I see I may have stirred a bit of a sore sport here. But then that is what fascinates me about history.
Ok so you are saying:
- The British adhered to the non-intervention pact, which as we know was a complete failure because it prevented neither Italian nor German intervention on the Nationalist side.
- The British, through their lack of support for intervention, effectively also forced France to adhere to the non-intervention pact, who would otherwise have aided the Republicans.
So far I agree entirely and this was my prior understanding.
Your interesting point is that:
- The reason (or in the interest of neutrality I shall say one of the reasons) Britain was so insintent on the non-intervention pact was because it was gaining (at the time? or only once Franco had won?) economic advantages from the Nationlist side.
- Furthermore, Britain was worried (as were others) over the Communist/Soviet influence on the Republican side - although ironically, IMO, this influence would have been lessened substanitally had Britain and France aided the Republcians. But that is the benefit of hindsight.
This I did not know. I think one does have to cut the UK some slack - this was, after all, in the middle of Chamberlain's Appeasement policy and Britain was desperately trying to avoid war (with even more dire consequences in 1939) - so I don't think economic interests were at the heart of Britain's reluctance. But that is not to say that they did not pay a role.
Interesting thoughts, thanks
-deguerra