porcher) Miles, who, strangely enough, was not voting, called for reconsideration of the balloting. The yeas and nays rang out again. Ward changed his vote to an affirmative, and DeClouet ended the division in Louisiana by making its ballot three to two in favor. The resolution passed, six states to three. The voice vote stood much closer, though — only 24 to 20. It was done, The resolution went directly to the President, and the next day he returned it with his signature."

Its a game and in games anything can happen, Richmond as the 2nd highest pop center of the CSA in 61 will treble its pop base after becomming the capital and by 64 be producing over half of the CSA mility warmaking requirements, CSA no longer required imports to field armies but could not sustain them food wise, the game allows that military munition resource base to be created in many areas simply by purchasing the capacity, in real life its more complicated and requires a long lead tim eto put into effect rather than get it instntly as inthe game.

If it was a simulation then you would have less options for where munition production etc can be produced, and a more certain outcome to not only where the production base can be built,but the outcome itself much more predictable.Either way once Richmondd is the capital and VA is the main theatre, any relocation should have a massive negative to the CSA morale and warfighting capacity after its been established for any length of time.

[Stauffenberg]

To the People of the Confederate States of America.
Danville, Va., April 4, 1865.

For many months the largest and finest army of the Confederacy, under the command of a leader whose presence inspires equal confidence in the troops and the people, has been greatly trammeled by the necessity of keeping constant watch over the approaches to the capital, and has thus been forced to forego more than one opportunity for promising enterprise. The hopes and confidence of the enemy have been constantly excited by the belief that their possession of Richmond would be the signal for our submission to their rule, and relieve them from the burden of war, as their failing resources admonish them it must be abandoned if not speedily brought to a successful close. It is for us, my countrymen, to show by our bearing under reverses how wretched has been the self-deception of those who have believed us less able to endure misfortune with fortitude than to encounter danger with courage. We have now entered upon a new phase of a struggle the memory of which is to endure for all ages and to shed an increasing luster upon our country.

Jefferson Davis. Transcribed from Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, compiled by James D. Richardson (2 vols., 1904), Volume 1, pp. 568-70.

From a ‘moral and political’ viewpoint, Richmond's fall would be ‘a serious calamity,’ Lee reportedly conceded, but once it happened, he could prolong the war for two more years on Virginia soil. Since the war began he had been forced to let the enemy make strategic plans for him, because he had to defend the capital, but ‘when Richmond falls I shall be able to make them for myself.’

Ernest B. Furguson, Ashes of Glory: Richmond at War (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1997), 306-307


Moving the capital and Lee's army south was in fact actively anticipated; however, such was the unshakable belief that Lee would keep holding the transfer of the capital was delayed until it was far too late. Conversely, Lee was sworn to defend the capital and did so until his forces were exhausted and unable to move south in advance of the Union armies to join up with Johnston. The 'Richmond at all costs' and 'Lee cannot fail' mindset in Davis almost assured the historical outcome but it might not have occurred as it did. In any case CW II allows the CSA player to explore this and many other 'what-ifs.'

[Captain_Orso]

8<

Its a game and in games anything can happen, Richmond as the 2nd highest pop center of the CSA in 61 will treble its pop base after becomming the capital and by 64 be producing over half of the CSA mility warmaking requirements, CSA no longer required imports to field armies but could not sustain them food wise, the game allows that military munition resource base to be created in many areas simply by purchasing the capacity, in real life its more complicated and requires a long lead tim eto put into effect rather than get it instntly as inthe game.

If it was a simulation then you would have less options for where munition production etc can be produced, and a more certain outcome to not only where the production base can be built,but the outcome itself much more predictable.Either way once Richmondd is the capital and VA is the main theatre, any relocation should have a massive negative to the CSA morale and warfighting capacity after its been established for any length of time.

Very interesting reading, thanks.

I agree, the economy in the game is very, very vaguely modeled. I am in no way an expert on the Southern economy, but I've picked up a thing or two along the way.

Very basically, the Southern economy before the war was based on selling cotton for cash or gold and spending the proceeds to buy all good necessary to live and thrive on. As I read once, a Southerner before the war said, in my words because I don't remember the quote exactly, "why have factories to make shoes, when you can pay somebody else to have a factory to make shoes".

When trade was reduced by the blockade, the economy reacted very slowly to readjust to the new situation, and a large part of this was caused by the prevailing attitude of paying others for your necessities. It was not just a way of life, but a perceived entitlement.

Although the factory structures offered to be put into military use during the game are historical, I have no reason to believe their costs nor their output are in any way historical. If we accept that a very large portion of war materials were produced in Richmond, it questions how production is represented in the game.

The economy of the war could really be a game by itself, if it were done right.

[Captain_Orso]

To the People of the Confederate States of America.
Danville, Va., April 4, 1865.

For many months the largest and finest army of the Confederacy, under the command of a leader whose presence inspires equal confidence in the troops and the people, has been greatly trammeled by the necessity of keeping constant watch over the approaches to the capital, and has thus been forced to forego more than one opportunity for promising enterprise. The hopes and confidence of the enemy have been constantly excited by the belief that their possession of Richmond would be the signal for our submission to their rule, and relieve them from the burden of war, as their failing resources admonish them it must be abandoned if not speedily brought to a successful close. It is for us, my countrymen, to show by our bearing under reverses how wretched has been the self-deception of those who have believed us less able to endure misfortune with fortitude than to encounter danger with courage. We have now entered upon a new phase of a struggle the memory of which is to endure for all ages and to shed an increasing luster upon our country.

Jefferson Davis. Transcribed from Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, compiled by James D. Richardson (2 vols., 1904), Volume 1, pp. 568-70.

From a ‘moral and political’ viewpoint, Richmond's fall would be ‘a serious calamity,’ Lee reportedly conceded, but once it happened, he could prolong the war for two more years on Virginia soil. Since the war began he had been forced to let the enemy make strategic plans for him, because he had to defend the capital, but ‘when Richmond falls I shall be able to make them for myself.’

Ernest B. Furguson, Ashes of Glory: Richmond at War (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1997), 306-307


Moving the capital and Lee's army south was in fact actively anticipated; however, such was the unshakable belief that Lee would keep holding the transfer of the capital was delayed until it was far too late. Conversely, Lee was sworn to defend the capital and did so until his forces were exhausted and unable to move south in advance of the Union armies to join up with Johnston. The 'Richmond at all costs' and 'Lee cannot fail' mindset in Davis almost assured the historical outcome but it might not have occurred as it did. In any case CW II allows the CSA player to explore this and many other 'what-ifs.'

One thing Davis and Lee both agreed on, was that the Confederacy's best chance at success, was to work together as one entity... kind of like the Union...

But Davis, I believe concentrated--had to actually--on the politics more than Lee, and Lee's view was pragmatically based on the military aspect of the conflict.

I'm curios, do you know from when Lee's quote is?

[Stauffenberg]

A good question and I don't have Furguson's book on Richmond during the war. One might assume it was made during the period of the siege in 64-65, but it could really apply to any period he was fighting to defend Richmond, even back to the Peninsula campaign. So I don't know.

As well: "reportedly conceded" implies it is not a direct quote.

[Captain_Orso]

I may have found the source: https://bi.hcpdts.com/reflowable/scroll ... 0062029201

I've found several indications that he was quoted in a newspaper article which circulated around Virginia and North Carolina, maybe even as far reaching as Cincinnati, in July 1881. But access to the online copies of the papers costs money, and I'm not that fanatical to find the source

[Stauffenberg]

I may have found the source: https://bi.hcpdts.com/reflowable/scroll ... 0062029201

I've found several indications that he was quoted in a newspaper article which circulated around Virginia and North Carolina, maybe even as far reaching as Cincinnati, in July 1881. But access to the online copies of the papers costs money, and I'm not that fanatical to find the source

Yes you found it and I've ordered Winik's book as it looks superb, and not just because it bolsters my own view of how things might have ended very differently in 1865.
From the editor's description of the book:

Winik shows that there was nothing inevitable about the end of the Civil War, from the fall of Richmond to the surrender at Appomattox to the murder of Lincoln. It all happened so quickly, in what "proved to be perhaps the most moving and decisive month not simply of the Civil War, but indeed, quite likely, in the life of the United States."

[Gray Fox]

Atlanta and Columbia were smoldering ruins. Grant's strategy seemed to be to kill as many Confederate soldiers as possible. Continuing the war would be very costly. Many sources believe that Lee probably suffered a heart attack some time after Gettysburg. This may certainly have influenced his judgement about surrender. Remember that Lee joined with the Confederacy because he could not fight his fellow Virginians. How could he abandon VA to continue the war?

[Captain_Orso]

Because Lee understood that to save the Confederacy, and ultimately Virginia from the Union, he would above all else have to focus on the survival of his only weapon against the threats on the Confederacy and Virginia, his army. Without it, all else was lost.

He knew that even if he were forced off Virginia soil, he might still return to retake it. If he lost is army, he could stand in Virginia all he wanted, and change nothing, which is actually what the status was after Appomattox.

[Stauffenberg]

Yes and he had intended to move earlier and head south. Two final factors closed the door for Lee: his horses were too weak to pull guns and wagons with heavy mud and he was waiting for the land to dry out; and secondly the infamous CSA supply train for his army that failed to appear when he finally did get moving west. With supplies he might have pushed through Grant's blocking forces, but without them it was all over for Lee's army.

[hanny1]

8<

Its a game and in games anything can happen, Richmond as the 2nd highest pop center of the CSA in 61 will treble its pop base after becomming the capital and by 64 be producing over half of the CSA mility warmaking requirements, CSA no longer required imports to field armies but could not sustain them food wise, the game allows that military munition resource base to be created in many areas simply by purchasing the capacity, in real life its more complicated and requires a long lead tim eto put into effect rather than get it instntly as inthe game.

If it was a simulation then you would have less options for where munition production etc can be produced, and a more certain outcome to not only where the production base can be built,but the outcome itself much more predictable.Either way once Richmondd is the capital and VA is the main theatre, any relocation should have a massive negative to the CSA morale and warfighting capacity after its been established for any length of time.

Very interesting reading, thanks.

I agree, the economy in the game is very, very vaguely modeled. I am in no way an expert on the Southern economy, but I've picked up a thing or two along the way.

Very basically, the Southern economy before the war was based on selling cotton for cash or gold and spending the proceeds to buy all good necessary to live and thrive on. As I read once, a Southerner before the war said, in my words because I don't remember the quote exactly, "why have factories to make shoes, when you can pay somebody else to have a factory to make shoes".

When trade was reduced by the blockade, the economy reacted very slowly to readjust to the new situation, and a large part of this was caused by the prevailing attitude of paying others for your necessities. It was not just a way of life, but a perceived entitlement.

Although the factory structures offered to be put into military use during the game are historical, I have no reason to believe their costs nor their output are in any way historical. If we accept that a very large portion of war materials were produced in Richmond, it questions how production is represented in the game.

The economy of the war could really be a game by itself, if it were done right.

if you have not seen mark hermans gmt boardgame, for the people, at his website or boardgamegeek, then check out the online rules for how he modeled the conflict. it has many excellent mechanisms that are easily ported into a pc game, such as the strategic will, csa production resource assets. many boardgames have insights that can usually be borrowed from, gmts game is one of the better ones.

[Captain_Orso]

8<

if you have not seen mark hermans gmt boardgame, for the people, at his website or boardgamegeek, then check out the online rules for how he modeled the conflict. it has many excellent mechanisms that are easily ported into a pc game, such as the strategic will, csa production resource assets. many boardgames have insights that can usually be borrowed from, gmts game is one of the better ones.

Thanks Hanny, I'll have to take a look at that.

[principes romanes]

if you have not seen mark hermans gmt boardgame, for the people, at his website or boardgamegeek, then check out the online rules for how he modeled the conflict. it has many excellent mechanisms that are easily ported into a pc game, such as the strategic will, csa production resource assets. many boardgames have insights that can usually be borrowed from, gmts game is one of the better ones.

I was looking at this game a bit over the holidays. One of the really cool features is how the blockade in that game interacts not only with production, but also strategic will. And I think it has a neat difference on how it conceptualizes both the relative (i.e. compared to the other side) and absolute will to fight. And I think it is interesting that one of Mark Hermann's observations is that the size of forces did not matter that much - which is at odds (pun fully intended) with the 3-1 odds conventional wisdom says is required in AGEOD.

[hanny1]

Yes combat odds in FtP is an intresting take on things, 10 to 1 is an overun and no you get a bonus for 3 to 1, 4 to 1, 5to 1, hias rational is differnt from most crt tables in that after a certain point the extra men are largly irrelevent to the outcome, as the number of defenders are already matched by as many men per meter of ground as can be achieved. Further dividing the crt into small medium and large engagments with the large ones also effecting Strategic will is a a further innovative aproach that makes most engagements attritional in nature that allow a smaller force to cause relativly more losses on an attacker than one might excpect, of course there are other bonuses to combat that further adjustments but the central point to the combat mechanics hie ahs introduced is to make being outnumbered from 4 to 9 to 1 almost irreloavent for the opening engagement, and if you lose as the defender you get to retreat away from further combat for free so as to avoid being overun in losses bring you down to a 10 to 1 ratio. He does not say but i would bet bet he was influenced by the very dated crt tables that largely reflect numbers of men, ie a raw value, as compared to more modern systems that reflect a combat power generated by a number of crewed weapon systems, so men with shoulder arms, crew served long range weapon etc as per his Div sized basic unit counter.

He is correct ( as evidenced by Dupoys QJM,] that the WBTS saw dimishing returns for numbers engaged and an increase in frontage of the forces brought into contact.

All in all an excellent boardgame, and others should borrow as many of his ideas as possible!