Early War Union Command: How can we make it better?

[Captain_Orso]

I have to disagree. McClellan only planned one single offensive and that was set for the spring of '62 and that's when it was executed. If you depend on a strategic rating of '2' to simulate this, then nothing will come of it. Theoretically McClellan would be active about 4 months of the year.

Activation:
[LIST=
[*]Role a d6 (6 sided die) for each leader.

• If the leader is currently active, subtract 1 from the d6 results.
  
  • If the modified d6 is <= the strategic rating of the leader, then the leader remains activated,
    if not he becomes inactive.

• If the leader is currently inactive, add 1 to the d6 results.
  
  • If the modified d6 is <= the strategic rating of the leader, then the leader becomes activated,
    if not he remains inactive.

[/LIST]

This allows that an active leader tends to remain active and an inactive leader tends to remain inactive.

But at strategic 2 even when active there is a 50-50 chance of going inactive. That will not allow for any strategic planning, because you have to plan that you will go inactive right in the middle of your strategic move.

Additionally your one or two windows of activity per year will be randomly dispersed. It does you no good what so ever if your 4 months of activity start on 1 February, when rain and snow hamper every move that even contemplating a campaign is ridiculous.

Giving McClellan an event triggered campaign start seems the most realistic to me. It should be weighted to start near mid-spring, and to run between 4 and 6 turns. Outside of this, only normal activation.

This would give the player time to prepare but neither player would have an exact date of kick-off, nor know exactly how much time the Union would have before McClellan goes back into camp to hide from Lee and play soldier in his Napoleon-pajamas.

Edit: I almost forgot, all of McClellan's corps should go active when he is active. The influence of his poor strategic rating will leave his corp inactive when he has finally gone active. I'm fairly sure that this should also be possible, even with current script code.

[aariediger]

First off, I never knew that's how activation worked under the hood. However, is there something else that effects it? Because under those rules, I think, is should be impossible for Mac to become active if inactive, and impossible for Grant/Lee to go inactive once active. But I've seen both of these happen.

Also, I don't think you can say that Mac was 'active' durring his spring offensive. He sat at Yorktown for forever, and in games terms, if he was active the player would have stomped on Magruder like a bug. Further, after the battles of Williamsburg and Seven Pines, an active McClellan probably would be moved to Richmond. But, if inactive, you would be forced to sit still. I think it's perfectly reasonable to have all of Mac's activations be at random. Also, I don't think we need to force his corps to be active, because they weren't either. Part of the reason McClellan was such a poor general was that his corps would not MTSOG, and leave each other out to dry. If they are only active a third or so at a time, than you will run into more problems on the defensive too. And, at least I think, when you attack all that matters is whether or not the commanding general is active. If most of his corps aren't, he can still attack without penalty, but his whole army moves really slow. Sounds about right to me.

[Jerzul]

But at strategic 2 even when active there is a 50-50 chance of going inactive. That will not allow for any strategic planning, because you have to plan that you will go inactive right in the middle of your strategic move.

Additionally your one or two windows of activity per year will be randomly dispersed. It does you no good what so ever if your 4 months of activity start on 1 February, when rain and snow hamper every move that even contemplating a campaign is ridiculous.

But isn't this the case in other Union theaters early in the war? Also, simulating playing as Lincoln, George B. should be a frustrating experience of inactivity with brief bouts of action...followed by calls for reinforcements.

[Captain_Orso]

First off, I never knew that's how activation worked under the hood. However, is there something else that effects it? Because under those rules, I think, is should be impossible for Mac to become active if inactive, and impossible for Grant/Lee to go inactive once active. But I've seen both of these happen.

Yes, there are other modifiers, but I don't know exactly what they are. One thing I have seen often enough has been Grant going inactive after some large battles. I've also seen him go inactive without having been in battle, but that happens pretty rarely.

Also, I don't think you can say that Mac was 'active' durring his spring offensive. He sat at Yorktown for forever, and in games terms, if he was active the player would have stomped on Magruder like a bug. Further, after the battles of Williamsburg and Seven Pines, an active McClellan probably would be moved to Richmond. But, if inactive, you would be forced to sit still. I think it's perfectly reasonable to have all of Mac's activations be at random. Also, I don't think we need to force his corps to be active, because they weren't either. Part of the reason McClellan was such a poor general was that his corps would not MTSOG, and leave each other out to dry. If they are only active a third or so at a time, than you will run into more problems on the defensive too. And, at least I think, when you attack all that matters is whether or not the commanding general is active. If most of his corps aren't, he can still attack without penalty, but his whole army moves really slow. Sounds about right to me.

True, McClellan was no more aggressive when 'on the move' than before. Maybe not having all his corps auto-activate when he's active would represent that better, thus forcing the player to wait for enough corp to be active to risk an attack. This might also represent the corps inability/unwillingness to MTSG as well, as corps that are not active will probably not have the movement points to MTSG successfully, especially if the ground is swampy or muddy.

[Captain_Orso]

But isn't this the case in other Union theaters early in the war? Also, simulating playing as Lincoln, George B. should be a frustrating experience of inactivity with brief bouts of action...followed by calls for reinforcements.

Well, there is some game-play balance in the 'On to Richmond' event. It would be pretty hard on the Union player if when the event fired and McClellan was inactive for the entire time, thus costing the Union 10NM practically automatically.

As much as I dislike McClellan one must give him credit for at least getting his entire army on to the peninsula and up to within view of the spires of the churches of Richmond.

It's just very difficult to model McClellan's unpredictable behavior--beyond just that he probably won't move when you want him to--and still give the Union player some chance of doing something with him.

[aariediger]

I think it should be hard to campaign with Mac. That 'On to Richmond' thing only forces you to get within 2 regions, and even if he's inactive it shouldn't be that hard to do. Assuming we're talking about normal activation, I've never played with the harden activation that locks armies in place. Really though, as a Union player, I'd rather just use something like a 2-3-0, 2-2-0, 2-3-1 type of general than a 1 strat leader with some special rules. I'll take my chances.

[aariediger]

I found this article...

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/artsandliving/civilwar/mcclellan-graphic/index.html?tab=1

while reading over at Armchair General, and thought it was interesting to say the least. It makes some pretty big claims, and some seem more reasonable than others. He makes three claims:

1 The telegram that McClellan sent to Lincoln to explain having found the enemy’s plans reads 12:00 M. This has been taken to mean Meridian, or noon. However, Lincoln’s copy reads 12:00 Midnight. This is a full twelve hours later, and also helps explain how the seizure of Catoctin Mountain, which didn’t happen until after when the telegram was thought to have been originally sent, was included in the message. Also, the army was on the march that night, meaning he didn’t wait and do nothing until the next day.

2 Confederate casualties in the Maryland campaign were higher than previously thought. Most sources put Rebel casualties at around 2,000 at South Mountain, and 10,000 at Antietam, for 12,000 total. The article puts Southern casualties at around 16,000. The extra 4,000 come from killed and captured, having acquired the numbers by comparing southern after action reports to the number of actual graves and parole slips in northern possession.

3 Claims the southern army contained 77,000 men.

[HR][/HR]


I have to say, it looks like he has the evidence to shoot down the whole wasted 18 hours bit after finding Order 191, and the fact that there are approximately twice as many dead rebels buried north of the Potomac as what Confederate reports claim (also taking into consideration how poor record keeping was in the Army of Northern Virginia), that the first two are probably true. But the last bit on army size, while probably accurate, I have one problem with. The amount of straggling that occurred was incredible. It is probably true to say that Lee’s army had 77,000 men in it, but probably at least a third were straggling along the way somewhere else. I think Longstreet’s estimate of 41,000 present on the field is probably correct.

[HR][/HR]

Anyway, I thought I would post this and one other thing I’ve found: Ewell at three stars just so happens to have the exact 2-3-1 I’ve been looking for this whole time for McClellan! So, how do they compare?

Poor defensive general?

McClellan: During the Seven Days, allowed corps to be attacked in detail, nearly lost entire army

Ewell: Lost two brigades captured at 2nd Rappahannock station, entire division captured at Spotsylvania

Okay-ish Offensive general?

McClellan: Fine performance at Rich Mountain, won a nice little victory at South Mountain, followed by Antietam, where he inflicted one of the three highest daily losses of the war for an attacking general (Antietam, Chickamauga, Mule Shoe)

Ewell: Fine division commander under Jackson, rolled up 11th corps at Gettysburg, just before had fought at 2nd Winchester, which is one of the three most lopsided victories in the war for an attacking general (Winchester, Richmond, Sayler Creek)

Slow?

McClellan: Took forever to move against Magruder at Yorktown, couldn’t catch Johnston after Yorktown or Lee after Antietam, probably waited too long to attack Lee before his whole army arrived

Ewell: Couldn’t strike Hancock when Lee needed him to at the North Anna, probably should have attacked Cemetary Hill on the 1st day before Meade’s whole army showed up


Sounds like a match to me!

[Canon]

I just finished a book on Antietam by Stephen W. Sears (Landscape Turned Red - which I highly recommend as it was an excellent read), and he would tend to disagree with those points, and in any case the facts still aren't too friendly to McClellan.

1. We know that McClellan had the complete layout of Confederate forces, so we know that any competent commander would attempt to strike hard and fast at the isolated pieces in detail. He still acts slowly and staggered (in my opinion). To bring the main Confederate force to battle at Antietam still took from September 13 (Lost Orders found - at noon or earlier depending on source) to September 17. The distance between Frederick and Sharpsburg is not much more than 20 miles, so this pace is not exactly tearing it up. Yes I know their were engagements with Stuarts Cavalry and D.H. Hills division, and a lot of the blame must be put on McClellan's lieutenants as well, but in the end the Army of the Potomac was his responsibility.

2. If the Confederate casualties were indeed as high as this report says, than an attack the next day should have been the most obvious plan, using the fresh V and VI Corps, and really should've have been committed somewhere the previous day to drive home the win.

3. If the author of that report believes that McLaw's, A.P. Hill's, and the others were able to fight at Harpers Ferry and force march back to Sharpsburg without any lost men to straggling, than maybe, just maybe you can count up 60,000 men. There is no way Lee had 77,000, otherwise, considering his style, he probably would have attacked!

This author seems to want to stir up some debates or perhaps is a McClellan supporter. Either way for now, I will agree with the previous held account of Antietam.

[nevada73]

Let us all remember that this is a game, not a simulation. I think the stats and rules are pretty accurate. McClellan is exactly what he is, a good staff officer and organizer (his training trait). As overall commander in chief I can choose to put him in the field or not. Depending on the circumstances I will suffer NM or VP hits or perhaps I won't. Just because I have the commanders does not mean I have to use them to field troops. Forcing us to use a commander is not gaming, that is simulation. I am sure most of us put McClellan away from the front and even Banks and Burnside (to recruit). Nothing wrong with putting men where their strengths are at. We all have the hindsight that Lincoln did not have.

Personally, I think Robert E. Lee is overated.

[B0rn_C0nfused]

I found this article...

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/artsandliving/civilwar/mcclellan-graphic/index.html?tab=1

while reading over at Armchair General, and thought it was interesting to say the least. It makes some pretty big claims, and some seem more reasonable than others. He makes three claims:

1 The telegram that McClellan sent to Lincoln to explain having found the enemy’s plans reads 12:00 M. This has been taken to mean Meridian, or noon. However, Lincoln’s copy reads 12:00 Midnight. This is a full twelve hours later, and also helps explain how the seizure of Catoctin Mountain, which didn’t happen until after when the telegram was thought to have been originally sent, was included in the message. Also, the army was on the march that night, meaning he didn’t wait and do nothing until the next day.

2 Confederate casualties in the Maryland campaign were higher than previously thought. Most sources put Rebel casualties at around 2,000 at South Mountain, and 10,000 at Antietam, for 12,000 total. The article puts Southern casualties at around 16,000. The extra 4,000 come from killed and captured, having acquired the numbers by comparing southern after action reports to the number of actual graves and parole slips in northern possession.

3 Claims the southern army contained 77,000 men.

[HR][/HR]


I have to say, it looks like he has the evidence to shoot down the whole wasted 18 hours bit after finding Order 191, and the fact that there are approximately twice as many dead rebels buried north of the Potomac as what Confederate reports claim (also taking into consideration how poor record keeping was in the Army of Northern Virginia), that the first two are probably true. But the last bit on army size, while probably accurate, I have one problem with. The amount of straggling that occurred was incredible. It is probably true to say that Lee’s army had 77,000 men in it, but probably at least a third were straggling along the way somewhere else. I think Longstreet’s estimate of 41,000 present on the field is probably correct.

[HR][/HR]

Anyway, I thought I would post this and one other thing I’ve found: Ewell at three stars just so happens to have the exact 2-3-1 I’ve been looking for this whole time for McClellan! So, how do they compare?

Poor defensive general?

McClellan: During the Seven Days, allowed corps to be attacked in detail, nearly lost entire army

Ewell: Lost two brigades captured at 2nd Rappahannock station, entire division captured at Spotsylvania

Okay-ish Offensive general?

McClellan: Fine performance at Rich Mountain, won a nice little victory at South Mountain, followed by Antietam, where he inflicted one of the three highest daily losses of the war for an attacking general (Antietam, Chickamauga, Mule Shoe)

Ewell: Fine division commander under Jackson, rolled up 11th corps at Gettysburg, just before had fought at 2nd Winchester, which is one of the three most lopsided victories in the war for an attacking general (Winchester, Richmond, Sayler Creek)

Slow?

McClellan: Took forever to move against Magruder at Yorktown, couldn’t catch Johnston after Yorktown or Lee after Antietam, probably waited too long to attack Lee before his whole army arrived

Ewell: Couldn’t strike Hancock when Lee needed him to at the North Anna, probably should have attacked Cemetary Hill on the 1st day before Meade’s whole army showed up


Sounds like a match to me!

http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/antietam/history/mcclellan-at-antietam.html I think this is the glass that many including myself view McClellan through.

I think the author sums it up nicely when he says "Against an enemy he outnumbered better than two to one, George McClellan devoted himself to not losing rather than winning."