Gray Fox wrote:1. Crush the east.
2. So far, no benefit accrues for splitting the Confederacy in two. Taking the Mississippi does not aid the Union economically or militarily.
3. In the Far West, take Tucson (5 NM) and then El Paso. The CSA does not have a large force to defend here and no supplies. Many of the Regional Decision Cards in Jan 1862 can aid you in this (build depots, muster militias, partisans, land sailors and strip two 12-lbers from the fleet in California).
4. You start with more than enough ships to enforce a 35% blockade and that is all I recommend.
In 1861, you'll get about twenty free brigades with a light infantry element and two volunteer elements. Entrench two of these each in St. Louis MO, Cairo IL, Evansville IN, Cincinnatti, Ashland and Marriette OH, Wheeling WV and Pittsburgh PA. Rail in a 3-1-1 General with a Supply Unit to each of these cities. Now build a Sharpshooter, a brigade with 4 infantry and a 6-lber and 5 state militia to fill out a future garrison Division for these Generals. Have a 9th similar Division formed in Indiana across the river from Louisville KY to garrison that city as soon as Kentucky enters the war. Use cheap river transport to build depots in Evansville, Louisville and Marriette. This gives you a line of strongpoints along defendable rivers to secure the geographic center of the Union. If you put together 30 2-gunboat units and 15 river transports, then you can blockade the river zones from St. Louis to just outside of Cincinnatti to any CSA land movement. A few ironclads next to Cairo should keep Athena's river forces at bay. You have enough starting cavalry to form a Division or two to chase down any partisans or deep raiders in the midwest to MO area.
You are allowed three army stacks in '61. One should take and hold Harper's Ferry ASAP. In fact the first units you get should head to HF and take it immediately. Another army should entrench permanently to defend D.C. The third, under McDowell is your reserve. It should also be positioned in D.C. but can react to any developments. If Athena charges off to Pittsburgh or Fort Monroe, then take Manassas. Build as many Divisions as you can over the winter (I can get a total force of 30-36 Divisions done by spring '62). Don't build ocean-going ships, don't do amphibious invasions, don't attack coastal forts and don't lose your capital.
In 1862, take Manassas (if you haven't already), Culpepper, Charlotteville, Amhurst and Buckingham. This puts your army on the doorstep to Richmond and you don't have to fight a river-crossing battle to get there. Take Richmond and continue down the east-coast if the CSA does not surrender outright. Good luck!
midnight wrote:(On a side note, if anyone has any good book recommendations that would be much appreciated, I'm currently working my way through Foote's trilogy and loving it!).
tripax wrote:I'm reading Grant's memoirs (since it is on the public domain and easy to download onto my phone for reading on commutes) and enjoying it very much. I've read Foote (and am rereading) and Hurst's biography of Forrest. I'm thinking about reading other memoirs next, possibly Early's (I don't know much about the "Lost Cause", so I think his work will be interesting.
tripax wrote:national moral (NM) is more important than $, WS, Loyalty, Conscripts, etc.
Mickey3D wrote:NM is undoubtedly very important but sometimes you must accept to loose some of them to increase your force. E.g. it may be worth loosing 2 NM to play the "raise taxes" decision if it gives you the money to raise more troops (obviously, I will first use the two other decisions before this one) : if you don't have the troops to fight battles, you will loose NM sooner or later by loosing objectives.
midnight wrote:Just so I can gain a better understanding, why doesn't splitting confederacy in two offer military or economic benefits? I was under the (maybe mistaken) impression that it will aid the blockade and act as a springboard for operations to capture the VP cities?
Gray Fox wrote:An ancient axiom of war is not to fight on two fronts at the same time. That is why I hold in the center with a line of strongpoints along major rivers and attack in the east. If you attack down the Mississippi this would require a lot of men and supplies that you should be using to take Richmond. The so-called Western Campaign is a bad idea militarily.
In RL, everything produced for export in the Midwest was shipped down the Mississippi to New Orleans and everthing imported traveled this route in reverse. The game should reflect this as a Confederate blockade of all the harbor cities in the midwest until the Mississippi is cleared. Since it does not, no economic reason exists to clear Ole Miss.
Gray Fox wrote:To clarify my statement about amphibious invasions, Churchill recognized that the allies in the First World War had the advantage of sea power. He argued that they should use it by assaulting...Gallipoli. Despite incredible heroism and sacrifice, this was a disaster. You might threaten to land somewhere to keep the CSA distracted, but an amphibious assault against any competent CSA player is not a good idea. It only takes 5 heavy artillery replacements to get all the coastal artillery to max strength. I always split the two batteries in each fort into two groups to further double their effect. Launch a surprise invasion of Charleston and face six batteries of "volley and thunder". Same again on the way out. I only know what I would do to an amphibious assault.
Jim-NC wrote:As the union, you can generally land a force on a fort without taking any damage from bombardment from the fort(s). As long as you don't move 2 regions beside the fort you are OK (it's called the DAR - double adjacency rule). So if you want to take Charleston for example, move your ships in the region next to Ft. Sumter, and land troops. Then take the troops, and capture each fort in turn. It telegraphs your move, but against Athena, that is OK (she doesn't always react well to these sorts of things). In my last PBEM, Soundoff landed troops in Wilmington, bypassing the forts. He then landed an additional force to take Ft. Fisher (and was moving on to take the other fort with that force). This would have allowed him to hold Wilmington forever, as it would get sea supply. To kick him out of there, I had to place 4 divisions in the area (I already had 1 guarding NC/SC). This was 4 divisions I didn't have guarding Richmond. He almost captured Richmond the next turn.
minipol wrote:That's the reason I do attack the coastline as the union. It forces the CSA to send troops they need elsewhere. Positioning troops to dislodge the entrenched enemy
RebelYell wrote:What year? You can reinforce the forts, more and more every year. He will have to come with such force that is also away from elsewhere for him.
Gray Fox wrote:An ancient axiom of war is not to fight on two fronts at the same time. That is why I hold in the center with a line of strongpoints along major rivers and attack in the east. If you attack down the Mississippi this would require a lot of men and supplies that you should be using to take Richmond. The so-called Western Campaign is a bad idea militarily.
In RL, everything produced for export in the Midwest was shipped down the Mississippi to New Orleans and everthing imported traveled this route in reverse. The game should reflect this as a Confederate blockade of all the harbor cities in the midwest until the Mississippi is cleared. Since it does not, no economic reason exists to clear Ole Miss.
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