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aariediger
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I would agree with all of these things, particularly the one about just rotating around corps commanders. However, I think there is one other big problem.
It is too hard to replace army generals when they perform poorly. Look at it this way, when Burnside smashed his army into bits at Fredericksburg, he was fired (ok, actually it was after the Mud March, but close enough.) If you do the same thing in game, you can’t fire him, because no one did well enough to earn a promotion! Really, the only way to replace an army general is after he does something right, enough to get a subordinate promoted. It’s a dumb system, where you can’t replace a general who does badly, only one who does well.
I think the way to fix it would be to either:
a. Issue promotions even when your army gets beat. This makes sense, because it’s what actually happens. Even in defeats, some folks still do well. For example, Meade had a good showing at Fredericksburg. This way, when a commanding general fall flat on his face, perhaps a well performing subordinate can pick up the pieces.
b. Do away with ranks. Use seniority as the only barrier to army command. This would make promotions much more dynamic, and solve some of the weird problems the South sometimes runs into with not having enough two-star generals available to form corps for two to three field armies. You could still leave the frontage system the way it is, giving generals with more stars an advantage, but still giving you the flexibility to put together a cohesive command system. It could be difficult to implement this, both engine wise and preventing ‘gamey’ use, but I think it would be for the best.
I actually think that both of these ideas could be implemented together and change the game for the better.
It is too hard to replace army generals when they perform poorly. Look at it this way, when Burnside smashed his army into bits at Fredericksburg, he was fired (ok, actually it was after the Mud March, but close enough.) If you do the same thing in game, you can’t fire him, because no one did well enough to earn a promotion! Really, the only way to replace an army general is after he does something right, enough to get a subordinate promoted. It’s a dumb system, where you can’t replace a general who does badly, only one who does well.
I think the way to fix it would be to either:
a. Issue promotions even when your army gets beat. This makes sense, because it’s what actually happens. Even in defeats, some folks still do well. For example, Meade had a good showing at Fredericksburg. This way, when a commanding general fall flat on his face, perhaps a well performing subordinate can pick up the pieces.
b. Do away with ranks. Use seniority as the only barrier to army command. This would make promotions much more dynamic, and solve some of the weird problems the South sometimes runs into with not having enough two-star generals available to form corps for two to three field armies. You could still leave the frontage system the way it is, giving generals with more stars an advantage, but still giving you the flexibility to put together a cohesive command system. It could be difficult to implement this, both engine wise and preventing ‘gamey’ use, but I think it would be for the best.
I actually think that both of these ideas could be implemented together and change the game for the better.
aariediger wrote:a. Issue promotions even when your army gets beat. This makes sense, because it’s what actually happens. Even in defeats, some folks still do well. For example, Meade had a good showing at Fredericksburg. This way, when a commanding general fall flat on his face, perhaps a well performing subordinate can pick up the pieces.
It is already included in the current engine. Even in defeat sometimes your generals rise in seniority. Maybe seniority rises could be higher.
aariediger wrote:b. Do away with ranks. Use seniority as the only barrier to army command. This would make promotions much more dynamic, and solve some of the weird problems the South sometimes runs into with not having enough two-star generals available to form corps for two to three field armies. You could still leave the frontage system the way it is, giving generals with more stars an advantage, but still giving you the flexibility to put together a cohesive command system. It could be difficult to implement this, both engine wise and preventing ‘gamey’ use, but I think it would be for the best.
Good idea, especially considering many generals during the war did hold positions higher than their current ranking. I would hover limit the army command to two star generals and a HEAVY PENALTY for using it. In that case, every available 3 star general should get upset with their respective VP and NM hit to your cause. I presume everyone would be upset by your decision, not just the first general in line.
Corps command could be given to 1 star general, but only with respective NM and VP hit also.
I always thought NM and VP hit for promoting below seniority and for army command below seniority should be generated from political values of all generals in line, not just the first general in line for promotion or army command. This way there is no difference in promoting a 93 seniority points general and promoting 6 seniority points general as long as he is not first in line.
In RL, it would make a lot of difference. Promoting unknown general would generate massive resentment from his superiors.
Of course, some limit (maximum) in NM and VP hit can be set so it can be the same if you promote someone with seniority 40 and seniority 130.
In RL, it would make a lot of difference. Promoting unknown general would generate massive resentment from his superiors.
Of course, some limit (maximum) in NM and VP hit can be set so it can be the same if you promote someone with seniority 40 and seniority 130.
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Captain_Orso
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I think only the general on top should be considered when assessing penalties for passing somebody over for promotion. If you are next in line for promotion and get passed-over you have reason to complain.
If you are 5rd in line, or 12th, and you all get passed-over, there are others who were "wronged" more than you. If you complain to the press or a political benefactor now, you sound like a fool who doesn't understand that even if he and the other 10 leaders in line were not passed-over and the top 5 were promoted he would still not have been promoted. Would he then complain for not being promoted over the top of others in front of him?
Nee, if there were such vain fools in the army, I think they would have used up any political influence they might have had very quickly.
If you are 5rd in line, or 12th, and you all get passed-over, there are others who were "wronged" more than you. If you complain to the press or a political benefactor now, you sound like a fool who doesn't understand that even if he and the other 10 leaders in line were not passed-over and the top 5 were promoted he would still not have been promoted. Would he then complain for not being promoted over the top of others in front of him?
Nee, if there were such vain fools in the army, I think they would have used up any political influence they might have had very quickly.
Captain_Orso wrote:If you are 5rd in line, or 12th, and you all get passed-over, there are others who were "wronged" more than you. If you complain to the press or a political benefactor now, you sound like a fool who doesn't understand that even if he and the other 10 leaders in line were not passed-over and the top 5 were promoted he would still not have been promoted. Would he then complain for not being promoted over the top of others in front of him?
But imagine the top 5 leaders complaining to the press TOGETHER. It would make all the difference.
Imagine only top leader complaining to be passed over a no-name leader, and complaining to be passed over to lower seniority, but still established leader. It is not the same.
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Captain_Orso
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Ace wrote:It is already included in the current engine. Even in defeat sometimes your generals rise in seniority. Maybe seniority rises could be higher.
Good idea, especially considering many generals during the war did hold positions higher than their current ranking. I would hover limit the army command to two star generals and a HEAVY PENALTY for using it. In that case, every available 3 star general should get upset with their respective VP and NM hit to your cause. I presume everyone would be upset by your decision, not just the first general in line.
Corps command could be given to 1 star general, but only with respective NM and VP hit also.
No, AACW generals (at least originally) were ranked (1*, 2*, 3*) according to commands held and not according to actual rank. So a 1* is someone who held a divisional command (it's among these that probably some additional ones slipped in at some point, but as long as most held actual divisional commands this is not a big issue), a 2* is someone who held a corps command and a 3* someone with army command (one of the large ones, not the small ones like the Army of the Indian Territory which was really a large division)...
To avoid confusion I think it might be better to get rid of the stars (*) to denote in game rank and go for NATO X to better visualise what size of force can be commanded. So 1* would become XX, 2* XXX, 3* XXXX and 4* XXXXX...
Marc aka Caran...
Captain_Orso wrote:If you are not up for promotion and get passed over by a successful up-and-comer who's just had a great success and is in all the newspapers as the new hope of the nation, you will sound like a whiny old man who's already seen his best days.
When Hood got promoted to AoT head, there were more than one general who were in front of him, and it was seen as a gamble by Jeff Davis.
If Longstreet or Hardee were promoted, it would not be seen as such. And there would not be the same amount of controversy in replacing Johnston as it was when Hood (who was much less senior than those two) was promoted.
In game therms, you would get the same hit when relieving Johnston regardless who is replacing him.
Maybe the hit should be proportional to difference in seniority and political rating of two generals in question.
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Captain_Orso
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It actually already is. When you relieve an army commander from command of an army you will lose 1 NM and some VP's, unless you subsequently appoint a higher ranking leader to command that Army HQ.
If you subsequently appoint a leader below the highest ranking leader to command that Army HQ you will pay a penalty depending the the difference in seniority and the political value of the highest ranking leader.
If you subsequently appoint a leader below the highest ranking leader to command that Army HQ you will pay a penalty depending the the difference in seniority and the political value of the highest ranking leader.
Captain_Orso wrote:It actually already is. When you relieve an army commander from command of an army you will lose 1 NM and some VP's, unless you subsequently appoint a higher ranking leader to command that Army HQ.
If you subsequently appoint a leader below the highest ranking leader to command that Army HQ you will pay a penalty depending the the difference in seniority and the political value of the highest ranking leader.
I am not sure about that. When you dismiss current army general, the only penalty comes from the most senior leader aspiring to that post.
So, if you dismiss current army general, and appoint a higher seniority one - no penalty.
If you dismiss current army general, and appoint a lower seniority one - most senior general gets angered, most often it is the current army general, sometimes it is not.
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Captain_Orso
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Ace wrote:I am not sure about that. When you dismiss current army general, the only penalty comes from the most senior leader aspiring to that post.
No, if you relieve, or dismiss or fire or send into retirement or how ever you want to call it, an army commander without appointing a new army commander to that Army HQ, there is still a penalty; about 1NM and some VP's.
Ace wrote:So, if you dismiss current army general, and appoint a higher seniority one - no penalty.
If you dismiss current army general, and appoint a lower seniority one - most senior general gets angered, most often it is the current army general, sometimes it is not.
Just a moment, I need my meds on this one...
That's almost exactly what I said, only it is always the most senior Lt. Gen. who does not current command an army who is used to assess the penalty.
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John Schilling
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Captain_Orso wrote:If you are not up for promotion and get passed over by a successful up-and-comer who's just had a great success and is in all the newspapers as the new hope of the nation, you will sound like a whiny old man who's already seen his best days.
Quite so, which makes it rather annoying when a one- or two-star general becomes eligible for promotion due to battlefield success, but cannot be promoted without an NM/VP hit because the most senior 1/2* is himself not eligible for promotion but will complain effectively. If anything, it is the new guy with the recent victory who could complain and be heard, and would likely have complaints made on his behalf by a press looking for a good story.
My suggestion would be that, in the turn when a general becomes eligible for promotion due to battlefield victory, there should be no morale hit due to the mere existence of higher-ranked generals who are not themselves eligible for promotion that turn, but there <b>should</b> be a morale hit and seniority loss for <b>not</b> promoting the hero of the day.
This would also help deal with the issue of players using their ahistorical knowledge that certain generals don't do so well at higher ranks and keeping them at divisional level for the entire game. Certainly one can tell e.g. Longstreet that no matter how many glorious victories he wins you're never going to let him have that third star, but there should be a price for that.
I think we are missing the point. It is not the press which is the obstacle to promoting regardless of seniority. It is military establishment with ranks and a set hierarchy. Going against set military establishment is not a good thing when you are in the middle of the war. Also, many political generals provided their own regiments and funding). So maybe, VP, EP hit, money and conscript production cost could be more suitable penalty than the NM hit for political general who is not loved by the public.
If it is beloved general, (eg. Lee or McClellan in the beginning, NM hit is in order)
If it is beloved general, (eg. Lee or McClellan in the beginning, NM hit is in order)
Captain_Orso wrote:Just a moment, I need my meds on this one...
That's almost exactly what I said, only it is always the most senior Lt. Gen. who does not current command an army who is used to assess the penalty.
I am only saying, it is the same penalty if you promote Patterson and if you promote Grant to head AoP. It shouldn't be so.
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Captain_Orso
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Ahhhhh, I see said the blind man 
. Okay I get what you mean now. Yes, logically that would make sense.
What one should understand is that the rule is not just meant to mirror the political influence of some leaders, but also to influence the player into using those really bad early war leaders who the player would rather leave out of the active game.
For example I rather doubt that McClellan had so much political influence that after First Manassas if Lincoln and Scott hadn't put him in charge of the AoP that public opinion would have suffered as much as in the game where the Union takes a heavy hit on NM and VP's. But without the heavy hand of the political influence rule the player would practically never put McClellan in charge of the AoP, because the player knows how poor of a leader he is in the game.
. Okay I get what you mean now. Yes, logically that would make sense.
What one should understand is that the rule is not just meant to mirror the political influence of some leaders, but also to influence the player into using those really bad early war leaders who the player would rather leave out of the active game.
For example I rather doubt that McClellan had so much political influence that after First Manassas if Lincoln and Scott hadn't put him in charge of the AoP that public opinion would have suffered as much as in the game where the Union takes a heavy hit on NM and VP's. But without the heavy hand of the political influence rule the player would practically never put McClellan in charge of the AoP, because the player knows how poor of a leader he is in the game.
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Ol' Choctaw
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I have been thinking about this. Many generals lose value when promoted, some few gain it.
It is not the rank that made that difference, it was the responsibility that went with the command.
Li’l Mac should look good, until he gets command. He was active in western Virginia and saw what needed to be done, exercised initiative and got the job done, thanks in no small part to his subordinates tactical skills. Mac might have made a good corps commander under someone who could direct and channel his energies. Hooker, Mead, Hood, and many others were solidly good corps commanders but not at the next level of command. This is not a question of rank. If still a corps commander they should perform the same as they did before. Just not in high command.
It should be position and not rank that dictates performance. In other words they look great until they get the job.
It is not the rank that made that difference, it was the responsibility that went with the command.
Li’l Mac should look good, until he gets command. He was active in western Virginia and saw what needed to be done, exercised initiative and got the job done, thanks in no small part to his subordinates tactical skills. Mac might have made a good corps commander under someone who could direct and channel his energies. Hooker, Mead, Hood, and many others were solidly good corps commanders but not at the next level of command. This is not a question of rank. If still a corps commander they should perform the same as they did before. Just not in high command.
It should be position and not rank that dictates performance. In other words they look great until they get the job.
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Captain_Orso
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This is pretty much true, although I wouldn't say that Meade was that bad as an army commander, although he did seem to become more cautious; it seems that when you are commanding a corp and have a few left and right of you it instills a certain amount of confidence that it's difficult to hold on to when you are in charge of all of the corps.
Historically it seems that when Hooker only had a corp to lead he was back to his "old self", until he took his hat and left. Burnside also didn't do so bad in Knoxville even though he was pretty much independent, way out there, but still had Grant's guiding hand over him.
So I would tend to agree with a leader's quality being coupled with position more than just rank.
Historically it seems that when Hooker only had a corp to lead he was back to his "old self", until he took his hat and left. Burnside also didn't do so bad in Knoxville even though he was pretty much independent, way out there, but still had Grant's guiding hand over him.
So I would tend to agree with a leader's quality being coupled with position more than just rank.
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aariediger
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Well, part of the reason everyone looked so bad in the east is because they were. Burnside throwing his brigades in piecemeal at Fredericksburg, Hooker panicking in the Wilderness, Pope just flat out ignoring Longstreet’s approach at 2nd Manassas. McClellan got pushed around in the Seven Days. Until Gettysburg, most Federal battles in the east were disasters. The fact is McClellan was the only guy to even come close to beating Lee, and even he got fired. I’m not saying McClellan was a genius or anything, but he held his own better than McDowell/Fremont/Pope/Burnside/Hooker. Like Ol' Choctaw said, Mac did well in west virginia, and I pointed out earlier on in the thread that he did pretty well on the attack. Only a few times in the whole war was an attacker able to inflict 10,000 casualties in one day. You have Grant at Spotsyvainia in his May 12th assault that captured the Mule Shoe and an entire Confederate division. Then you have Bragg at Chickugauga. And lastly McClellan at Antietam. Say what you want, but I think that deserves more than a 1 offensive rating. I through out a 2-3-1 rating, as I figured that would at least make Mac a little bit useful, and keep people from shipping out of range of his corp commanders to prevent him compltely destroying their rating.
Back to the point, in reality Lee was too aggressive, and once he ran into an opponent who wouldn’t flinch, he was toast. Grant was amazing, both in the west and the east. Twice he nearly won the war in one swift blow, he very nearly broke Lee’s army in two at Spotsylvania, and should have captured Petersburg practically un-apposed if Wright was competent.
Back to the point, in reality Lee was too aggressive, and once he ran into an opponent who wouldn’t flinch, he was toast. Grant was amazing, both in the west and the east. Twice he nearly won the war in one swift blow, he very nearly broke Lee’s army in two at Spotsylvania, and should have captured Petersburg practically un-apposed if Wright was competent.
Burnside and Pope awful - absolutely correct
I am not so sure about Hooker. His plan as an army commander was actually very good. He was let down by his corps commanders He sent a message to Howard that a large CSA column is approaching to his right, and to prepare defensive works there. Howard (corps commander on his right flank) answered that he is prepared for any rebel force coming from that direction while he didn't turn a single regiment to that direction - he practically lied to his commanding officer in the time where there was no satellite imagery. That is the case for court marshall. Hooker made a strategic error in deciding to forfeit his advantage in artillery, but on his left wing (Fredericksburg) he urged his whole corps to attack a single CSA brigade, and they refused to move until the end of the battle. So he was alright, in fact one of the better generals of the war, not a brilliant one, but certainly better than all those before him, and offensively only Grant did better than him.
I am not so sure about Hooker. His plan as an army commander was actually very good. He was let down by his corps commanders He sent a message to Howard that a large CSA column is approaching to his right, and to prepare defensive works there. Howard (corps commander on his right flank) answered that he is prepared for any rebel force coming from that direction while he didn't turn a single regiment to that direction - he practically lied to his commanding officer in the time where there was no satellite imagery. That is the case for court marshall. Hooker made a strategic error in deciding to forfeit his advantage in artillery, but on his left wing (Fredericksburg) he urged his whole corps to attack a single CSA brigade, and they refused to move until the end of the battle. So he was alright, in fact one of the better generals of the war, not a brilliant one, but certainly better than all those before him, and offensively only Grant did better than him.
Second note.
On Seven days battles, CSA had not yet established effective command structure so they had blunders of their own. If they were organised the way they were only few months after, they would have captured entire Union army on penninsula and thus end the war. So much about McClellan.
Grant was not amazing. He was amazing in the West. He was only good in the East, and that is because he met his match.
If Longstreet had not been shot at the beginning of Wilderness campaign, he would have been beaten back as everybody else. After he got out of woods, he employed good strategy, grasping the fact CSA was exhausted and applying total war (some would call it war crime now) burning the Shenandoah valley and deriving it from supplies for the CSA. He was not called the butcher both North and South without reason.
Some of the battles he directly oversaw were brilliant, some not so, but he was not an inch better commander than Sherman. His Atlanta campaign was a masterpiece. That is what broke the south, not the Overland Campaign.
On Seven days battles, CSA had not yet established effective command structure so they had blunders of their own. If they were organised the way they were only few months after, they would have captured entire Union army on penninsula and thus end the war. So much about McClellan.
Grant was not amazing. He was amazing in the West. He was only good in the East, and that is because he met his match.
If Longstreet had not been shot at the beginning of Wilderness campaign, he would have been beaten back as everybody else. After he got out of woods, he employed good strategy, grasping the fact CSA was exhausted and applying total war (some would call it war crime now) burning the Shenandoah valley and deriving it from supplies for the CSA. He was not called the butcher both North and South without reason.
Some of the battles he directly oversaw were brilliant, some not so, but he was not an inch better commander than Sherman. His Atlanta campaign was a masterpiece. That is what broke the south, not the Overland Campaign.
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Captain_Orso
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Burnside lacked any capacity to realize what his opponent might do. He viewed Lee as static, which knowing Lee is so outlandishly ridiculous. His idea to cross and take Fredericksburg on Lee's flank was good, but only good so long as he could cross unopposed and still be on Lee's flank.
When his march took far too long and he then also waited for the arrival of the rest of his pontoon bridges he had lost every basis of his plan, but continued anyway thinking that now that Lee stood on the hills overlooking Fredericksburg not even Lee would think that he would cross there now. In other words, the plan is so stupid nobody will expect it; it being so unexpected, it will work.
But Burnside completely ignored what he should have know Lee would be thinking, that even though it would be stupid to cross at Fredericksburg now, Burnside is now here and so he--Lee--must stay and prepare for what comes. Not calling the campaign off was his biggest mistake. Not being able to think and organize quickly and switch his plan to basically what Hookers plan would be, to cross and attack Lee's flank through Chancellorsville, only shows how unimaginative and unaggressive he was. His assault on Marye's Hights was only the dotting of the i on his incompetence.
The problem with McClellan is not that he couldn't think things through and didn't know what to do to fight a campaign, but that he was unwilling to fight his troops. He wanted to out-smart Johnston thinking that he must give in to his maneuvering and fall back with as little fighting as possible. He thought Lee must conduct himself in submission because he was outnumbered. McClellan couldn't conceive that Lee would use aggression to counter his strategy of overwhelming the enemy, because it was so far removed from his mind. He wanted to be America's Napoleon, but Napoleon won at Austerlitz by assaulting the enemy aggressively. All his genial plans would have meant nothing without being willing to fight.
McClellan at Antietam did little to control the battle. He didn't come close to the battlefield to see its development, because he had no intentions of changing his original plan and refused to adjust his tactics where needed. He could maneuver his army well, but he wouldn't fight it.
I could see maybe raising McClellan's strategic rating to 2, because he could move his army when he wanted, but he rarely did, so that rather speaks against it. More logical would be when he is active if all of his corps were also made active. I could see that to be fitting. If using 'hardened activation' there were a way to allow him to move his army into Maryland for example to counter an invasion, that would make sense, but that goes for every leader.
Theoretically McClellan knew enough to lead an army, and that well. In reality he would not fight an army. His only real battle was Antietam and while Lee was divided he failed to do anything close to kicking Lee from his position. That is not the signs of a good fighter and that is what the Offensive value is on a leader.
When his march took far too long and he then also waited for the arrival of the rest of his pontoon bridges he had lost every basis of his plan, but continued anyway thinking that now that Lee stood on the hills overlooking Fredericksburg not even Lee would think that he would cross there now. In other words, the plan is so stupid nobody will expect it; it being so unexpected, it will work.
But Burnside completely ignored what he should have know Lee would be thinking, that even though it would be stupid to cross at Fredericksburg now, Burnside is now here and so he--Lee--must stay and prepare for what comes. Not calling the campaign off was his biggest mistake. Not being able to think and organize quickly and switch his plan to basically what Hookers plan would be, to cross and attack Lee's flank through Chancellorsville, only shows how unimaginative and unaggressive he was. His assault on Marye's Hights was only the dotting of the i on his incompetence.
The problem with McClellan is not that he couldn't think things through and didn't know what to do to fight a campaign, but that he was unwilling to fight his troops. He wanted to out-smart Johnston thinking that he must give in to his maneuvering and fall back with as little fighting as possible. He thought Lee must conduct himself in submission because he was outnumbered. McClellan couldn't conceive that Lee would use aggression to counter his strategy of overwhelming the enemy, because it was so far removed from his mind. He wanted to be America's Napoleon, but Napoleon won at Austerlitz by assaulting the enemy aggressively. All his genial plans would have meant nothing without being willing to fight.
McClellan at Antietam did little to control the battle. He didn't come close to the battlefield to see its development, because he had no intentions of changing his original plan and refused to adjust his tactics where needed. He could maneuver his army well, but he wouldn't fight it.
I could see maybe raising McClellan's strategic rating to 2, because he could move his army when he wanted, but he rarely did, so that rather speaks against it. More logical would be when he is active if all of his corps were also made active. I could see that to be fitting. If using 'hardened activation' there were a way to allow him to move his army into Maryland for example to counter an invasion, that would make sense, but that goes for every leader.
Theoretically McClellan knew enough to lead an army, and that well. In reality he would not fight an army. His only real battle was Antietam and while Lee was divided he failed to do anything close to kicking Lee from his position. That is not the signs of a good fighter and that is what the Offensive value is on a leader.
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Ol' Choctaw
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Oh, but you touch on Mac’s problem without going all the way. He could maneuver with the best of them. He could develop a good and daring plan. He just could not cross that line to committing his troops to an attack, or even a pursuit for that matter.
Mac should be a 4-1-2 or a 5-1-2 but when he gets to the last region he should flip to blue and sit there. He should almost always be able to move, just not to attack. He did not want to take casualties. In defense it was not his problem. He could dig in and take what was thrown at him, he just could not send his men in to die, win or lose.
Mac should be a 4-1-2 or a 5-1-2 but when he gets to the last region he should flip to blue and sit there. He should almost always be able to move, just not to attack. He did not want to take casualties. In defense it was not his problem. He could dig in and take what was thrown at him, he just could not send his men in to die, win or lose.
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Captain_Orso
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... and he didn't move. I sometimes wonder what would have happened if Lincoln hadn't been prodding him for months on end. Would he really have sat around Washington until the politicians, seeing that there is no way to prosecute the war with him sitting on the army, negotiated a solution?
You play the game as Lincoln and Scott, Halleck or later on Grant. So when you want McClellan to move and do something, he doesn't. If you give him a strategic value of 4, or god forbid 5, he would be activated most of the time and, although not great on offensive tactics, he could be made to wield that massive army of his and do things that the historical McClellan wouldn't have dreamed of after a visit to an opium den.
The game deals with this with the event forcing the player to close on Richmond and unlocking McClellan through the following months. Other than the predictability of the dates I find this to be pretty close to the way it was historically. Maybe AACW-II will refine this concept a bit to make it at the same time more historical realistic and more unpredictable; maybe variable unlock-time-frames for McClellan.
You play the game as Lincoln and Scott, Halleck or later on Grant. So when you want McClellan to move and do something, he doesn't. If you give him a strategic value of 4, or god forbid 5, he would be activated most of the time and, although not great on offensive tactics, he could be made to wield that massive army of his and do things that the historical McClellan wouldn't have dreamed of after a visit to an opium den.
The game deals with this with the event forcing the player to close on Richmond and unlocking McClellan through the following months. Other than the predictability of the dates I find this to be pretty close to the way it was historically. Maybe AACW-II will refine this concept a bit to make it at the same time more historical realistic and more unpredictable; maybe variable unlock-time-frames for McClellan.
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aariediger
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"Maybe AACW-II will refine this concept a bit to make it at the same time more historical realistic and more unpredictable; maybe variable unlock-time-frames for McClellan."
We already have a way to make his activations random and unpredictiable: eliminate the event activations and bump his strat rating to 2. You will get about the same number of total activations, but you don't know when. Right now, since you know ahead of time when he will be active for say 4 or 5 turns in a row, you can plan your campaigns for that time frame and use him like he has a 6 strat rating because you know he will be active! Few people realise how strong late '61 McDowell is, or late '62 McClellan. You can fly around the map with these two in those time periods, and use them like a Grant or Lee!
If you take away the activation events and bump the strat rating to 2, it will make Mac less predictable, more historical, and a worse general.
We already have a way to make his activations random and unpredictiable: eliminate the event activations and bump his strat rating to 2. You will get about the same number of total activations, but you don't know when. Right now, since you know ahead of time when he will be active for say 4 or 5 turns in a row, you can plan your campaigns for that time frame and use him like he has a 6 strat rating because you know he will be active! Few people realise how strong late '61 McDowell is, or late '62 McClellan. You can fly around the map with these two in those time periods, and use them like a Grant or Lee!
If you take away the activation events and bump the strat rating to 2, it will make Mac less predictable, more historical, and a worse general.
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aariediger
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One other thing:
I think McClellan needs to be a bad defensive general. Really bad. In fact, so bad that you should be scared to move it near the enemy and out of its entrenchments. That's how Mac felt, and a 1 or amybe even a 0 dfensive rating could make this work. Additionally, the south should consider attacking McClellan the better option compared to remaining on the defensive. Right now, with 1 strat and offensive ratings, the southern player is better off sitting still. A 2-3-1 0r 2-3-0 McClellan changes that, and makes a seven days style counter offensive seem like the better alternative.
I think McClellan needs to be a bad defensive general. Really bad. In fact, so bad that you should be scared to move it near the enemy and out of its entrenchments. That's how Mac felt, and a 1 or amybe even a 0 dfensive rating could make this work. Additionally, the south should consider attacking McClellan the better option compared to remaining on the defensive. Right now, with 1 strat and offensive ratings, the southern player is better off sitting still. A 2-3-1 0r 2-3-0 McClellan changes that, and makes a seven days style counter offensive seem like the better alternative.
aariediger wrote:
If you take away the activation events and bump the strat rating to 2, it will make Mac less predictable, more historical, and a worse general.
He will not be worse general than. Remember, dragging down strategic rating of corps commanders is really the pain in the but, not the activation of the army stack, since the fighting troops are in subordinate corps, not in army stack.
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aariediger
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Well heck, if that's what you're worried about, just scale back those early war Union 2 star commanders to 2-1-1, and there you go. It's not like any of them were exactly world beaters, so I don't think anybody would complain. Also, it might slow down people on the off chance they get Lyon or Grant up to army command in '61-'62. Problem solved.
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