Historical 'What-Ifs'

[GraniteStater]

OK, here's a long comment and analysis.

In short, with the utmost repect to a very fine commander who certainly had more theoretical and practical knolwedge of the art of war than I'll ever have, I disagree. Longstreet, methinks, if he used the words "interior lines", was using the phrase as a shorthand. Yes, I understand what he meant, but, truthfully, the South did not have interior lines, not at all. In fact, they had a quite different and more serious problem.

To demonstrate: the classical example, as an abstract construct, is a circle. The threat from those outside the circle is that of being surrounded and cut off from succor. The advantage is those within the circle may move rapidly to threatened places. This is easy to grasp. Now, let us continue with another illustration; the problem of defense in general. Imagine a line, Euclidean or otherwise. You are charged with defending this line, i. e., an incursion across it, in strength, that cannot be repulsed or reversed, is defeat. The defender has to attempt to defend the entire line and has to guess, or spy out, the opponent's intentions as to time and place and strength. The attacker can choose where, when, and how much, can feint, can probe, etc.

The South did not have interior lines. What it had was the problem described above, across a 1500 mile front. Except for the Virginia salient, the South was defending am east-west line. The Appalachians and the Mississippi defined three thatres. The eastern one had certain advantages for defense, but also certain disadvantages. To some degree, interior lines applied in Virginia. More on Virginia anon.

Beyond the mountains, the South had pronounced difficulties, if not severe ones. Oh yes, the rivers are athwart the line of invasion - rivers that the North, with riverine superiority (to use an analogy from the 20th century experience in the air, the North had 100% water supremacy) can nullify as defenses or use as crowbars to crack open positions. AS Johnston, Bragg & Co. were going to defend the entire length of the Cumberland and Tennessee? I don't think so, they had not the men nor resources. The US Army could apprise the situation and cross somewhere else. That is the standard way to defeat a riverine defense. Bear in mind that these riverine lines were outflanked on the west by Ole Man River, which proved to be a Northern asset, a highway into Dixie. I'm afraid that the lack of a means to seriously contest the US Navy on inland waterways spelled doom in the center. Just for an exercise, play as the Union on Normal or Easy and try to acquire Forts H&D, Nashville, Memphis, and New Orleans by June of 1862 (the RL result). Let me know if you can do this fairly easily, seriously - brother, you're a heck of a player if you can replicate historical Union gains in the central theater. I'm dead serious, from the beginning of my experience with AACW, trying to seize all those points by late spring 1862 is a tall order and I don't think I've ever done it, maybe about 60% at best.

Virginia - as a player wrote to me in a PbeM, the abilty to RR Corps in mutual support in central VA can be very powerful. That, plus the F-burg/Culpeper/C-ville river line can be hard to crack, because of MTSG (the very best feature of AACW, IMHO). However, the CSA player cannot dismiss the Yorktown pennsula/Norfolk-Petersburg axes of approach - a good Union player is always going to keep that poised, for it is a very dangerous threat, a potential Game Over threat. At the very least, it ties down CSA forces in a static defense. Now, in AACW, I love taking C-ville, because it's a straight shot SE to Richmond from there, with no rivers in the way, Why didn't this happen in the war? I think because it's 60 miles from C-ville to Richmond, the country is hiily (I went to UVA in Charlottesville), and, in reality, a defender could stand athwart this axis and use the two rivers concerned as bulwarks for his flanks,. i. e., dig in and picket the riverbanks. IOW, it wasn't really that practical and even had disadvantages, disadvantages that, unfortunately, really don't come to the fore in the game, as good as it is. This is why Grant went the other way through the Tidewater - much flatter, Water was his Friend, and, as it turned out, he eventually corksrewed in on Lee to approach P-burg (and almost could have had it in his palm) and settled down for a siege, a situation that foxy Marse Robert was going to lose, because Grant had put the fox in a hole and the fox had no more tricks, just a siege to endure and that was Bad News for Lee.

So, in Virginia, yes, "interior lines" applied, to a good degree, but ultimately, couldn't provide a recipe for success against a determined commander with more men and materiel who knew how to use them. Strategically, I would say, No, the South did not enjoy interior lines in general, in fact, it was almost the opposite. I haven't even touched upon defending a coast when you have no freakin' navy (File under: What Were They Thinking?).

Lastly, note that the 30,000 men moved cited above was in 1862, fairly early in the war, before the South's rolling stock and motive power started to seriously deteriorate. Yes, Longstreet was at Chickamauga, but methinks it took Herculean efforts by CSA RRs to move entire Corps 500 miles, per schedule, with equipment and provisions by mid-war. Oh yes, they did it, but I have a feeling it was an exceptional accomplishment and certainly not something that could be characterized as routinely feasible by the South.

Well, them's my thoughts, after some reflection. In general, I think we must say that AACW favors the South in its modelling, chiefly to make it a game where the South has a chance (most of this is because of the NM structure, which is actually a pretty darn good element of modelling, I think). You have to, really, as a game designer. Overall, though, I find AACW to be a pretty darn good model of the Civil War, the best I've ever seen - not perfect, just the best for yer bucks.

[khbynum]

Good analysis, GraniteStater. By the usual definition of the term, the South did have interior lines and used them to good effect during Bragg's redeployment prior to the Perryville campaign and in Longstreet's deployment to Georgia prior to the battle of Chickamauga. In both cases the Federals did not anticipate or counter the shifts and were caught off guard. As I recall, only 5 of Longstreet's brigades (and none of the corps artillery battalion) made it time for the battle, so as you say even an Herculean effort managed less than was desired. If the South had increased rail capacity, moved troops about without regard to politics or Presidential friendships and used railroad iron to connect Selma and Montgomery instead of build useless ironclads, who knows? The game lets us do those things (except the last), so I don't think it's biased towards the South. It's a simulation that lets us explore alternatives in a realistic way. That's what a wargame should be.

[Captain_Orso]

8<

So what you would have in this scenario is:
--no CSA loss at Gettysburg
--total destruction of Rosecran's Army near Chattanouga after he advanced and pushed Bragg back in the Tullahoma campaign. Thomas for all his defensive talents, surrounded killed or captured as well.
--Invasion of Kentucky and threat to Cincinnati
--Nashville besieged and Grant forced to call off Vicksburg campaign to contain the confederate advances to his rear.

8<

Those are awfully big assumptions Stauffenberg.

Firstly, at Chancellorsville Hooker had over 133,000 men vs Lee's 60,000. Casualties were 17,000 on the Union side and 13,000 on the CS. That leaves 115,000 Union troops under Hooker in Virginia with 47,000 with Lee, which is growing an already sizable disparity. These figures do not include Longstreet's 15,000 men.

The idea that Lee could execute another Jacksonian stroke of genius -- and a damn risky one it was at that -- at will in the face of those odds to hold the Army of the Potomac at bay is not by any means founded on any facts. The Chancellorsville debacle could not have taken place if Hooker had not been so sloppy in his positioning for forces and protecting his right flank and if Jackson had not been allowed to exploit it.

With a not only more cautious Meade in charge, but also Jackson's departure from this world, I see little chance of Lee repleting Jackson's tactical genius, nor did Lee. He concluded the South could not defeat the Union militarily, but only break their will to fight and make the Union 'cause' the 'Lost Cause'. He intended to put his army into a defensible position threatening to the Union -- near Washington and inside Union territory -- and let the AoP try to pry them out as he had done at Second Manassas, Antietam and Fredericksburg. History has shown that he failed in this plan and I'll not go into specifics, because they are well known. This was 2 months after Chancellorsville.

Grant's crossing of the Mississippi stared in the last days of April so the Vicksburg campaign was on the way. Rosecrans didn't move from Murfreesboro until late June over a month later, so the only logical use of the shifting of a corp from Virginia to the west directly after Chancellorsville would be to Johnston's defense of northern Mississippi; Jackson and Vicksburg.

Would Longstreet's corp have made a difference in the campaign, bolstering Johnston's force from just over 30,000 to 45,- to 50,000? Definitely! But they would be facing Grant's 77,000 and then would be deadlocked there in a struggle for Vicksburg leaving Lee to face 2-1 odds alone in Virginia and once Rosecrans started his Tullahoma campaign on the 24th of June there would be no help for him from Bragg nor Johnston.

If the South could have pulled a large local superiority together for a short time to smash open the door for a return to lost territory or otherwise, then shifting of a large force would be strategically feasible. But only for a short time and if they were returned to their original position in good condition to bolster a temporarily weak defense and only if the Union could be persuaded to remain unaware and motionless throughout such an opening campaign.

I believe that had Longstreet been shifted to the Mississippi or Tennessee Lincoln would have insisted that Hooker or later Meade take advantage of Longstreet's absence and force another push on Richmond. Hooker did not attack Lee west of Fredericksburg because of Longstreet's absence, but only coincidentally to it. The Army of the Potomac's performance at Gettysburg shows that they were not nearly as weak nor demoralized as would need be for Lee to counter such and advance under such a huge disparity of forces.

[GraniteStater]

Good analysis, GraniteStater. By the usual definition of the term, the South did have interior lines and used them to good effect during Bragg's redeployment prior to the Perryville campaign and in Longstreet's deployment to Georgia prior to the battle of Chickamauga. In both cases the Federals did not anticipate or counter the shifts and were caught off guard. As I recall, only 5 of Longstreet's brigades (and none of the corps artillery battalion) made it time for the battle, so as you say even an Herculean effort managed less than was desired. If the South had increased rail capacity, moved troops about without regard to politics or Presidential friendships and used railroad iron to connect Selma and Montgomery instead of build useless ironclads, who knows? The game lets us do those things (except the last), so I don't think it's biased towards the South. It's a simulation that lets us explore alternatives in a realistic way. That's what a wargame should be.

Not to quibble, but I didn't say, or mean, 'biased'. Let's say it's goosed a little bit, mostly in the first half. There are some things that do not favor the South - is it possible to unlock Lee before his time? No, not AFAIK. From my limited experience with the CSA (I have some more now), Yes, it's always something - no $$, no WS, no men. My CSA experience has taught me that Yes, Virginia, you can run a war on a shoestring and not to overspend on The Economy as the Union.

I've got a rockin' AI game with FI going on (me as CSA), it's mid-64 and I am running out of warm bodies, fast. I can't quite put the KO on Athena, although I have everything, practically, except Philly & NYC (and Baltimore, where 4000 PWr is holed up and being a royal pain - if I can defeat that crowd, I'm sure she'll surrender). She's even at 80 NM, IIRC, back from the depths of 50ish. So, no, nothing's guaranteed, but there's a little bit of favor to the South in the early game. There almost has to be to make it a good game, that's what I'm saying. Even so, it's pretty well balanced - witness the Tournament, it's not impossible for the Union to get ahead on VPs by halftime.

Don't get me wrong, it's a very fair game, with chances for both sides.

[khbynum]

I've tried repeatedly to contribute to this thread, but almost every time am told that I "don't have authority to perform this action" despite being logged in. I'm tired of typing lengthy posts to contribute to an interesting discussion only to have the time wasted. Please don't regard this as a pout, but this forum (not the members) sucks.

I'll bet this one goes through, so I'll look like an ass.

[GraniteStater]

Asses are more than welcome here. They let me in.

[khbynum]

There it is. I follow the forums daily and appreciate all the help playing the game, but I despair of getting any help through this cobby interface, should I ever need it. Best of luck to you all.

[GraniteStater]

You're welcome, come back when you can. Maybe it's your system?

[RebelYell]

I'm sorry you feel that way, I truly am (in the wider context).

But you misread if you think I was trying to rehash the Southern rationalizations. One point only: the voting conducted in the South for ratifications was done with bayonets at the ballot box, among other things. Lincoln said that, with the exception of SC, it was debatable whether a majority of the voters, free to vote their will, formed a majority in any state voting on the question (which could not be voted upon in the first place - examine, re-examine and think: Andrew Jackson had it right in 1832 and was still right in 1861: the United States government is a government, not a league, to quote Old Hickory, and that Tennesean was prepared to invade SC and start hanging seditionists who proposed to defy Federal law). And think deeply about it, my friend, with the greatest love I ask you - for what? Their 'right' to hold other human beings in perpetual bondage?

If you wish to go over this in detail, start a thread, unless it's against forum rules in this case. I can present a very cogent case why it was, indeed, an unlawful rebellion. This is not unimportant; the moral factor carries a certain weight, which is not light. And also consider - it would have been a very easy course to 'let the erring sisters go'. Why were so many so willing, from the beginning, to set aside their own peace, happiness and even their lives, to ensure that not one stripe or star would be effaced from Old Glory, that the Union was worth dying for?

And it's not Grant versus Lee, really - that was settled in 1865 and Grant won. Look at May 1864 and what followed in Virginia - threaten, maneuver, threaten, maneuver, until the fox was holed up with few exits left. What are ya gonna do now, tricksy Reynaud?

IMHO, Grant is the best commander of the 1860s in North America.

As an outsider and not an expert on the conflict i just have to say that to me the contrary seems more true. The willingness to fight in the South seems so much more clear that in the North. Draft dodgers from the start and paying some else to take your draft number where the rule in the North. Southerners without guns, clothes, shoes and food show to an outsider that there was something they were ready to die for. And when you realise most of them didnt own slaves you start to wonder what it was. Just my opinion, in Finnish schools they only teach it was because slavery so this was the first thing i noticed as a kid when i read about the war some more.

[Captain_Orso]

The war was about choice, but the choice was slavery.

I would ask any person considering whether the secession was legal and rightful to first consider whether slavery was a rightful institution. It was legal in that it was written into the laws of the states in that it stated that black Africans were not humans and not protected by the constitution of the United States of America. But was this rightful?

It will always be the pinnacle of irony to me, and one of the saddest examples of human nature, that people at one time denied their fellow humans not only their legal rights* but even of the dignity of being considered human beings and then demanded their own right to partake in slavery and force it upon their poor victims who had to endure these crimes.

In the light of this, can anyone of a right mind, claim that the southern states had the moral right to secede with the goal of perpetuating this human atrocity?

[INDENT]* Races are a social construct. All humans scientifically are of the same species and therefore must be grated the same legal rights. The constitution of the United States of America guarantees all people within the United States of America that same basic human rights, be they citizens or not. Therefore the institution of slavery was never legal in any sense within the United States of America.[/INDENT]

[Longshanks]

The war was about choice, but the choice was slavery.

I would ask any person considering whether the secession was legal and rightful to first consider whether slavery was a rightful institution. It was legal in that it was written into the laws of the states in that it stated that black Africans were not humans and not protected by the constitution of the United States of America. But was this rightful?

It will always be the pinnacle of irony to me, and one of the saddest examples of human nature, that people at one time denied their fellow humans not only their legal rights* but even of the dignity of being considered human beings and then demanded their own right to partake in slavery and force it upon their poor victims who had to endure these crimes.

In the light of this, can anyone of a right mind, claim that the southern states had the moral right to secede with the goal of perpetuating this human atrocity?

[INDENT]* Races are a social construct. All humans scientifically are of the same species and therefore must be grated the same legal rights. The constitution of the United States of America guarantees all people within the United States of America that same basic human rights, be they citizens or not. Therefore the institution of slavery was never legal in any sense within the United States of America.[/INDENT]

I certainly agree with your first statement, and I can't argue with the rest either. The only addition I'd make is that we judge them based on the standards (and prejudices) of our day, which is always a dangerous business. My wife overheard visitors at Mount Vernon (George Washington's home and estate) say that "he didn't build all this, his slaves did." They were right, and wrong. He conceived it and managed it, but they built it - and, for my dollar, none of that changes his contributions to the founding of our nation. Many (most?) Southerners of the Civil War days believed the Bible condoned slavery. I think we'd be pretty hard pressed to find anyone who would preach that today. It's an appalling practice, but it continues today under a different guise, so perhaps we're not so different as we'd like to think.

[Stauffenberg]

8<

8<

Those are awfully big assumptions Stauffenberg.

Firstly, at Chancellorsville Hooker had over 133,000 men vs Lee's 60,000. Casualties were 17,000 on the Union side and 13,000 on the CS. That leaves 115,000 Union troops under Hooker in Virginia with 47,000 with Lee, which is growing an already sizable disparity. These figures do not include Longstreet's 15,000 men.

The idea that Lee could execute another Jacksonian stroke of genius -- and a damn risky one it was at that -- at will in the face of those odds to hold the Army of the Potomac at bay is not by any means founded on any facts.

Lee faced long odds all the time, and won or at least held his ground most of the time I need hardly remind you of that: Antietam and Chancellorsville etc etc. You seem to be dodging the entire issue of morale here, with every move on the union side aiming at avoiding a major military reversal going into the election year of 1864. The Army in the East had won nothing to date and had suffered yet another rout--the cries of "on to Richmond!" were getting a bit old.

So, with Hooker thrashed and yet another new notoriously cautious general appearing, there was an excellent period of grace for the South to hit into E. Tennessee and roll up Rosecrans, invade Kentucky, invest Nashville and render Grant's hinterland supply lines a tattered joke. Lee beat Hooker without Longstreet and I imagine he could hold on for a bit behind the Rappahanock without Longstreet, especially with all hell breaking loose in the West. Let us recall what Lincoln did when Rosecrans was totally thrashed later in the year? He sent Hooker and 20,000 detached from the Army of the Potomac to Chattanooga and another five divisions from the west under Sherman.
There goes the numerical advantage in Virginia.

Longstreet's plan btw, from what I can surmise, intended to have 20,000-25,000 sent west.

[Stauffenberg]

It's an appalling practice, but it continues today under a different guise, so perhaps we're not so different as we'd like to think.

Agreed, as any objective look at the incarceration rate of a certain segment of the population in the U.S indicates. As does the obvious issues of "sweatshop labour" wherever it appears, with workers virtual slaves to the point that claiming they are not "really" slaves is just semantics.

Re motivations for this war, they are much the same as any war I think: both sides fought for the very best and very worst of reasons. It is the contradiction of human motives.

[Longshanks]

Back to the (latest) topic ... movement of troops.

One of the major advantages that the South has in this game is the ability to move its two best generals, Jackson and Longstreet, into the Kentucky-Tennessee area, where they are very likely to accumulate promotions and defeat weaker Union Generals, at least until Grant appears.

I suspect there are many reasons why that could not have happened in "real life"(C)(TM)(P). So, perhaps, in the game there ought to be a price to be paid for moving "Virginia first" generals like these two and RE Lee, although I don't have a suggestion on what it should be.

[Stauffenberg]

Longstreet, methinks, if he used the words "interior lines", was using the phrase as a shorthand. Yes, I understand what he meant, but, truthfully, the South did not have interior lines, not at all. In fact, they had a quite different and more serious problem....
....The defender has to attempt to defend the entire line and has to guess, or spy out, the opponent's intentions as to time and place and strength. The attacker can choose where, when, and how much, can feint, can probe, etc.

The South did not have interior lines. What it had was the problem described above, across a 1500 mile front. Except for the Virginia salient, the South was defending am east-west line. The Appalachians and the Mississippi defined three thatres. The eastern one had certain advantages for defense, but also certain disadvantages. To some degree, interior lines applied in Virginia.

But this just isn't the case. The South had interior lines, at least as far as they control a direct open RR line into Tennessee, precisely because the Appalachians forms such a magnificent shield for the entire Confederacy. Think of it as two arches extending SW from Charlottesville VA, on either side of the Richmond-Memphis RR, the most important and strategic RR in the entire war--precisely because it allowed the South to potentially operate upon interior lines dramatically.

The outer arch has Knoxville as a strategic "keystone" forming a shield to the RR net extending south of Nashville. The inner arch extends SW below the RR and has Chattanooga as it’s keystone, and extends much further to the SW right to the Tombigbee R. forming the east border of Mississippi. It has not been discussed much, at least in my readings on the subject so far, that northern Alabama was as effective a shield as anywhere else in both “arches”. Forget about no RRs, there were barely any roads and this dense hilly terrain formed a thick defensive shield north of Montgomery.

It’s clear then, that the South, if it could upgrade it’s RR cap sufficiently, had interior lines from Virginia to east Alabama, protected by two effective shields, only 2 portals through these barriers, and in fact only ONE that was a RR corridor. There are obvious reasons that after the initial campaign in W. VA there was no significant incursions from either side from Staunton to Knoxville. From there to Chattanooga across the second shield, or from Chattanooga to Mississippi. The ponderous Civil War era logistical tail could barely follow a division through most of that in high summer and the rest of the season not at all. A look at the map indicates the designers have modeled this very well with some critical impassable mountain regions.

Yes, Longstreet was at Chickamauga, but methinks it took Herculean efforts by CSA RRs to move entire Corps 500 miles, per schedule, with equipment and provisions by mid-war. Oh yes, they did it, but I have a feeling it was an exceptional accomplishment and certainly not something that could be characterized as routinely feasible by the South.

Correct, but it might have come about with a better appraisal of the situation along the lines of Longstreet’s ‘what-if.’

I have to say that Lincoln grasped the situation better than any other player on the map after seeing Rosencrans get beaten. Lincoln, the man with no military background, out-thought and out-played Davis, the military president par excellence, in one of the most important campaigns of the war. The loss of firm entry to that last portal to the Deep South required every effort to avoid—more important than any other endeavour at the time. Lincoln got this, and so it was that he sent two corps under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, comprising 20,000 troops and more than 3,000 horses and mules, to travel 1,157 miles. By way of contrast, the distance Longstreet or other ANV units had to go, Richmond to Knoxville, is 435 Miles. This definitely qualifies as an example of interior lines used to distinct advantage. The CSA player in the game would do well to appreciate this.

[Captain_Orso]

Lee faced long odds all the time, and won or at least held his ground most of the time I need hardly remind you of that: Antietam and Chancellorsville etc etc. You seem to be dodging the entire issue of morale here, with every move on the union side aiming at avoiding a major military reversal going into the election year of 1864. The Army in the East had won nothing to date and had suffered yet another rout--the cries of "on to Richmond!" were getting a bit old.

So, with Hooker thrashed and yet another new notoriously cautious general appearing, there was an excellent period of grace for the South to hit into E. Tennessee and roll up Rosecrans, invade Kentucky, invest Nashville and render Grant's hinterland supply lines a tattered joke. Lee beat Hooker without Longstreet and I imagine he could hold on for a bit behind the Rappahanock without Longstreet, especially with all hell breaking loose in the West. Let us recall what Lincoln did when Rosecrans was totally thrashed later in the year? He sent Hooker and 20,000 detached from the Army of the Potomac to Chattanooga and another five divisions from the west under Sherman.
There goes the numerical advantage in Virginia.

Longstreet's plan btw, from what I can surmise, intended to have 20,000-25,000 sent west.

I do not discount the South's morale at all, nor the Union's. Have a look at how the Union troops fought at Fredericksburg, being thrown in piecemeal to charging an unassailable position. They neither hesitated nor faltered, but charged headlong against Marye's Heights and actually nearly reached the defenses. A quote from the Cincinnati Commercial of the time, "It can hardly be in human nature for men to show more valor or generals to manifest less judgment, than were perceptible on our side that day." That is not the mark of low morale or a lack of determination. But put the troops in an indefensible position and assault them and they will be rolled up along the line as was demonstrated on Hooker's right at Chancellorsville.

This principle applies also to the South as demonstrated on Missionary Ridge. Poor planing and execution of the defenses let the Union literally roll over the defenses almost at will and the first mass route of Southern troops was experienced. And that on a piece of ground thought to be unassailable.

Hooker was sent not simply to bolster the numbers of the beleaguered Army of the Cumberland, but because they, for a lack of sustenance, had be starving and were in no condition to fight at the time. And Hooker's corp being moved to Chattanooga gave in no way Lee parity in Virginia, not even close.

Why, please explain to me, should Longstreet's corp suddenly make Bragg's Army of the Tennessee into a force so irresistible that they should be able to destroy Rosecrans as a fighting force and leave Bragg total control of Tennessee and then Kentucky. I can think of only 3 times during the entire war in which one force was totally reduced to practical ineffectiveness other than very small battles: Donelson (a surrender), Vicksburg (a surrender), Hood's attack on Nashville (Hood totally abused his army and destroyed it through his inability to use it properly). I conjecture that even after First and Second Bull Run that the Union army would have fought again given a commander in whom they had confidence and had McClellan actually fought them I believe we would have seen this.

The Union did not make a poor showing at Chancellorsville because the troops had no morale, but because they were poorly lead. 40,000 hardly even fired a shot and may as well have not been present. The same army that Lee threw out of the Wilderness at Chancellorsville, now under a different command, stood fast on the hills of Pennsylvania 8 weeks later. The Union's leadership was finally rising to the top while the South's was more and more being skimmed off by fate.

[GraniteStater]

I certainly agree with your first statement, and I can't argue with the rest either. The only addition I'd make is that we judge them based on the standards (and prejudices) of our day, which is always a dangerous business. My wife overheard visitors at Mount Vernon (George Washington's home and estate) say that "he didn't build all this, his slaves did." They were right, and wrong. He conceived it and managed it, but they built it - and, for my dollar, none of that changes his contributions to the founding of our nation. Many (most?) Southerners of the Civil War days believed the Bible condoned slavery. I think we'd be pretty hard pressed to find anyone who would preach that today. It's an appalling practice, but it continues today under a different guise, so perhaps we're not so different as we'd like to think.

IIRC, Mt. Vernon was built by Lawrence Washington, George's older brother, who predeceased him. So go find those tourists and tell 'em to get it right!

[Stauffenberg]

Why, please explain to me, should Longstreet's corp suddenly make Bragg's Army of the Tennessee into a force so irresistible that they should be able to destroy Rosecrans as a fighting force and leave Bragg total control of Tennessee and then Kentucky. I can think of only 3 times during the entire war in which one force was totally reduced to practical ineffectiveness other than very small battles: Donelson (a surrender), Vicksburg (a surrender), Hood's attack on Nashville (Hood totally abused his army and destroyed it through his inability to use it properly). I conjecture that even after First and Second Bull Run that the Union army would have fought again given a commander in whom they had confidence and had McClellan actually fought them I believe we would have seen this.

I think if you reread what I said (and admittedly I did not devote much space to really describing eventualities in detail--my bad) you'll see that:

1) yes I was conjecturing that Rosencrans could have been destroyed if he had his neck stuck out at Chickamauga, as almost happened later that year. That great victory was Bragg's for the taking and he balked--Forrest almost physically thrashed him on the spot for failing to push the victory through and had to be distanced from Bragg as a consequence. If they almost pulled if off in the Fall it was a fair bet earlier on with an augmented Longstreet corps moved over asap.

2) a drive through Knoxville to threaten the Ohio R and Cincinnati

3) a drive to invest Nashville with Forrest torching Grant's supply lines north and west of there

There is no "total control of Tennessee and then Kentucky" in any of this. It's all aimed at avoiding the major CSA defeats that happened historically (Gettysburg and Vicksburg), inflicting at least one huge resounding defeat in the West, and really putting the boot into Lincoln's reelection prospects the following year.

And I can see I did not express myself well in talking about morale as I was not in any way intending to depict union soldiers in the east as demoralized--jaded with their commanders they certainly were though, and with damn good reasons.

The real issue of morale is with Lincoln's electorate. It ultimately does not matter if a drive in to Kentucky by the CSA comes to naught finally, and the same with a failure to take Nashville... What matters is how it looks to northern voters and I submit all of the above would look exceedingly grim. Winning at Gettysburg and Vicksburg and avoiding a crushing defeat at Chickamauga saved Lincoln's bacon, and he knew it. It follows that a reverse result might have cost Lincoln the presidency and the Union the war.

[GraniteStater]

But this just isn't the case. The South had interior lines, at least as far as they control a direct open RR line into Tennessee, precisely because the Appalachians forms such a magnificent shield for the entire Confederacy. Think of it as two arches extending SW from Charlottesville VA, on either side of the Richmond-Memphis RR, the most important and strategic RR in the entire war--precisely because it allowed the South to potentially operate upon interior lines dramatically.

The outer arch has Knoxville as a strategic "keystone" forming a shield to the RR net extending south of Nashville. The inner arch extends SW below the RR and has Chattanooga as it’s keystone, and extends much further to the SW right to the Tombigbee R. forming the east border of Mississippi. It has not been discussed much, at least in my readings on the subject so far, that northern Alabama was as effective a shield as anywhere else in both “arches”. Forget about no RRs, there were barely any roads and this dense hilly terrain formed a thick defensive shield north of Montgomery.

It’s clear then, that the South, if it could upgrade it’s RR cap sufficiently, had interior lines from Virginia to east Alabama, protected by two effective shields, only 2 portals through these barriers, and in fact only ONE that was a RR corridor. There are obvious reasons that after the initial campaign in W. VA there was no significant incursions from either side from Staunton to Knoxville. From there to Chattanooga across the second shield, or from Chattanooga to Mississippi. The ponderous Civil War era logistical tail could barely follow a division through most of that in high summer and the rest of the season not at all. A look at the map indicates the designers have modeled this very well with some critical impassable mountain regions.




Correct, but it might have come about with a better appraisal of the situation along the lines of Longstreet’s ‘what-if.’

I have to say that Lincoln grasped the situation better than any other player on the map after seeing Rosencrans get beaten. Lincoln, the man with no military background, out-thought and out-played Davis, the military president par excellence, in one of the most important campaigns of the war. The loss of firm entry to that last portal to the Deep South required every effort to avoid—more important than any other endeavour at the time. Lincoln got this, and so it was that he sent two corps under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, comprising 20,000 troops and more than 3,000 horses and mules, to travel 1,157 miles. By way of contrast, the distance Longstreet or other ANV units had to go, Richmond to Knoxville, is 435 Miles. This definitely qualifies as an example of interior lines used to distinct advantage. The CSA player in the game would do well to appreciate this.

Your enthusiasm tramples on your understanding, methinks. I have no reservations about your intellect, good sir, but slow down and understand a distinction.

As I went to pains to demonstrate, shuttling troops along a protected corridor is not really 'interior lines'. Yes, in a narrative, even if I were editing it, I would let it stand (as we in the discipline note on the manuscript, stet), but, technically, the Lynchburg to C-nooga Express is not really 'interior lines'. Yes, I was splitting a hair, but (a) it's a valid distinction, and (b) I did it solely to illiustrate a definition, chiefly for readers who may enjoy the point.

The situation (in the game) in central Virginia, as I referred to, is interior lines. One can RR from C-ville to P-burg to meet a threat on an entirely different axis, in that case, roughly 120 degrees away. The RR is not the point - pivoting to address a threat on a pronouncedly different approach is. Reinforcing or switching elements along different sectors of a 'straight line' is not 'interior lines', technically speaking. That's the distinction I was making.

Aside from a definition, the broader point, strategically, is that the South was threatened along an E-W front 1500 miles in breadth, a front split by a river that proved to be an interstate highway into the interior, and was also threatened by landings (I hesitate to say 'amphibious', because the phenomenon didn't really exist until 70 years ago, in WW2; note the term wasn't even used until then) along roughly 1000 miles of coast, if you exclude FL & TX. Remember this coast was, in Mobile, for instance, 500 miles away from the main E-W front.

IOW, strategically, the South didn't have the wherewithal to play 'interior lines', moving troops rapidly from Atlanta to Mobile to N. O. to Charleston, the same units, all in a matter of weeks - not as a normal routine defensive tactic. The South was left with static defense of the coasts, really - what a good CSA player can do in the game was out of the question IRL; there was very little possibilty of using a strategic reserve to put out fires along the coasts, not as a strategy, a policy. Southern rail transpo had enough on its hands feeding itself, for heaven's sake; tthe South had mismatched gauges in some instances, a limited (to be charitable) capability for tending and repairing locomotives and those were in just certain places, far and few between. Add in degradation of rolling stock, subpar maintenance of switching, bridging, etc., and you have an overall situation that wasn't really up to the task you may envision. They did the best they could and accomplished some minor miracles, but miracles are exceptions, not a reliable and normal course of events.

[Stauffenberg]

Your enthusiasm tramples on your understanding, methinks. I have no reservations about your intellect, good sir, but slow down and understand a distinction.

As I went to pains to demonstrate, shuttling troops along a protected corridor is not really 'interior lines'. Yes, in a narrative, even if I were editing it, I would let it stand (as we in the discipline note on the manuscript, stet), but, technically, the Lynchburg to C-nooga Express is not really 'interior lines'. Yes, I was splitting a hair, but (a) it's a valid distinction, and (b) I did it solely to illiustrate a definition, chiefly for readers who may enjoy the point.

I've read your original post, and this one adequately enough I think. You seem to be missing my discussion entirely. I don't find your "straight-line" description at all realistic or useful to pursue--in what sense does the north have a straight line north of the "Richmond-Memphis" strategic RR link? Ans: they don't. It's a large northwards bow following the RRs up there. Here's a simple quote for you:

"Interior lines is a strategy of warfare that is based on the concept that lines of movement, communication, and supply within an area are shorter than those on the outside."

No? In any case I'm not interested in pursuing the semantics further with you.

[GraniteStater]

I've read your original post, and this one adequately enough I think. You seem to be missing my discussion entirely. I don't find your "straight-line" description at all realistic or useful to pursue--in what sense does the north have a straight line north of the "Richmond-Memphis" strategic RR link? Ans: they don't. It's a large northwards bow following the RRs up there. Here's a simple quote for you:

"Interior lines is a strategy of warfare that is based on the concept that lines of movement, communication, and supply within an area are shorter than those on the outside."

No? In any case I'm not interested in pursuing the semantics further with you.

The qoute implies a circle, as distinguished from movement alone, shall we say. Interior lines connotes different axes of attack and defense, that is what I'm saying. You're free to differ.

[John Sedgwick]

I've been lurking in this thread for some time now, partly to gain insight on my current PBEM opponent's psychological makeup , but mainly because counterfactual history is a topic near and dear to my heart.

Very fascinating, high-brow discussion you got going here - as for the semantics, "interior lines" can be a slippery concept, and I'm inclined to say you're both right, but GraniteStater is somewhat more correct in a geometric sense, insofar as the term refers to advantages of manoeuvre conferred on one armed force over another whose base of operations lies outside a roughly circular battlespace. The term may be usefully applied on a strategic level, as Stauffenberg has aptly illustrated, but loses its original meaning without reference to one particular armed force operating within discretely defined areas, bases and lines of operation.

I will return when I have something more meaningful to add to the discussion than wrangling over semantics, but I think the distinction is not insignificant.

[Captain_Orso]

I think if you reread what I said (and admittedly I did not devote much space to really describing eventualities in detail--my bad) you'll see that:

1) yes I was conjecturing that Rosencrans could have been destroyed if he had his neck stuck out at Chickamauga, as almost happened later that year. That great victory was Bragg's for the taking and he balked--Forrest almost physically thrashed him on the spot for failing to push the victory through and had to be distanced from Bragg as a consequence. If they almost pulled if off in the Fall it was a fair bet earlier on with an augmented Longstreet corps moved over asap.

2) a drive through Knoxville to threaten the Ohio R and Cincinnati

3) a drive to invest Nashville with Forrest torching Grant's supply lines north and west of there

There is no "total control of Tennessee and then Kentucky" in any of this. It's all aimed at avoiding the major CSA defeats that happened historically (Gettysburg and Vicksburg), inflicting at least one huge resounding defeat in the West, and really putting the boot into Lincoln's reelection prospects the following year.

And I can see I did not express myself well in talking about morale as I was not in any way intending to depict union soldiers in the east as demoralized--jaded with their commanders they certainly were though, and with damn good reasons.

The real issue of morale is with Lincoln's electorate. It ultimately does not matter if a drive in to Kentucky by the CSA comes to naught finally, and the same with a failure to take Nashville... What matters is how it looks to northern voters and I submit all of the above would look exceedingly grim. Winning at Gettysburg and Vicksburg and avoiding a crushing defeat at Chickamauga saved Lincoln's bacon, and he knew it. It follows that a reverse result might have cost Lincoln the presidency and the Union the war.

First point, you cannot conjecture a different strategy to avoid a battle such as Gettysburg, that at said point in time could not be have been fathomed. That is illogical. That Vicksburg was in grave danger of falling and the affects of that on the war can be.

But, had Bragg pushed on Rosecrans/Thomas while he was holding Chattanooga with a very flimsy supply line the results could have been devastating. Short-term it maybe would have been the best thing for the Army of the Cumberland, pulling out of a location that in their situation they could not reasonably hold. Who said something like, good generals think in logistics, poor generals think in battles? From the standpoint at that time there is no way to speculate that Bragg could not have pushed the AoC out of Chattanooga. How that may have occurred and in what condition either army might be is pure speculation.

So in retreating to Nashville, the Army of the Cumberland would have fallen back on their supplies and into a position that they could not only defend better than Chattanooga, but also a shorter, more direct line of communications to transfer troops into eastern Kentucky quickly were Bragg to push up through Knoxville; and the line of attack through Knoxville, as historically demonstrated, would leave the South with an even worse supply situation to support forces in eastern Kentucky than Rosecrans had in Chattanooga. The breakwater in both directions is the Appellation Mountain-range.

Would Rosecrans' retreat from Chattanooga influence Grant's Vicksburg campaign? Definitely. But anything said about such possible events are conjecture and need to be evaluated logically. The worst case scenario would have Grant pulling back from Vicksburg and returning north to Memphis and Nashville. This would save Vicksburg, for the time being, but also put Grant's army in front of or on Bragg's flank. With both the Army of the Cumberland and Western Tennessee to oppose Bragg I believe that Bragg would have had little to no chance of doing anything short of holding on to the Tennessee River east of it's bend in that direction. I think that Grant would not sit back and do nothing else in that situation. With Rosecrans having shown that, though he executed one of the best campaigns in history in pushing down to Chattanooga, he was not the right commander to fight his army Grant would have replaced him with possibly Sherman, who would have done much better against Bragg, or McPherson or Ord. Whether Thomas had already obtained his 'Slow-Trot' reputation at that time I don't know, but I think that Grant would not have tolerated him in command of the Army of the Cumberland had he another choice. In any case, Bragg bolstered with Longstreet and his corp would still not match both the AoWT and AoC, thus again freeing one of them to move on either Vicksburg or Chattanooga.

It is also not unthinkable that Grant would have put Thomas, having replaced Rosecrans, into defensive positions to protect Nashville and Memphis and continued with his campaign. Were Bragg to threaten to relieve Vicksburg he would have to leave Chattanooga vulnerable. And the same thing applies to Lee in Virginia.

For the Overland Campaign Grant had about as many men as Hooker/Meade had after Chancellorsville and Lee had less. Removing yet more from Lee to send them west, where I see little chance of them actually changing the situation significantly, would only open Lee to attack on the same scale as during the Overland Campaign, with possibly close to the same results, and this all a year earlier than occurred historically. Even if Meade were not as successful as Grant, the conjecture that Lee would have been able to execute another Chancellorsville-like defeat on Meade is in my mind little more than a flight into romantic fantasy. Lee was not given another opportunity for such a battle again, because Meade in command of the AoP was not as erratic in his qualities as Hooker was. The Battle of Chancellorsville was not of Lee's construction. It was an opportunity he saw and a chance that he took. Had Hooker forced an attack on Lee while Jackson was stretched out along back-woods roads it would have be as disastrous for Lee as the actual results were for Hooker; and Hooker had the forces to do this, more than enough.

[Stauffenberg]

First point, you cannot conjecture a different strategy to avoid a battle such as Gettysburg, that at said point in time could not be have been fathomed. That is illogical.

"It's my 'what-if' and I can if I want to..."

Seriously, I wanted to get this thread back up and running--I seem to have ignited a fire-storm over certain basic concepts and possibilities.

I think part of the problem is that I did not make clear that I was taking the historical donneé, what is a given, as a launching pad for what-ifs that can be explored in the game since, obviously, one cannot change the historical outcome. I titled it "Longstreet's what-if" because that is what he himself conjectured, after the war... as did Alexander in his memoirs; i.e. no Gettysburg, a large-scale series of attacks in E. Tennessee as soon as practicable. And so I am in good company I think?

I hope this clarifies any misconceptions here. The rest of your thoughtful post while I can quibble with certain conclusions, I agree with in the main. Perhaps if the 'what-if' saw Jackson surviving Chancellorsville, being promoted and replacing Bragg to lead the Army of Tennessee, you would find more credible. I also noted in my first post on this topic that a developed scenario exactly at the junction that Longstreet and Alexander are concerned with would be an excellent idea.

[Stauffenberg]

I've been lurking in this thread for some time now, partly to gain insight on my current PBEM opponent's psychological makeup ,

This is dastardly Sir, I had not expected such from a fellow Canuck, and on Canada Day no less ouet:; however, I'll make allowances since playing at being a Yankee with all those pasty-faced mechanics and foreign hirelings may have gone to your head.

Or perhaps you ate some tainted pierogies.

[khbynum]

Agreed, as any objective look at the incarceration rate of a certain segment of the population in the U.S indicates. As does the obvious issues of "sweatshop labour" wherever it appears, with workers virtual slaves to the point that claiming they are not "really" slaves is just semantics.

I'm really tired of Europeans (and Canadians) taking the USA to task for a problem they never had to deal with. Was slavery wrong? Of course it was. Did we pay for that national sin? Yes, with the blood of a million young men, Northern and Southern. Should criminals, of whatever color, be jailed for their crimes? Well, I think so.

As for the Longstreet Scenario, since all my posts have been ignored until one of the Big Five made the same point, I guess I'll just go back to lurking.

[GraniteStater]

To be charitable, anyone may opine, including funny furriners.

Slamming the US for historical sins is another matter and does not belong on these boards, I would agree; posting 'what-if Robert E. Lee had B-52s' is OK.

[Stauffenberg]

I'm really tired of Europeans (and Canadians) taking the USA to task for a problem they never had to deal with. Was slavery wrong? Of course it was. Did we pay for that national sin? Yes, with the blood of a million young men, Northern and Southern. Should criminals, of whatever color, be jailed for their crimes? Well, I think so.

As for the Longstreet Scenario, since all my posts have been ignored until one of the Big Five made the same point, I guess I'll just go back to lurking.

Nope, no slamming of the US of A in this thread--just the odd poke is allowed. oke:

Hey if you go back 2 days you will see I did respond to one of your posts, and I'm not even officially mediating this thread although I started it.

[wsatterwhite]

Back to the (latest) topic ... movement of troops.

One of the major advantages that the South has in this game is the ability to move its two best generals, Jackson and Longstreet, into the Kentucky-Tennessee area, where they are very likely to accumulate promotions and defeat weaker Union Generals, at least until Grant appears.

I suspect there are many reasons why that could not have happened in "real life"(C)(TM)(P). So, perhaps, in the game there ought to be a price to be paid for moving "Virginia first" generals like these two and RE Lee, although I don't have a suggestion on what it should be.

In real life, promotions (in game terms) were harder to come by for the Confederates- there were basically only 3 or 4 spots for Army-level generals at any given time (this is why the Confederates almost always had what amounts to a spare full General seemingly just hanging around) and then only around 6-7 spots for Corps-level commanders. The in-game promotion system is perfect for the Union who needs masses of high level generals to command a multitude of armies and corps but much less so for the Rebel side. In actual practice, the price to be paid for having Jackson or Longstreet out west is that it should result in Polk or Hardee serving in the east.

The interesting thing about the recent conversation regarding Longstreet going west is that everyone assumes Meade would still end up commanding the Army of the Potomac. Hooker wasn't never relieved after Chancellorsville and if I'm not mistaken, only quit himself over a disagreement regarding something having to do with militia or garrison troops while on the march to Gettysburg. Without a northern offensive by Lee, the situation is basically just as it was before Chancellorsville with an aggressive Hooker still in command of the AoP and now armed with the knowledge of what happens when he loses confidence in himself- except Lee is now still just as outnumbered while breaking in at least one new corps commander.

[Stauffenberg]

In real life, promotions (in game terms) were harder to come by for the Confederates- there were basically only 3 or 4 spots for Army-level generals at any given time (this is why the Confederates almost always had what amounts to a spare full General seemingly just hanging around) and then only around 6-7 spots for Corps-level commanders. The in-game promotion system is perfect for the Union who needs masses of high level generals to command a multitude of armies and corps but much less so for the Rebel side. In actual practice, the price to be paid for having Jackson or Longstreet out west is that it should result in Polk or Hardee serving in the east.

Some interesting points.

Based on my own pbem I think an attempt to put limits on deployment of generals would introduce some pretty convoluted house rules that would end up being more trouble than they are worth. In game terms it all seems to average out for both sides, and if you are going to more or less prevent Jackson from scooting west easily, then you would have to pin Lyon in MO early on for the same historical reasons.

You don't mention teleporting limitations and what I have been using is a limit of only one 2 or 3 star general move per turn (out of the three moves available), with movement from the field to capital, or capital to the field the only allowable movement. This would prevent powerful corps--or even army--leaders from appearing for a fast attack and then flying back to their usual command by lear jet. You could still do it... if you are willing to see such a powerful leader basically sitting on his hands commanding nothing for 2 turns.

I would like to know if anyone has ever used the randomized general setting for a campaign game. Using this would make concerns about commander deployment limitations irrelevant and has to inject some very interesting uncertainty into the game. I am really tempted to try it soon.