How can river crossings and the blocking of them best be portrayed in AACW?

[willgamer]

Point is, we need to differentiate between personal exploits and operational command when making these arguments.

Did I not say it well enough for you, or do you actually disagree about something?

There is only one argument, based on lack of evidence, for total interdiction. You are arguing based on unarmed transport as the exclusive means of crossing any river. That could certainly be considered fantasy.

I'm not trying to score debating points. The main arguement here is that large organizations of troops, certainly any with arty and wagons, cannot cross large rivers without transport. Clearly, from history, small units, especially cavalry, crossed many rivers that are currently coded the same gamewise as the Mississippi.

The rankest beginner is not playing historically if he has total interdiction available. He is playing historically if he has deterrence available.

Not as the game is currently coded. If the only choice is total interdiction by armed boats of unarmed crossings of (the current way the game defines) a major river, I submit is as accurate as possible.

True that.

I think I actually agree with you on more than just that... everybody is not at you!

[pepe4158]

I already asked it. Does Every river sector on the game map have a ford (in the real world)? Were those "real" fords always available no matter the season?

If there was at least a ford on every river sector, then no problem, I would allow armies to cross a river no matter how many enemy gunboat were trying to intercept it. If there is not at least a ford on every river sector, then it means that a force trying to cross a river had to do it the hard way (i.e. using boats, a pontoon bridge, riverine shipping etc.). In that case I think that a few gunboats were enough deterrent to make a general cancel the crossing and look for an easier place to cross the river.

Unfortunately fords are included but in an abstracted way, so it is an all or nothing issue.



A counter offensive is just an offensive aimed to counter an enemy offensive and the enemy gains derived from that offensive. We should not confuse counterattack and counteroffensive. The Perryville campaign was a true confederate counteroffensive which involved armies moving far away from their bases.

No, I am not dismisive at all. I think the game is really good, but it is a game, so game designer had to simplify things and make design compromises. I think the overall result is really good. Can it be improved? Maybe (moving-to-the-sound-of-the-guns for river fleets might be a way to do so), but at present I am pretty happy with the current game. That's the reason I support leaving the game as it already is regarding gunboat blocking of river sectors. It's you who are not happy with it, so you would like players were allowed to cross a river in face of enemy gunboats.

I still don't understand why the Southern navy is so important. Can an army cross a river in face of uncontested enemy riverine forces? That's the question. I think it doesn't matter what navy, Union or confederate, is involved.

Hmm I dont really see any thing here we are in disagreement about, I conceed the Perryville campaign, a mistake on my part to overlook it, but that I did overlook it seems kind of irrelevent to our arguement wouldnt you say? As no union gunboats rushed to block Bragg or support Beull, but thats only off the cuff.
Well I think you miss-understand my position too....I dont say I am unhappy with the current game engine, just hoping for improvements at some latter time.

[Jabberwock]

I hear you though Will ....not to mix apples and oranges, but you know when Jabber uses the Cav trick and runs his southern Cav. up, down, and all around, upstate NY my skin just crawls and I want to yell this is whimsical non historic BS....but I do agree some non-historic concessions must be made to allow for a smooth balanced game, so I grin and bear it.

You are entitled to yell that. I freely admit that cavalry has the ability for ahistorically deep raids in this game when the commander understands its full capabilities given the game mechanics. I would not be opposed to a realistic solution. It is, however, a lot of fun in the meantime, just like putting gunboats and brigs in all the rivers is fun.

I understand that total interdiction was created to balance deep raiding, along with adjustments that were made to cohesion loss. I'm trying for a less gamey solution than total interdiction. If that leads to a further adjustment of cavalry capabilities, I'm fine with that.

[Jabberwock]

Did I not say it well enough for you, or do you actually disagree about something?

The human shield was something Forrest did on a very personal level. The attack on the gunboats was something he did as a general. It is a question of scale.

I'm not trying to score debating points. The main arguement here is that large organizations of troops, certainly any with arty and wagons, cannot cross large rivers without transport. Clearly, from history, small units, especially cavalry, crossed many rivers that are currently coded the same gamewise as the Mississippi.

Hood crossed the Tennessee with no transport, should we therefore not require transport crossing the Mississippi?

Not as the game is currently coded. If the only choice is total interdiction by armed boats of unarmed crossings of (the current way the game defines) a major river, I submit is as accurate as possible.

If the only choice is between total interdiction and nothing, then I favor interdiction. That should not be the only choice.

I think I actually agree with you on more than just that... everybody is not at you!

No, but it has been difficult over the last year watching supporters of these issues waver or disappear, while the variety of people with MORE IMPORTANT CONCERNS, and more than willing to ignore the naval issues, who chime in opposing any constructive proposal, seems endless. I thought for a while that maybe I was just too outspoken, but after an extended absence, I found that nothing had been done in this area.

EDIT: P.S. If you had my experiences with the authorities during that absent time, you might show some evidence of paranoia, too. Just because I'm paranoid doesn't mean they aren't out to get me.

[pepe4158]

I'm not trying to score debating points. The main arguement here is that large organizations of troops, certainly any with arty and wagons, cannot cross large rivers without transport. Clearly, from history, small units, especially cavalry, crossed many rivers that are currently coded the same gamewise as the Mississippi.

Say you may really be on to something here.....It was a real surprise the way the game engine addresses the Mississippi. I mean when I first played the game, I thought you HAD to use transports, then latter I saw the move by river command.....if there is the move by river command, why even bother to build transports (as opposed to their abstract counterparts?)....Just build and handle abstractly (as can be done), having both really seems redundant IMO.

The problem seems to be the wait in bording and unloading transports.If transports are in the square...couldnt it be coded at some future time that armies or troops can enter and exit transports without a months delay? (again another arguement I think in favor of a move to 7 day turns as in CoN)

I wouldnt be opposed to the Mississipi being coded that way in the future, as it adds the MUST to build transports. The way the game is currently coded why bother to build river transports? Why even have them in the game as players find them useless to build almost?

And barges, the abstract river transports moving into oceans yeah kidding me man.

[Brochgale]

Say you may really be on to something here.....It was a real surprise the way the game engine addresses the Mississippi. I mean when I first played the game, I thought you HAD to use transports, then latter I saw the move by river command.....if there is the move by river command, why even bother to build transports (as opposed to their abstract counterparts?)....Just build and handle abstractly (as can be done), having both really seems redundant IMO.

The problem seems to be the wait in bording and unloading transports.If transports are in the square...couldnt it be coded at some future time that armies or troops can enter and exit transports without a months delay? (again another arguement I think in favor of a move to 7 day turns as in CoN)

I wouldnt be opposed to the Mississipi being coded that way in the future, as it adds the MUST to build transports. The way the game is currently coded why bother to build river transports? Why even have them in the game as players find them useless to build almost?

And barges, the abstract river transports moving into oceans yeah kidding me man.

I have used them to build depots, also according to what I read about supply increasing your river transport capacity alongside rail capacity helps with supply? I find as CSA That Riverine capacity is useful. Especially out west. I view that the onus is on the Feds to take control of the Mississippi as it did in the actual war.

[willgamer]

Hood crossed the Tennessee with no transport, should we therefore not require transport crossing the Mississippi?

Technically true, but from Hood's Tennessee Campaign -part 10, a blog at The History Channel by SFCDAN:

"Behind the cavalry action Hood's pontoon train, hauled partially by longhorn steers, finally arrived after a long struggle with the soft roads and the unruly creatures. The bridge was erected without opposition at Davis Ford." (emphasis added by me).

Amending my earlier statement to account for the pontoons: the main arguement here is that large organizations of troops, certainly any with arty and wagons, cannot cross large rivers without transport or bridging equipment. Clearly, from history, small units, especially cavalry, crossed many rivers that are currently coded the same gamewise as the Mississippi.

I contend it is extremely rare that unarmed transport or pontoon bridging was accomplished in the presence of hostile gunboats. To me, this indicates the recent changes to the river blocking rule are ill advised.

No, but it has been difficult over the last year watching supporters of these issues waver or disappear, while the variety of people with MORE IMPORTANT CONCERNS, and more than willing to ignore the naval issues, who chime in opposing any constructive proposal, seems endless. I thought for a while that maybe I was just too outspoken, but after an extended absence, I found that nothing had been done in this area.

EDIT: P.S. If you had my experiences with the authorities during that absent time, you might show some evidence of paranoia, too. Just because I'm paranoid doesn't mean they aren't out to get me.

I seeing more and more of a problem. The game mechanics to stop large armies with arty and suppy trains crossing the Mississippi vs cav troops crossing a smaller river (in reality, but coded the same gamewise) are troubling. Throw in the unreasonable ease of sizeable cav raids and it's a mess that needs cleanup.

I'm guess I'm catching the Jabberwock Echo Syndrome!

[Jabberwock]

What's the Jabberwock Echo Syndrome? Syndrome? Syndrome? [SIZE="1"]Syndrome?[/size]

[Jagger]

No, but it has been difficult over the last year watching supporters of these issues waver or disappear, while the variety of people with MORE IMPORTANT CONCERNS, and more than willing to ignore the naval issues, who chime in opposing any constructive proposal, seems endless. I thought for a while that maybe I was just too outspoken, but after an extended absence, I found that nothing had been done in this area.

Personally, I would like to see the naval system receive some serious attention from the ground up. Many aspects are extremely simplified and ahistorical.

Unfortunately, you have focused on one issue which is historical and relatively accurate even if it is simplified. If I felt this was a problem and you had a solid argument, I would support you. Instead I see a solution to a non-problem which potentially creates greater problems (more cav raids) and is ahistorical to boot.

IMO, making it easier for the CSA to cross rivers in the West is not a major problem with the game. I would rather see a re-examination of other naval issues such as ship data including flotation hits, more ship and fort types, mines and other water obstacles, troop speed in disembarking from ships, large and smaller traversable rivers, low and high water, a unique ship vs ship and ship vs fort combat resolution. Many areas could be revised to produce a more realistic game. But river crossing is already pretty good and historical.

I am on your side in examining naval issues. It just this one issue, IMO, seems like the wrong issue.

[Franciscus]

Gentlemen, sorry to intrude in this amazing discussion, but I think that we must not forget a simple point: previously there was a rule - 1 ship element could block river crossing - that worked (and no one seemed to complain much about it ) and now we have a new rule - 4 ship elements in offensive posture can block river crossing - that is broken.
I do not know exactly the reasoning behind this change, nor do I have the knowledge of you guys about how it was historically. But I would like to stress a few points:
- This whole thing (AACW) is an abstraction. Every other rule is an abstraction of the real thing, and that's why it is a game.
- This whole discussion is probably delaying the fixing of the rule, that now simply does not allow river blocking (and I presume that no one is happy with this ?)
- To me the rule must be analysed in perspective: against the AI, and considering that unfortunately she rarely (ever ?) uses ships to block rivers, the new rule, if it worked, and in comparison with the one ship rule would make for the human player (especially CSA, with fewer resources) the game more though (and indirectly help the AI, which to me is a good thing ). In PBEM the new rule makes more difficult for both to effectively block river crossings (more so for the CSA player, which has less resources), which, analysing how it seems that there were no such many occasions of river crossing blockings, does not seem to be a bad thing, either.

It would be useful if Pocus or the betas could give some insight about the reasons that led to the rule change, but I think that I am not that far away.

[Jabberwock]

Franciscus -

A good part of the history behind the change is here.

Korrigan & Rafiki -

Since this is no longer part of the 1.10 thread, could these two threads be merged?

EDIT: Franciscus - a good part of the history behind this change (and the complaints that were made) is now in the first few pages of this thread.

[Turbo823]

I think the simplest way to is to fix this whole river gunboat debate is just to
implement some sort of winter attrition type hit to units crossing a river segment with 4 or more gunboats present. These mechanics are already in place so I would imagine that this is easier for AGEOD to do.

[Turbo823]

Hi!
In case you don’t know, you will be able to cross the river if you "contest" the control of the river zone with some of your ships.
You don’t need to battle or destroy the enemy gunboat. A lone gunboat of yours sitting on the zone with evade combat will be enough for your corps to cross.
Another option (i'm not sure about it, but you can try) is to use riverine movement with that trapped stack to move it to an adjacent river zone and then to the other side of the river, instead of trying a direct crossing. I think it could work on a gamey kind of way

This single gunboat tactic is useful (and probably pretty historic) to impede small units to cross an raid your side of the river.
The systematic use your rival does of this tactic looks a little gamey, but not much… as you should be able to have little a fleet which could contest the crossing for just once or two turns.
Or better still, a fort/entrenched guns which did not let your opponent to deploy single gunboats on your back.
If you don't, campaigning on the wrong side or the river seems too risky...
Look at history: once Fort Henry/Donelson was taken, the CSA knew they should retreat from Bowling Greene area or be trapped there. And they did retreat!

Just my 2 cents

That tactic doesn't really work as you can't cherry pick which city your gunboat is going to be built at, much less the state. Remember, gunboats are built in large regions which can be far removed from the river in question.

[Jabberwock]

Personally, I would like to see the naval system receive some serious attention from the ground up. Many aspects are extremely simplified and ahistorical.

Unfortunately, you have focused on one issue which is historical and relatively accurate even if it is simplified. If I felt this was a problem and you had a solid argument, I would support you. Instead I see a solution to a non-problem which potentially creates greater problems (more cav raids) and is ahistorical to boot.

IMO, making it easier for the CSA to cross rivers in the West is not a major problem with the game. I would rather see a re-examination of other naval issues such as ship data including flotation hits, more ship and fort types, mines and other water obstacles, troop speed in disembarking from ships, large and smaller traversable rivers, low and high water, a unique ship vs ship and ship vs fort combat resolution. Many areas could be revised to produce a more realistic game. But river crossing is already pretty good and historical.

I am on your side in examining naval issues. It just this one issue, IMO, seems like the wrong issue.

This is not just a problem for the CSA in the west. It is a problem for the USA. I've given examples how the CSA can lock down river systems in the west. It is a problem for the CSA in the east. I've shown how the USA can easily flood any river system not protected by a fort or batteries with brigs, and bring the war to a fairly rapid end (without directly attacking the main rebel armies) by doing it at the right place and time. Perhaps I, and my esteemed opponent, for a number of reasons, didn't show the community enough details of what happened in that case.

Getting overwhelming numbers of cavalry around the river interdiction obstacle has never been an issue for me, personally. The problems I've seen have been for the main armies and supply. In terms of supply, I think it is historical and realistic. That issue could best be addressed by introduction of obstacles and torpedoes.

I don't think total interdiction solves what it was meant to solve. I think that it is a separate issue. Interdiction produces a side-effect, similar to the problems you've shown with command radius and static corps lines.

Addressing large and small traversable rivers, low and high water, combat resolution, and the other issues are all highly desirable; but IMO there are two major abstractions/obstacles that fall into the rock/paper/scissors category. First, land forces always beat naval forces unless overwhelming numbers are introduced in stacks of optimized sizes, or the bombard system is heavily modded. Second, naval forces can create static lines that opposing land forces cannot cross along any navigable river system. They can protect the outlets with large forces and batteries, keeping opposing naval forces from interfering. I feel that both these issues are seriously unbalancing. I also believe that they are both ahistorical, although the lack of positive evidence in this case makes it arguable, which is being done here. Addressing the other issues, while definitely a priority for me, has to be lower priority IMO. If these two abstractions stand as the basis for naval/land interaction (or lack thereof), then fixes in other areas will tend to be along the same lines, and/or be mostly irrelevant.

I do understand that we're on the same side, just that we have different priorities and methods.

[Jabberwock]

willgamer -

Not using this as a debate point, just for informational purposes:

In several cases where pontoons were not available, improvised pontoons were created from scratch in short periods of time (2-4 days), by demolishing nearby houses to use them for materials.

[W.Barksdale]

That sounds like Sherman!

[Jabberwock]

or Lee just after Gettysburg.

[Rafiki]

Korrigan & Rafiki -

Since this is no longer part of the 1.10 thread, could these two threads be merged?

[color="Blue"]Sure [/color]

[Turbo823]

The more I read and think about this whole concept the more impractical it becomes.

Will gunboats interdict leader or partisan movement? I find it hard to believe that a single man or small units of men were not able to slip across lesser rivers (the Mississippi would be an exception). Larger forces with supply wagons perhaps.

What about forts and interdicting land movement across water? I'm referring to Fort Pickens, Fort Sumter, and others. If the gunboat rule applies, then Fort Sumter should interdiction movement from Charleston and other land areas.

[Banks6060]

Honestly, and I'm not expert...I believe that it should probably require an entire blockade of a stretch of river to effectively cut off all crossings. So upping the required number of gunboats to the blockade amount could be pertinent.

Instead of only 4 elements.

[denisonh]

The more I read and think about this whole concept the more impractical it becomes.

Will gunboats interdict leader or partisan movement? I find it hard to believe that a single man or small units of men were not able to slip across lesser rivers (the Mississippi would be an exception). Larger forces with supply wagons perhaps.

What about forts and interdicting land movement across water? I'm referring to Fort Pickens, Fort Sumter, and others. If the gunboat rule applies, then Fort Sumter should interdiction movement from Charleston and other land areas.

That is why I made the recommendation to tie interdiction to detection: if not detected, not interdicted.

As for Ft Sumter, it controls the entrance to Charleston harbor and nothing else.

[veji1]

to be honest I just think there should be a battle, with specific frontage settings that mean that : infantry and cavalry can't fire on the boats but can be fired upon, only artillery can fire on the boats (with a slight penalty), boats shoot at everything, and depending on the number of boats, they inflict more or less damage. If the boat wins (ie inflicts a big damage, should be unlikely), the crossing force retreats to where it came from, otherwise it accomplishes its crossing albeit with the cohesion and troop losses incurred.

Say A division with 8 infantry brigades and 2 medium artilleries and 1 cavalry regiment crosses a stretch where there is one Gunboat counter (ie 2 boats), well it starts crossing, a battle ensues, and after 2 rounds the division retreats having lost cohesion, 500 soldiers, half a battery and a few horses, having hurt a bit one of the boats.

If it's a corp or army with say 3 divisions and overall 25 regts + 7battries + Cav and Supply, well after 3 rounds it has crossed, lost few hundred soldiers and cohesion, but driven the boats, injured, to retreat, allowing the crossing.

Detection and evasion value should be use to allow cavalry raids or very small stacks to escape.. just assume that they have the "evade combat while moving" order on..;

Ideally this is what I would like to see.

[willgamer]

to be honest I just think there should be a battle, with specific frontage settings that mean that : infantry and cavalry can't fire on the boats but can be fired upon, only artillery can fire on the boats (with a slight penalty), boats shoot at everything, and depending on the number of boats, they inflict more or less damage. If the boat wins (ie inflicts a big damage, should be unlikely), the crossing force retreats to where it came from, otherwise it accomplishes its crossing albeit with the cohesion and troop losses incurred.

Say A division with 8 infantry brigades and 2 medium artilleries and 1 cavalry regiment crosses a stretch where there is one Gunboat counter (ie 2 boats), well it starts crossing, a battle ensues, and after 2 rounds the division retreats having lost cohesion, 500 soldiers, half a battery and a few horses, having hurt a bit one of the boats.

If it's a corp or army with say 3 divisions and overall 25 regts + 7battries + Cav and Supply, well after 3 rounds it has crossed, lost few hundred soldiers and cohesion, but driven the boats, injured, to retreat, allowing the crossing.

Detection and evasion value should be use to allow cavalry raids or very small stacks to escape.. just assume that they have the "evade combat while moving" order on..;

Ideally this is what I would like to see.

Clearly we need setup options for this as what floats your boat does not float mine.

For me, this view of river crossing is utterly ahistorical. We would do what no ACW commander in reality ventured to do. In retrospect, however, due to our superior knowledge, we can float entire divisions across the Mississippi, in spite of perhaps 6 enemy gunboats, perhaps take a few casualities, no problems.

My preception of a crossing is that, if discovered, gunboats wait out of range until the unarmed transport or bridging effort is near the far shore from whence it started, then these gunboats make their run to sink it by firepower or ramming. Unless the gunboats are sunk before sinking the opposing transports/pontoons, crossing failed!

Until naval warfare is modeled with greater granularity, I'd like an option to at least go back to what I believe is a closer approximation of history, 1 unopposed gunboat element blocks crossings.

[Turbo823]

That is why I made the recommendation to tie interdiction to detection: if not detected, not interdicted.

As for Ft Sumter, it controls the entrance to Charleston harbor and nothing else.

Not a bad idea using detection. Works for me.

[Brochgale]

This is not just a problem for the CSA in the west. It is a problem for the USA. I've given examples how the CSA can lock down river systems in the west. It is a problem for the CSA in the east. I've shown how the USA can easily flood any river system not protected by a fort or batteries with brigs, and bring the war to a fairly rapid end (without directly attacking the main rebel armies) by doing it at the right place and time. Perhaps I, and my esteemed opponent, for a number of reasons, didn't show the community enough details of what happened in that case.

Getting overwhelming numbers of cavalry around the river interdiction obstacle has never been an issue for me, personally. The problems I've seen have been for the main armies and supply. In terms of supply, I think it is historical and realistic. That issue could best be addressed by introduction of obstacles and torpedoes.

I don't think total interdiction solves what it was meant to solve. I think that it is a separate issue. Interdiction produces a side-effect, similar to the problems you've shown with command radius and static corps lines.

Addressing large and small traversable rivers, low and high water, combat resolution, and the other issues are all highly desirable; but IMO there are two major abstractions/obstacles that fall into the rock/paper/scissors category. First, land forces always beat naval forces unless overwhelming numbers are introduced in stacks of optimized sizes, or the bombard system is heavily modded. Second, naval forces can create static lines that opposing land forces cannot cross along any navigable river system. They can protect the outlets with large forces and batteries, keeping opposing naval forces from interfering. I feel that both these issues are seriously unbalancing. I also believe that they are both ahistorical, although the lack of positive evidence in this case makes it arguable, which is being done here. Addressing the other issues, while definitely a priority for me, has to be lower priority IMO. If these two abstractions stand as the basis for naval/land interaction (or lack thereof), then fixes in other areas will tend to be along the same lines, and/or be mostly irrelevant.

I do understand that we're on the same side, just that we have different priorities and methods.

I see a problem with this obsession with naval balance - CSA Will pour resources into building ironclads to lock down Mississippi in West. Feds buid ironclds to compensate - you end up fighting most of war on Mississippi with battles that are probably going to be inconclusive or just plain annoying to fight - game dies a death?
In East I see similar sorts of problems - coastal forts and cities with entrenched forces that will require monumental Naval building programmes perhaps to the dtriment of the rest of the game?

[Jabberwock]

I see a problem with this obsession with naval balance - CSA Will pour resources into building ironclads to lock down Mississippi in West. Feds buid ironclds to compensate - you end up fighting most of war on Mississippi with battles that are probably going to be inconclusive or just plain annoying to fight - game dies a death?
In East I see similar sorts of problems - coastal forts and cities with entrenched forces that will require monumental Naval building programmes perhaps to the dtriment of the rest of the game?

The navy is a weapon in my arsenal, one of many, whether these issues are fixed properly or not. If they are, I will use the navy as it was used historically. If they are not, I will continue to take advantage of the gamey aspects to destroy my opponents with ahistorical strategies. Tha's jus' how I do, yo. It's a highly effective convincer, much more effective than arguing, but it plays to a smaller audience.

[Jabberwock]

Do you have a link or can you provide some additional detail? You are losing me on this.

PM sent.

[Jabberwock]

Clearly we need setup options for this as what floats your boat does not float mine.

For me, this view of river crossing is utterly ahistorical. We would do what no ACW commander in reality ventured to do. In retrospect, however, due to our superior knowledge, we can float entire divisions across the Mississippi, in spite of perhaps 6 enemy gunboats, perhaps take a few casualities, no problems.

My preception of a crossing is that, if discovered, gunboats wait out of range until the unarmed transport or bridging effort is near the far shore from whence it started, then these gunboats make their run to sink it by firepower or ramming. Unless the gunboats are sunk before sinking the opposing transports/pontoons, crossing failed!

Until naval warfare is modeled with greater granularity, I'd like an option to at least go back to what I believe is a closer approximation of history, 1 unopposed gunboat element blocks crossings.

Clearly this would be a good idea, as my view of your pre-ception is not that it is utterly ahistorical, but that it is just one thing that could have happened if the conditions were exactly right, and no replacements were available.

If the option was deterrence, I would suggest using it with evasion, because small forces would almost always be effectively wiped out by a close-up encounter with a gunboat. If the option is interdiction, y'all can do as you please.

BTW - I have never advocated "perhaps take a few casualities, no problems."

[willgamer]

Clearly this would be a good idea, as my view of your pre-ception...

Ha-ha, good one, I'll try to post anything that needs proofreading where you'll read it.

...is not that it is utterly ahistorical, but that it is just one thing that could have happened if the conditions were exactly right, and no replacements were available.

I was responding to veji1's hypothetical of a division or corps forcing a crossing of a major river, against unopposed gunboats, with just transports/pontoons. Was this common, rare, or almost unheard of in the ACW?

BTW - I have never advocated "perhaps take a few casualities, no problems."

Never said or implied you did.

[berto]

For me, this view of river crossing is utterly ahistorical. We would do what no ACW commander in reality ventured to do.

I think we need to be careful with the argument: If it didn't happen in The Real Game, then it shouldn't be allowable in this game, AACW. That if historical commanders never attempted something, that something should be off-limits to us game players.

In the face of overwhelming 2-1/2 to 1 odds, divide your forces, then divide your forces again--then go on the attack and win!

Order your center to stand pat, then watch in awed stupefaction as your soldiers spontaneously charge uphill in the face of certain destruction--but against all odds, take the position!

Despite the grave misgivings of your commander and president, cut yourself off completely from your sources of supply, march into the enemy's heartland--then six weeks later miraculously reappear to take a major enemy coastal city from the rear!

Ill-advised, foolhardy, impossible even? Yes, yes, and yes.

Yet Lee (Chancellorsville), Grant, (Missionary Ridge), and Sherman (March to the Sea) oversaw these highly improbable events just the same.

If Forrest had never been, would we now dismiss as "impossible" some of the exploits he magically achieved time and time again? (Fact is, after improbably capturing two Union gunboats, Forrest was in a position to cross the Tennessee at Johnsonville, just at that moment he chose not to.)

Allow for the occasional stroke of genius or just plain dumb luck.

IMO, it would be best not to absolutely prohibit forced river crossings in the face of enemy gunboats, no matter their disposition or number. It should be risky, maybe in the extreme, but still permissible.

I think it would be so cool to find myself in Kirby Smith's situation and, overcoming my fears and all good reason, attempt a Mississippi River crossing in mid to late 1864. What if, what if...

If for some reason the nuances can't be programmed, I suppose I would agree: if it didn't happen in history, don't allow it to happen in game.

If it can't be programmed. But I suspect it can. Simplifying abstractions have their place, but maybe this is not one of those places. Easy for me to say, but I don't face Pocus & co.'s hectic work load and time constraints.