Suggestion about leaderless units

[aryaman]

There are sometimes in the game that send leaderless units seems to be advantageous, as they avoid the strategic activation issue. I imagine this has been discussed before, but why not make leaderless units strategically inactive by default? you still can move them and raid enemy territory, but you can´t assault cities, that will also increase the value of militia garrisons.

[PhilThib]

Could be an interesting option..although there quite a few mixed feelings about this

[Rafiki]

Or perhaps consider their (anonymous) commander to have a strategic rating of 1? I.e. might be able to assault now and then, but usually not.

[Pocus]

sound good, but there are problems... What supports the strat activation toggle? A given unit, or the force container? In both case I can find easily an exploit to try to activate again.

[aryaman]

Yes, that sort of things made think about non activation by default of any leaderless unit

[Rafiki]

sound good, but there are problems... What supports the strat activation toggle? A given unit, or the force container? In both case I can find easily an exploit to try to activate again.

How about the following:

- Activation is checked for each stack at the start of each round
- When splitting off units from a stack, the new stack retains the same activation status as the stack it is splitting from
- When merging an inactive stack and an active stack, it goes inactive.

Or with the same principles, but slightly different approach:
- Each stack is checked for activation at the start of each round.
- Each unit is flagged depending on how the check went for its stack
- For the remainder of the round, any stack that contains at least one unit that is inactive, is inactive, except stacks that are led, which will always follow the status of the leader.

In effect, the main lesson under these rules will be "if you want a leaderless stack to remain active, don't bring in units from inactive stacks", while the morale would be "You might get lucky and be able to assault with a leaderless stack, but don't make your war goals depend on it"

[denisonh]

I would like ask what consititues a "leaderless unit"? The reason I ask, is that a brigade has a "leader" (just not a game represented one).

If a brigade is given a mission, why penalize a individual unit given that mission? A brigade given a mision to be the garrison for a rear city would be more than adequate for the task. It doesn't take Longstreet or Grant to defend a static location.

The game already penalizes a formation larger than a brigade "without a leader". Maybe make it more sever when more than one brigade/unit is in the same stack.

Concerned that single element units would be penalized uneccesarily when other game mechanisms will take care of that.

The issue is them "working together". By themsleves, small units should not suffer, it is a combat involving multiple stakcs that where the issue lies.

Is that covered already?

[Pocus]

Or with the same principles, but slightly different approach:
- Each stack is checked for activation at the start of each round.
- Each unit is flagged depending on how the check went for its stack
- For the remainder of the round, any stack that contains at least one unit that is inactive, is inactive, except stacks that are led, which will always follow the status of the leader.

In effect, the main lesson under these rules will be "if you want a leaderless stack to remain active, don't bring in units from inactive stacks", while the morale would be "You might get lucky and be able to assault with a leaderless stack, but don't make your war goals depend on it"

This solution is good theorically, and I don't see any potential abuse there. The problem is you are inducing a lot of micromanaging. You tag activation at the unit level, so bean counters will feel compelled to optimize their leaderless stacks, by checking each units, and then forming a stack with only activated ones, so to conduct the offensive operation they seek. Each turn, in each region when there is something to fight.

All that to find a fix to the supposed potency of having leaderless units always activated... But leaderless units by essence suffers a high move/combat penalty and don't get the advantages of having a leader in combat (even if not activated). So I'm unsure the solution is better than the problem... you are removing an abuse but are creating micromanaging for me.

[Rafiki]

I don't think there will be much micromanaging in reality. How often are several leaderless stacks interacting in such a way that they depend on e.g. being able to assume an assault posture?

Also, you won't be needing to check each individual unit in by far most cases, since at the start of your round, all units in a stack will be the same, and the indicator for the stack will apply to all units.

[veji1]

I think Leaderless units work well enough the way they are, ie, they are pretty good at the beginning of the war but once you have enough general with good enough ratings (4 strat or more...) they are not very interesting...

OK they move more efficiently, but that doesn't make much of a difference...

[Rafiki]

I've *never* had enough generals with good strat ratings...

[Pocus]

I don't think there will be much micromanaging in reality. How often are several leaderless stacks interacting in such a way that they depend on e.g. being able to assume an assault posture?

Also, you won't be needing to check each individual unit in by far most cases, since at the start of your round, all units in a stack will be the same, and the indicator for the stack will apply to all units.

right, I did not understand fully your proposal, to have the roll at the stack level but impacted & stored to all units. Better yes.

I not against putting that under a new optional rule, which would penalize also more heavily non activated leaders (they would be prevented from moving in hostile region)

[Dan]

right, I did not understand fully your proposal, to have the roll at the stack level but impacted & stored to all units. Better yes.

I not against putting that under a new optional rule, which would penalize also more heavily non activated leaders (they would be prevented from moving in hostile region)

Non activated INDEPENDENT leaders should not be able to move into hostile regions. Now, if the non activated leader is a part of a larger force (a Corps or Army) that is activated then that leader should be allowed to enter the region, along with all of the penalties that come with him being non activated.

It was extremly difficult to get a large group of soilders to move and act in an organized manner during the Civil War. It should be next to impossible for a non activated general to get a Division or larger to do anything other than the simpilest of tasks during that turn. Entering a hostile region with or without the enemy being present should be at or near the top of the list of things said generals can not do.

And for formations smaller than a division (either single brigade or a few units stacked together), the current command penalties PLUS an increase in the loss of cohesion for operating in non friendly regions for more than a turn or two should discourage abuse of these forces. Single brigades should have the ability to make very limited offensive moves (entering hostile regions, cutting rail lines, capturing unguarded towns) but unless they are in friendly regions they should only be able to function for a couple of turns in this manor before their loss of cohesion forces them back to a friendly region where they can regain their lost strength.

[runyan99]

Non activated INDEPENDENT leaders should not be able to move into hostile regions. Now, if the non activated leader is a part of a larger force (a Corps or Army) that is activated then that leader should be allowed to enter the region, along with all of the penalties that come with him being non activated.

An interesting way to handle that would be to only check the activation of the army leader. If the army commander is active, then all of his subordinate corps are active automatically. If inactive, then the corps are inactive.

So, if McClellan is inactive, his corps commanders cannot go on the offensive on their own, because they have good strategic ratings.

This would seem to accurately reflect the chain of command. This would also put maximum pressure on the players to put their best generals in the army command slot, so that the formations are activated.

As the rules are now, I don't necessasarily see why I shouldn't just keep Beuaregard as army commander, and Lee as an excellent corps commander, for example.

I also don't see how McClellan's poor strategic ratings currently keep Hooker, Sumner and the rest of the corps commanders from doing whatever they want in 1861 and 1862.

[jimwinsor]

A poor Strategic Rating does get passed down to subordinate corps commanders through minus modifiers.

[caranorn]

And an excellent corps commander would logically be able to activate even when his superior officer doesn't, and vice versa a good army commander doesn't necessarily lead to the activation of a subordinate leader (the AACW system already helps subordinates of good commanders). I think the 2nd Bull Run might be an example where some leaders on a side were activated (Porter, yes I know he refused to act, but in that case it was the intelligent choice) and some weren't (certainly McDowell and probably Pope himself).

[Dan]

An interesting way to handle that would be to only check the activation of the army leader. If the army commander is active, then all of his subordinate corps are active automatically. If inactive, then the corps are inactive.

I think this might be a little bit too much. There are a lot of Union generals/troops that would be inactive for the first 1/3 to 1/2 of the war if this was the case.

I like the idea of checking each leader for activation. This does give the player some ability to get things done even when the the higher-ups in the Chain of Command are not activated. Perhaps more emphasis can be put on the bonuses and penalties in the chain of command depending on if the higher levels are active or not.

So, if McClellan is inactive, his corps commanders cannot go on the offensive on their own, because they have good strategic ratings..

If the Army commander is inactive, his Corps commanders can go on the offensive if they are active, but they would pay a huge penalty since the Army commander is inactive. The penalty would need to be big enough to make it 'not worth it' to put the Corps on the offensive. This way, if the player felt he HAD to make a move he would still be allowed, but it would be at a huge disadvantage. The penalty of making such a move with an inactive Army commander would need to, at least, be more than enough to offset any benefits an average Corps commander would bring to the fight. Also, if a good/great commander takes his Corps on the offensive with an inactive Army commander and other inactive Corps commanders , his chance of getting support in the event of battle would be next to none.

(Replace Army with Corps and Corps with Division to see how this process would work down to the next level.)

In most cases, a player would find that some parts of his army, when on the offensive, are operating under penalties for being inactive. This will mean that he is operating at less than maximum strength. But there will be rare occasions where all of the commanders (Army/Corps/Div) are active and the bonuses will be so big the enemy best watch out!

As the best generals work their way up through the ranks, their ratings should help offset some/most of these penalties from inactive superiors. The lower rated generals' commands will suffer more from these penalties. Eventually, the player will be forced to remove the poor generals from high command so that he can go on substained offensives in enemy territory.

I hope some of this makes sense...

[Wilhammer]

Dan, I like those suggestions.

That models rather well how it should work when your mistrusting obstinate ambitious know-it-all Army commander reigns in his loose cannon, which would be anyone not obeying him completely, and on down the line.

AMOF, is that how military command is supposed to be?

Yep, I agree with those that think the Command Rules, though they might be more simplified, are not restricting enough.

[denisonh]

I would say the penalty of an activated Corps Commander and a non activated Army commnder is a reduced chance of being reinforced from the Army, and most certainly from other Corps in the area.

If he goes alone, he gets less help. That is a penalty.

A Corps should not be penalized for execution of independent action as much as he would be disciplined if he lost.

If you risk a corps commander with Army command potential, then be prepared for him to "take it in the shorts" for seniority loss if it goes badly.

That would be more realistic than a penalty IMO.

[Rafiki]

(Replace Army with Corps and Corps with Division to see how this process would work down to the next level.)

In the command structure, divisions must always be part of a corps and are therefore subject to the corps commander's activation. Divisions outside a corps are independent.

Other than that, I like the idea that the activation status of an Army commander should have an impact on what a corps commander does, i.e. be able to do stuff if active, but receive penalties/consequences for doing so if the Army commander is inactive.

How does it work the other way round; should an active Army commander e.g. give a +1 on the activation check for a subordinate corps commanders? (Not knowing exactly which impact an Army commander has on his corps commanders today)

[denisonh]

In the command structure, divisions must always be part of a corps and are therefore subject to the corps commander's activation. Divisions outside a corps are independent.

Other than that, I like the idea that the activation status of an Army commander should have an impact on what a corps commander does, i.e. be able to do stuff if active, but receive penalties/consequences for doing so if the Army commander is inactive.

How does it work the other way round; should an active Army commander e.g. give a +1 on the activation check for a subordinate corps commanders? (Not knowing exactly which impact an Army commander has on his corps commanders today)

Army commnaders in a different location than the Corps commander would be candidate to suffer more than those coloacted with the Army commander.

Proximity to the "flagpole" should affect activation.

[tc237]

If a Corps commander moved his corps the distance of, for example, a AACW region or more, without his superiors orders, he would be court-martialed.
That is a move of 7-10 days away from the Army.
Not talking about Dan Sickles moving his Corps a few hundred yards at Gettysburg.
Not talking about "taking the initiative" either. That would be an operational level thing, handled on a smaller scale than AACW.
Remember, that Corps has a sector to hold somewhere in the line, even if it is in "camp", it's pickets are defending something.

I cannot see an entire Corps, boarding trains or transports, without the Army staff being informed or issuing an order.
Why are they moving, 'cause the Corps commander wants action or is restless?

Haven't read the whole thread or given much thought to the "division problem", if there even is one.
Just posting my thoughts on Corps or Divisions, that are directly attached to and Army, and the subordinate commander decides to move.

[denisonh]

If a Corps commander moved his corps the distance of, for example, a AACW region or more, without his superiors orders, he would be court-martialed.
That is a move of 7-10 days away from the Army.
Not talking about Dan Sickles moving his Corps a few hundred yards at Gettysburg.
Not talking about "taking the initiative" either. That would be an operational level thing, handled on a smaller scale than AACW.
Remember, that Corps has a sector to hold somewhere in the line, even if it is in "camp", it's pickets are defending something.

I cannot see an entire Corps, boarding trains or transports, without the Army staff being informed or issuing an order.
Why are they moving, 'cause the Corps commander wants action or is restless?

Haven't read the whole thread or given much thought to the "division problem", if there even is one.
Just posting my thoughts on Corps or Divisions, that are directly attached to and Army, and the subordinate commander decides to move.

If I am not mistaken, Grant had leeway (or took a liberal interpretation of his orders) to execute his taking of Ft Donelson that wasn't in the specifics given by Halleck.

If there is a restriction, I would make sure that the Corps does not leave the Army commanders command area. Other than that, the Corps commander should be allowed to execute IMO.

[tc237]

If I am not mistaken, Grant had leeway (or took a liberal interpretation of his orders) to execute his taking of Ft Donelson that wasn't in the specifics given by Halleck.

From Steven E. Woodworth's "Nothing but Victory: the Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865"

pg 69)"..Grant..on January 28..telegraphed Halleck suggesting that, 'if permitted, I could take and hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee'"

pg 70)"...Halleck...on January 30...wired Grant 'Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry."' In his telegram, Halleck promised to send full instructions by mail. Those arrived on February 1...Grant...was to take every last man he could muster...Finally, Halleck urged Grant to take the Fort before Beauregard could arrive."

pg 72)"'I will leave here tomorrow night,' Grant telegraphed Halleck on February 1."

A few things I didn't quote:
Halleck approved Grant's move because of Lincoln's Feb 22 order that all armies would start major movements. That order kinda got Halleck in gear.
Also, once Grant got his orders, he moved out very quickly because he was afraid Halleck would balk and recall the expedition.

OK, I'm not trying to be a smart ass here by quoting books, or trying to show anyone up. I just try to use references to help back me up, probably cause they say it better then I could alone.
Plus it is a very good book

[denisonh]

From Steven E. Woodworth's "Nothing but Victory: the Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865"

pg 69)"..Grant..on January 28..telegraphed Halleck suggesting that, 'if permitted, I could take and hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee'"

pg 70)"...Halleck...on January 30...wired Grant 'Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry."' In his telegram, Halleck promised to send full instructions by mail. Those arrived on February 1...Grant...was to take every last man he could muster...Finally, Halleck urged Grant to take the Fort before Beauregard could arrive."

pg 72)"'I will leave here tomorrow night,' Grant telegraphed Halleck on February 1."

A few things I didn't quote:
Halleck approved Grant's move because of Lincoln's Feb 22 order that all armies would start major movements. That order kinda got Halleck in gear.
Also, once Grant got his orders, he moved out very quickly because he was afraid Halleck would balk and recall the expedition.

OK, I'm not trying to be a smart ass here by quoting books, or trying to show anyone up. I just try to use references to help back me up, probably cause they say it better then I could alone.
Plus it is a very good book

I think the point is that the campaign was conducted on the initiative of Grant, not Halleck.

This supports the premise that the Corps commander can initiate the action IMO.

If Grant had failed, Halleck would have sold him down the river I think.

Hence, my arguement that the Corps commander can initiate and in effect be covered by the Army commander inn the case of success.

[Dan]

I would say the penalty of an activated Corps Commander and a non activated Army commnder is a reduced chance of being reinforced from the Army, and most certainly from other Corps in the area.

If he goes alone, he gets less help. That is a penalty.

A Corps should not be penalized for execution of independent action as much as he would be disciplined if he lost.

If you risk a corps commander with Army command potential, then be prepared for him to "take it in the shorts" for seniority loss if it goes badly.

That would be more realistic than a penalty IMO.

Less hope for help would be the first penalty. Also, the general should lose some of his abilities for that turn (-2 to his Attack/Defense numbers?) if he goes on the offensive while his Army commander is inactive. (Perhaps a large loss of cohesion if the active Corps enters a hostile region while the Army is inactve. If a Corps commander would make such a move, it would have to be made quick and with little planning and limited support services. Otherwise word would get back to the Army commander and said general would be out of work.) The general is acting against his superior's orders and should suffer severe penalties strong enough to discourage the player from using a Corps in such a manner unless it was absolutly needed. A Corps is part of a larger formation and as such, the player should not be able to use a Corps however he wants with no regard for the status of the Army commander.

It is possible now to play the Union and not really worry about who your Army commanders are. Just as long as you have your best generals leading your biggest Corps. That is not right. By trying to force the player to wait on the Army commander to be active, the player will find himself attacking when it may not be the 'best' time simply because the Army commander is active that turn. It will also make the USA get rid of the high ranking, bad Army commanders.

[tc237]

-edit-Ooops..posted the same time as Dan, so this should really be just before his, as we agree.

OK, after finally reading the thread thoroughly, I see what you guys are getting at.
I agree mostly with Dan's post:

If the Army commander is inactive, his Corps commanders can go on the offensive if they are active, but they would pay a huge penalty since the Army commander is inactive. The penalty would need to be big enough to make it 'not worth it' to put the Corps on the offensive

This would be preferably to me but.....
Can the game engine handle that?
How would it know the Corps CO screwed up?
What kind of penalty would he get? There would have to be a "Trial by court-martial" die roll.

Making the Corps more independent will open up a whole new can of worms.

[denisonh]

Less hope for help would be the first penalty. Also, the general should lose some of his abilities for that turn (-2 to his Attack/Defense numbers?) if he goes on the offensive while his Army commander is inactive. (Perhaps a large loss of cohesion if the active Corps enters a hostile region while the Army is inactve. If a Corps commander would make such a move, it would have to be made quick and with little planning and limited support services. Otherwise word would get back to the Army commander and said general would be out of work.) The general is acting against his superior's orders and should suffer severe penalties strong enough to discourage the player from using a Corps in such a manner unless it was absolutly needed. A Corps is part of a larger formation and as such, the player should not be able to use a Corps however he wants with no regard for the status of the Army commander.

It is possible now to play the Union and not really worry about who your Army commanders are. Just as long as you have your best generals leading your biggest Corps. That is not right. By trying to force the player to wait on the Army commander to be active, the player will find himself attacking when it may not be the 'best' time simply because the Army commander is active that turn. It will also make the USA get rid of the high ranking, bad Army commanders.

I think that the assumption that it is AGAINST the Army Commnaders orders when it may well be in the ABSENCE of army commander orders may be germain.

As a career Army officer, I have had situations that in the absence of orders I executed in accordance with my best judgement. I beleive that that should be replicated here, as the "tightness" of command and control thyen was not near what it it was in the 20th century.

[Dan]

I think the point is that the campaign was conducted on the initiative of Grant, not Halleck.

This supports the premise that the Corps commander can initiate the action IMO.

If Grant had failed, Halleck would have sold him down the river I think.

Hence, my arguement that the Corps commander can initiate and in effect be covered by the Army commander inn the case of success.

And Grant has good enough ratings to pull such a move off without having an active Army commander. But in games turn, if such a move were to fail, Grant should drop in seniority to reflect his utter lack of regard for the chain of command.

In July of 61, the USA has no Army commanders with a Strat rating higher than a 2. I assume this is to reflect the difficulty the Union had in getting their top generals to do ANYTHING during the first 2 years of the war. However, all of the 1 and 2 star generals in July 61 have a Strat rating of 3. The way it is set up now, the Union player can bypass inactive army commanders and use their lower ranked but active generals to go on the offensive against the CSA.

That is just not how the game should play out i nthe beginning.

[Dan]

In the command structure, divisions must always be part of a corps and are therefore subject to the corps commander's activation. Divisions outside a corps are independent.

That takes me to another issue. Just like a Corps can operate away from the Army HQ (may be a little to far for my tastes, but anyway...) a division should be able to operate in an adjacent region for one turn before being forced to rejoin its Corps. but like I said, that is a different issue.

Other than that, I like the idea that the activation status of an Army commander should have an impact on what a corps commander does, i.e. be able to do stuff if active, but receive penalties/consequences for doing so if the Army commander is inactive.

How does it work the other way round; should an active Army commander e.g. give a +1 on the activation check for a subordinate corps commanders? (Not knowing exactly which impact an Army commander has on his corps commanders today)

Nah...if the Corps commander is inactive, he is inactive. Nothing like an army going into battle with a Corps commander not interested in the goings on. Happened more than once in the Civil War.