20th Maine

[It's a Trap]

I was watching Gettysburg the other day and was wondering did the 20th Maine really end up going from defending little round top too the center just in time for Pickett's attack or was this just good movie making? I tried looking it up on multiple websites, but haven't found anything to confirm or deny. Just seeing how some people here are really good at finding this stuff, I was just wondering.

[Heldenkaiser]

It's not true. On 3 July, the 20th ME (together with the rest of the brigade) was posted in the rear of V Corps' sector (which should be obvious from its belonging to V Cps), thus far to the south from the point of impact of Pickett's charge, which fell mostly on II Cps, which was divided from V Cps by III Cps. The 20th ME spent a quiet day behind a stone wall probably not even within view of the battle.

More errors in the movie concerning the 20th ME: Chamberlain ordering a bayonet charge; the 20th ME fighting superior numbers; its position being so vital that the regiment's falling back would have spelt defeat for the entire army (a ridiculous notion in itself, seeing the nature of the ground both on LRT and behind and the ratio of a regiment or two breaking through compared to seven army corps, of which one - VI Cps - was in reserve wholesale); and Chamberlain reporting to MG. Hancock - not only a regimental commander directly to a corps commander, but not even to his own corps commander!

Chamberlain was a cunning and eloquent man and great at constructing his own legend and making himself appear a hero. Shaara seems to have taken his story for granted, and accordingly so did the movie-makers. Great stuff, but not history.

A good critical biography is "Joshua Chamberlain: The Soldier and the Man", by Edward Longacre.

[Mortar]

I'm no historian, but I must disagree on a few things. The 20th Maine (under Chamberlain), along with the rest of the 3rd brigade (under Col. Strong Vincent) of the 1st division of the 5th Corps, was indeed posted at little round top on July 2nd, when John B. Hood attempted to turn the union left flank and take Little Round Top in so doing. Colonel Strong Vincent himself was killed defending Little Round Top. The 20th Maine was the very end of the union line and had Hood succeeded he would have been able to run up the union line and place artillery and reinforments on that very crucial piece of high ground. I do believe that the regiment was moved from Little Round Top by July 3rd, when picketts charge took place, but the advance was not focused on the Union right, but the Union center, North (If I recall correctly), of Little Round Top. It is important to note that Chamberlain won the medal of honor for the events during that battle, and that he did have the respect of many other members of the Army, including U.S. Grant, who promoted him to Brigadier General in 1864. While Im sure there are many details I am unaware of, I was not aware that any of these things were in question.

[Heldenkaiser]

The 20th Maine was the very end of the union line and had Hood succeeded he would have been able to run up the union line and place artillery and reinforments on that very crucial piece of high ground.

So the myth goes.

But really, have a look at the positions of the armies and the nature of the ground. First, the 20th ME was the end of "a" not "the" line, as there were plenty of reserves behind its position. Secondly, the odds being as they were--the 20th was only attacked by one quite exhausted Reb regiment which it outnumbered--the chances of the Rebs "succeeding" there were very small indeed. Thirdly, LRT was high ground, but heavily wooded. The chances for the Rebs of bringing artillery up their were negligible, and the chances of its having a field of fire even if it would have made it up there were non-existent. Fourthly and finally, LRT was a lot more accessible from the Union (northeast) than from the Reb (southwest) side. So any successful move of the Rebs up there, especially that late in the day, would have been much more easily countered by the Union.

Had the Rebs taken LRT, they would have had a hill. There are plenty of hills on that field. The loss of none of them would have spelt defeat for an army of 90,000. An army can reinforce positions, and move to better positions. It's a nice story. But it's that, a story. History is more complex than one regiment saving an army.

[Mortar]

Just reread the post and realized I misread a few points that I responded to, I apologize for trying to correct the things which I misread. I agree that the 20th Maine likely saw less action on July 3rd than the movie would suggest. But is the bayonet charge on July 2nd really in question?

[Colonel Dreux]

So the myth goes.

But really, have a look at the positions of the armies and the nature of the ground. First, the 20th ME was the end of "a" not "the" line, as there were plenty of reserves behind its position. Secondly, the odds being as they were--the 20th was only attacked by one quite exhausted Reb regiment which it outnumbered--the chances of the Rebs "succeeding" there were very small indeed. Thirdly, LRT was high ground, but heavily wooded. The chances for the Rebs of bringing artillery up their were negligible, and the chances of its having a field of fire even if it would have made it up there were non-existent. Fourthly and finally, LRT was a lot more accessible from the Union (northeast) than from the Reb (southwest) side. So any successful move of the Rebs up there, especially that late in the day, would have been much more easily countered by the Union.

Had the Rebs taken LRT, they would have had a hill. There are plenty of hills on that field. The loss of none of them would have spelt defeat for an army of 90,000. An army can reinforce positions, and move to better positions. It's a nice story. But it's that, a story. History is more complex than one regiment saving an army.

It's not really a myth though. It's not known if a company officer called for the bayonet charge or started the charge, or if Chamberlain called for it after talking with the company officer who was at the end of the line. There are different stories about what actually happened. Chamberlain himself said the order to charge was vague or awkward, and it just kind of happened in the commotion of the fighting.

[It's a Trap]

Concerning the Bayonet. It is my understanding that Chamberlain had ordered to fix bayonets and was intending to charge when Lt. Melcher requested permission to advance the center of the line toward a boulder ledge where some of the men were wounded and unable to move. Chamberlain agreed and sent him back to his company, telling him that he was about to order the entire regiment forward. As Melcher returned to his men, the shouts of "Bayonet!" were already working their way down the line. Melcher in fact initiated the charge by running down the hill and calling the men to follow and to protect fallen comrades. So while the order was never given his intentions to charge were obvious.

Ref:

Desjardin, Thomas A., Stand Firm Ye Boys from Maine: The 20th Maine and the Gettysburg Campaign, Thomas Publications, 1995,

Styple, William B. (Ed.), With a Flash of his Sword: The Writings of. Maj. Holman S. Melcher, 20th Maine Infantry, Belle Grove Publishing, 1994,

[Heldenkaiser]

One final comment from the perspective of a historian. Of course nearly everything in history is potentially contentious. They say we rewrite history every 10 years. It's not an exact science, there is hardly anything that qualifies as "fact", we can't prove anything and we can't experiment. So it's really mainly about having the more convincing arguments.

That's even more true once we enter the realm of "what-if". And what would have happened had the 20th ME retreated from LRT is of course "what-if", as historically they did not. Yes, a possible outcome is that some Rebs coming over that hill would have triggered a rout that would have swept the entire Union army from the field. Stranger things have happened in war. It's not likely at all in my opinion, for the reasons I mentioned, but of course one can't prove it couldn't have happened that way. It's not always the logical or likely thing that happens in history. (Starting with the Confederacy holding out until 1865 when by all logic it should have lost in 1862 at the latest.)

For those interested in "what-if's" of the Civil War, there is a volume "Revisioning the Civil War: Historians on Counter-Factual Scenarios", edited by James C. Bresnahan (Jefferson, NC, 2006). About two dozen notable civil war historians, among them Richard Beringer, Larry Daniel, Mark Grimsley, John Hennessy, Donald Pfanz, Gordon Rhea--names that probably ring a bell or two for most of us--discuss various things that did not happen, but might have, if .... Pp. 136-144 discuss the second day at Gettysburg.

The interesting thing about that volume of course is how much the experts disagree on practically everything.

[Mortar]

There certainly seems to be alot of room for interpretation regarding the events of the time and their significance. I believe the heights on the southern end of the field did serve to be an important advantage to the union and one that certainly would have influenced the outcome of the battle if lost (even if the Union still managed victory). General Lee must have realized the importance when he made attempts to take it on day 1 and 2, as did the Colonel of the 15th Alabama, William Oates, who's stated intention was to haul guns onto LRT to fire on the Union flank. The Union General Gouverneur Warren also must have seen the importance as he rushed reinforcements to that position after being sent by Meade to survey the position, believing that the entire federal position would be in jeopardy with the loss of the hill. True they may have been able to adjust, to withdraw and to reposition, but that is precisely what may have caused their collapse if they were unable to do it as quickly as Lee could exploit that loss in initiative and position. As much as I believe in Meade's command ability, Im not sure he could have gotten a solid footing (being new to Army command at that time) before Lee would have exploited an advantage like that. As you said, this is all simply "what ifffing" but as long as we're speculating, just thought I'd throw in 2 more cents.

[mikee64]

Just got back from Gettysburg with some new pics, thought some on this thread might like to see what this part of the battlefield looks like today.

First are the markers for the position of the 20th Maine at the Vincent Spur-

Right flank markers:




Center of line, no marker present:


Left flank marker, no more than 20-25 yards or so from previous pics; the center of the line is in middle background, right of line curves out of picture to right, showing how the left flank was refused on natural defensive terrain:


Monument showing the farthest advance of the (bayonet?) charge, this is not visible in the pics above, but is no more than 15-20 yards in advance of the left-center of the defensive line.

[mikee64]

Pictures taken from Little Round Top (often called "Rocky Hill" in Confederate reports because it was at least partially clear of woods in 1863). Had the CSA captured it I strongly suspect the rocks would have presented more of a challenge to placing artillery than the trees; many trees were felled during the battle either to clear LOS or for use as entrenchments.

Warren statue; this is looking North along Union line on Cemetery Ridge:


You can see that had guns been placed here the entire Union center would be enfiladed; in addition just out of picture to right are open fields of fire to Taneytown Road, a key rear reserve area for the Union.

From the same spot looking NW; the clearings in the middle background are the route of the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble charge; Union batteries fired on them from here on July 3rd. Wheatfield obscured by trees at left in top pic, Cordori Farm at left-center of bottom pic:




The guns; 10 lb Parrots:


Looking West towards Devils Den and Houck's Ridge; base of BRT at left in top picture, Slaughter Pen in middle of second:

[Mortar]

Beautiful pics, hope to visit there myself someday...

[gchristie]

For those interested in "what-if's" of the Civil War, there is a volume "Revisioning the Civil War: Historians on Counter-Factual Scenarios", edited by James C. Bresnahan (Jefferson, NC, 2006). About two dozen notable civil war historians, among them Richard Beringer, Larry Daniel, Mark Grimsley, John Hennessy, Donald Pfanz, Gordon Rhea--names that probably ring a bell or two for most of us--discuss various things that did not happen, but might have, if .... Pp. 136-144 discuss the second day at Gettysburg.

Thanks for the tip, Heldenkaiser. This sounds exactly like what I've been looking for (minus AK-47s and other tomfoolery.)

Regards.

[LSSpam]

General Lee must have realized the importance when he made attempts to take it on day 1 and 2

What's critical to understanding this however is that the orders Lee issued to take it on Day 2 were issued in a far different situation then which they were carried out.

The I and XI corps were largely oriented on Cemetery Hill, the XII on Culp's Hill (except for 1 division). Only 2 divisions (1 of the III and 1 of the XII) held Cemetery Ridge (and only the north half) when Lee issued his original orders that night. When he woke up at 3am on the Day 2, the situation was the same.

Only the arrival of the II and V Corps that day altered the situation, with the V taking the place of the III's position in reserve and the II taking the north and center position on the ridge, allowing the III to shift down in it's entirety.

This is an important point because what Lee originally contemplated was a broad sweeping flank move on the Cemetery Hill/Culps Hill positions oriented north. Little Round Top did not factor into his thinking.




Little Round Top WAS important, mainly as a means of anchoring the left end of the Union line and preventing Cemetery Ridge from being flanked. Certainly had Hood managed to take and hold Little Round Top, a follow-up attack on Cemetery Ridge the next day (i.e. Pickett's charge) would have likely been devastating.

However

1) The Union line would certainly not have just immediately disintegrated

2) Nor was Hood's ability to hold that position guaranteed. Namely on the third day Meade had Sedgewick's entire corp, the largest in the Union, available and untouched.


One last bit of lagniappe. The quote you refer too

as did the Colonel of the 15th Alabama, William Oates, who's stated intention was to haul guns onto LRT to fire on the Union flank.

Was actually in reference to Big Round Top. Which was actually quite a bit higher and more easily defended (due to it's steepness) then Little Round Top. It was, however, heavily wooded unlike LRT which had recently been cleared. So that wasn't practical to begin with.

[tc237]

Something I heard a Park Ranger at Gettysburg say years ago about Shaara's book...
Before Killer Angels came out in the early 1970's, the "heroes" of the battle on the 2nd day was considered a Minnesota regiment (1st?) that fought in the center and held off numerous attacks.

Any info this?

[Colonel Dreux]

Something I heard a Park Ranger at Gettysburg say years ago about Shaara's book...
Before Killer Angels came out in the early 1970's, the "heroes" of the battle on the 2nd day was considered a Minnesota regiment (1st?) that fought in the center and held off numerous attacks.

Any info this?

Gets the gist of it right, I think:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Minnesota_Volunteer_Infantry

Maybe the ballsiest Union regiment at Gettysburg and one of the ballsiest displays during the War? I don't know how else to put it. That's the first thing that comes into my head when I read about their little action at Gettysburg.

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[Degataga]

I've gotta agree about the glorification of the 20th Maine. While they fought well, there situation wasn't exactly desperate and the loss of the hill would not have been quite as decisive as people like to claim.

Actions like that involving the 1st Minnesota and Greene's defense of Culp's Hill were far more heroic and decisive to the fighting IMO.

[Chamberlain]

Thanks mikee64 for sharing this cool pictures....



I also need to get down there one of these days !!!!

Chamberlain

[andatiep]

Gets the gist of it right, I think:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Minnesota_Volunteer_Infantry

Maybe the ballsiest Union regiment at Gettysburg and one of the ballsiest displays during the War? I don't know how else to put it. That's the first thing that comes into my head when I read about their little action at Gettysburg.

Well, it really looks like the scenarist of the film "Gettysburg" stold the glorious story of the 1st Minnesota to improve with it the fame of the 20th of Maine.
If it's not the one of the 20th of Maine, then it is their story which is in the film : the really outnumbered ratio, the explicitly ordered bayonnet charge, the heavy losses, a real action that probably saved the battlefield and at the end, the story of the remaining survivors who had to contribute to repulse the Pickett's charge the day after.

A new legend is borned with this film, they should have named that moovie regiment the 21st Mainesota Volunteer Infantry

[bbbwl]

You may need to re-learn your history reguarding the 20th Maine. You are correct about their day 3 placement in the movie being wrong, but you are way off about the importance of that flank and the how the battle played out. Are you from the south? Your responce would make it seem so. If you want to talk about people writing their own history, the master of that would be Gen. Picket. He was only one of the Division commanders. If anythnig it sould have been named Longstreets charge, as he was the corps commander, and in command of the charge.