Division Cap

[W.Barksdale]

Why is this such a big deal? Is this ruining the game?

Yes actually, post 1863 things get quite annoying with hundreds of tiny bde's.

[CWNut77]

Why is this such a big deal? Is this ruining the game?

I'm not saying you should always just listen to the developers and just eat whatever they say, but this conversation is not going anywhere.

The game is great, we all agree. Countless improvements have been made to make it the way it is, and perhaps a few more could be made. But it seems like the point we are at is this: Find a source with better historical figures, or let it rest.

I don't usually jump into what could degenerate into a flaming column...but I have to agree with soloswolf here.

WBarksdale, you have been playing this game (if the forums are any indication) for some time now. Why the sudden anger at the division cap? My apologies if you brought it up previously and I was unaware. But it appears to me that you have accepted this up until now and all of a sudden, some straw has broken the camel's back. I guess I should inquire what that straw may be?

[Franciscus]

Personally I think this discussion is useful, if not for AACW, maybe to the current development of VGN. I hope the devs are not considering "historic" division caps in VGN...

[W.Barksdale]

WBarksdale, you have been playing this game (if the forums are any indication) for some time now. Why the sudden anger at the division cap? My apologies if you brought it up previously and I was unaware. But it appears to me that you have accepted this up until now and all of a sudden, some straw has broken the camel's back. I guess I should inquire what that straw may be?

Try reading the first post. If your still not convinced, do a search through my thread titles.

And just to clarify. It's not anger..it's just frustration that after 1863 the games becomes very hard to play.

[husky1943]

Ciao Barks,
I did understand your frustration with the limit cap on divisions. However, I just learned to live with it. I found it fascinating to try and relieve some generals (many whom had done the best they could) with newer ones. In fact, imagine radomizing the generals, and then knowing that you only can afford to field so many divisions. Talk about flying in the dark!! One more stress point!!

[Gray_Lensman]

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[Gray_Lensman]

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[CWNut77]

Try reading the first post. If your still not convinced, do a search through my thread titles.

And just to clarify. It's not anger..it's just frustration that after 1863 the games becomes very hard to play.

Well, perhaps you should try to beat your opponent before 1863

Just kidding of course, I flame not. I understand your point, I just don't see it worth getting so frustrated over when the game is enjoyable despite this limitation

[Generalisimo]

BTW - are you planning to "cap" the number of corps/divisons available to be created in the forthcoming VGN ??

VGN models & units scheme is completelly different from AACW.
We are talking about a GRAND Strategy Game, so the scale is completelly different from one game to the other.
Anyway, the concept of "Force Pool" still exists in VGN.

[Colonel Dreux]

Two more cents from a new player... on thinking more about the Division Cap, it makes sense. You want to keep the South playing with fewer effective forces and having to use them more carefully and effectively. That was what the South had to do. You can also win the game with only 30 div and a bunch of other command forces. So it's not hugely important.

Where I agree with Barksdale (God bless you... struck down by a couple of cannonballs at Gettysburg) is that later in the game it becomes annoying to have no more divisions to make and yet you can still produce plenty more troops. In real life, if the South had been able to raise more units they would have organized them. Therefore it wouldn't necessarily be unhistorical to allow players to build more divisions. So, to me at least, it makes sense that you should be able to organize the troops you're able to produce.

Randomization is an unhistorical part of AACW, I think, so clearly some unhistorical game play aspects are acceptable. Personally, I don't randomize because I won't the donkeys who were generals to still be donkeys. I do think some Union generals are probably under scored, maybe even a couple of Confederate ones. McClellan wasn't all that bad, he was just not aggressive. Basically the North sucked in the early years thanks to Abraham Lincoln and the radical Republicans in his cabinet and Congress. They were frankly military illiterate, although they learned on the job and were much better leaders by the end of the war.

[Gray_Lensman]

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[Redeemer]

Yes actually, post 1863 things get quite annoying with hundreds of tiny bde's.

When Grant took over command of the armies in the Spring of '64 the north had over 600,000 men under arms and present for duty (the highest totals happened in early '63 sometime with almost 700,000 present.) Only half that number (300,000ish) were in the actual mobile armies and organized into divisions. the rest were spread out in garrisions and in the various military departments. Average division size at the time was 4800 to 6000 men. This gives us a division count of about 50 to 63. Using the 700,000 in '63 and assuming the same ratios and division sizes gives us a range of 60 to 73 divisions. I don't think the game is that far off.

[husky1943]

Ciao Redeemer,
I enjoyed your post until I realized you were using math. Math is a four-letter word!!

[Chaplain Lovejoy]

Lincoln had a better grasp of what needed to be done than any of his generals for the first 2 years of the war.

...and any of his admirals, per Lincoln and His Admirals. Highly recommended.

[Gray_Lensman]

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[Colonel Dreux]

Regarding Lincoln, I totally disagree. I highly recommend reading Shelby Foote's 3 Vol. narrative for starters, which is somewhat based off of facts from "The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies".

Lincoln had a better grasp of what needed to be done than any of his generals for the first 2 years of the war. The trouble was, he couldn't find any generals before Grant and Sherman that understood the same concepts. i.e. if you have numerical superiority use it to your advantage by attacking simultaneously to prevent your opponent from shifting his forces using his interior lines. Also, don't stop pressing the issue.

Unfortunately for the North, regardless of Lincoln's attempt at implementing this winning strategy, the Eastern generals would initiate a fight, usually getting whipped in the process, then they'd withdraw to lick their wounds for several months allowing the Southern forces to recuperate and repeat the cycle. This cycle continued even up to George Meade and the Battle of Gettysburg in 1863, when Lincoln wanted Meade to pursue and destroy the pretty much defeated and demoralized CSA army when it was pinned against a flooded river for well over a week. Instead, once again, a Union general (Meade) chose to sit on his hindside and let Lee get away to survive to fight almost another 2 years.

Clip from Shelby Foote's Narrative Vol II regarding an undelivered letter from Lincoln to George Meade (after Gettysburg):



I never had much of an opinion concerning Lincoln until I read these Narratives. (Going thru them for the 3rd time now in the last 2 years), but I've come to the personal opinion that he was the first truly great president who actually took it to heart when he swore to preserve, protect, and defend the constitution of the United States. He would stop at nothing for that purpose. He surrounded himself with political enemies and managed to play them off against each other if they were the best qualified persons for whatever job was needed to accomplish that goal. And as the above quote shows, he wanted the war over as quickly as possible for the good of the entire country. It pained him considerably when his first few generals would drag their feet causing the country to have to suffer many more casualties than should have been necessary.

I disagree, although I understand and I'm aware of this argument. Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and others understood what to do, I agree. Lincoln and the radical Republicans, however, wanted to attack hard and fast early on, not so much because it would be an effective military strategy but because they wanted to win the war and punish the South as quickly as possible. Their strategy was political, not military. Lincoln didn't know what this would take and was ordering major campaigns in the winter of 61-62 (ignorant) and well before the Army of the Potomac was prepared (somewhat stupid). He and his cabinet picked the wrong men, stuck McClellan with subordinates who were politically averse to him and who were not his own picks. Lincoln made all kinds of poor decisions, and even if Grant had been chosen (he wouldn't have been because he was an unknown) he would have failed as well because he would have been pushed to use an unprepared Army, in enemy territory, and against a competent foe. Grant would have also had all the same false information that the other generals had with regard's to the ANV true numbers and whereabouts, etc...

McClellan is underrated in the game in my opinion. He was actually a good leader, excellent at logistics and siege warfare, and knew how to fight once the battle was underway. He was just overly cautious due to bad intelligence and concern for his men. He was nowhere near as incompetent as a lot of other Union generals like Fremont, Banks, and Pope. Irvin McDowell wasn't that bad either.

McClellan would have kicked butt in the West as well if he had been put in command out there.

Lincoln also didn't have a grand strategy in the first two years of the war, he simply wanted to win it as fast as he could. He didn't totally understand what he was doing, and only over time figured out what needed to be done.

I understand what your saying, but I disagree.

[GraniteStater]

This might be involved, so bear with me.

* The way I've read some above posts, DivCaps aren't going to be removed anytime soon. These are trying run a company and perhaps even make a profit. Go buy Age of Sail II out of the box, circa 2000 and check it out. What a piece of junk, they shoulda been sued for fraud. I think the support and customer care here is the best in the business.

* Whatever you think you know about military affairs does not obtain in this time period. There is a huge watershed between the mid-19th century and everything after the Franco-Prussian War. The ACW was the last major conflict of the 'old-time' wars. There were elements of what was to come, but, in general, the way the people who fought it thought about it, planned it, executed it, and everything else, bears very little upon the Western way of war after it.

* DivCaps make sense. Corps, divisions, and even brigades were not administrative or even the 'natural' tactical units of the day, regiments were. Heck, the US Army hasn't had regiments as such since the 1940s (don't quibble this, please - Marshall was completely redesigning everything all through WW2).

* To embellish - officers were asked to command large bodies of men with which no one, no one, had any experience. They threw regiments together under a colonel or brigadier and said, "here's your brigade." When they got even larger bodies, they repeated the process and called them divisions. The fact that marching in formation and changing formations was a huge tactical consideration led to command and control problems even at that lowly level. Now throw in Corps and Army levels and what you have is a C3I nightmare.

* Wargamers have, for a half century, pushed stuff around on a map. It's a game, it's an abstraction, and tends to reduce itself to such. Those seeking authenticity have gradually, especially with the advent of computing machines to do all the record keeping, introduced logistical and administrative modelling. This is good, because as the old saw goes, "amateurs discuss strategy, the pros talk about their supplies." Stop and reflect for a minute what a typical day was for a Union or Confederate general - can we say, 'paperwork?' I knew ya could. You don't just tell subordinates, go here, go there. Orders are written, supplies are requested, Sergeant Jones needs to be promoted, yadda, yadda, yadda, it never ends. Commanders delegate a great many tasks, but still, the commander is responsible, whether it be for a company or the Army of the Tennessee.

* Now, for the Union, not only did you have to come to grips with your opponent and maneuver to defeat him, you had to occupy and garrison hostile territory, you had to guard every mile of track leading back to the North, you had to co-ordinate your supplies and new regiments arriving and post pickets and send out foraging parties and co-ordinate with the Navy and deal with Halleck and keep the President informed and talk with the occasional correspondent...get the picture? For the poor Confederate commander, he probably wished he had those problems. Trying to keep enough Johnny Rebs fed, clothed, equipped, and ready to oppose what his opposite number was going to do was a full time job. The South probably skimped on paperwork, but still, it never goes away.

* In short, both sides were learning on the job, all the way to '65, and the administrative nightmares never were fully solved. To a large degree, you could say that administration is what defeated the South.

* So I look at 60 for the USA and 30 for the CSA as a reflection of the command and control limits obtaining at the time. Neither side had formal divisions or corps, anyway. An army was that which was commanded by a general of a suitable rank. To my mind, this element of game design makes sense and I can almost guess what the discussions were in the design meetings. I work in IT; software is software, and you have to make decisions about what it is you are building. The DivCaps make sense in the model design to me.

[AndrewKurtz]

The game is great, we all agree. Countless improvements have been made to make it the way it is, and perhaps a few more could be made. But it seems like the point we are at is this: Find a source with better historical figures, or let it rest.

+1

[Rondor]

I disagree, although I understand and I'm aware of this argument. Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and others understood what to do, I agree. Lincoln and the radical Republicans, however, wanted to attack hard and fast early on, not so much because it would be an effective military strategy but because they wanted to win the war and punish the South as quickly as possible. Their strategy was political, not military. Lincoln didn't know what this would take and was ordering major campaigns in the winter of 61-62 (ignorant) and well before the Army of the Potomac was prepared (somewhat stupid). He and his cabinet picked the wrong men, stuck McClellan with subordinates who were politically averse to him and who were not his own picks. Lincoln made all kinds of poor decisions, and even if Grant had been chosen (he wouldn't have been because he was an unknown) he would have failed as well because he would have been pushed to use an unprepared Army, in enemy territory, and against a competent foe. Grant would have also had all the same false information that the other generals had with regard's to the ANV true numbers and whereabouts, etc...

McClellan is underrated in the game in my opinion. He was actually a good leader, excellent at logistics and siege warfare, and knew how to fight once the battle was underway. He was just overly cautious due to bad intelligence and concern for his men. He was nowhere near as incompetent as a lot of other Union generals like Fremont, Banks, and Pope. Irvin McDowell wasn't that bad either.

McClellan would have kicked butt in the West as well if he had been put in command out there.

Lincoln also didn't have a grand strategy in the first two years of the war, he simply wanted to win it as fast as he could. He didn't totally understand what he was doing, and only over time figured out what needed to be done.

I understand what your saying, but I disagree.

I believe Lincoln wanted to end the war that had torn usunder the nation which he loved as quickly as possible rather than simply punish the south. Also, there were several occasions early in the war where the Union had huge manpower advantages and failed to take advantage of it. There is a difference between a field commander and an administrative one.

The "honor" standards of the times made it very difficult to put the right men in the right place so early in the war. Generals were offended to the point of resignation or challenging perceived opponenets to duels if they felt their honor was somehow impuned, even slightly.

I am in the middle of reading McPherson's one volume book on the war and according to him McClellan's Peninsula Campaign was bungled because he simply was unable or unwilling to pull the trigger. He sat in the Chicahominy swamps doing nothing while his men sickened more each day all the while facing an enemy far smaller than his own. Besides the fact that it is well documented that he felt Lincoln was unfit as commander in chief which could have only further complicated the matter.

I believe McClellan was an elitist who felt he should suffer no interference whatsoever from the President and man who appointed him. In the end he failed his men who suffered more than they would have had he attacked rather than wasting away in a swamp. He would have been better placed behind the front lines training men which was Lincoln's mistake.

[Gray_Lensman]

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[GraniteStater]

I believe Lincoln wanted to end the war that had torn usunder the nation which he loved as quickly as possible rather than simply punish the south. Also, there were several occasions early in the war where the Union had huge manpower advantages and failed to take advantage of it. There is a difference between a field commander and an administrative one.

The "honor" standards of the times made it very difficult to put the right men in the right place so early in the war. Generals were offended to the point of resignation or challenging perceived opponenets to duels if they felt their honor was somehow impuned, even slightly.

I am in the middle of reading McPherson's one volume book on the war and according to him McClellan's Peninsula Campaign was bungled because he simply was unable or unwilling to pull the trigger. He sat in the Chicahominy swamps doing nothing while his men sickened more each day all the while facing an enemy far smaller than his own. Besides the fact that it is well documented that he felt Lincoln was unfit as commander in chief which could have only further complicated the matter.

I believe McClellan was an elitist who felt he should suffer no interference whatsoever from the President and man who appointed him. In the end he failed his men who suffered more than they would have had he attacked rather than wasting away in a swamp. He would have been better placed behind the front lines training men which was Lincoln's mistake.

Good observations. If I may:


There is a difference between a field commander and an administrative one.

Which is why Prussia/Germany invented the General Staff.

* Some historian stated that one should never forget that Mac trained the Army that won in 63-65. He took a buncha wannabes and made them into soldiers. He just didn't know how to use the tool he had created. Again, nobody had any experience with anything above regiments.

* Hooker may have won Chancellorsville if not for a freak cannonball and a temporary psychological burnout. Not a bad corps commander at all.

* Burnside was a pretty good subordinate who never wanted to be in command, said so himself. His re-org before F-burg buttresses my observations above.

* It took over two years for the Union to find the officers who could put it all together. They didn't have OCS, or vocational testing, or modern methods of training and command.

[Colonel Dreux]

I believe Lincoln wanted to end the war that had torn usunder the nation which he loved as quickly as possible rather than simply punish the south. Also, there were several occasions early in the war where the Union had huge manpower advantages and failed to take advantage of it. There is a difference between a field commander and an administrative one.

The "honor" standards of the times made it very difficult to put the right men in the right place so early in the war. Generals were offended to the point of resignation or challenging perceived opponenets to duels if they felt their honor was somehow impuned, even slightly.

I am in the middle of reading McPherson's one volume book on the war and according to him McClellan's Peninsula Campaign was bungled because he simply was unable or unwilling to pull the trigger. He sat in the Chicahominy swamps doing nothing while his men sickened more each day all the while facing an enemy far smaller than his own. Besides the fact that it is well documented that he felt Lincoln was unfit as commander in chief which could have only further complicated the matter.

I believe McClellan was an elitist who felt he should suffer no interference whatsoever from the President and man who appointed him. In the end he failed his men who suffered more than they would have had he attacked rather than wasting away in a swamp. He would have been better placed behind the front lines training men which was Lincoln's mistake.

I agree with you that Lincoln didn't want to punish the South. I meant to say the radicals in his cabinet and Congress wanted to punish the South. Lincoln wasn't a radical. Others were though and they were his political supporters so he had to listen to them.

I agree with you about the seniority/"honor" system in appointing people. Political appointments often turned in to problems as well.

I disagree with McPherson's take. Bungled is too harsh I think. Could McClellan have pushed harder? He could have. However, everyone, including Lincoln thought the South had a large force in Virginia. Everyone also thought Washington was always in threat of being taken, so Lincoln and his cabinet kept McDowell from reinforcing McClellan. They also didn't let him use the garrison at Ft. Monroe. I think they took one other division away from his as well. McClellan thought he was out gunned, didn't want to kill people unnecessarily, and so proceeded with caution. He still was successful getting up the Peninsula, he sent in Sumner's Corps to save the day at Seven Pines, and he deftly maneuvered the AoP to safety during the Seven Days battles, which cost the South a lot of good people.

He wasn't a fighter like Lee or Jackson, but he was a good leader, good organizer, good trainer, and was a good enough commander to not be beaten. McDowell and Pope got beat, not so much McClellan (I don't blame McDowell all that much though... cause he just about won the battle with a sound plan).

[Colonel Dreux]

As long as he had Rosecrans to do his thinking for him, as was the case at Rich Mountain, West Virginia, which is the precipitating circumstance that made McClellan looks so good to Washington. In reality, it was Rosecrans, who was the successful thinking general of that campaign while McClellan went along for the ride.

Neither McClellan for the USA, nor Johnston for the CSA had the real "killer" instinct needed for fighting the war. For both of them, nothing was ever "perfect" enough for them to command armies on the "fly". Incidentally, Rosecrans developed this same "procrastinating" attitude when he was elevated to command his own army.

A Johnston - McClellan comparison sort of works. I think J. Johnston was great actually, he just was a bit sensitive personally and he wasn't going to use his troops up if he didn't have to. If he hadn't of been wounded at Seven Pines/Fair Oaks who knows what would have happened. R.E. Lee is now often criticized for having been too aggressive, and people look at Longstreet as if his way could have won the War. Longstreet's way was just about Johnston's way.

McClellan never really lost any major battles, he just didn't take Richmond or destroy the Army of N. Virginia. He won a bunch of battles against Lee in the Seven Days battles to save the Army of the Potomac (killing a lot of nice Southerners who would never come back or be replaced). I think Pope is rated higher than him in the game and that is an abomination, cause Pope did just about everything wrong once he came East. He too was appointed from the West after taking New Madrid and Island No. 10. He won despite being awful at pretty much everything.

Even the Confederate generals realized the politicians in Washington were a huge part of the problem for AoP's leadership and well-being.

[Gray_Lensman]

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[Colonel Dreux]

, I'm done with this discussion. It can only go downhill from here.

No, it won't go downhill. Why would it? People having different opinions on the subject. There are all kinds of revisionist history going on right now with the Civil War.

[Colonel Dreux]

Good observations. If I may:

* Some historian stated that one should never forget that Mac trained the Army that won in 63-65. He took a buncha wannabes and made them into soldiers. He just didn't know how to use the tool he had created. Again, nobody had any experience with anything above regiments.

* Burnside was a pretty good subordinate who never wanted to be in command, said so himself. His re-org before F-burg buttresses my observations above.

Yep, Burnside wanted McClellan to be in charge.

[RELee]

, I'm done with this discussion. It can only go downhill from here.

Yes, but I'll still be watching. The entertainment value will surpass anything on TV currently.

[Gray_Lensman]

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[Chaplain Lovejoy]

the History Channel, Discovery Channel or National Geographic Channel

I'm a junkie of all three. Of course, I also live in my parents' basement and have never been on a date.

[GraniteStater]

Thank you for sharing.

It'll get better.