yellow ribbon wrote:there should be truly higher penalties for it and a limitation of military units as i argued for it in a detailed way in different places...
In this connection, in the Army Historical Series,WINNING THE WEST THE ARMY IN THE INDIAN WARS, 1865-1890 online, there are details about US army strength. A large army in the west would mean 2,000-3,000 combat troops.
In the absence of war with anyone other than the Indian tribes this should mean small single battalion (called regiment) sized Units with strict caps and some tiny garrison units fixed in a few major eastern forts. I also think Outposts rather than PON "Forts" more accurately represent the small forts of the west, but enforcing that is probably not necessary. Given the prevalent use of volunteers raised locally or by state through the century, this would be the way the forces would be built out in major difficulty.
"Congress in June 1850 approved enlarging the companies serving on the frontier to 74 privates, a considerable increase over the 50 in the dragoons, 64 in the mounted rifles, and 42 in the artillery and infantry authorized at the end of 1848. Thereafter 90 of the 158 companies were enlarged, so that by the end of 1850 the Army was authorized 12,927 officers and men.
When Jefferson Davis became Secretary of War in 1853, he strongly urged a larger Army, one that could be expanded to 27,818 men in time of war by enlarging the company to 128 men. Davis desired new mounted regiments for frontier service, because only highly mobile units could hope to handle the Indians. In March 1855 Congress added 4 new regiments to the existing 15 (2 of dragoons, 1 of mounted rifles, 4 of artillery, and 8 of infantry). They were the 1st and 2d Cavalry Regiments and the 9th and 10th Infantry Regiments. The mounted arm thus consisted of dragoons, mounted rifles, and cavalry until the Civil War, when all mounted regiments were called cavalry."
"Whereas the prewar Army of the 1850's was essentially a frontier Army, the postwar Army became something more. To defense of the frontier were added military occupation of the southern states, neutralization of the Mexican border during Napoleon's colonial enterprise under Maximilian, elimination of a Fenian (Irish Brotherhood) threat to Canada in the Northeast, and dispersion of white marauders in the border states. But these and other later involvements were passing concerns. The conflict with the red man was the overriding consideration in the next twenty-five years until Indian power was broken.
Unfortunately, the military assets released from other tasks were lost through reductions in force instead of being diverted to frontier defense. For even though the country during the Indian campaigns could not be said to be at peace, neither Congress nor the war-weary citizens in the populous Atlantic states were prepared to consider it in a state of war. And in any case, there was strong sentiment against a large standing army as well as a widely held belief that the Indian problem could be settled by other than military means.
As the postwar Army took shape, its strength began a decade of decline, dropping from an 1867 level of about 57,000 to half that in the year that General Custer was killed, then leveling off at an average of about 26,000 for the remaining years up to the War with Spain. Effective strength always lay somewhere below authorized strength, seriously impaired, for example, by high rates of sickness and desertion."
Specifically, "General Grant, the General in Chief, wanted to increase the Regular Army, kept small during the Civil War, to 80,000 men, but neither Secretary Stanton nor Congress would agree. Congress, on July 28, 1866, voted an establishment of 54,302 officers and enlisted men. Actual strength reached about 57,000 on September 30, 1867, a peak for the whole period down to 1898. In 1869 Congress cut the number of infantry regiments to 25 and the authorized strength to 45,000; in 1876 the regimental tables of organization were reduced so as to limit the total authorized force to 27,442, an authorization that remained virtually stationary until the Spanish-American War.
A significant effect of the Civil War on the new organization of the Army was a provision in the 1866 act for four Negro infantry regiments, which were reduced to two in 1869, and two Negro cavalry regiments, though most of their officers would be white. "
"Thus the regional defense systems established in the West in the 1850's and 60's provided a framework for the deployment of the Army as it turned from the Civil War to frontier responsibilities. In the late summer of 1866 the general command and administrative structure for frontier defense comprised the Division of the Missouri, containing the Departments of Arkansas, Missouri, Dakota, and the Platte; the Division of the Pacific, consisting of the Departments of California and the Columbia; and the independent Department of the Gulf, whose area included Texas."
"George Crook almost alone among the Army leaders at the upper levels of the Indian wars had pre-Civil War frontier experience, dating from 1852, that he could bring back to the West in 1866."
"As Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman, commanding the Division of the Missouri, put it, 'Were I or the department commanders to send guards to every point where they are clamored for, we would need alone on the plains a hundred thousand men, mostly of cavalry. Each spot of every road, and each little settlement along five thousand miles of frontier, wants its regiment of cavalry or infantry to protect it against the combined power of all the Indians, because of the bare possibility of their being attacked by the combined force of all the Indians.'"