Divisional HQ

[Queeg]

Pasternakski:

I see your point. I like the current HQ setup for the same reasons. I guess I read Pocus' posts on the subject to suggest that the things I like (cost, operational delay and need for strategic planning) really won't change that much. Only the means by which generals are assigned to divisions will change. We'll see.

But I certainly do second your concerns. Creating divisions shouldn't be reduced to an after-thought.

[pasternakski]

Thanks, Queeg. I'm glad there's somebody around here who can cut through the BS and say simply and intelligently what needs to be said.

I tend to be the artillery battery with a nearsighted spotter...

[McNaughton]

All I can say is wait and see.

We are looking at things through a certain point of view, and only see the loss of an aspect. I really cannot say how the forming of divisions will be after the removal of Divisional HQs.

Like with any choice, there are consequences as well as positive changes. Arguing for or against a change before we see it is going to be an exercise in futility. We can't really say how this will affect things.

[jimwinsor]

A lot of people seem to be assuming that divisions could not (and hence should not) be created "on the fly." But not backing up this assumption with facts or evidence. Or even anecdotes.

But as I pointed in the other thread, division staffs and support troops were minimal. Adding up the numbers, you could often count such troops in the OBs I looked at on one hand (ie, 5 men). Hence it would not really be that complicated to tell a bunch of brigades "Hey, see that guy over there with the 4 staff officers around him? THAT'S you new division commander!"

I think someone pointed out in the earlier thread that much of the menial support work on this level was carried out by unofficial "camp followers." Well, that may be so, but does that not argue for elimination of these highly official Div HQs, which are so fancy and rarified they need to be created in the national capitol?

I just can't envision Stanton issuing orders for "camp followers" to be rounded up, and railed to an army out west in need of a new division.

I don't believe division creation back then was even half as complicated as many of you seem to think it was. BUT I could be wrong...if people can cite good evidence to the contrary I'll certainly reconsider.

[jimkehn]

Jim, I don't disagree with you on this point as a historical, practical matter.

However, my contention was...in the event there were unlimited division creation based solely on the number of leaders....then I think that would skew the whole game and the combat efficiency of the troops. Especially early on. I have repeatedly stated that I think the divisional HQs and the limitation they put on the player, represented, much more than official camp groupies and 5 guys pushin pencils. However, my concerns about them have been largely laid to rest as someone here (a couple, really) has mentioned that Pocus is going to limit the number of divisions possible, increasing them as the war wears on. Having heard this, I now am less concerned about the change.

[color="red"]<I just wish wish I could understand the combat better. i.e. Lee keeps gettin his butt kicked by the likes of Pope and Banks. Even when on defense (entrenched 30% and having terrain benefits) AND when he outnumbers the them almost 3:1>[/color]

[McNaughton]

[color="red"]<I just wish wish I could understand the combat better. i.e. Lee keeps gettin his butt kicked by the likes of Pope and Banks. Even when on defense (entrenched 30% and having terrain benefits) AND when he outnumbers the them almost 3:1>[/color]

This is a bit to general of a description to give an answer. Were you under any command penalties at the time? What about your supply or equipment? What terrain were you fighting in, and did you have sufficient (or too much) cavalry? Did you have one stack, or many stacks (also important was which commanders were leading the stacks)? Are you using any variation on leader stats (i.e., a game option)? What are your AI bonus' set at?

[jimkehn]

WOW!!! That's a lotta questions. My answer is.....Yes.....to all of the above.

As I study the battle, you bring a lot of valid points. I just brought a couple a brigades into the area and hadn't had a chance to attach them to a leader, yet. I had a significant number of elements that were uncommanded. Maybe it was them. They were obviously under command penalty. Supplies not a problem. Clear terrain I believe (Stafford, VA) No leader variations and the game is PBEM. Also, just FYI, I noticed the North opened fire at range 7 and my guys held their fire til range 4. I understand that his should give him 3 free shots at me without return fire. But are not the shots less effective the further the range?? Not too many stacks other than Lee and Hood in Lee's stack, and the two Brigades just arriving. No Cav, but he had none, as well. I outnumbered him over 2:1 and took casualties over 2:1 more than he did. Pope was his commander. Luck was 53 each.

I think I blew this game anyway, by not building the south strong enough fast enough.

[McNaughton]

Your opponent probably had a lot of heavy artillery units (Rodman or 20-lb Parrott, hence the 7 range vs your 4 range), which gave him a significant range bonus in combat. I don't believe that range affects 'accuracy' (IMO, this should mean that smoothbore guns should have lowered range).

The Command penalty means that your troops weren't fighting at full capacity. At 35% penalty, your 'odds' are significantly reduced (on paper it looked like 2:1, but ended up to probably be about 1:1).

Things tend to work well when you have maximized your corps. Get them to their highest combat value without going over command limits. It is better to have 2 corps than 1 corps over command limits, but, it is also better to have 2 corps at command limit, than having 3 corps (not all troops in stacks necessarily engage in a battle, I have noticed, and it is best to have the largest, combat effective, stacks as possible).

Cavalry also helps out, as their ability to evade, as well as engage, is better than all other troops. Plus, they seem to have an added recon ability (you know more about your opponent's stacks with cavalry nearby).

[jimkehn]

Thanks. That all helps. Not sure what he had for arty, but your analysis makes sense.

[Queeg]

All I can say is wait and see.

We are looking at things through a certain point of view, and only see the loss of an aspect. I really cannot say how the forming of divisions will be after the removal of Divisional HQs.

Like with any choice, there are consequences as well as positive changes. Arguing for or against a change before we see it is going to be an exercise in futility. We can't really say how this will affect things.

But we can perhaps influence the direction of the change. First and foremost, I'm for whatever changes best strengthen the AI. Beyond that, I like most everything about the current system except the need to transport HQs to where they are needed.

[pasternakski]

Hence it would not really be that complicated to tell a bunch of brigades "Hey, see that guy over there with the 4 staff officers around him? THAT'S you new division commander!"

I dunno, Jim. It seems to me that there was just more to it than that, but analyses of Civil War division-level administrative organization and how difficult it was (or wasn't) seem to be rare as hens' teeth.

There are hints in the history, however. For example, corps became an official designation in the U.S. Army by act of Congress. In early 1862, McClellan was unwilling to institute a corps structure because he wanted to see how his division commanders performed in the Peninsula Campaign before promoting any of them (good old ""Wait and See" Little Mac). Lincoln stepped in and organized the first four corps despite McClellan. The structure of divisions in terms of general numbers of brigades (which, I grant you, were the real meat and potatoes organization of the times), which brigades they were, and who commanded their division was pretty rigid.

This site, http://www.civilwararchive.com, contains a lot of narrative commentary from division and other commanders that indicate divisional command was a pretty hard business. You had to be able to get your brigades to move and fight as an efficient, cohesive whole. They had to be supplied, often in circumstances where vagaries of movement and presence of the enemy made just finding some of them a problem. Training, command flow, communication, and subordination of tasks and responsibilities presented significant considerations. Those four or five staff officers had a lot of work to do and their C.O. had to have been responsible for superimposing an effective structure for them to work in.

Well, anyway. I just think that the idea that forming a division was a little like putting together a bunch of guys for a pickup basketball game diminishes the matter too much. Having to form the HQ unit at the nation's capital, have it come "up to speed," then be shipped out to where it is needed appeals to me as a good (if not perfect) way of reflecting the difficulty of planning and fielding a well-organized army that has the elements it needs in the right places at the right times.

As far as the game is concerned, I think McNaughten's "wait and see" posture is the best one. I tend to expect the worst so that I can reserve the right to say, "I told you so," and, if anything better happens, I can be pleasantly surprised.

[Mike]

I was on the other side of Jim's battle. Here was my observations on it. I'd appreciate any feedback.


Here's what I see when I look at this battle between Pope and Lee.

1. I've got 3 arty units you have 3, we even there.

2. I've got 3 divisions with 24 brigades, and you've got 1 division with 13 brigades, you are heavily outnumbered.

3. The biggie is that you had 14 sub units that were out of command, I had none.

4. You have the better general.

5. You are on defense and have terrain.



Even with a lesser general like Pope, attacking Lee in that position is favorable I think.

[jimkehn]

OK....more info...Mike is right, but the tool tip on the bottom scales shows I had 387 total Combat Value, he (Pope) had 180. Lee took 36 hits, and Pope 15. Also shows I had 16 units on the battlefield while Pope had 27. This last value is a little unclear to me. Why are there not more on battlefield? Is this a product of random chance? Was it because I marched the two brigades on the battlefield without a leader that turn and they were caught and minced before the rest of my troops could arrive?? Almost ALL of the casualties were taken by one of those brigades. Anyway...I'd like to thank all for helping dissect this battle. It helps to know what you are looking at, and what the stuff means. Here is the screenie

[jimwinsor]

If you want a pretty good under-the-hood peak at the battle system, there is always this thread:

http://www.ageod-forum.com/showthread.php?t=1024

It's a sticky in the BoA forum, but I'm inclined to think much of the info is generic enough to apply to AACW as well.

[McNaughton]

Looking at everything, it wasn't that bad of a defeat. Losing 1700 men vs 700 men (just about 2:1 in casualties) isn't a critical defeat (more like a large scale skirmish). I believe that combat isn't throw all your units against all of their units, while individual corps may be activated, while others are not (which makes having corps commanders themselves be valuable, not just your army leader). It does appear that your two brigades were caught by Pope, who took advantage of the situation and savaged them before Lee really could do anything. Even still, had this not been Pope, and a viable general, pretty much expect those two brigades to be totally destroyed (indeed, not one single regiment was eliminated, which is a good sign!).

Artillery is one thing, but, compare the 6-lb artillery to the 20-lb artillery and you see vast differences. The 20-lb has almost twice the range, and does have twice the damage. The fact that Pope had 3 Divisions and Lee had 1 Division was probably another factor, which would have increased Lee's combat effectiveness (had he commanded fewer troops).

In this situation, where you don't have many divisions, place brigadier generals in command of Brigades. This helps out your situation a bit, and makes your brigades a bit tougher.

[McNaughton]

snip...

Basically the entire chain of command was a concern. Regimental commanders needed to be coordinated by Brigadier commanders. Brigadier commanders needed to be coordinated by Divisional commanders. Divisional commanders needed to be coordinated by Corps commanders. A weak link in the chain meant inefficient deployment. All too often a brigadier would have a mess of a brigade as he was inefficient in his command of his brigade. Same on divisional scale (and corps, and even army command). All too often a commander (regiment, brigade, division, corps) didn't act quickly enough, or had an uncoordinated plan of operation.

Historically, a lot of commanders, from regiment to army, were totally ineffective in their role on both sides. A lot were created on the fly, a lot of commands were formed and disbanded on a whim. Most commands took a long time to flesh out, to become effective (indeed, the Army of Northern Virginia became effective only after bloodying itself in the Peninsula Campaign).

In my opinion, the effectiveness of a newly created combat unit should have combat penalties until their first few engagements (representing the unit being created in reserve, and having its command system tested in combat). Historically, most newly organized units required bloodying in order to become effective units, regardless on how famous their commanders and staffs would become (from Lee to Grant, both had to experience bloody mismanagements before they became effective).

[jimkehn]

Jim, I looked at the post. I had forgotten about that one. Read it way back when.....when playing BoA.

I noticed that units not on Defense Posture can engage without the rest of the army engaging (defensive blokes, anyway). Once the guys on Defense engage, then they all engage. Sounds like armies that are moving or in Offensive posture may or may not engage. Not sure how you define armies as used in the post. A "stack" i.e. if two brigades are moving together, they could engage but not necessarily the division that is in the province in another stack if he is in Offensive posture?? Sounds like all who are in defensive posture engage together....regardless.

Game gets deeper as I go. (I know I sound like it, but I am not a rookie at this system).

[Mike]

Interesting observations all, thanks.

The reason I attacked with Pope was Lee was there and the report on him was he had 1 division with him. I targeted him with 2 full strength (3 and 4 divisions). Only one followed orders. As it was the results were acceptable even though I retreated victoriously.

A big problem with the Union side is the pathetic generals for army command early in the game. Grant seems to self promote quickly, which I don't agree with. You have to use Mcdowell and others so you can organized. Amazing, how historical.

[jimkehn]

Mike....You definitely did a number on Lee THIS turn. It was a REAL victory with Lee retreating to Fredricksburg. Back to reinforcements....more Corps who were sitting back there rebuilding. I suggest putting Burnside in charge of your army and attacking. Say....around Christmas time???

Anyway.......now that I got a better understanding of the game....."Press on men.......For Virginia!!!!"

[pasternakski]

...the results were acceptable even though I retreated victoriously.

Can you imagine sending that in a dispatch to your army commander?

[denisonh]

Can you imagine sending that in a dispatch to your army commander?

[jimkehn]

HAHAHAHAHHAHA!!!

Well...He killed more of me than I of him. In that sense he was victorious. But.......he did retreat.

Just so ya know. Franklin defeated Lee in Stafford last turn. So Pope gets a lil sweet revenge. The South will rise in Virginia. Right now I am more worried about Grant and Sherman in Tennessee. I have little to stop him, and he keeps comin'. Building like crazy, but it will be close. Luckily, Braxton Bragg had a grand victory in South Carolina this past turn. Bragg is 3 star with an army. I am thinking of railing him all the way to western Tennessee somewhere. With or without the Army HQ. If without he can still be an effective corps commander under another Army in the area.

Gawd this game can be exciting......if complex.

[Jabberwock]

A lot of people seem to be assuming that divisions could not (and hence should not) be created "on the fly." But not backing up this assumption with facts or evidence. Or even anecdotes.

But as I pointed in the other thread, division staffs and support troops were minimal. Adding up the numbers, you could often count such troops in the OBs I looked at on one hand (ie, 5 men). Hence it would not really be that complicated to tell a bunch of brigades "Hey, see that guy over there with the 4 staff officers around him? THAT'S you new division commander!"

I think someone pointed out in the earlier thread that much of the menial support work on this level was carried out by unofficial "camp followers." Well, that may be so, but does that not argue for elimination of these highly official Div HQs, which are so fancy and rarified they need to be created in the national capitol?

I just can't envision Stanton issuing orders for "camp followers" to be rounded up, and railed to an army out west in need of a new division.

I don't believe division creation back then was even half as complicated as many of you seem to think it was. BUT I could be wrong...if people can cite good evidence to the contrary I'll certainly reconsider.

Wouldn't it make sense with the new system to limit the number of regiments that can be directly attached to a commander based on a combination of his rank and strategic rating? This would emulate both the staff available to a commander, and his personal abilities.

It might skew the game early on (I'm thinking Bull Run, where the South had no divisions, only corps) but more realistic in the long run. Perhaps with some cost or temporary combat penalty associated every time new units were attached, it would even things out.

I don't think active players and posters should adopt a 'wait and see' attitude on this. AGEod responds to our ideas and feedback, but if we don't express our opinions, they really can't do their job as effectively.

[pasternakski]

I don't think active players and posters should adopt a 'wait and see' attitude on this. AGEod responds to our ideas and feedback, but if we don't express our opinions, they really can't do their job as effectively.

...and I love 'em for it, too, but this pan of Jiffy Pop is already on the stove...

Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!

[Jabberwock]

Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!

burble burble

[Wilhammer]

"the results were acceptable even though I retreated victoriously."

Are you sure you aren't quoting Li'l Mac?

[jimwinsor]

Wouldn't it make sense with the new system to limit the number of regiments that can be directly attached to a commander based on a combination of his rank and strategic rating? This would emulate both the staff available to a commander, and his personal abilities.

It might skew the game early on (I'm thinking Bull Run, where the South had no divisions, only corps) but more realistic in the long run. Perhaps with some cost or temporary combat penalty associated every time new units were attached, it would even things out.

I don't think active players and posters should adopt a 'wait and see' attitude on this. AGEod responds to our ideas and feedback, but if we don't express our opinions, they really can't do their job as effectively.

A good idea. A trait might work for this too, giving extra element command potential when forming divs. AP Hill would be a good candidate for such a trait.

[Mike]

"the results were acceptable even though I retreated victoriously."

Are you sure you aren't quoting Li'l Mac?

Sort of catchy huh? Maybe Pope could use it as his slogan for a presidential run in '64.

Some interesting trends seem to be appearing in my game with Jim. He has bottled up my landings in Florida nicely and threatens to eliminate them. He has eliminated one in SC, sending Hooker on a vacation. However this may have been done at the expense of his main armies. Lee is suffering at the hands a massive force in Virginia under McDowell and Grant and Rosecrans in Tenn. are just plain having fun.

Is this trade off between theaters typical of the Southern cause?

The other thing I'm seeing is its mid '62, I'm rolling in money, drowning in supplies, heavy industrialization in every state, but have to spend all my manpower on replacements as I can't draft or call for volunteers for several more months. Proof that war is good for the economy.

[McNaughton]

One question, will the union get a massive influx of new leaders to represent the many union divisions that are in the game now, but have 'abstracted' Divisional commanders? If not, it will be impossible to replicate the historic battles and orders of battle if leaders are required to create a division.

[Jabberwock]

One question, will the union get a massive influx of new leaders to represent the many union divisions that are in the game now, but have 'abstracted' Divisional commanders? If not, it will be impossible to replicate the historic battles and orders of battle if leaders are required to create a division.

Excellent point. I'm busy with graphics right now (I promised several people we'd have some new generals pics tonight) but does somebody want to look up the following and post them in the missing Generals thread?
William 'Bull' Nelson
George McCall
Charles Stone
Israel Richardson