I have played well into late 1806 and while the latest BETA patch fixes Pressburg the other scripted events are still not working as I think they should.
For example.
1. Confederation of the Rhine option does not align the major German states into the French alliance as historically (Hesse, Berg, Baden, Bavaria (though its normally already a member of the French alliance) Wuttemburg - they remain neutral. It instead creates a generic new state that I suppose is an acceptable abstraction of the minor German states but this new state is not in the French Alliance either and infact does not even allow French movement or supply!
2. 'Saxony Changes Sides' event simply makes Saxony sign a peace treaty with France but keeps it in the war against the French allies!! (Bavaria ETC) - Saxony should IMO join the French alliance when this event fires. Also this event causes French units in Saxony to teleport out and while this did not happen to me others have reported whole Corps being destroyed in this process.
3. Numerous events are missing a text entry for example 'Saxony changes sides' and or 'Unrivalled logistics'.
I think its fair to speculate that the other events (Tilsit etc) I have not got to yet are also broken - these really need to be fixed these aren't bugs related to technical problems they are simply the game not being released in a playable state.
Yes, quiete a mess right now
Here are some thoughts if you want to delve into modding events until all this gets fixed
1. Someone noticed in another thread that there is an event for the Confederation of the Rhine that has the wrong starting date in 1807 instead of 1806, I corrected this in the files and now it does joins France and gives access, still, this event should be much more meaningful and stop all the little wars in the southern german states and put them on the French side, at least while France has the upper hand, perhaps if French morale drops to a certain point the Confederation should break up?
2. Indeed this event is only a very good peace treaty for Saxony in it´s current form. I modded the event to put Saxony in an alliance with France and dissolve the defensive pacts with Prussia and Austria, this stops all the french allies wars with Saxony the next turn, I also added a drop of relations for Saxony with France`s enemies. Again, maybe there should be a reversal event in case of a french colapse
3. Adding text is a little more complicated but doable. I added a couple of lines to Saxony´s event, there is an excel file that contains the text for every event
Always make a backup of any file before changing it of course
Here are some thoughts if you want to delve into modding events until all this gets fixed
1. Someone noticed in another thread that there is an event for the Confederation of the Rhine that has the wrong starting date in 1807 instead of 1806, I corrected this in the files and now it does joins France and gives access, still, this event should be much more meaningful and stop all the little wars in the southern german states and put them on the French side, at least while France has the upper hand, perhaps if French morale drops to a certain point the Confederation should break up?
2. Indeed this event is only a very good peace treaty for Saxony in it´s current form. I modded the event to put Saxony in an alliance with France and dissolve the defensive pacts with Prussia and Austria, this stops all the french allies wars with Saxony the next turn, I also added a drop of relations for Saxony with France`s enemies. Again, maybe there should be a reversal event in case of a french colapse
3. Adding text is a little more complicated but doable. I added a couple of lines to Saxony´s event, there is an excel file that contains the text for every event
Always make a backup of any file before changing it of course
This is where a more dynamic core of events would make a world of difference. Basically the smaller german states in the period adapted to France's rising and then waning (the great 1813 coat turning) strength. Big french military victories against Austria (for southern german states) and Prussia (for middle and northern german ones) should lead those states to seek the french protection / change side, without meaning that they will be very committed to fighting for the french (ie all the german troops fighting for/with France should gain the dispirited trait). Only specific cases like Poland and the Kingdom of Italy saw french allies fight with commitment.
And indeed the diplomatic engine is at the same time a bit rigid and way too dynamic for many small countries...
Regarding the events, I just went through the Rhine Confederation sequence and it is indeed absurd to have that new state be neutral when the event should actually have as a consequence that most southern and central german states become french satellites (but with no real motivation to fight for the french).
Having a country called "Rhine confederation" to emulate all those middle germany small states is an abstraction I can leave with, but it should basically have hardly any troops (or recruiting abilities) beyond garrison troops so that it becomes the "playground" for campaigning for the bigger guys. I would actually call that country "Rhine confederation minors" and make it a dead fish diplomatically : a satellite french state with very limited troops who just switches sides (and changes name to "middle germany minors") when a simple set of criteria is meant (ie french morale below x, Prussiand or Austrian morale above y).
And indeed the diplomatic engine is at the same time a bit rigid and way too dynamic for many small countries...
Regarding the events, I just went through the Rhine Confederation sequence and it is indeed absurd to have that new state be neutral when the event should actually have as a consequence that most southern and central german states become french satellites (but with no real motivation to fight for the french).
Having a country called "Rhine confederation" to emulate all those middle germany small states is an abstraction I can leave with, but it should basically have hardly any troops (or recruiting abilities) beyond garrison troops so that it becomes the "playground" for campaigning for the bigger guys. I would actually call that country "Rhine confederation minors" and make it a dead fish diplomatically : a satellite french state with very limited troops who just switches sides (and changes name to "middle germany minors") when a simple set of criteria is meant (ie french morale below x, Prussiand or Austrian morale above y).
@ veji1
dunno from where youve got this wrong informations about german minor states.
some didnt fight well because of some reasons : badly equipped, some were pushed into states they dont liked like the westphalians, and some didnt like to be cannonfudder for the french.
but the most of them fought bravely and high respected by the french.
did you know that the most soldiers in russia have been german natives from the grande armee and hessians helped holding the beresina-bridge till its end and the spanish feared the hessian soldiers more then the french in the peninsular war?
there are a lot more examples i could write but i dont wanna take this offtopic
IMO it would be definately wrong to abstract those little states
dunno from where youve got this wrong informations about german minor states.
some didnt fight well because of some reasons : badly equipped, some were pushed into states they dont liked like the westphalians, and some didnt like to be cannonfudder for the french.
but the most of them fought bravely and high respected by the french.
did you know that the most soldiers in russia have been german natives from the grande armee and hessians helped holding the beresina-bridge till its end and the spanish feared the hessian soldiers more then the french in the peninsular war?
there are a lot more examples i could write but i dont wanna take this offtopic
IMO it would be definately wrong to abstract those little states
verdom wrote:@ veji1
dunno from where youve got this wrong informations about german minor states.
some didnt fight well because of some reasons : badly equipped, some were pushed into states they dont liked like the westphalians, and some didnt like to be cannonfudder for the french.
but the most of them fought bravely and high respected by the french.
did you know that the most soldiers in russia have been german natives from the grande armee and hessians helped holding the beresina-bridge till its end and the spanish feared the hessian soldiers more then the french in the peninsular war?
there are a lot more examples i could write but i dont wanna take this offtopic
IMO it would be definately wrong to abstract those little states
sorry, I didn't mean to offend or mean they weren't quality soldiers, in the 1809 campaigns they did some very heavy lifting as well. My point was more that in terms of game play, to avoid the french having more and more allies and using expeditionnary forces from many different states to reinforce his army excessively, having the german minors fighting along the french with the dispirited trait would emulate well the limits of their use.
By no means did I intend to call them bad soldiers.
I have to disagree with your blanket assessment of France’s German Allied troops. The following is an excerpt concerning German troops in the 1809 Campaign:
“In January of 1809, Napoleon In Valladoid, Spain, had dictated a series of Imperial commands to his allies in the Rheinbund, directing that they prepare their contingents for war against Austria. Twelve months later, the Habsburgs once more defeated, most of the German troops finally returned home. It had been a major effort for he Rheinbund states. Every available man had bee mobilized for the conflictand in most cases the only forces not engaged against the Austrians were those already committed in Spain. Additionally, most of the larger stats raised new new unhits during the course of the campaign. Württemburg, for example, eventually exceeded its Rheinbund requirement by nearly fifty per cent. In all, more than 100,000 German soldiers from thirty-one different states participated in the campaign, enduring brutal forced marches, horrifically grand battles and the dull loneliness of interminable picket duty in the service of their French Emperor. It had been a war broad in scope and the men of the Confederation had appeared in almost every theater, from the Baltic to Lake Balaton, from Westphalia to Warsaw. From the opening guns along the Isar to the last rounds fired at Znaim, Napoleon’s German allies had stood in the front ranks with their French comrades, playing a major role in the great struggles and paying a heavy price in blood.
Beyond the immediacy of the battlefield, however, it must be remembered that the early nineteenth century was a time of tremendous upheaval in Germany. The French Revolution and the subsequent progress of French arms across the face of Europe had awakened peoples and monarchs between the Rhine and the Elbe to new concepts of society, government and national identity. Militarily, these concepts were reflected in the changing nature of the German defense establishments as they made the transition dynastic, mercenary forces into truly national armies. Heavily influenced, if not dominated, by France after their incorporation into the Rheinbund and exposed to Napoleonic warfare on the fringes of the 1805 and 1806-07 campaigns, the remodelled, national armies of the German states faced their first true test in 1809. The war with Austria thus provides an opportunity to assess the martial qualities of Napoleon’s German allies within a context of dramatic social, political and military change.
The Heroic and the Hapless: Assessing the Rheinbund Contingents
Based on their battlefield performances in 1809, the Rheinbund troops can be placed into several catagories. The best are relatively easy to select: the contingents of Württemburg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt all displayed superior valour, initiative, endurance and tactical skill during the course of the campaign. The light troops of these three states was particularly good. Von Hügel’s crack Württemburg Light Brigade, for instance, nearly equalled the exertions of Davout’s redoubtable veterans between 19 and 22 April and achieved a brilliant success in its daring night attack against the Pöstlingberg on 17 May. The Baden Jäger Battalion in the pursuit after Wagram and the Hessian fusiliers in the June expedition to Hungary provide further proof of the high quality of these hardy troops. The light horseman matched their infantry comrades in courage and enterprise, earning the honest praise of such French cavalry heroes as Lasalle and Marulaz. Likewise, the light artillery batteries of Baden and Württemburg were noted for their proficiency and highly valued by the French. Nor should the line troops be neglected. The fighting at Linz, Aspern and Aderklaa gives testimony to the spirit, training and bravery of the line battalions, while their stamina was severely tested on numerous forced marches such as Massena’s move from Augsburg to Eggmühl.
A key factor in the performance of these contingents was the excellence of their leaders. At all levels, officers in the three armies demonstrated energy, determination and tactical competence, training their men well and instilling in them the the offensive spirit and drive characteristics of Napoleonic warfare. Among the senior leaders, the Württemburg generals von Hügel and von Wöllwarth were especially noteworthy, while men such as Oberstlieutenant (sic) von Francken, Major von Gall, Käpitan von von Freydorf and Rittmeister von Bismark exemplified the fine qualities of the middle and junior grades. Under leaders such as these, the troops of Baden, Württemburg and Hesse-Darmstadt represented the best the Rheinbund had to offer in 1809, providing Napoleon with superb troops equal to the majority of French soldiers.
Just as best troops stand out, so do the worst, and it is a fairly simple matter to identify the Mecklenburg, Oldenburg and Westphalian units as the least reliable of Napoleon’s German allies in 1809. The causes for their unreliability, however, were significantly different. Oldenburg and the two Mecklenburg Duchies were old states, unrepentantly clinging to the norms of a bygone age. Their armies, closely linked to Prussia’s and imbued with Frederickian notions of military organization, were generally recruited from ne’er-do-well foreigners and consequently had no national spirit and little loyalty to their nominal monarchs. These weaknesses were compounded by the poor training, poor equipment and distinctly anti-French attitude that pervaded all three contingents. When Schill brought combat to the north German states, it is threrefore hardly surprising that the Mecklenburgers broke and deserted en masse, while the Oldenburg troops, at the direction of their duke, carefully avoided any contact with Braunschweig’s Black Corps. The French had every reason to be dissatisfied with these contingents.
The Westphalians, on the other hand showed some potential. The men could be individually courageous – as at Dodendorf and Halberstadt – even as they went down to defeat and the army held together despite the tensions of divided loyalties and repeated internal rebellions. It was, however, a new army, there had been no time to develop unit cohesion, the troops were generally inexperienced and inadequately trained. Moreover, the army’s leadership was conspicuously poor. Despite occasional moments of competence, Jerome and his senior commanders showed themselves confused, indecisive and far too fond of luxury, invariably setting a negative example for their subordinates on this their first campaign.
Having defined the extremes among the Confederation contingents, the remainder may be placed in the middle. Bavaria supplied by far the largest body of German troops in 1809, its numbers approaching 47,000 when all the reserve battalions, volunteer formations and National Guard units are added to its corps of regulars. I general, the infantry of the regular and reserve battalions were steady, brave and competent, but unexceptional and rather slow, lacking something of the verve of the French and the determination of the better Rheinbund troops. When pressed, however, they could move with speed and decision, as Wrede’s Division demonstrated in its admirable marches on Salzburg and Wagram. The cavalry and artillery were especially good, both branches repeatedly proving their courage and tactical skill on the road from Abensburg to Znaim. As with the armies of Württemburg, Baden and Hesse, leadership was a strong point of the Bavarian military. The divisional commanders and the cavalry brigade commanders stand out, but the entire officer corps performed well throughout the campaign, capable professionals who understood their missions and cared for their men.
A large part of the Bavarian experience of wra in 1809 was in the Tyrol. The exigencies of combating tenacious insurgents in the mountains of that region posed significant challenges for the Bavarians at first, but they gradually learned to cope witgh this style of warfare and the opening of the Third Offensive was a model of careful planning and skillful execution. Unfortunately, the war in the Tyrol was also marked by all manner of excesses and cruelties which otherwise tainted the otherwise fine combat record of the Bavarian troops.
Another unit to fight and bleed in the Tyrol was the 4th Rheinbund Regiment of the five Saxon Duchies. Like the Bavarian Corps, the 4th Rheinbund was a body of solid German troops, disciplined and professional. Though many were relatively new recruits, they trained hard, fought well, and exhibited excellent spirit under great adversity. The 5th and 6th Regiments, suffering sonewhat from desertion, were apparently less stable and cohesive, but it is difficult to form a firm impression of their combat value as they were never involved in a serious engagement. The same applies to the 2nd Rheinbund, but this regiment, through its superior appearance and drill, managed to acquire a (sic) enviable reputation which it later substantiated in Spain.
The Saxons are the most controversial lot. Their cavalry was universally regarded as superb and, under leaders like von Gutschmid, the mounted regiments added further lustre to their names in 1809 despite the lack of suitable horseflesh. The Schützen battalions, though new, also performed well. Battalion ‘von Metzsch,’ for example, earned the respect of General Dupas for being the last unit of his division to withdraw from the Russbach Heights on the evening of 5 July. The remainder of the infantry, however, presented a different picture. Although the individual soldiers were brave enough, unit cohesion was weak and the line formations were plagued by ancient leadership, insufficient training, poor equipment and outdated attitudes. The situation improved slightly when much of the gerontocracy returned to Saxony in mid-June, but there was not time to revitalize the corps in the weeks before Wagram. Thrown into the center of the line under Bernadotte’s uncertain command, the infantry took heavy casualties on 5 and 6 July and had to be pulled out of the fight. The thorough reforms introduced in 1810 were long overdue, but the Saxon Army’s reputation never recovered form the damage inflicted at Wagram.
The other contingents played only peripheral roles in the campaign. The Berg infantrymen seemed to be held in some esteem as combat troops when compared to the Westphalians, but shared the same evil reputation for misbehavior and indiscipline. The cavalry regiment, on the other hand, had impressed Napoleon at Versailles and was considered a real asset although it saw no combat in 1809. The Würzburg sappers and train personnel were too small in numbers to excite any attention and were essentially excluded from combat by the nature of their tasks. Likewise, the Frankfurt battalion only saw easy garrison duty in Erfurt and its members returned to their hearths without firing a shot.
A Broader Perspective
Beyond the combat qualities of the various contingents, the 1809 campaign offers interesting insights into several other aspects of the Napoleonic era. First, the Rheinbund armies present the full spectrum of military modernization as Europe progressed from Frederickian to Napoleonic styles of warfare. At one extreme, stiff, traditional states like Saxony tenaciously clung to the forms of the past, while at the other, modern states such as Bavaria and Württemburg accepted the spirit of the new age and judiciously remoulded their armies within the framework of their military heritages and national loyalties. Fealty to the sovereign continued to be a mojor consideration, particularly for officers, but Württemburg’s modern reserve system and Bavaria’s truly national army pointed the way to the future. The future was also evident in the details of the German armies of 1809. Influenced by the impressive triumphs of French Arms as well as direct pressure from Paris, the Rheinbund states modified their organizations, their tactics and even their uniforms to meet the demands of modern war and alliance with Napoleon. In many cases there was also a subtle change in attitude. Association with the impetuous, victorious Grande Armee infused in not a few Germans an expectation of glory and a bold offensive spirit, a desire, almost an urgency, to overcome all obstacles. The best of the Confederation forces thus drew close to the French model and fitted smoothly into the operational structure of the Grande Armee; the less capable were often bewildered, hastening to grasp changes they barely understood.”
and
“Paralleling the growth of nationalism, however, was an apperently contradictory trend among the German contingents: pride in their association with the Grande Armee. By transforming the Germans into alliesnd imposing upon them common tactics, doctrine and organization, Napoleon achieved a significant degree of standardization that raised the combat value of the German units and streamlined command and control in his multinational armies. Rheinbund units were thus full partners of the French in great victories of 1809 and added bright streamers of glory to their regimental chronicles. Less tangible but equally important was the intimate link Napoleon thereby forged between himself and his German soldiers. The men and their commanders not only came to rely upon France for military support but also developed a personal attachment to the Emperor, and, before long, his appearance in front of a German regiment would evoke the same degree of enthusiasm he was accustomed to receiving from his French troops.”
SOURCE:
Gill, John H., “With Eagles to Glory – Napoleon and his German Allies in the 1809 Campaign,” Frontline Books, South Yorkshire, UK, 2011.
Also, Napoleon didn’t “Request” expeditionary forces from his allies – he issued Edicts describing how many troops to be raised, and what types of units to be formed. In the short term, so as to fit within the existing game system, the “Request Expeditionary Force” needs to be extremely liberal – all non-locked, non-garrison units.
“In January of 1809, Napoleon In Valladoid, Spain, had dictated a series of Imperial commands to his allies in the Rheinbund, directing that they prepare their contingents for war against Austria. Twelve months later, the Habsburgs once more defeated, most of the German troops finally returned home. It had been a major effort for he Rheinbund states. Every available man had bee mobilized for the conflictand in most cases the only forces not engaged against the Austrians were those already committed in Spain. Additionally, most of the larger stats raised new new unhits during the course of the campaign. Württemburg, for example, eventually exceeded its Rheinbund requirement by nearly fifty per cent. In all, more than 100,000 German soldiers from thirty-one different states participated in the campaign, enduring brutal forced marches, horrifically grand battles and the dull loneliness of interminable picket duty in the service of their French Emperor. It had been a war broad in scope and the men of the Confederation had appeared in almost every theater, from the Baltic to Lake Balaton, from Westphalia to Warsaw. From the opening guns along the Isar to the last rounds fired at Znaim, Napoleon’s German allies had stood in the front ranks with their French comrades, playing a major role in the great struggles and paying a heavy price in blood.
Beyond the immediacy of the battlefield, however, it must be remembered that the early nineteenth century was a time of tremendous upheaval in Germany. The French Revolution and the subsequent progress of French arms across the face of Europe had awakened peoples and monarchs between the Rhine and the Elbe to new concepts of society, government and national identity. Militarily, these concepts were reflected in the changing nature of the German defense establishments as they made the transition dynastic, mercenary forces into truly national armies. Heavily influenced, if not dominated, by France after their incorporation into the Rheinbund and exposed to Napoleonic warfare on the fringes of the 1805 and 1806-07 campaigns, the remodelled, national armies of the German states faced their first true test in 1809. The war with Austria thus provides an opportunity to assess the martial qualities of Napoleon’s German allies within a context of dramatic social, political and military change.
The Heroic and the Hapless: Assessing the Rheinbund Contingents
Based on their battlefield performances in 1809, the Rheinbund troops can be placed into several catagories. The best are relatively easy to select: the contingents of Württemburg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt all displayed superior valour, initiative, endurance and tactical skill during the course of the campaign. The light troops of these three states was particularly good. Von Hügel’s crack Württemburg Light Brigade, for instance, nearly equalled the exertions of Davout’s redoubtable veterans between 19 and 22 April and achieved a brilliant success in its daring night attack against the Pöstlingberg on 17 May. The Baden Jäger Battalion in the pursuit after Wagram and the Hessian fusiliers in the June expedition to Hungary provide further proof of the high quality of these hardy troops. The light horseman matched their infantry comrades in courage and enterprise, earning the honest praise of such French cavalry heroes as Lasalle and Marulaz. Likewise, the light artillery batteries of Baden and Württemburg were noted for their proficiency and highly valued by the French. Nor should the line troops be neglected. The fighting at Linz, Aspern and Aderklaa gives testimony to the spirit, training and bravery of the line battalions, while their stamina was severely tested on numerous forced marches such as Massena’s move from Augsburg to Eggmühl.
A key factor in the performance of these contingents was the excellence of their leaders. At all levels, officers in the three armies demonstrated energy, determination and tactical competence, training their men well and instilling in them the the offensive spirit and drive characteristics of Napoleonic warfare. Among the senior leaders, the Württemburg generals von Hügel and von Wöllwarth were especially noteworthy, while men such as Oberstlieutenant (sic) von Francken, Major von Gall, Käpitan von von Freydorf and Rittmeister von Bismark exemplified the fine qualities of the middle and junior grades. Under leaders such as these, the troops of Baden, Württemburg and Hesse-Darmstadt represented the best the Rheinbund had to offer in 1809, providing Napoleon with superb troops equal to the majority of French soldiers.
Just as best troops stand out, so do the worst, and it is a fairly simple matter to identify the Mecklenburg, Oldenburg and Westphalian units as the least reliable of Napoleon’s German allies in 1809. The causes for their unreliability, however, were significantly different. Oldenburg and the two Mecklenburg Duchies were old states, unrepentantly clinging to the norms of a bygone age. Their armies, closely linked to Prussia’s and imbued with Frederickian notions of military organization, were generally recruited from ne’er-do-well foreigners and consequently had no national spirit and little loyalty to their nominal monarchs. These weaknesses were compounded by the poor training, poor equipment and distinctly anti-French attitude that pervaded all three contingents. When Schill brought combat to the north German states, it is threrefore hardly surprising that the Mecklenburgers broke and deserted en masse, while the Oldenburg troops, at the direction of their duke, carefully avoided any contact with Braunschweig’s Black Corps. The French had every reason to be dissatisfied with these contingents.
The Westphalians, on the other hand showed some potential. The men could be individually courageous – as at Dodendorf and Halberstadt – even as they went down to defeat and the army held together despite the tensions of divided loyalties and repeated internal rebellions. It was, however, a new army, there had been no time to develop unit cohesion, the troops were generally inexperienced and inadequately trained. Moreover, the army’s leadership was conspicuously poor. Despite occasional moments of competence, Jerome and his senior commanders showed themselves confused, indecisive and far too fond of luxury, invariably setting a negative example for their subordinates on this their first campaign.
Having defined the extremes among the Confederation contingents, the remainder may be placed in the middle. Bavaria supplied by far the largest body of German troops in 1809, its numbers approaching 47,000 when all the reserve battalions, volunteer formations and National Guard units are added to its corps of regulars. I general, the infantry of the regular and reserve battalions were steady, brave and competent, but unexceptional and rather slow, lacking something of the verve of the French and the determination of the better Rheinbund troops. When pressed, however, they could move with speed and decision, as Wrede’s Division demonstrated in its admirable marches on Salzburg and Wagram. The cavalry and artillery were especially good, both branches repeatedly proving their courage and tactical skill on the road from Abensburg to Znaim. As with the armies of Württemburg, Baden and Hesse, leadership was a strong point of the Bavarian military. The divisional commanders and the cavalry brigade commanders stand out, but the entire officer corps performed well throughout the campaign, capable professionals who understood their missions and cared for their men.
A large part of the Bavarian experience of wra in 1809 was in the Tyrol. The exigencies of combating tenacious insurgents in the mountains of that region posed significant challenges for the Bavarians at first, but they gradually learned to cope witgh this style of warfare and the opening of the Third Offensive was a model of careful planning and skillful execution. Unfortunately, the war in the Tyrol was also marked by all manner of excesses and cruelties which otherwise tainted the otherwise fine combat record of the Bavarian troops.
Another unit to fight and bleed in the Tyrol was the 4th Rheinbund Regiment of the five Saxon Duchies. Like the Bavarian Corps, the 4th Rheinbund was a body of solid German troops, disciplined and professional. Though many were relatively new recruits, they trained hard, fought well, and exhibited excellent spirit under great adversity. The 5th and 6th Regiments, suffering sonewhat from desertion, were apparently less stable and cohesive, but it is difficult to form a firm impression of their combat value as they were never involved in a serious engagement. The same applies to the 2nd Rheinbund, but this regiment, through its superior appearance and drill, managed to acquire a (sic) enviable reputation which it later substantiated in Spain.
The Saxons are the most controversial lot. Their cavalry was universally regarded as superb and, under leaders like von Gutschmid, the mounted regiments added further lustre to their names in 1809 despite the lack of suitable horseflesh. The Schützen battalions, though new, also performed well. Battalion ‘von Metzsch,’ for example, earned the respect of General Dupas for being the last unit of his division to withdraw from the Russbach Heights on the evening of 5 July. The remainder of the infantry, however, presented a different picture. Although the individual soldiers were brave enough, unit cohesion was weak and the line formations were plagued by ancient leadership, insufficient training, poor equipment and outdated attitudes. The situation improved slightly when much of the gerontocracy returned to Saxony in mid-June, but there was not time to revitalize the corps in the weeks before Wagram. Thrown into the center of the line under Bernadotte’s uncertain command, the infantry took heavy casualties on 5 and 6 July and had to be pulled out of the fight. The thorough reforms introduced in 1810 were long overdue, but the Saxon Army’s reputation never recovered form the damage inflicted at Wagram.
The other contingents played only peripheral roles in the campaign. The Berg infantrymen seemed to be held in some esteem as combat troops when compared to the Westphalians, but shared the same evil reputation for misbehavior and indiscipline. The cavalry regiment, on the other hand, had impressed Napoleon at Versailles and was considered a real asset although it saw no combat in 1809. The Würzburg sappers and train personnel were too small in numbers to excite any attention and were essentially excluded from combat by the nature of their tasks. Likewise, the Frankfurt battalion only saw easy garrison duty in Erfurt and its members returned to their hearths without firing a shot.
A Broader Perspective
Beyond the combat qualities of the various contingents, the 1809 campaign offers interesting insights into several other aspects of the Napoleonic era. First, the Rheinbund armies present the full spectrum of military modernization as Europe progressed from Frederickian to Napoleonic styles of warfare. At one extreme, stiff, traditional states like Saxony tenaciously clung to the forms of the past, while at the other, modern states such as Bavaria and Württemburg accepted the spirit of the new age and judiciously remoulded their armies within the framework of their military heritages and national loyalties. Fealty to the sovereign continued to be a mojor consideration, particularly for officers, but Württemburg’s modern reserve system and Bavaria’s truly national army pointed the way to the future. The future was also evident in the details of the German armies of 1809. Influenced by the impressive triumphs of French Arms as well as direct pressure from Paris, the Rheinbund states modified their organizations, their tactics and even their uniforms to meet the demands of modern war and alliance with Napoleon. In many cases there was also a subtle change in attitude. Association with the impetuous, victorious Grande Armee infused in not a few Germans an expectation of glory and a bold offensive spirit, a desire, almost an urgency, to overcome all obstacles. The best of the Confederation forces thus drew close to the French model and fitted smoothly into the operational structure of the Grande Armee; the less capable were often bewildered, hastening to grasp changes they barely understood.”
and
“Paralleling the growth of nationalism, however, was an apperently contradictory trend among the German contingents: pride in their association with the Grande Armee. By transforming the Germans into alliesnd imposing upon them common tactics, doctrine and organization, Napoleon achieved a significant degree of standardization that raised the combat value of the German units and streamlined command and control in his multinational armies. Rheinbund units were thus full partners of the French in great victories of 1809 and added bright streamers of glory to their regimental chronicles. Less tangible but equally important was the intimate link Napoleon thereby forged between himself and his German soldiers. The men and their commanders not only came to rely upon France for military support but also developed a personal attachment to the Emperor, and, before long, his appearance in front of a German regiment would evoke the same degree of enthusiasm he was accustomed to receiving from his French troops.”
SOURCE:
Gill, John H., “With Eagles to Glory – Napoleon and his German Allies in the 1809 Campaign,” Frontline Books, South Yorkshire, UK, 2011.
Also, Napoleon didn’t “Request” expeditionary forces from his allies – he issued Edicts describing how many troops to be raised, and what types of units to be formed. In the short term, so as to fit within the existing game system, the “Request Expeditionary Force” needs to be extremely liberal – all non-locked, non-garrison units.
verdom wrote:All fine, i just dont wanted to let this game going into a direction where are just the major powers and thats it, as i think we should respect the smaller nations and the need for the majors to get them into their alliance and live with the small hinds they have and give.
I'm not an expert on history, but most of the minors in central Europe either became Satellites or were annexed. The in game events allow for French Annexation or Satellites of Papacy, Sicily, Holland, Rhineland, (which encompasses more than one minor between France/Prussia), Westphailia, Hannover, Oldenburg, Saxony, Dutchy of Warsaw. Pretty much all of them got swallowed and made into larger Satellites or became Satellites in themselves.
What's missing in the game right now is the true "satellite", which contributed fiscally to the French War Effort as well as providing troops. Right now a Satellite is fully independent (unless you request expeditionary forces) and an "Ally" They were more than that. That's something I'm working on in a mod right now.
Hannover Annexations will be in place (as well as non-scripted annexations and satellites for all powers, with low chance for success and great chance to alienate target plus ability to liberate annexations back to the original owners.) I believe there's a factional modifier for satellite nations. I've seen it in the code. I'm figuring out how that will play into this.
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fred zeppelin
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vicberg wrote:I'm not an expert on history, but most of the minors in central Europe either became Satellites or were annexed. The in game events allow for French Annexation or Satellites of Papacy, Sicily, Holland, Rhineland, (which encompasses more than one minor between France/Prussia), Westphailia, Hannover, Oldenburg, Saxony, Dutchy of Warsaw. Pretty much all of them got swallowed and made into larger Satellites or became Satellites in themselves.
What's missing in the game right now is the true "satellite", which contributed fiscally to the French War Effort as well as providing troops. Right now a Satellite is fully independent (unless you request expeditionary forces) and an "Ally" They were more than that. That's something I'm working on in a mod right now.
Hannover Annexations will be in place (as well as non-scripted annexations and satellites for all powers, with low chance for success and great chance to alienate target plus ability to liberate annexations back to the original owners.) I believe there's a factional modifier for satellite nations. I've seen it in the code. I'm figuring out how that will play into this.
I applaud all your work on this.
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