Early War Union Command: How can we make it better?

[B0rn_C0nfused]

As a side not, I watched a big special on Antietam not that long ago. I believe they cited In that special that Mac had Lee outnumber 2:1, although he chose not to engage a large number of his troops. I also believe that it stated that Lee was able to hold on by the skin of his teeth be using economy of force. That is employing almost all his troops into battle. I believe there were very few Southern troops that sat out, 5,000 or less.

One more thing, Lee could have withdrawn his army and slipped south of the Potomac into Virginia. He had enough time to do that, but he didn't want to do that. Btw without South Mountain lee would not have been able to concentrate as much of his army as he did. South Mountain although a Union "victory" was a very successful delaying action and bought Lee enough time to concentrate enough of his army to be able to hang on at Antietam.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

I understand Burnside showed some initiative to modify his plan in the middle of battle, but when your new plan is to assault entrenchments head on one brigade at a time, you don’t win any points in my book. I do, however, like Hooker and the way he is treated in game as a decent general that just happened to be fighting practically a military genius like Lee.

Back to McDowell, Burnside, Fremont, and Banks: Why do we think they were so much more active than McClellan? They all kind of dragged their feet when it came time to move or attack, and although McClellan was slow, was he so much worse than the rest of these guys that he is the only one of the bunch to get a 1 strategy rating?

I think you are a little misguided with the other generals. Banks and Fremont were HORRIBLE generals that is why their in game ratings are 2-0-1, the zero is for attack, so Mac is rated higher than them. Although Burnside was an idiot at Fredericksburg. He showed some offensive prowess in other battles, most notably in Georgia. That is where his offensive rating comes from (which is only a 2 btw). Also in McDowell's case he launched a successful attack at first Bull run, and was being to rout J. Johnston's army, P. G. T. Beauregard arrived via rail from the Shenandoah Valley just in time to stop the attack, counter attack and win the day, that is also where Jackson got his nickname. Something like "There is Jackson standing like a stone wall, rally around the Virginians). This is all from memory of course so it might be wrong.

[aariediger]

But why would Lee stay in such a vulnerable position, without all his troops, if he didn't have to? There was nothing to be gained, and everything to be lost. Either Lee had to stand and fight against his will, or he took a huge risk all for nothing. If he had thrown back McClellan, then what? Countinue his invasion with a battered army while outnumbered? Which makes more sense?

[aariediger]

Banks and Fremont were HORRIBLE generals that is why their in game ratings are 2-0-1

That's kind of my point. They were horrible, worse than McClellan even. And yet, they are active twice as often. Why?

[wsatterwhite]

I must say as someone who is generally a McClellan sympathizer, I appreciate your steadfast defense of him, as much as I disagree regarding his offensive/defensive ratings.

While it can be argued that Burnside was probably better off taking a McClellan-esque stance at Fredericksburg rather than making the decision to throw brigade after brigade against Marie's Heights, the main point there is that the way I see it Burnside's effort is more in line with a general deserving a higher offensive rating than a general who would simply stay in his hq when the bullets started flying- I dare say that if Lee or a Grant (the best of the best I think we can all agree) found themselves in Burnside's shoes the way things played out that day they likely wouldn't have done much differently (see Pickett's Charge and Cold Harbor). Can the same be said if Lee or Grant were in McClellan's shoes at South Mountain or Antietam? You make a good point in that the main attack at Antietam lost momentum when the two corps commanders on that front fell but that is the exact point where an active and engaged army commander would have made a difference by committing additional reserves (either the 5th or 6th Corps) to sustain the momentum against Jackson's line or ensuring Sumner didn't foul up his assault on his front. Lee was able to shift troops from problem sector to problem sector precisely because McClellan did what a good general should not do on the offensive- he wasted his superior manpower advantage and allowed his offensive to break down into essentially three separate battles.

[wsatterwhite]

That's kind of my point. They were horrible, worse than McClellan even. And yet, they are active twice as often. Why?

Personally I'm not sure Fremont should even be represented within the game but in all fairness to Banks, being active with the troops under his command was never really an issue- for much of his time in active commands his troops were generally on the move, the only problem was Banks' incompetence once the enemy got in the way. Banks' rating is fairly accurate- he can move troops around a bit but when it comes to actually doing something constructive with those troops, he's useless.

[wsatterwhite]

Looking at the Maryland Campaign, I think he did an okay job. At South Mountain, he lost less men than the screening force, and although they bought some time for Lee to consolidate his forces a bit, Lee was still in a spectacularly vulnerable position when McClellan got to Sharpsburg two days later. He had his back to the Potomac, and a mistake could mean losing the war right then and there. If South Mountain was really such a successful delaying action, then Lee should have had enough time to slip south of the Potomac where he would be safe. He didn’t, so I think South Mountain was a northern victory, both tactically and strategically.

One thing to remember about South Mountain and the Maryland Campaign in general is that Lee couldn't really abandon the campaign until Harpers Ferry surrendered. That is one major reason South Mountain can't be considered a strategic victory- by not forcing his way through Lee's screening forces as a more aggressive commander likely would have, McClellan basically ensured 12,000+ were surrendered the next day. Also, it must be noted that Lee's greatest trait was his ability to perfectly read his opponents minds and understand exactly how they operated- he knew he could take a defensive stand in Maryland precisely because McClellan would be hard pressed to push him out.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

But why would Lee stay in such a vulnerable position, without all his troops, if he didn't have to? There was nothing to be gained, and everything to be lost. Either Lee had to stand and fight against his will, or he took a huge risk all for nothing. If he had thrown back McClellan, then what? Countinue his invasion with a battered army while outnumbered? Which makes more sense?

I could be wrong but, one this coincided with the offensive in ky, two, perhaps most important. Jefferson Davis thought a victory on northern soil would secure foreign support, three lee wanted to resupply outside of Vir and give Vir a break, four Lee still had hopes of cutting the raillines in Harrisburg Pa (his objective). Four Lee thought Maryland had strong Southern sympathies (wrong) and he wanted to recruit and bring Maryland into the Southern cause. I could be wrong, but I believe Lee could have retreated. Sharpsberg is where he cgose to concentrate his scattered army and defend.

[aariediger]

I don’t know how much more he could have gotten done at Antietam that same day. Don’t get me wrong, McClellan could have, and should have, pursued Lee’s army. They were every bit as broken and disorganized as he was, and he had Franklin’s corps still fresh (Porter had not engaged, but wasn’t exactly at 100% either.) But he had already had four corps shot to pieces, was down two corps commanders, and had taken 12,000 casualties. That will kind of knock you off your game. Meade was content to let Lee retreat south after Gettysburg when he lost a pair of corps commanders and had taken over 23,000 casualties, even though Sedgwick’s corps was still fresh and hadn’t participated in the battle.

But looking at the battle on the day of September 17th, what would you do? The situation on the right is confused, all three corps are fought out, two are down to their second in command. Burnside is struggling, but you had always meant for his attack to be secondary in nature anyway. You have two corps unengaged so far, Franklin’s fresh corps, and Porter’s tired corps.
So, do you throw either or both of your corps into the fray on the right or the left? I don’t think more men is going to get Burnside across his bridge. So the only options are:

1. Throw Franklin’s corps at Lee’s left right now.
2. Order Porter to join Franklin and wait to attack later in the day if there’s any daylight left.
3. Try to restore some semblance of order on the right, and then decide where, and if, to attack

McClellan never got his right wing fixed, and never sent in a second attack. A great commander would have chosen one of the first two options. He didn’t.

[ATTACH]21885[/ATTACH]

I don’t know that Harpers Ferry fell because of South Mountain. The siege began September 12th, the Army of Potomac arrived at South Mountain the next day, punched through on the 14th, but the garrison surrendered the next morning. It seems a little much to expect anyone to have reached Harper’s Ferry before then. They had to fight through the mountain passes, and then Lee’s army. I don’t know if anyone could have gotten there before September 15th. McClellan had wanted Harper’s Ferry evacuated after Lee started heading north, but Halleck refused. After receiving word that they were besieged, McClellan said he would save the garrison if they stood their ground and fought. They didn’t, surrendering after only three days to a force the same size as their own.

Their commander Dixon Miles, who was mortally wounded right after his decision to surrender, some say by his own troops, was later denounced by a court of inquiry for "incapacity, amounting to almost imbecility.”

[B0rn_C0nfused]

That's kind of my point. They were horrible, worse than McClellan even. And yet, they are active twice as often. Why?

I could be wrong, but competence of a general has nothing to do with how active they were. John Bell Hood was the WORST general IMO once he got promoted to an army commander, but he was highly active, and I think his ratings go from something like 5-4-1 to 4-0-1 once he goes from 2-3 stars. A general can be more active than another and be way less skilled, Hence why Mac has one more off/def point than Banks and Fremont and Butler.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

http://www.civilwarinteractive.com/forums/forum40/2349.html

This is just a discussion, but makes for an interesting read.

[aariediger]

I would argue that how active a commander is has everything to do with how competent he is. True, there are exceptions, Hood for example, and also Thomas (who is slow but a good general.) However, to be great you need to have a high strategic rating. It’s why Grant, Lee, and Sherman are the best army commanders, they can move and fight at a moment’s notice, and can seize opportunities when they arise. Now, you still have to be able to fight well, which they all can, but strategic rating means a lot. It’s the main reason most people don’t put Longstreet in charge of an army.

We have been told that 3-1-1 is an average leader. That is not the case for army commanders.

First, you have your great commanders, your Lees and Grants. I think about 5-4-4 is the mark set for greatness, if your better than that you’re pretty damn good.

I would argue 4-3-3 is about average. Hooker, Lyon, Howard, both Johnstons, Bragg, and Beauregard all fit into this category.

Next, you have your poor commanders, about 3-2-2. This is where you find Pope, Burnside, Rosecrans, Buell, Pemberton and McDowell.

Lastly, the worst of the worst, you’re 2-0-1 commanders. Halleck, Fremont, Banks, Butler, Hood, Polk, and Patterson. This is where McClellan is right now. I think he deserves to be one rank above this, basically just replacing McDowell, who I think deserves to be down here.

Look at the Peninsula Campaign. Seems like an okay idea right? Lincoln let McClellan try it. In the game, would you ever let 1-1-2 McClellan try that? What about 2-3-1 McClellan? If you changed your answer to a maybe or a yes, then I think we have our answer. I think a better McClellan is better for the game, and doesn’t run completely out of line with the facts.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

I would argue that how active a commander is has everything to do with how competent he is. True, there are exceptions, Hood for example, and also Thomas (who is slow but a good general.) However, to be great you need to have a high strategic rating. It’s why Grant, Lee, and Sherman are the best army commanders, they can move and fight at a moment’s notice, and can seize opportunities when they arise. Now, you still have to be able to fight well, which they all can, but strategic rating means a lot. It’s the main reason most people don’t put Longstreet in charge of an army.

We have been told that 3-1-1 is an average leader. That is not the case for army commanders.

First, you have your great commanders, your Lees and Grants. I think about 5-4-4 is the mark set for greatness, if your better than that you’re pretty damn good.

I would argue 4-3-3 is about average. Hooker, Lyon, Howard, both Johnstons, Bragg, and Beauregard all fit into this category.

Next, you have your poor commanders, about 3-2-2. This is where you find Pope, Burnside, Rosecrans, Buell, Pemberton and McDowell.

Lastly, the worst of the worst, you’re 2-0-1 commanders. Halleck, Fremont, Banks, Butler, Hood, Polk, and Patterson. This is where McClellan is right now. I think he deserves to be one rank above this, basically just replacing McDowell, who I think deserves to be down here.

Look at the Peninsula Campaign. Seems like an okay idea right? Lincoln let McClellan try it. In the game, would you ever let 1-1-2 McClellan try that? What about 2-3-1 McClellan? If you changed your answer to a maybe or a yes, then I think we have our answer. I think a better McClellan is better for the game, and doesn’t run completely out of line with the facts.

All I'm saying in this game strategic rating has no correlation to offensive and defensive rating, therefore just because a player has a high strategic rating, that says nothing about his off/def stats.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

I would argue that how active a commander is has everything to do with how competent he is. True, there are exceptions, Hood for example, and also Thomas (who is slow but a good general.) However, to be great you need to have a high strategic rating. It’s why Grant, Lee, and Sherman are the best army commanders, they can move and fight at a moment’s notice, and can seize opportunities when they arise. Now, you still have to be able to fight well, which they all can, but strategic rating means a lot. It’s the main reason most people don’t put Longstreet in charge of an army.

We have been told that 3-1-1 is an average leader. That is not the case for army commanders.

First, you have your great commanders, your Lees and Grants. I think about 5-4-4 is the mark set for greatness, if your better than that you’re pretty damn good.

I would argue 4-3-3 is about average. Hooker, Lyon, Howard, both Johnstons, Bragg, and Beauregard all fit into this category.

Next, you have your poor commanders, about 3-2-2. This is where you find Pope, Burnside, Rosecrans, Buell, Pemberton and McDowell.

Lastly, the worst of the worst, you’re 2-0-1 commanders. Halleck, Fremont, Banks, Butler, Hood, Polk, and Patterson. This is where McClellan is right now. I think he deserves to be one rank above this, basically just replacing McDowell, who I think deserves to be down here.

Look at the Peninsula Campaign. Seems like an okay idea right? Lincoln let McClellan try it. In the game, would you ever let 1-1-2 McClellan try that? What about 2-3-1 McClellan? If you changed your answer to a maybe or a yes, then I think we have our answer. I think a better McClellan is better for the game, and doesn’t run completely out of line with the facts.

just an fyi Lyon is a 4-2-2 as an army commander, ditto for hooker, bragg is 5-3-1 and I think howard is 4-3-1 (I think), those guys are more in the 3-2-2 category if you ask me. You also left out other guys like winfred hancock meade and several others that would make good army commanders.

I think you have 5 tiers personally: This is just based on strat/off/def ratings, this doesn't factor in traits.
Elite:Grant Lee etc
good:meade, Hancock Jackson, Longrsteet, Thomas etc
average:Johnston, P. G. T etc
below average:Howard, Bragg, Pope, Mac, Buell etc.
inept:Banks, Butler, Banks, Fremont, Hellack, Hood etc.

Within each of those categories you have some variation, you can be high average, low average, high below average. low below average etc.

Mac is not in the lowest category IMO. He also has two good traits, trainer and good army administer I think a boast to 1-1-3 would do just fine. Once you factor in his traits this actually makes him fairly solid for early union command. He can sit somewhere and slowly train troops, then you can put him in charge of a corp/stack for cohesion recovery after some of your units get rung up. He would also be an adept corps ommander for holding down defensive positions, esp early in the game.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

I would argue that how active a commander is has everything to do with how competent he is. True, there are exceptions, Hood for example, and also Thomas (who is slow but a good general.) However, to be great you need to have a high strategic rating. It’s why Grant, Lee, and Sherman are the best army commanders, they can move and fight at a moment’s notice, and can seize opportunities when they arise. Now, you still have to be able to fight well, which they all can, but strategic rating means a lot. It’s the main reason most people don’t put Longstreet in charge of an army.

We have been told that 3-1-1 is an average leader. That is not the case for army commanders.

First, you have your great commanders, your Lees and Grants. I think about 5-4-4 is the mark set for greatness, if your better than that you’re pretty damn good.

I would argue 4-3-3 is about average. Hooker, Lyon, Howard, both Johnstons, Bragg, and Beauregard all fit into this category.

Next, you have your poor commanders, about 3-2-2. This is where you find Pope, Burnside, Rosecrans, Buell, Pemberton and McDowell.

Lastly, the worst of the worst, you’re 2-0-1 commanders. Halleck, Fremont, Banks, Butler, Hood, Polk, and Patterson. This is where McClellan is right now. I think he deserves to be one rank above this, basically just replacing McDowell, who I think deserves to be down here.

Look at the Peninsula Campaign. Seems like an okay idea right? Lincoln let McClellan try it. In the game, would you ever let 1-1-2 McClellan try that? What about 2-3-1 McClellan? If you changed your answer to a maybe or a yes, then I think we have our answer. I think a better McClellan is better for the game, and doesn’t run completely out of line with the facts.

To respond tot he last part. I think if Lincoln had seen general's "Ratings" like we can he would have made different choices for commanders. From my understanding the ratings in this game are largely based on what happened with the "benefit" of hindsight. Mac had great potential IMO, but he never showed it. I can't really think of any general who was more timid, cautious and less active the Mac. Infact I'm not sure any other general has below a two strategic rating in AACW besides Mac. The best way to put it is how U. S Grant did in his memoirs. "McClellan remains one of great mysteries of the war to me." Or something to that effect.

As a separate note here he kind of remains of this guy that plays a baseball sim that I do. He is constantly freakingout and overestimating other teams. It ia a 160 game season and he drops say 5 games in a row he freaks out and thinks he needs to add an ace. He is paranoid about his team's strength in relation to others.

Two quotes about McClellan sum him up really well I think.
1)something like "He can win any battle on paper"
2)something like "Even if he were approaching Richmond with a million men he would claim the enemy has 1.5 million and request reinforcements."

Lincoln had a few good ones about him including "Even if he can't fight himself, he excels at making others ready to fight" or something to that effect.

Mac was loved by his men, and he truly cared about their well being. He turned the AoP into a finely tuned machine. However, he was not a very active general, and was extremely cautious. His 1 strat rating is very appropriate to me. Antietam to me is the best example of how ineffective he was offensively(maybe a buff to 2). Again one seems appropriate. He was solid defensivly in my mind, and maybe deserves a buff to 3. However I think 1-1-3 along with good army administrater, troop trainer and maybe another one like strategist seems like it is representative of Mac in the war IMO.

[aariediger]

I think your estimate is far too high for southern troops at Antietam. http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_are_t...le_of_Antietam the source quoted for the answer seems to be scholarly.

I believe the reason Lee has was able to have so many troops later, was a concentration of troops that weren't in Maryland, and I believe there were still a considerable number at Harper's Ferry. I don't believe there were 60,000 Southern troops at Antietam.

There weren't 60,000 troops there. Here's the rest of what Longstreet said:

The Army of Northern Virginia concentrated at and near Fredericktown on the 9th of September, 1862, numbered a trifle over 61,000, all arms. General Lee's estimate of his troops engaged at Sharpsburg was 37,000. This may not include his cavalry arm, conceding which, his force on the field should have been about 41,000.

I understand that Lee did a good job of using all the troops he had on the field that day, but offensive and defensive ratings include both tactical and operational ability, and both commanders at Antietam used about two thirds of the troops available to them. However, we penalize McClellan for actually having brought his extra troops to the battle, while Lee’s unengaged forces weren’t even present.

Also, why is it we think McClellan was timid at Antietam? He launched an assault on Lee’s left with three corps, half of his entire army, some 40,000 men, and you would be hard pressed to find a larger attack en mass than that. I believe the 10,000 casualties he inflicted that day were the most any attacker ever inflicted in any one day in the entire Civil War.

Oh, and here is Grant's full quote, from his Memoirs:

“McClellan is to me one of the mysteries of the war. As a young man he was always a mystery. He had the way of inspiring you with the idea of immense capacity, if he would only have a chance. Then he is a man of unusual accomplishments, a student, and a well-read man. I have never studied his campaigns enough to make up my mind as to his military skill, but all my impressions are in his favor. I have entire confidence in McClellan’s loyalty and patriotism. But the test that was applied to him would be terrible to any man, being made a major general at the beginning of the war. It has always seemed to me that the critics of McClellan do not consider this vast and cruel responsibility—the war, a new thing to all of us, the army new, everything to do from the outset, with a restless people and Congress. McClellan was a young man when this devolved upon him, and if he did not succeed, it was because the conditions of success were so trying. If McClellan had gone into the war as Sherman, Thomas, or Meade, had fought his way along and up, I have no reason to suppose that he would not have won as high a distinction as any of us.”

[B0rn_C0nfused]

I think Chickamauga the Union suffered more than 10,000 casualties in one day as the defenders. I think during Shiloh Grant suffered about 10,000 casualties in one day. At any rate, the point in Mac should have inflicted more than 10,000 casualties, he should have defeated Lee. Antietam was a very sub par showing.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

There weren't 60,000 troops there. Here's the rest of what Longstreet said:


I understand that Lee did a good job of using all the troops he had on the field that day, but offensive and defensive ratings include both tactical and operational ability, and both commanders at Antietam used about two thirds of the troops available to them. However, we penalize McClellan for actually having brought his extra troops to the battle, while Lee’s unengaged forces weren’t even present.

Also, why is it we think McClellan was timid at Antietam? He launched an assault on Lee’s left with three corps, half of his entire army, some 40,000 men, and you would be hard pressed to find a larger attack en mass than that. I believe the 10,000 casualties he inflicted that day were the most any attacker ever inflicted in any one day in the entire Civil War.

Oh, and here is Grant's full quote, from his Memoirs:

Fyi I don't penalize Mac for bringing extra troops, he get "penalized" because he had extra troops and he could and should have used those troops to trounce Lee. His lack of doing so is why his offensive should not be very high IMO. Fyi Lee's troops weren't able to make it to the battle on time, if they were there he would have used them. A. P Hill made an extraordinary forced march just to be able to make it to the battle and participate in the fighting.

[aariediger]

I think Chickamauga the Union suffered more than 10,000 casualties in one day as the defenders. I think during Shiloh Grant suffered about 10,000 casualties in one day. At any rate, the point in Mac should have inflicted more than 10,000 casualties, he should have defeated Lee. Antietam was a very sub par showing

Both Shiloh and Chickamauga were two day battles.

However, I see a lot of parallels between Chickamauga and Antietam. In both cases, the attacker roughed up the defender pretty bad, but due to his own great losses and incompetence didn’t make any use of his victory by following it up with a pursuit that could have destroyed the enemy. It’s part of the reason I see Bragg and McClellan as very similar generals. It’s why I think that a 5-3-1 Bragg is a way to justify a 2-3-1 McClellan. They also were both good troop trainers, and had a lot of political support. The main differences are that Bragg was quick to act but extremely disliked, while McClellan was slow to act and extremely popular.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

Both Shiloh and Chickamauga were two day battles.

However, I see a lot of parallels between Chickamauga and Antietam. In both cases, the attacker roughed up the defender pretty bad, but due to his own great losses and incompetence didn’t make any use of his victory by following it up with a pursuit that could have destroyed the enemy. It’s part of the reason I see Bragg and McClellan as very similar generals. It’s why I think that a 5-3-1 Bragg is a way to justify a 2-3-1 McClellan. They also were both good troop trainers, and had a lot of political support. The main differences are that Bragg was quick to act but extremely disliked, while McClellan was slow to act and extremely popular.

yes, but that doesn't mean that there weren't 10,000 casualties in a day, you follow me?

[B0rn_C0nfused]

Both Shiloh and Chickamauga were two day battles.

However, I see a lot of parallels between Chickamauga and Antietam. In both cases, the attacker roughed up the defender pretty bad, but due to his own great losses and incompetence didn’t make any use of his victory by following it up with a pursuit that could have destroyed the enemy. It’s part of the reason I see Bragg and McClellan as very similar generals. It’s why I think that a 5-3-1 Bragg is a way to justify a 2-3-1 McClellan. They also were both good troop trainers, and had a lot of political support. The main differences are that Bragg was quick to act but extremely disliked, while McClellan was slow to act and extremely popular.

Bragg completely routed the Union army, Mac fought to a draw and Lee withdrew low on supplies and men. Very very different situations. Maybe you should read about the battles a little more? Another thing is, Bragg was competent offensively. He had like negative defensive competence. I don't think you can argue that Mac is like Bragg, I would say Mac is actually the polar opposite of Bragg. Mac was loved slow and better defensivly, Bragg was active, better offensively and hated. they did both share political clout and troop trainer abilities. But in different way in regards to the troop training abilities. I think that is where the similarities ended though.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

I believe the Union had 9,000-11,000 casualties on the second day of Chickamauga

[caranorn]

No time to get into this in detail, just a few points:

Concerning Halleck. We could use a similar system to PoN here, essentially Halleck would be a Theater commander affecting the ratings of his subordinates who would be army commanders in their own rights (at least Grant and Buell). The Theater (or department) commander would also deal with a lot of the problems we have with 3* generals in AACW-I by finding them a use, resp. forcing players to use them yet at the same time enabling lower seniority leaders to take the field...

Rating McClellan. I agree that his strategic rating should be raised. As a 2* he should be slightly above average (he proved strategic initiative in West Virginia and built an army out of nothing only to disband at the end of their term of enlistment). As a 3* he was still capable, just not extraordinary in any sense other than chosing subordinates, inspiring his troops and assembling an army (all traits and not stats). I can't pronounce myself on exact offensive/defensive stats as I don't know all that many details of his actions (and yes, Lee's army had dwindled between Fredericksburg and Antietam, so McClellan had a clear numerical advantage). One argument for better stats in general is that he didn't perform that poorly against Lee (who had Jackson and Longstreet as lieutnants)...

[aariediger]

Concerning Halleck. We could use a similar system to PoN here, essentially Halleck would be a Theater commander affecting the ratings of his subordinates who would be army commanders in their own rights (at least Grant and Buell). The Theater (or department) commander would also deal with a lot of the problems we have with 3* generals in AACW-I by finding them a use, resp. forcing players to use them yet at the same time enabling lower seniority leaders to take the field...

I really like this idea, although I'm unfamiliar with any other ageod games beside this one. I think it would be neat to be able to assign armies to an army group commander, like Halleck, Grant, and Sherman. If you look at Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign, or Grant’s Overland Campaign, in both instances the armies in those theaters acted more like corps under an army commanded by each.

Bragg completely routed the Union army, Mac fought to a draw and Lee withdrew low on supplies and men. I believe the Union had 9,000-11,000 casualties on the second day of Chickamauga

In The Terrible Sound, Cozzens estimates the Union took 7,000 or so casualties the first day, and 9,000 the second.

Also, you and I must have different definition of what “routed” means. I kind of think the losing side should probably take more casualties than the winning side, and be out of action for a while. At both Antietam and Chickamauga, the winners took more casualties, and the losers still remained a pretty tough force. Lee won at Fredericksburg just three months after Antietam, and the Army of the Cumberland broke Bragg’s army at Missionary Ridge just two months after Chickamauga. If you want the definition of a rout, look no further than the battle of Chattanooga.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

I really like this idea, although I'm unfamiliar with any other ageod games beside this one. I think it would be neat to be able to assign armies to an army group commander, like Halleck, Grant, and Sherman. If you look at Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign, or Grant’s Overland Campaign, in both instances the armies in those theaters acted more like corps under an army commanded by each.



In The Terrible Sound, Cozzens estimates the Union took 7,000 or so casualties the first day, and 9,000 the second.

Also, you and I must have different definition of what “routed” means. I kind of think the losing side should probably take more casualties than the winning side, and be out of action for a while. At both Antietam and Chickamauga, the winners took more casualties, and the losers still remained a pretty tough force. Lee won at Fredericksburg just three months after Antietam, and the Army of the Cumberland broke Bragg’s army at Missionary Ridge just two months after Chickamauga. If you want the definition of a route, look no further than the battle of Chattanooga.

You really need to look at what happened at Chickamauga. Ever heard of the rock of Chickamauga. The Union army was completely routed. No such think happened to Lee at Antietam.

[aariediger]

Yeah, Thomas drove back Bragg and saved the day, and perhaps Rosecrans’s Army as well. At Antietam, A.P. Hill came up and drove back Burnside, saving the day. A rout implies that the battle was an overwhelming victory. And Bragg lost 18,000 men against only 16,000 casualties inflicted. Both McClellan and Bragg had their chances to destroy an enemy army, and both failed, taking heavier casualties than the “loser” of the battle. They were not great generals. But they were at least decent. They were competent enough to win the battle, but not great enough to take advantage of it.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

Yeah, Thomas drove back Bragg and saved the day, and perhaps Rosecrans’s Army as well. At Antietam, A.P. Hill came up and drove back Burnside, saving the day. A rout implies that the battle was an overwhelming victory. And Bragg lost 18,000 men against only 16,000 casualties inflicted. Both McClellan and Bragg had their chances to destroy an enemy army, and both failed, taking heavier casualties than the “loser” of the battle. They were not great generals. But they were at least decent. They were competent enough to win the battle, but not great enough to take advantage of it.

The Union army was routed at Chickamauga. Lee's army was not. Lee was able to hold the line and withdraw voluntarily in an orderly fashion. I'm sorry but you are just mistaken in your definition of rout.

"A rout is a chaotic and disorderly retreat or withdrawal of troops from a battlefield, resulting in the victory of the opposing party, or following defeat, a collapse of discipline, or poor morale. A routed army often degenerates into a sense of "every man for himself" as the surviving combatants attempt to flee to safety."

What you are describing is the difference between a rout and completely having your army destroyed.

For example, the Union forces were routed at the first battle of Bull Run. However, their army was largely intact and not destroyed. Chickamauga was a clear Southern victory. Antietam was a tactical a slight confederate victory, but a strategic union victory since Lee ended his Maryland campaign.

[aariediger]

Lee launches an invasion onto U.S. soil. His invasion is checked and ultimately turned back at Antietam, where he loses 1/4, or 25% of his troops. After holding his line the following day, Lee reluctantly recrosses the Potomac and heads south, back into Virginia. His campaign, his invasion, lasted just two weeks and his objectives for the campaign were simply not met. President Lincoln is glad to hear of the victory but is frustrated by the fact that his commander, George McClellan, did not pursue Lee, allowing the Army of Northern Virginia to get safely back to Virginia.
This was September 1862.

Let's fast forward to June and July 1863: Lee launches an invasion onto U.S. soil. His invasion is checked and ultimately turned back at Gettysburg, where he loses 1/4, or 25% of his troops. After holding his line the day following the battle, Lee reluctantly leads his army south, recrosses the Potomac back into Virginia. His invasion this time lasted six weeks, but again his objectives for the campaign were not met. President Lincoln is glad to hear of the victory, but is frustrated by the fact that his commander, this time George Meade, did not pursue Lee, allowing the Army of Northern Virginia to get safely back to Virginia.

That Gettysburg was a resounding Union victory is seldom denied. But to state that Antietam was a resounding Union victory raises many an eyebrow.

What I am trying to say is that if Antietam is viewed as a tactical draw, but a strategic Union victory, then so too was Gettysburg. Conversely, if Gettysburg was a resounding Union victory, then so too was Antietam. - John David Hoptak

How is Antietam a tactical Confederate victory? All Lee managed to do was avoid destruction. Yeah, he hurt McClellan pretty bad, but no worse than Mac hurt him. So, because he didn’t retreat immediately after the battle, it was a southern victory? Well, he waited a day after Pickett’s Charge too, but I don’t think Gettysburg was a Confederate victory. The most you can say is that he managed a draw. I think it was a northern strategic and tactical victory. McClellan was on the tactical offensive, and suffered the casualties associated with that, but beat Lee’s army to a pulp and held the field in the end.

To add to my last comment, here’s a narrative for you:

Moving quickly, the brilliant commander attacked the enemy’s army while it was divided, with its back to the river. Hoping to cutoff their retreat and destroy them, the commander launched a strong flank attack, which bogged down when two of its commanders went down, one killed, the other wounded. After some of the bloodiest fighting in the war, the enemy still held his ground, and days later retreated across the river to safety.

I speak of course of Chancellorsville. Lee’s greatest victory.

That this battle and Antietam sound so similar makes perfect sense, as the situations leading up to them were quite similar as well. Both Lee and Hooker had divided their armies of their own free will, Lee to besiege and capture the garrison of Harper’s Ferry, Hooker to flank the Rebel position at Fredericksburg. In each case, McClellan and Lee respectively, concentrated their forces on one part of the enemy’s forces, and savagely attacked it. In both cases, as the attacker, they suffered a lot of casualties of their own, but still inflicted a lot on their enemy. Lee, with more or less even losses in killed and wounded, made up for this with large disparity in men lost missing/captured, about 2,000 to 6,000. McClellan did not have nearly such a large disparity, only about 800 versus 1,000. Both commanders failed to cut off the enemy’s retreat and destroy them, though this was not completely their fault.

I do not mean to suggest that Antietam and Chancellorsville are victories of equal stature. Chancellorsville was a masterpiece, only darkness and Jackson’s death prevented this from being mentioned alongside Cannae, Austerlitz, and Saratoga. However, Antietam was a victory too, just not as clear cut as Lee’s triumph.

[elxaime]

Good ideas above. Here are some more as regards the "political" generals, the replacement of generals and the promotion of generals.

Right now, as pointed out above, the incentives are all negative - a loss of morale IF you replace so-and-so with another leader with less seniority. This is fine as far as it goes. However, it is too much a zero-sum game...replacement is dependent solely on Union morale increasing enough to make the morale hit worthwhile. I would suggest another option. Instead of just taking a morale hit when you replace them, the political generals on each side should provide a temporary morale bonus while in command of an army - and a chance of a small benefit from the home state/region they hail from. For example, it is October 1861 and as the Union you have Fremont and a free army HQ. Union morale is 90. Placing Fremont in command provides a morale bonus of +2 that endures while Fremont commands an army. Fremont is accordingly placed in command. Union morale jumps to 92 (you can put in brackets a 2 besides it to note that 2 of the points come from a political morale benefit, which endures each turn but is not cumulative). While Fremont is in command of an army in the theater he hails from, there are percentage chances each turn of the Union receiving some benefit from the state or region Fremont hails from. This can involve any number of possibilities - incremental loyalty increases in certain cities per turn, more conscripts, supplies or money, a chance of a free unit of a certain type periodically being mustered, etc. If/when Fremont is replaced, the Union loses Fremont's morale and other benefits. To enable this new scheme to work best, we would also want to reduce the morale hit if he is replaced by a less senior leader to half of what it is in the vanilla game - the Union would basically loses the same number of morale points for Fremont's replacement by a less senior leader, but half those would be the boost he had been providing.

So taking our example, let's assume it is June 1862. Fremont is in command of the Army of the West and Union morale is 92 (2). The Union morale figure reflects that, of the 92 morale, 2 of it is coming from Fremont's political benefit. Fremont also provides specific benefits related to his popularity in the Western theatre - 1 conscripts a turn and random chance of raising a volunteer infantry in his home state from time to time. The Union player replaces Fremont with Grant, who is less senior. Next turn Union morale drops to 88 - they lose the 2 points they had been getting from Fremont plus 2 points for it being a less senior man. They also lose Fremont's other benefits. However, some of the morale sting of replacing Fremont could be ameliorate by placing in command somewhere else another political general. For example, sayin our example you replace Fremont with a less senior Ben Butler, who provides his own political morale boost of two. Union morale next turn would drop to 90 - the Butler political bonus would cancel the loss of Fremont's, but you'd still lose the 2 morale from replacing Fremont with a less senior man.

This system could be deepened by including some political corps commanders. And it would provide an incentive to give a replaced political army commander a corps command. For example, you could retain Fremont regional (but not morale) benefits by placing him in command of a corps or department in his region. For this purpose, each side should have "departments" in various regions which are 0-0-0 fixed location entities but allow a good political leader to be stationed with a "corps" or in command of a "department" deep in the rear where he can still provide some minor benefit. There should also be an option for a player to temporarily "bust" some army leaders back down to corps level where they might do better service. So, if you replace Fremont, he just doesn't wander about. You can put him in command of the Department of the Northwest in Chicago where he would still help with some small benefits.

Of course, there are even more interesting possibilities. You could have not just static department units, but static state governments, each with their own leaders (which include many 0-0-0 governors and such who provide unique and interesting effects within regional or state boundaries and some of whom might be replaced by the 1864 elections).

Added together, we now have some positive reasons for the Union to want Fremont in command. The regional aspects provide an incentive to give the army commands to generals with pull in that theatre, east or west. The same of course applies to the lesser number of CSA political generals.

By making positive - not just negative - reasons for giving commands to certain men, and weaving these into regional political dynamics, you would add tremendous depth and potential ways to reflect the historical value of these leaders. The war was not just about military accomplishments, men on either side made essential political contributions and even if replaced tended to still have some position.

These changes can be deep and dynamic. Hooker, for example, can provide a 1 morale benefit when placed in command of the army of the Potomac (only). But if replaced, the Union could choose to make him a corps commander again. Historically, this is what happened - Hooker went west and commanded a corps with distinction elsewhere. Burnside did so as well.

I hope ACW 2 fully realizes the possibilities and doesn't just replicate ACW here. The current system, while serviceable, is too static and unreflective of the real political concerns of leaders on both sides.

[Ace]

Corps commander seniority and disbanding out of range corps (the disbanding range can be double the range of bonus giving Army range) would be a mayor improvement to simulate Union command structure. I would also limit the numbers of corps per Army. The way it is now, McCllelan can be head of AoP sitting in Boston, while Grant is doing all the fighting.