Shri wrote:Waterloo is a great victory but it is not as decisive as portrayed by the English press and propaganda which his accepted by some history books.
The real blow to Napoleon was the losses in Spain and Russia followed by the coup de grace in Leipzig.
Even if Napoleon wins Waterloo, the Russian army was fast approaching and they alone would have outnumbered and outgunned the French.
The Austrians and Swedes were also mobilising big armies.
The decisve allied victories were - Trafalgar, Spain, Russia and Leipzig.
Shri wrote:Waterloo is a great victory but it is not as decisive as portrayed by the English press and propaganda which his accepted by some history books.
The real blow to Napoleon was the losses in Spain and Russia followed by the coup de grace in Leipzig.
Even if Napoleon wins Waterloo, the Russian army was fast approaching and they alone would have outnumbered and outgunned the French.
The Austrians and Swedes were also mobilising big armies.
The decisve allied victories were - Trafalgar, Spain, Russia and Leipzig.
dinsdale wrote:With respect, I don't understand this new version of the end of Napoleon's wars. By definition, there was only one battle as closely decisive as Waterloo during the period, and that was Austerlitz. No other battle, not even Jena/Auerstadt, brought such a cataclysmic end to one of the participants. Of course there were many contributing factors to the end of the Napoleonic Wars, but to deny the decisive nature of a battle which utterly destroyed one army and left France unable to fight should require more evidence than the current line of 'Napoleon would have eventually lost anyway.'
We don't put a suffix to Austerlitz, that it was only decisive because of Ulm, and it didn't really settle anything, so why is it so fashionable to do so now with Waterloo?
As for what would have happened had he won, I think Napoleon has demonstrated a remarkable ability to correctly read the political will of nations and intervene with perfect timing. Is it possible that the inevitability of his defeat which hindsight seems to have convinced modern historians may be incorrect and that perhaps Napoleon knew how great his chances for success were? Do we dismiss everything Napoleon did and trust the opinion of historians?
Napoleon's bet was had the Prussians been destroyed in Belgium, the Austrians would have either been eliminated or made peace. The Russian army would not have been on the Danube in time to save them. The Swedes were a minor contingent in 1813, and would be no greater in 1815 or 1816. Both Prussia and Austria were at the end of their desire to see their countries turned into battlefields and their armies destroyed in return for British gold, one major victory over each of them and the coalition would have collapsed. Perhaps Napoleon was wrong, but based on his history, I would wager he had a far greater grasp on the situation than anyone writing about it in the next 200 years.
Probably another topic, but IMHO, Trafalgar is the most overrated battle in the English speaking world. It settled nothing other than British morale and the enlargement of a number of estates through prize money. Had Nelson lost every ship, another larger British fleet was waiting for the Franco/Spaniards in the Channel. Even if there were no fleet at all, the next invasion opportunity was Spring 1806, by which time France was busy with Prussia.
Shri wrote:continuing my pedantry,
Russia should start with highly experienced artillery, guards and cavalry, decent infantry, but 0 ammo wagons and 0 hospitals.
Their AMMO was atrocious in 1805-1809 period. didn't explode half the time.
Every year they should get 1 AMMO, 1 HOSPITAL and 1 SUPPLY wagon in MOSCOW by event but be unable to produce any of those (Russian logistics and medical care was appalling and that is the reason their armies didn't perform as well as they ought to have).
Further, English armies should be able to regain only half the reinforcements gained by others (they had a sea to cross), this means English armies must start highly experienced and get excellent recruits but replenishment being slow, their advance should be very very slow.
England should have a lavish logistics train and excellent medics, engineers etc.
French 1805 army should start 2* exp and guards at 3* but replacements should be 1.25 times faster than others but too many replacements will erode the experience and destroy effectiveness. French generals, at least a few should have "Forager" or "Logistic wizard" ability.
France shouldn't have a great logistic train, but rely on "logistic wizard generals", but they should have good engineers and medics.
Shri wrote:I guess you agree about the English.
Regarding the Russians- said AMMO not SUPPLY Wagons and MEDICS.
If no MEDICS, then cohesion is lesser and recovery is lower and slower also the accruals from combat i.e. wounded healing is lesser.
If no AMMO trucks, Artillery is disadvantaged not infantry. After 2 rounds usually Russia would resort to cavalry charges and bayonet assaults,
why? one reason suggested was Suvorov the master Russian commander in the 1780s-90s whose advise if it had been followed, Napoleon wouldn't have come to power itself!.
But that aside, it was due to the fact that Russian artillery ran out of ammo and musket ammo was so useless after 2 rounds that bayonet was preferred. The russians usually had 20-25% more men in every infantry division as compared to other countries, this helped them in bayonet charges as the first line usually died in enemy fire.
For French- i don't know how you can give divisions forager ability!
That is why the compromise was commanders.
Shri wrote:France shouldn't have a great logistic train, but rely on "logistic wizard generals", but they should have good engineers and medics.
Shri wrote:@dinsdale, soundoff and others-
Besides, the Tsar had his own armies charging in.
Strategic Situation in 1815-
Russian armies were at their peak by 1813-1815, French were at their lowest. The Russians are always slow in a campaign, but once they get into their groove they are a STEAMROLLER, Russia alone could have taken on Austria, England, Prussia and France and conquered all of Europe and all of the allies were aware of this fact. If the Russians had captured Nappy, he would have been blown off a cannon!, that is why he surrendered to the English!.
Some background-
Just before Nappy's 100 day kids adventure began (Nappy was well past his prime, the whole campaign was useless in my opinion).
In late 1814, the 4 majors sat down for a discussion to carve the World-
England wanted World Empire and Naval Dominance- All Agreed.
Austria wanted Status Quo- none Agreed.
Prussia wanted to gobble Saxony and smaller German states - a la Bismarck, but only Russia agreed.
Russia wanted to gobble Poland (it has swallowed and spit out Poland for the last 500 years) - Prussia agreed.
Lord Londonderry of England against the English Cabinet's opinion, tried to trick Austria's Prince Metternich into bribing Prussia to join their side, Talleyrand of France was also a party to this devious trick, (a repeat of Edward Grey's trick just before WW1), somehow the Tsar's spies came to know (another version is - Koenig Wilhelm III made one of his Military Advisers- Count York or Gneisenau leak it), the Tsar immediately challenged Londonderry and Metternich to a duel!
He also declared in open session-
The King of Prussia will get Saxony and i will get whatever i want, i have 450000 troops in Poland and another 500000 in Moscow, he who dares oppose say so!.
This scared the living daylights of the Austrian Crown, Emperor Francis I was forced to intercede with the Tsar and sort out the matter.
In all this confusion, in came Napoleon and solved the fight of the 4 powers!.
Russia wouldn't have given up the fight on Napoleon whatever the cost, similarly Prussia.
So, defeat or victory at Waterloo is immaterial.
Even if Napoleon had mobilised Belgian French troops post Waterloo and added another 50000, sheer numbers of the Tsar's armies mattered and mind you the Tsar's armies were the best troops in Europe in 1815, had most amount of cannon and were lavishly equipped and supplied.
Going further, If you read about the Russian armies, you will see clearly that GRAND BATTERY concept isn't Napoleon's invention, it was used by Count Suvorov and the Russians again and again since the 1790s, the problem was till 1809, the Russian gunpowder was of inferior quality and in very less quantity, when the British subsidies reached them, gunpowder factories were set up which solved the problems of the artillery and infantry (infantry gunpowder was terrible, that is why Russian soldiers always used bayonets pre 1809 not guns).
By the time of 1812, Russian army had some 25% more guns than Napoleon's Grand Army, still they had ammo shortages and so they weren't used that effectively. Russian Artillery men even fought hand-to-hand melee to save the Tsar's cannon, as losing it meant death or Siberia!.
The French officers were amazed to see that their own artillery abandoned guns but Russians never abandoned, they preferred to take the guns with them in retreat or die trying.
In Napoleon, the French had discovered a new type of morale, but this was always there in the persona of the Tsar since the times of Peter the Great, the Tsar was a kind of God for the Russian Muzik(peasant) and the Tsar's rifle and cannon were worth more than 'life'.
Mickey3D wrote:I have just finished reading an article on the French Grand Army : it seems the idea the French were "living off the country" is not completely true.
Napoleon was giving importance to the war logistic (there was a dedicated ministry), chains of depots were organized in friendly/allied territories and/or allies were supporting French troops in their country (ok, we know it's difficult to ensure hundreds of thousands of men are not taking some liberties...).
It's only in ennemy territories that requisition was allowed. Moreover at its peak, the supply train was, theoritecally, made of 24 bataillons of 4 companies equiped with 34 wagons (i.e. a total of 3264 wagons).
Shri wrote:P.S.: In 1798, at the start of the 2nd coalition, Prince Suvorov put forth a proposal, 100000 Russians + 100000 Austrian Empire Soldiers guarded by 20000 Cossacks doing a straight march to Paris bypassing all the nonsense, bayoneting all the Revolutionary leaders and installing a Bourbon in Paris.
He asked for this and 3 months time. War Over. If the then Tsar (Paul the idiot) had agreed, the Napoleonic Wars would have been over before they started.
Suvorov's bold and rapid marches, constant offensives, grand battery formations, foraging for food, intense drilling, bayonet attacks, thirst for battle and reading enemy general's minds were all lessons learnt and applied well by Napoleonic France ironically and not Russia.
What you write of the Russian affinity for the French is pre 1812, post invasion, Russia was decidedly anti-French and pro-Prussian and remained so for the next 70 odd years. The Russians won over the French invaders because they were better fighters and better led, had better logistics, more cannon and a willingness to take losses that even shocked Bloody Boney. The TSAR wouldn't have let him go alive if his Cossacks had caught him. Imprisonment or Death awaited for sure.
The "ICE" won the battles is French propaganda just like German propaganda of a century later in 1940s.
Many of the Russian victories were never studied, all battles between Borodino and Berezina are ignored by French writers - in all of them French lost and lost badly, 2:1 losses or more even though it was the Russians who attacked. Most of these are being studied/written now in the 20th-21st centuries.
Russia wanted to conquer all they could in the intervals- look at the FATE of Finns and Turks.
Prussia wanted compensation for the immense losses due to TILSIT, they had lost nearly half their country to Russia (impossible to get back) and Austria (no Frederick alive to trounce the Austrians) and so wanted an end to the WESTPHALIA STATES. i.e. gobble them up.
Britain of course, didn't want land on the continent and so felt no-one should have land on the continent. The main reason it didn't want continental land was it is difficult to defend, whereas the island was easily defended by the Royal Navy.
Adm Jervis is reported to have stated to Pitt at the start of the wars- The French may come, but i assure you they will never come by sea.
Brave words and true words. This word was kept from 1792 to 1815 and beyond.
Traditional British foreign policy is to form a coalition of the weak and surround the strong. A popular saying in Europe post 1807 was- England would fight till the last drop of Austrian, Prussian and Russian blood.
The Austrians didn't want Netherlands as it was anyway Spanish Hapsberg ruled and not Austrian Hapsberg ruled lands. With the Spanish cousins dead, the Austrians didn't want direct borders with the BBB (France - BIG BLUE BLOB). Instead they wanted good buffer states just like Russia, with puppet rulers reporting to the Emperor.
veji1 wrote:utter nonsense... Suvorov was an interesting general for sure, but his scenario was absurd and wouldn't have worked and the idea that Napoleonic armies applied lessons learnt from Suvorov and not from 10 years of revolutionary wars is gibberish.
I don't want to sound pedantic, but you really like definitive statements. You know the period well, fair enough, but things tend to be more complicated than what they seem to be at first sight.
Regarding the french generals being mediocre, that is really pushing the enveloppe. The point wasn't that they weren't good, rather that they weren't quite as good as pictured because they benefited from the comparison with very bad and obsolete officier corps in the austrian, prussian or russian armies AND that they also benefited from their troops' ability to execute on the battlefield, to march fast and long on the campaign trail (thanks partly to the living of the land aspect + the fanning of corps allowing maximum use of the road system without clogging).
But in 1805-1807 most of the generals are very good at seeing opportunities and seizing them. Ney and Bernadotte lacked initiative so would have average strategic ratings say 3-4-1 for Ney (+ reckless) and 3-2-2 for Bernadotte, Soult was always very dependable if not creative or great (something like 4-2-2), a guy like Davout would get 5-4-4 while a guy like Lannes something like 4-4-2 (and reckless trait), these are just guesses/hunches.
The main problem for the marshalls should be that most of them had a hard time commanding in autonomy, so once the lead an army, their limited strategic sense (so the strategic rating) started showing. Basically give Ney or Marmont an army command and they become very average, would tend to be fairly enough inactive in game, etc..
A bit like in AACW and CW2, in a game the point isn't that the french generals are super, rather that you have lots of them being average to good to begin with, whereas the allies start with many poor ones and only few good ones. Progressively the allies get more quality leaders whereas for the french the new ones tend to be limited : for a Suchet you get many Grouchys, Vandamnes, Oudinots which where out of their depth once they commanded bigger forces.
Drake001 wrote:
As far as your statements about Russian soldiers and army vs the French....whoo. Your "cossack" is showing. All I can say is scoreboard.
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veji1 wrote:Rest assured, I didn't mean you had been offensive in any way, you are a polite and courteous poster, so no worries. Although harsh my post was directed at your very definitive conclusions regarding Zuvorov and how he would have marched to Paris straight on with the right troops. 1799 France wasn't 1814 France exhausted after 25 years of wars and particularly all the losses from Napoleon's war. In 1799 the revolution is still full of vigor if trying to find a stable incarnation (which eventually was the empire). 200 000 austro-russians would have had a very hard time marching throught the country to Paris withouth taking lots of time securing a logistical train, etc..
And saying that the second coalition lost due to coalition infighting is ridiculous. Sure politics play a big role and coalitions are unstable unruly things with different states having different interests, but the second battle of Zurich and Hoehlinden are not "caolition infighting" : They are coalition defeats that led the coalitin to desintegrate and accept peace. My overall point is that you shouldn't jump to conclusions "had so and so done this than it would have unfolded that way". You never know how things could have been derailed.
Lastly as you say we are in agreements on manys things (and disagree on others), and regarding french leaders in game we seem to agree that they shouldn't be made too strong : they are strongish compared to their early rivals, but in absolute most of them are solid, not brilliant.
Shri wrote:Your other points, i have also said it, the allies weren't one, they all had their own self interests.
As for French Generals, i have already replied, now to the main statement you make-
Inferior massed Russians is an old fallacy fed by French, English and later German propaganda.
Let us see a campaign by campaign measure of the Russians-
1. First and Second Coalition - Russian performance was quite good, Russian politics under Tsar Paul awful/
2. Third Coalition- as Austria's allies, they lost at Austerlitz, the site was Austrian, the plans also were Austrian.
Score- 2:0 in favor of France.
3. 4th Coalition - Once Russians entered, Eylau and Heilsberg were bloody setbacks for the French though at Friedland Russians badly lost.
3:0
The next time after Freidland the French and Russians fought would be in the Russian invasion- A gap of 5 years.
4. Russian Invasion - Disaster for France and decisive victory for Russia.
Against the 685000 fielded overall by Bonaparte, the Russians had a front-line of 200000, a Reserve of 100000 and another 150000+ were raised from the depots during the campaign, a total of 450000+ which includes some 80000 Cossacks and 100000 Militia.
685000 Troops invade, ~200000 are left on the Flanks, another ~100000 Prussians and other Germans escape or change sides, ~200000 French are captured of which about half survive (100000+ released post 1814 and several thousand of these fight in 1815), ~100000 escape in the end and another ~100000 died in various battles in a period of ~6 months. (all approximations with 5-10% variances)
As for Winter, Battle of Berezina as per my memory is in mid or late November so December, January and February weren't even touched.
Big Russian victories like - Tarutino, Krasnoi, Vyazma, 2nd Polotsk etc are skipped by many of the older writers.
Even pre-Borodino, -- Smolensk, Valutino, 1st Polotsk, the Russians retreated but in good order and after near equal casualties.
Borodino is a victory sure, but in Strategic sense a Pyrrhic victory.
I would give Russia - 2:0 for the Decisive Victory here as France lost its entire Horse and Cannon equipment besides logistics train, all this hurt badly in the German Campaign.
Total Score - 3:2.
5. Sixth Coalition- Decisive Victory for Russia which headed the Coalition.
Score - 3:3
6. Seventh Coalition- Decisive Victory Again
Score - 3:4.
Final Result- the whole work of the Valois-Bourbon Dynasty starting from 1500s, gaining momentum by 1650s is lost and in 1815, Russia is the pre-eminent power on the continent with France a distant second, in coming decades it would slip further.
Overall Strategic Result for France- Disaster.
I like the idea of starting out the French with high experience and using the replacement system to degrade them. I think the Russians and Prussians should actually be similar. By 1813, the Russian Army was a mixed bag of experience and combat efficiency (at least their infantry). Russian generals especially gained in experience and competence as the wars progressed and I think that the AGEOD system models this well.
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