cohimbra wrote:Hi again, I don't want to be a wet towel (guastafeste) but I'm here and I report what I see, hoping that this news will
help you to fix the (minor) issues of this new release. Look that:
[ATTACH=CONFIG]22498[/ATTACH]
When I enter in the 'Decision Mode', in the background it appear a second 'Military Recruitment' menu. Regards (again).
cohimbra wrote:Hi again, I don't want to be a wet towel (guastafeste) but I'm here and I report what I see, hoping that this news will
help you to fix the (minor) issues of this new release. Look that:
[ATTACH=CONFIG]22498[/ATTACH]
When I enter in the 'Decision Mode', in the background it appear a second 'Military Recruitment' menu. Regards (again).
PhilThib wrote:Just found a bug in the upgrade kit, that may be the reason of some of these. Will work quickly on a fix
PhilThib wrote:Cooperation between players inside a MP PBEM game is totally free, there are no written rule in the engine. It's up to the players to decide what "allies" can do, something that all should agree as house rules before starting the game. My own feeling is that they should behave like historically, i.e. no transfer of information or with a delay (remember, no cell phones at the time, so a delay was always present and accuracy always absent).. the game is planned so that "allies" don't share LOS (i.e. all are on FoW)
In terms of objectives, VP, the allies should be cooperative...now, the winner will be the one with most VPs, so they can also have "hidden" agendas of their own..... here again, players shall decide... and yes, Human diplomacy must be there...
Die Zieten wrote:Would it be possible to have an option to hide the VP from other players?
What about creating events that bring some friction between the allies?
There where some troop transfers IRL that did not happen and monetary subsidies etc..
PhilThib wrote:Are you sure about this?
Which campaign are you talking about? 1757?
The 1757 Campaigns in Gold (both normal and MP) are strictly identical to the one we had in the original ROP game, and no one ever complained about such an issue before. I checked the events, there are no events between 1756 and April 1757 in either version of the game that give reinforcements (the Prussian player receives a few replacements end of 1756, but they are are already included in the at start pool of 1757)
Organisation of a Regiment
In 1756, a regiment usually counted two battalions. Each battalion consisted of 5 companies of musketeers and 1 company of grenadiers.
Musketeer Battalion
In 1748, a musketeer battalion counted 658 men (including battalion staff and excluding the grenadier company) and included 5 companies:
21 officers (including 1 adjutant)
50 non commissioned officers
16 drummers
570 musketeers
1 fifer
In 1756, a musketeer battalion counted 706 men (including battalion staff and excluding the grenadier company) and included 5 companies (140 men each).
The reinforcement of January 1757 brought the total strength of a battalion of musketeers to 856.
Grenadier Battalion
In 1756, a converged grenadier battalion counted 600 men and included 4 companies (150 men each).
After the reinforcement of January 1757, a grenadier battalion counted 720 troopers, for a total of 754 men including staff (for the moment, we do not know if the staff of a converged grenadier battalion was similar to the staff of a musketeer battalion).
Wartime Organisation
With the mobilisation of the army in summer 1756, the regiments were to arrive with 3 battalions at their assigned destinations. A regiments 4th battalion was to remain behind and serve as the regiments reserve depot and being now entitled a "Garrison Battalion", while the 3 other battalions would now form as 2 so called "Field Battalions" with each 6 coys, by disbanding a regiments 3rd battalion.
Total book strength of a regular 1756 "Field Battalion" was 18 officers and 798 men; the 4 coy "Garrison Battalion" with a regular 12 officers and 532 men.
Notes on variants, augmentation, and changes of organisation
[B]Austria failed to arrive at a system that could compete with Prussia’s much superior means to replace losses, despite all efforts to improve the armies resources for ample replacement. As a result, with the beginning of 1755, general Daun estimated a shortage of no less then 38,000 men for the infantry. By June 1756, the infantry was still short of about 10,000 men – very different to Frederick’s Prussian army, which entered the war ‘complete’ and could additionally draw from a large reserve of trained men. [/B]The regiments stationed in Italy and Netherlands counted only 2,000 men each. The single Slavonian regiment Simbschen (No. 53) – the former Trenck Pandurs of the War of Austrian Succession 1740-1748 – entered the 7 Years War with only a single battalion, being augmented to regulation size only early in 1757.
Summer 1756, the 2 national-Italian as well as 16 German and Hungarian regiments stationed in Italy and Netherlands were fixed on a somewhat lower force, for lack of enough recruits. Their fusilier coy counted 3 officers and only 113 men for a total of 18 officers and 678 men per battalion. The 4 National-Netherlanish battalions attached to the French army in 1757 (one battalion from each of these regiments: IR 9, 30, 38, and 55) took to the field with 5 coys each of 2 officers / 112 men and a single grenadier coy with some 90 men. During the course of the war, their garrison battalions were eventually disbanded altogether, as a result of insufficient replacement. The 4 National-Netherlandish regiments, thus being organised with 3 battalions of 4 coys each throughout most of the 7YW.
During 1757 – in response to the successful Prussian early invasion of Bohemia – a good number of the regiments garrison battalions had been ordered to the field. They were really converged battalions, created by combining 6 coys of 2 or 3 regiments. Most of the 3 battalion regiments listed in the Kolin order of battle would have fielded such a 3rd battalion. The 3rd battalion Moltke (IR 13), for example, was formed of 4 coys Moltke and 2 Kheul (IR 49).
Winter 1757/58, the regiments were ordered to raise "Depositories" in strength of 1 or 2 officers and a 100 to 200 NCO’s and men, that were to serve as a regiments store of recruits, and to receive the sick, and lightly wounded. They were to be set up at a suitable distance somewhat in the rear of the army. Also all of a regiments dispensable baggage was to be located here. For an example, by September 1758, the "Depositories" of 43 regiments with more then 6,900 men were located at Prague.
Spring 1758, all of the armies "Garrison Battalions", that had for the most part been sucked into the field army during the preceding campaign, were to be re-raised and organised in 6 companies like the 2 "Field Battalions". In contrast to the "Depositories", they were to be employed to escort the transports and other rear activities. At the same time each fusilier coy was somewhat increased to a total of 140 men, including officers.
Each regiment was now organised in 2 coys of grenadiers and 3 battalions of fusiliers of 6 coys each, with a total of 24 officers and 816 men per battalion. With regard of the "Field-Battalions", this 1758 re-organisation would basically now remain unaltered until the end of the war, except for the 4 Netherlandish regiments, which eventually organised in 3 battalions with 4 coys each. However, as a result of severe losses, the number of battalions in some regiments had temporally been reduced during the course of the one or other campaign.
Winter 1761/1762, overall strength of the regiments had to be reduced as a result of Austria’s dwindling financial resources. Each regiments 3rd Garrison-Battalion was cut down to the 4 company establishment of 1756 in order to reduce costs.
The grenadiers often formed in ad hoc battalions of between 4 to 8 companies for special tasks. Often, the grenadiers of the entire armies 1st and 2nd line regiments were converged into a so entitled "Grenadier Corps" of elites only. Size and composition greatly changed during campaign.
Charles wrote:I would be careful in using wiki as a source for anything, unless you can check out the source material.
Duffy makes no mention of any "1757 reinforcements" or of any TO&E changes in 1757.
According to Duffy, the Prussian infantry regiment TO&E was the same during the entire 1740-63 period with a max of 1700 men which works out to a max of 850 men for each of the two battalions. From that figure, you have to deduct the Grenadiers.
Grenadier battalions in the SYW were not permanent units, but were formed on an adhoc basis before battle. This was done by taking the two grenadier companies in an infantry regiment (around 350 men) from two separate regiments to form an adhoc Grenadier battalion of 700 men.
Once you deduct the 350 grenadiers from the regiment, you are left with a total of 1350 men or 675 in each battalion.
so TO&E
-grenadier battalion - 700 men
-infantry battalion - 675 men
Note these are the max figures, it is doubtful any unit would have been at 100% TO&E on a consistent basis.
Again according to Duffy, the average Austrian infantry regiment had a shortfall of about 9% at the beginning of each campaign in the SYW.
We have no equivalent figures for the Prussian Army. Much has been made of the Prussian "cantonal" (i.e draft) system, but this supplied only part of the Prussian needs, namely 50,000 out of 133,000 (38%) in 1751 and 70,000 out of 160,000 (44%) in 1768. The proportion of draftees was higher during the middle/end of the SYW, but never fulfilled all the manpower needs since Frederick spent heavily on foreign recruitment during the war and also forcibly recruited enemy prisoners, something which no one else did. The Prussians also had a big problem with desertions. IR n39 "Jung-Braunschwig" alone lost 1650 men, basically 100% of its TO&E to desertions in the SYW.
so, it is doubtful, the Prussian army was much better off than the Austrians in obtaining replacements.
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