Captain_Orso wrote:Think strategically not tactically. You want to gain control over territory to limit your enemies movement and communications (supply) while maintaining your own.
Also remember that the regions are large. Even large forces under the right conditions can avoid each other if at least one is inclined to do so even if they are "passing" each other in each entering the other's region.
aariediger wrote:I understand that the minimum Military control for retreating has been lowered to 0%, so now about the only way to lose entire corps sized forces are starvation, failed amphibious landings, surrenders in siege situations, or an assault on units in a structure. So if your opponent leaves a large number of troops in position to get cut off, how should you go about making him pay for it?
Philo32b wrote:Now if you have sealed off the retreat paths (their military control is less than 5%) they should be trapped there turn after turn while you destroy them.
aariediger wrote:
And as far as entire armies being cut off and destroyed, just look at the next major war that comes right after the civil war. The Eastern front in world war one provides two perfect examples, the Battle of Tannenberg, and the 2nd battle of Masurian Lakes....
I think the minimum Military Control for retreats should be set to 1%. That way it is possible to destroy an entire corps sized force, but still very hard to do, as it was historically.
John Schilling wrote:I'm not sure the difference between 1% and 5% makes much difference, or whether we should be looking for another mechanism altogether. But whatever the answer is, it needs to be wired into Athena II's logic as a strong inhibition against putting (or leaving) her armies in a position from which retreat can be easily interdicted, and there should be an informed consensus amongst PBEM players about how it will be handled in their games.
Philo32b wrote:...
The rule about a "retreat penalty" for retreating into a region where enemy units are present (cltRetPenaltyPerNmySU) is the one that gives you some control on where the enemy army retreats. The penalty is against interest points in retreating into a certain region, so the more units you have stationed in a region the less likely the enemy will retreat there. But the default is pretty low compared to all the other factors (city/fort/depot, per level, in the region, for example). If we were to make cltRetPenaltyPerNmySU much higher, then you have a lot more control where the enemy retreats.
I don't think you would want to make cltRetPenaltyPerNmySU so high that it is the only consideration, though, because then you could make a 30,000 man army retreat to some godawful place simply because you have a single cavalry regiment posted at the one retreat route available to it. That's not realistic. But you might want to have it high enough that the presence of your units have a chance of pushing the enemy army to the godawful place by sending units to where you don't want the enemy to go. Then the enemy player will know that there is a threat to being reckless and they should not take it for granted that they will be safe if they do all the ahistorical things you describe, which seems to be the essence of the problem.
The "Coefficient applied to the interest if the region is the one where we are coming from" also looks like it has promise, to keep enemies from retreating where the attack is coming from. I'm not clear on how this rule interacts with the others, though. Perhaps someone could explain how the coefficient would work.
Philo32b wrote:...
The rule about a "retreat penalty" for retreating into a region where enemy units are present (cltRetPenaltyPerNmySU) is the one that gives you some control on where the enemy army retreats. The penalty is against interest points in retreating into a certain region, so the more units you have stationed in a region the less likely the enemy will retreat there. But the default is pretty low compared to all the other factors (city/fort/depot, per level, in the region, for example). If we were to make cltRetPenaltyPerNmySU much higher, then you have a lot more control where the enemy retreats.
I don't think you would want to make cltRetPenaltyPerNmySU so high that it is the only consideration, though, because then you could make a 30,000 man army retreat to some godawful place simply because you have a single cavalry regiment posted at the one retreat route available to it. That's not realistic. But you might want to have it high enough that the presence of your units have a chance of pushing the enemy army to the godawful place by sending units to where you don't want the enemy to go. Then the enemy player will know that there is a threat to being reckless and they should not take it for granted that they will be safe if they do all the ahistorical things you describe, which seems to be the essence of the problem.
The "Coefficient applied to the interest if the region is the one where we are coming from" also looks like it has promise, to keep enemies from retreating where the attack is coming from. I'm not clear on how this rule interacts with the others, though. Perhaps someone could explain how the coefficient would work.
exar83 wrote:how do you order your force to intercept?
aariediger wrote:And as far as entire armies being cut off and destroyed, just look at the next major war that comes right after the civil war. The Eastern front in world war one provides two perfect examples, the Battle of Tannenberg, and the 2nd battle of Masurian Lakes. The events of these two campaigns resulted in the total destruction of two huge Russian armies, in excess of 300,000 men total. Together they knocked Russia out of the war. And there are examples of instances where this could have happened in the Civil War but didn’t. I mentioned two CSA examples in my original post, and here are two USA ones. If Grant doesn’t open the Cracker line, then Bragg could very well have bagged an entire army at Chattanooga. If Jackson hadn’t been shot down by his own men in the dark, he well could have taken United States Ford and destroyed Hooker’s army. These could have happened.
Captain_Orso wrote:This seems very gamey to me.
Captain_Orso wrote:As a mainly Union player the worst that's happened to me from raiding has been some disruption of strategic movement and then only because I was getting a bit sloppy.
With loans I guess you mean printing money. Unless I'm mistaken the federal government could just do that, print money, and flood the economy with it. It's not good for the economy and I don't do it often. But when I did it was because the difference in consequences between not being able to get out of a downward spiral of MN and income vs having inflation and paying a bit more for every unit for the rest of the game; for me it paid off.
Jarkko wrote:Sorry, that just doesn't float. A couple dozen militia brigades sent raiding to cut rail-lines is waaay too cheap, easy and effective in AACW. Without rails supplies doesn't flow, and your frontline troopers will be crushed with the human wave attacks. If you place huge numbers (to counter ~20 militia regiments sent raiding you need at least 100 regiments to hold your rail-linesystem integrated. I don't know what sort of opponents you have fought against, but against a competetive opponent you need to be bit more active than "not-sloppy" to prevent absolute disasters
orca wrote:I'm new at this game, so I'm hoping you can enlighten me on this. Why do you need 100 regiments to hold rail lines against 20 militia?
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