tc237 wrote:Pinkerton started exaggerating his numbers only after it became apparent to him that McClellan was seeing ghosts.
Prior to that Pinkerton had very accurate intelligence estimates and analysis on the rebel army.
Eventually though, after dealing with McClellan long enough, Pinkerton gave in and started reporting the over-extimates that McClellan wanted.
When was McClellan "found out"?
Could be that Lincoln new about it all along. Lincoln was getting hundreds of reports and had his own little paid intelligence collectors.
After McClellan was relieved, Hooker established an excellent intelligence bureau that carried on to the end of the war, they probably knew about it.
Thing is, no one was going to come public and disparage McClellan, they just didn't do that at the time.
In any case it would have been a tough task, they would have had to give up their own intelligence sources and McClellan was very popular politically
After the war McClellan suporters laid the "blame" on Pinkerton while conversly the "Lost Cause" writers painted McClellan as a dunder brain with stars. (and Grant a drunk, Sherman a terror, yadda yadda...)
Now we are in an era, that I call a golden age, of Civil War research were there are huge amounts of new resources, previously unavailable to past writers like Foote, opening up to modern day Civil War scholars.
Thankfully, many of the old established concepts, misconceptions or myths are slowly being debunked or revised by all this new and accurate information.
McClellan's story might be one of them.
gchristie wrote:And I believe that Robert E Lee, when asked something along the lines of who he thought the best union general he had faced, answered McClellan.
Heldenkaiser wrote:I am sure he said that. But I believe he meant the best Union general for HIM (Lee).![]()
dublish wrote:Debatable. The AoNV suffered some of its heaviest losses relative to those it inflicted on the AotP while McClellan was in command. For all the bad that McClellan did (and I'm one of those who think it was a lot), he was able, for whatever reasons, to keep the Union army in fighting form.
dublish wrote:Debatable. The AoNV suffered some of its heaviest losses relative to those it inflicted on the AotP while McClellan was in command. For all the bad that McClellan did (and I'm one of those who think it was a lot), he was able, for whatever reasons, to keep the Union army in fighting form.
Coffee Sergeant wrote:Perhaps Lee was referring to the Seven Days. That was one of the few battles in which he took more casualties than he inflicted. But I don't think it had much to do with McClellan's generalship. It was also one of the few times Lee was on the tactical offensive as well . Besides, if I remember right McPherson said the heavy casualties suffered had mainly to do with disparity in weaponry - most of the CSA units were still equipped with smoothbores while all the Union forces had rilfled muskets. And the Union forces outnumbered Confederate forces by a considerable margin. And the offensive was an operational success in he was able to push the AotP off the peninsula. Unlike Gettysburg or Antietam
Colonel Dreux wrote:I'm with you dublish. We were debating McClellan in the officers forum recently. Lots of kind and harsh words said about him in his ranking thread.
I like McClellan personally. He was, like you said, not a fool. Even U.S. Grant wondered to himself how McClellan would have done if given more time and more political support. McClellan really only got one campaign season to prove himself, i.e., the summer and fall of 1862. He likely would have worn down the AoNV over time and he would have kept Lee from invading the North again perhaps if fully in control of the whole Eastern theatre. My guess is he would have gotten his army/armies back down to Richmond somehow and besieged it in 1863. Per speculation, but I'm of the opinion he was competent enough to defeat Lee in the end.
Grant himself, with the same amount of time Spring - Fall of 1864 couldn't even defeat a demoralized and weakened AoNV.
dublish wrote:Now, don't go putting words into my mouth. McClellan had a full year from late 1861 to late 1862 to 'prove himself', and he proved exactly what he was capable of. In the same amount of time, from May '64 to May '65, Grant won the war. I think we agree that McClellan would never be crushed by the AoNV, but the North didn't need just to not get crushed- they needed Lee's army to be crushed, and McClellan was never going to deliver that.
tagwyn wrote:Gen Lee could not "provide further damage" to McClellan because "the Miscreat" Pope was wandering around and Lee really wanted to "supress" this pile of crap before McC could get back and join him. t
dublish wrote:Oh, indeed. He was perfectly content to politely leave the Confederates to their business, and was very ready to defer to them if his objectives and theirs happened to conflict with each other.
Coffee Sergeant wrote:Besides, if I remember right McPherson said the heavy casualties suffered had mainly to do with disparity in weaponry - most of the CSA units were still equipped with smoothbores while all the Union forces had rilfled muskets.
Colonel Dreux wrote:I disagree with you that McClellan wouldn't have crushed Lee's army though. We don't know that.
LSSpam wrote:No. We have a very a good idea.
He had two opportunities, better chances then any other general got in the war except for Meade at Williamsport after the Gettysburg retreat and Grant at Petersburg after Fort Stedmen. He got thoroughly cowed by Lee at Seven Days, completely put on his heels despite a large operational advantage in numbers. And this was Lee just in command, saddled with incompetent generals he didn't know, and an army structure (absence of corps, the brigaded artillery, etc) that was ineffective.
Then he was handed a second opportunity on a golden platter at Antietam, but just didn't have the stomach for it.
No, we can say with confidence McClellan's counter-factual performance had he stayed in command would have likely been that of a Meade with better PR. Competent, certainly wouldn't produce a Fredricksburg, but quite capable of giving up a Chancellorville and more likely to spend months like Meade did after Gettysburg chasing his tail around in circles only to end up right where he started with Lee to begin with.
Colonel Dreux wrote: All there was to do was go into winter quarters and wait after letting Lee get back down South.
You should remember (you probably do) that technically Meade was still the commander of the Army of the Potomac when Grant was in charge. So Meade finished off Lee with Grant. He just doesn't get the koodoes for it. And I agree with you that Meade and McClellan had some similarities as commanders.
Lee may have freaked McClellan into taking the defensive and abandoning the offensive against Richmond, but Lee didn't have his way with McClellan. Lee struggled to coordinate his army and McClellan was able to smash Lee against up the anvils he setup while he slipped away from Lee.
Colonel Dreux wrote:I disagree again. We don't know what would have happened. He let Lee get away after Antietam, but so what? All there was to do was go into winter quarters and wait after letting Lee get back down South. My guess is McClellan would have eventually seen the light on the number of Confederate troops and he would have devised a plan to pin Lee down in and around Richmond.
You should remember (you probably do) that technically Meade was still the commander of the Army of the Potomac when Grant was in charge. So Meade finished off Lee with Grant. He just doesn't get the koodoes for it. And I agree with you that Meade and McClellan had some similarities as commanders.
Grant ended the War, but it took him longer than he and Lincoln expected. So even pushing hard as can be and against a post-Gettysburg Army of NV wasn't easy (Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor) and took some time, and in fact that is what really won the war, time... thanks to attrition and the economic collapse of the Confederacy.
Lee may have freaked McClellan into taking the defensive and abandoning the offensive against Richmond, but Lee didn't have his way with McClellan. Lee struggled to coordinate his army and McClellan was able to smash Lee against up the anvils he setup while he slipped away from Lee.
dublish wrote:That's the first time I've ever heard of someone describing McClellan as 'smashing' anything. Whatever you're on, I want some of it.
LSSpam wrote:Or use his relatively fresh corps (Franklin and Porters) to finish off Lee's army, shortening the war by who knows what.
LSSpam wrote:That's incredibly disingenuous. I refuse to believe your grasp of history is that poor.
Meade spent the entire rest of 1863 post-Gettysburg shadow-boxing Lee for absolutely zero effect. You seem to be confusing tactical competency with the basic ability to do operationally what needed to be done. Grant had it, McClellan and Meade lacked it. It took Grant's operational control to do what no other Union commander was able to do, which is pin Lee down and finish him off.
Meade was a competent Corp commander, I'm sure McClellan would have been as well, but they obviously, demonstratively, did not have what it took to finish the war in the Eastern Theatre. Grant did. This is why Grant gets put in the history books.
LSSpam wrote:Operationally McClellan was completely out-matched against Lee. Again, this is historical record. Despite vast preponderance of numbers, McClellan was fundamentally incapable of doing anything but "checking" Lee. How is that considered a success? You're well supplied, well equipped, outnumber your poorly equipped/supplied foe 2-1, and operating (at the time of Seven Days - Antietam) with an effective and established commanded structure while your opponent is improvising on the fly.
LSSpam wrote:And "holding his own" is the qualifier for success?
McClellan failed by any rational objective measure. Period. Grant, by contrast, succeeded. Give McClellan credit for not getting his army destroyed, which he almost very well did at Seven Days (and arguably would have lost at least a significant portion had Lee inherited the structure of the ANV established by early 1863) but that doesn't make him a competent Army commander considering his advantages.
dublish wrote:That's the first time I've ever heard of someone describing McClellan as 'smashing' anything. Whatever you're on, I want some of it.
LSSpam wrote:Yeah i'm just floored that somehow the mark of success in leading a well-equipped/supplied army with an established chain of command and a 2-1 advantage in numbers is "being able to slip away" from your, by any other measure except the commanding General, inferior opponent.
The very act of being forced to "slip away" in such a situation screams "failure"
kwhitehead wrote:McClellan had two major flaws that undermined an otherwise above average leader.
First, he fought ghost armies. This crippled his ability to go on the offensive and deliver the kind of killing blow the AoP was capable of in 1862. They had the numbers in Virginia to take Richmond. They had more than enough strength to destroy Lee's whole army at Antietam. But he was always holding back to counter the coming attack by the ghost army.
Second, he allowed himself and the AoP to be drawn into the political war going on in Washington between those who wanted Union only and the radical Abolitionist. This eventually cost him the political support by Lincoln he needed to be effective.
As to the Seven Days, when you consider Lee had an army that barely existed four weeks prior he accomplished a minor miracle with them. Especially when you consider the best force in his command, Jackson's, was rendered almost useless for some unknown reason. If Jackson had shown any of his old and future agressiveness Lee would have probably destroyed the AoP as he planned to do.
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