Fri Mar 06, 2015 8:37 am
That's basically it... there were many other elements too, one of them was the political situation in Greece. The king was pro-German (a German descent himself), while Venizelos the PM was pro-Entente...both forces counterbalanced each other in Greece, at least till 1917, and the Allies were reluctant to press through in fear of Greece siding finally with the CP. They had an attempt in Athens that almost degenerated into a war between the Entente and Greece, so prudence was the key word. Everyone remembered also the bloody failure at the Dardanelles and did not want a replica in Greece.
Adding to this, the CiC for the 'Armée D'Orient' in Salonika, French general Maurice Sarrail, was mostly a 'political' general and played the waiting game under orders from Paris. This lasted till 1918, when the new French government wanted more action and Clémenceau appointed a more bellicose commander, Franchet D'Esperey. The Armée d'Orient managed to launch a succesful offensive outside of the "biggest war prisonner camp in Europe" (the nickname the Germans gave to the Salonika camp before) which knocked out Bulgaria from the war and was about to liberate Serbia and enter Hungary when the armistice was signed.
As for the serbs, they retreated through Albania end of 1915 to early 1916. From there, they were evacuated to the island of Corfu (another part of Greece, like the island of Moudros at the Dardanelles entrance, that the entente "occupied" despite international law!), then later again to Salonika (by sea) where they were re-equipped by the French. In 1918, the renewed Serbian army was an important part of the success of the Armée d'Orient offensive....
