Interpretation of the War

[CavScout]

I don’t think the South could have won a military war against the North. The advantages the North enjoyed were too great.

What the South could have, and at times seemed to be on the verge of, was winning the political war against the North.

The South truly didn’t need to beat the North; they just had to break their spirit. This is why the South’s early wins were so powerful.

That the North kept trying to win by breaking the South’s spirit over breaking them militarily probably ended up lengthening the war longer than it needed to be.

[Offworlder]

A few points from the point of view of a non American.

The belief of the South that the European powers could effectively intervene on their behalf were based on the idea that their cotton was the only available to the British. The British had alternate sources closer at hand (Egypt) and/or controllable (India). The war accelerated the British trend to rely less on American imports. As stated above they still imported a lot of North American foodstuffs. One must also understand that the British would only intervene if the French did like in the Crimean war. The British army wasn't that big, still innured in the traditions of Wellington & Co and badly prepared even doctrinally to fight large scale engagements. I'm not sure that they could have done more than defend Canada.

Secondly the French were in no real position to intervene effectively in America. Just look at the Mexican fiasco. They couldn't even effectively beat a third rate power (no disrespect). Also a large part of the French army was tied down either in colonial garrisons or in the fighting in Algeria or in a rather large garrison in Rome. Frankly their army was small, spread out and used to small scale warfare and would have been hard put to fight northern armies which had, by 1863, become more professional and used to large scale manouvers.

Last but not least, keep in mind that the drums of war were already sounding in Europe. German nationalism was on the march, with the Schleswig war actually taking place during this period, and the Austro-Prussian war taking place in 1866. The French were looking rather apprehensively over the Rhine all this time, while fighting wars in far flung territories. They also had to somehow restrain Italian "Risorgimento" ambitions (ie the incorporation of Venice and Rome in the new Italian Kingdom).

Besides there was the Russians who were trying to overturn the verdict of the Crimean War. Propping up the 'Sick man of Europe' absorbed a lot of the diplomatic energy of both the French and the Brits.

I think that American writers should have taken this background before even trying to assess the willingness and ability of western european powers to intervene in such a conflict. Do you really think that Russia would have stood idley by? I'd say no because with the Western powers embroiled in America, they would have overrun the Ottoman Empire and overturn the result of the Crimean War. And what about the German question? With the French tied down in America, Prussia would have absorbed the rest of Germany in short order. Neither France nor Britain could allow a broken Austria-Hungary or a bankrupt Ottoman Empire to fall to the new guys on the block (Prussia, Italy and Russia).

Please note that these questions had more bearing on the foreign offices of the British and French than a rather obscure war on the other side of the Atlantic. Besides the question of abolition of slavery and its effects on European foreign affairs, though so close to American hearts, wouldn't stand up to real scrutiny. In both British and French empires, slavery was still widely practiced in the colonies. Sometimes it bore a different name (ex the Caste system in India) but it still existed just under the radar of the administration, which many a time, had a hand in the illicit trade. What these powers had abolished was legal slave trade, but they condoned it for a long time in the areas they controlled or influenced. Though there was a lot of chest thumping and millions of words written about this horrid institution, this was mostly for homeland consumption.

In brief, what I'm trying to say is that neither Britain nor France were really interested or capable of intervening effectively in the war. They were too tied down with other committments to come to the aid to a country which effectively tried to blackmail one (Britain) and bribe the other (France). Foreign intervention was a Southern pipe dream.

On the other hand, in the game it is possible and adds flavour to the game! Yay!

[Jabberwock]

Palmerston (Prime Minister) to Russell (Foreign Minister) - September 23, 1862

If the Federals sustain a great defeat, they may at once be ready for mediation, and the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait awhile, and see what may follow.

Discussions of British and French military power or doctrine, and their continental realpolitik are irrelevant. The Lincoln administration had made it very clear that recognition or "mediation" would have meant war. The historical fact is that they were ready to intervene, and that they had every intention of intervening dependent on further Confederate military success.

Now we can discuss the concept of effective intervention in hypothetical situations. It's often mentioned in these arguments that the British could barely have broken the blockade and defended Canada. Given the political situation in the north that any kind of southern win at Antietam along with intervention would have caused, would they need to do more than that to be effective? It's not the armies of the europeans that would have been most effective. It's the fact that the south could have received virtually unlimited armaments and supplies for its own military. Give Marse Robert just 50 more cannon at Fredericksburg, and Jackson would have smashed Burnside's left wing the way Longstreet did with the right. Throw in the sudden lack of overseas markets for Northern goods, and the expeditionary forces off the coast (that never actually need to land the bulk of their forces to be effective, just enough to keep the scare up). The North would have given up quickly at that point.

[Offworlder]

I'm sorry but I can't agree. Mediation for Lincoln might have meant war (which made sense since it was an intolerable intervention in internal matters) but for the Europeans, it just meant that. The point is that the Europeans would have intervened not to help the Confederates but to pick on the carcass of the US.

Old world politics were a more relevant issue to the Europeans (and still are by the way) than to the Americans. Russian sabre rattling, the manifest weakness of the Austrians and Ottomans in the face of ambitous neighbours were the constant headaches of the British and the French. The British had a stake (indirectly) in the conflict, and that was the future of Canada and not the future of an indipendent South. As to the selling of weapons, the British were more than happy to sell to anyone with the money. As to those they sent to the South, I need not comment...

The French had great ambitions but few resourses. Widely spread over the globe, and losing allies all the time because of Napoleon III's erratic foreign policy, they were even less ready to intervene. And its armament industry was only in its infancy, incapable of sustaining their own army in the field, let alone export the numbers of weapons required by the South to win. Only after Marshal Niel's reforms (starting 1867 or 68) were the French capable of equipping their entire army with a common weapon (the redoubtable Chassepot).

Btw keep in mind that both French and British navies were in a state of flux, changing from sail to steam. In essence a war at that time would have caught their navies with their proverbial pants around their knees. Though they might have been able to break the blockade, neither had a proper port in the new world to service advanced ships. As to keeping expeditionary forces at see indefinately, well I need not comment.

Truth is that the European western powers would have only intervened if (minimum) the South was besieging Washington following a crushing Union defeat. Despite all the sabre rattling, they would only have intervened if the Union was really and truly prostrate, taking choice pieces of territory and backing Southern indipendence as the price for 'mediation'. They were playing a waiting game like vultures on the sidelines.

[Jabberwock]

I'm sorry I had to break up your paragraphs to refute your statements, but some of your thoughts on this subject are not grouped logically.

I'm sorry but I can't agree. Mediation for Lincoln might have meant war (which made sense since it was an intolerable intervention in internal matters) but for the Europeans, it just meant that.

LOL - They knew perfectly well what it meant. It meant cease fire or we recognize the Confederacy, and if that means war, ok.

The point is that the Europeans would have intervened not to help the Confederates but to pick on the carcass of the US.

They were not thinking about taking territory from the US for themselves. They would have been perfectly happy splitting it into two countries.

Old world politics were a more relevant issue to the Europeans (and still are by the way) than to the Americans. Russian sabre rattling, the manifest weakness of the Austrians and Ottomans in the face of ambitous neighbours were the constant headaches of the British and the French.

So? That doesn't change the fact that they were ready to intervene.

The British had a stake (indirectly) in the conflict, and that was the future of Canada and not the future of an indipendent South.

They didn't care about the south like they did about Canada, but the future of Canada would clearly be impacted by the strength of the United States, and whether it included the south.

As to the selling of weapons, the British were more than happy to sell to anyone with the money. As to those they sent to the South, I need not comment...

Anyone they weren't at war with. You have a problem with Enfields, Armstrongs, and Whitworths? I'll concede that the Blakely cannons were not popular (largely due to the fact that the Confederates couldn't produce or procure proper ammunition for them), and that the Armstrongs were too expensive for mass export.

The French had great ambitions but few resourses. Widely spread over the globe, and losing allies all the time because of Napoleon III's erratic foreign policy, they were even less ready to intervene. And its armament industry was only in its infancy, incapable of sustaining their own army in the field, let alone export the numbers of weapons required by the South to win. Only after Marshal Niel's reforms (starting 1867 or 68) were the French capable of equipping their entire army with a common weapon (the redoubtable Chassepot).

Ready and willing are two different topics, especially when considering Napoleon III. I concede the French would not have intervened without the British.

Btw keep in mind that both French and British navies were in a state of flux, changing from sail to steam. In essence a war at that time would have caught their navies with their proverbial pants around their knees.

Not any more in flux than the US Navy. The British were already building some of the most advanced ships in the world for the CSN.

Though they might have been able to break the blockade, neither had a proper port in the new world to service advanced ships. As to keeping expeditionary forces at see indefinately, well I need not comment.

Hello? Charleston, Wilmington, Halifax, Nassau. They could easily have taken back Norfolk as well.

Truth is that the European western powers would have only intervened if (minimum) the South was besieging Washington following a crushing Union defeat.

Truth is, there was a British Cabinet meeting scheduled for late September 1862 to discuss immediate mediation to be followed by intervention if necessary. Until news of Antietam arrived, they had the votes (in the Cabinet, where it mattered) and the will to do it.

Despite all the sabre rattling, they would only have intervened if the Union was really and truly prostrate, taking choice pieces of territory and backing Southern indipendence as the price for 'mediation'. They were playing a waiting game like vultures on the sidelines.

Now I need not comment...

[Korrigan]

[color="Blue"]WARNING

This discussion has been interesting so far, but I feel here the necessity to remind the forum rules to everyone.

No politics, No aggressivity. Always use words with care.

Use only historical facts to support your opinions and contradict others.

And if you can't convince someone, well, c'est la vie.

Thank you for your attention,

Korrigan[/color]

[Banks6060]

I have to agree with Jabber here. Not because I'm an American, but the almighty dollar (pound, frank, what have you) rules just about all policy in the end. As much as one would say that the brits didn't need southern goods. I don't believe you could stress how much they did. The south provided 50% of Britain's cotton for clothing and it was a heck of alot easier to ship the stuff from the east coast to England than it was for English companies to deal with shipping their goods back and forth all the way around Africa. (the Suez canal wasn't opened for use until 1869.)

I'm too lazy to do the research...but I believe the lack of Southern commerce put a nasty little dent in the British economy for awhile.

Plus, regarding foreign policy. I think it is ludicrous to think that Britain WOULDN'T have, in some way helped tear America apart with it already making its way across the continent, threatening to become a prominent world power. Why eventually deal with one large foreign power when you could deal with two smaller ones? Britain was not about to allow itself to be unseated as the world's greatest superpower. Again, coming from an American point of view

NOW...France...no doubt they had issues...but they were, in my opinion, the guardians of the mainland and I'm sure the British had no problem leaving the "Prussian Problem" up to them. If there were ever a time where the Brits and French actually had each others' best interests in mind....I'd be surprised.

The Russians were still reeling from the Crimean War were they not?? It would not have taken too hefty an effort on the British Navy's part to contain the modest American Navy during the civil war....I'm quite sure the Brits could have engaged the Russians in a blockade had it come to war with them again...the British Navy, no matter how antiquated, was simply immense.

Quite frankly....I don't think the Brits would have needed to put much more than a corps or so of infantry on the ground to make a difference....leaving the rest of the army for the government to do with what it wanted. The largest impact would have been the broken blockade by a vastly superior British Navy.

[Jabberwock]

Apologies if I offended anyone, especially Offworlder. I'm not expecting to personally convince him. I can only hope that my recent (and regretted)aggressivity encourages him to do more research in this area, with an aim towards refuting my points. That said, I'll rein it in as best I can.

[Offworlder]

Apologies if I offended anyone, especially Offworlder. I'm not expecting to personally convince him. I can only hope that my recent (and regretted)aggressivity encourages him to do more research in this area, with an aim towards refuting my points. That said, I'll rein it in as best I can.

No offence taken! I don't feel that you were aggressive in any way. Everyone has an opinion to express and a right to do so. And I hope that I didn't offend anyone's sensibilities either.

I'm really sorry if I started a mini war here. It wasn't my intention at all. All I wanted to point out is that many of the books written about the Civil War have been written by authors who see the conflict as a central event of the time without really taking into account the wider world happenings. It is understandable but regrettable. I don't want to offend anyone, but from a XIX century Eurpoean perspective, America wasn't important as say, the continental balance of power and the rise in nationalism. Please note that even militarily the Europeans didn't even bother that much about the Civil War, even though there were lessons to be learnt (mobilisation, rail transport etc). It is also worthwhile noting that the British and the French were not exactly on good terms so it would have been very hard to create a coalition out of these two powers.

Historically this decade was the most interesting in European history before the upheavals brought by WWII, starting with the unification of Italy and ending with the unification of Germany. These and other events that happened in between were the real hot issues of the day. Though this might be a Euro-centric point of view, seemingly out of place here, it is a more realistic assesment of European attitudes during those times.

BTW this particular period is one of my pet subjects and together with the World Wars (I see this whole era as a homogenous one), is the era I majored in.

I'm going to pull out of here before I get banned.

[Rafiki]

I'm going to pull out of here before I get banned.

Just keep what Korrigan said in mind, and there won't be any danger of that

[Offworlder]

Problem is that is too easy to overstep the line without realising. So I'm just going to read on (because this is a subject that I find very interesting) but I'm not going to intervene.

[Banks6060]

@offworlder...I can see much sense in your argument. But idea that the British were not even considering mediation...at the least...just seems strange. Because, as you've pointed out...it goes against decades of writing.

According to every source I've ever read about the ACW....Britain was ready to mediate if the South had won at Sharpsburg and Perryville.

I look at 19th century Britain the same as the modern day United States...no offense to any non U.S. resident...but in most ALL world dealings...the U.S. is typically called-on for either mediation...or assistance....and in many cases, if not all, we consider it. I just don't see how Britain would not have even considered it. (this is not me getting political )

[TommH]

Obviously, British and other European power actions are totally a "what if" situation. Still, I think your building a large case on a single "off the record" comment. A couple of points to consider.

The introduction of Ironclads by in the Civil war had the British and their Naval planners very off balance. For more information see:
"Clad in Iron: The American Civil War and the Challenge of British Naval Power"
But essentially the gist of it was that British naval commanders were NOT confident about being able to bring ships of any kind near ironclads especially troop transports. The vast and rapid expansion of the Union army took the British by surprise and tghat, coupled with the fact that ironclad designs obsoleted much of what came before it, left the British in a much weaker naval position.

As I stated previously Canada, and to a lesser extent Britian's Carib possesions, were "hostages to fortune". Certainly they were a price Britian was not willing to pay to support the South.

I also believe that the British would not have been willing to open up their Merchant marine to the depridations of Yankee privateering. Britian was much more dependent on foreign trade then the south.


I believe the British were honestly only interested in actually mediating. This would have been the case only if the North was truly interested in peace, and a mediator was needed. So the question for me is could that have ever come about?

TO me this comes down to three questions. Could RE Lee have achieved the Cannae he was always seeking? Would Lincoln ever settled for terms? What would the Democrats have done if they defeated Lincoln?

My answer to the first is no I don't think so. For a variety of reasons I don't think it was likely that the AoP could have been anhillated and I don't think Washington could have been taken. It could (and was several times) be decisivly beaten.

My answer the second is also no. My take on Lincoln is that he believed in the Union too much to settle for any sort of division. I don't think I've ever seen a single statment from any of his private or public writings that would indicatge a willingness to negotiate.

So it really comes down the the Civil War democrats and their "soft war" candidate McClellan, along with the mood of the Union. Certainly to me this is the most likely scenario for Confederate independence.

[Jabberwock]

Problem is that is too easy to overstep the line without realising. So I'm just going to read on (because this is a subject that I find very interesting) but I'm not going to intervene.

+1 - That's why I generally avoid stepping into any threads that could get remotely political. I still enjoy reading them all. All due respect, but this area of the forum has gotten somewhat bland this summer. Seems quite a few of the forum veterans are avoiding it like the plague. It's become less of a learning and debating tool than it could be. Somebody expresses one viewpoint, and ... that becomes the viewpoint for that whole thread, or else. Not true in every case, but it's the trend I see.

Not saying I didn't deserve a warning in this case, either. I was not using all my words with care.

[Daxil]

I'm not trying to step on any mod toes or decisions here, but I think a good point vs point discussion that *toes* the line should be perfectly acceptabe. It's one of the things that fuels interaction.

[Le Ricain]

With some trepidation, I wade into the discussion on British intervention (or mediation) in the ACW. IMHO, Britain under the leadership of Palmerston had the desire to intervene. However, Britian had neither the military resources nor the political will to intervene except in the very special circumstance of a pending overwhelming Southern victory. The military restrictions faced by Britain have been ably covered in previous posts.

Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, was British Prime Minister (PM) during the ACW. Palmerston was, with the possible exception of Lord North (PM during AWI), the most anti-American of all PM's before or since. He is on record as describing Americans as dishonest men, disagreeable fellows, rogues and vulgar bullies.

Palmerston also subscribed to the interventionist school of foreign affairs. During a long career in government (Secretary of War 1809-1828, Foreign Secretary for most of 1830's and 1840's and PM off and on after 1855) Palmerston was able to meddle in American affairs in a number of cases: The War of 1812, attempts to keep Texas independent of the USA during the 1830's, the 'Aroostock War' of 1829 on the border between Maine and New Brunwick, The McLeod Affair, the US arrest and trial of British subject Alexander McLeod led Palmerston to consider war measures, the 1840's Oregon border disputes and in 1854 when the USS Cyane shelled a Central American port claimed by Britain leading Palmerston to mention burning US seacoast towns. To complicate matters further, Lincoln appointed William H Seward, a man who had stated that he fully expected to insult Britain when he came to power, as Secretary of State. Clearly, 'Young Pam' was going to get involved in the ACW at the first opportunity if possible.

The advantages to Britain in intervening were 1) to cripple an emerging rival, 2) reopen the Western Hemisphere to British influence, 3) create an open and low tariff market in the southern states 4) undercut the desire in Britain and Europe for America's nearly universal white male sufferage.

Regarding 4), there is no doubt that the election reform bill of 1867 was greatly facilitated by the Northern victory. It has been claimed that the AWI was about the desire of Americans to have the same rights as Englishmen (Taxation without Representation is Tyranny) and that ACW from a British perspective was about the desire of Englishmen to have the same rights as Americans. No Union victory = No Reform bills of 1867 and 1884.

Points 1-4 were all very desirable to the British ruling elite. However, in July 1862, when it appeared that the House of Commons was about to pass a resolution calling for the mediation between North and South, Palmerston forced its withdrawal.

[TommH]

good post. Its easy to overlook the 'personal aspect" when talking about international politics.

Thinking about it, I would say that if the British had intervened that would have cinched Lincoln's re-election. No President has ever lost an election while fighting a foreign power. Its hard to imagine anything that would have rallied the US more then direct British intervention, especially British troops on US soil.

[deadmeat1471]

Before i looked into the history of the civil war properly, i had always been under the assumption that the confederates were doomed to loose. But the simple fact of the Manassas campaign and how very very close the Confederates got to Washington in the early days of the war, proves that they did have a chance indeed, just it was a chance of aggressive strategy - They had to win fast, else the Yankehs would build up their army, their equipment, their industries would far outstrip the confederates (and did).

I feel that the Confederates could have won, but after second MANASSAS the game was up to be honest (my opinion).

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[Clovis]

Longstreet was a very good tactician and a mediocre strategist. South couldn't wage defensive battles on offensive because of a lack of logistical facilities and supplies. Lee was forzging in 1862 and 1863 campaigns. Foraging implies the necessety to move and then to risk encounter battles. And when the battle is joined, the side having the less supply is the one who must take the offensive, or take the risk to be fixed until starvation.

[deadmeat1471]

They didn't have to "win" at all. All they had to do was outlast northern public opinion.

Hence...... win

[77NY]

I agree that -- with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight -- we can say that the CSA could have achieved its political aims of maintaining secession without defeating the Union militarily, simply by "not losing."

But I think a few things impacted the actual likelihood of that outcome. First, the the failure of strategy to keep pace with technology. Note that 50 years after the U.S. Civil War engagements became military science case studies, the world's "foremost" military strategists were still moronically sending human waves across no-man's land against machine gun emplacements and pre-sighted heavy artillery.

Second, the often-cited fact that virtually all of the leading CSA and Union officers attended West Point. All were schooled in the same outdated tactics, the same sense of "honor" and the same sense of what "military victory" was (holding ground). (It's so easy to forget that people actually took honor seriously back then!) Unfortunately, "honor" in 1861-65 required making moronic charges against fixed emplacements. As someone aptly reminds all of us in one of the wiki/help articles, this is pre-Rommel, pre-vertical envelopment. "Capture the flag" was still the goal of military engagements -- plus troops were actually fighting on home soil. So ground mattered greatly psychologically and under existing military doctrine.

And yes, we can say today that there probably was a tipping-point limit on how long northern public opinion would have tolerated appalling losses and a drain on the economy. But I think that the Union would have had to have been stopped dead in their tracks all along a several thousand mile front for that to have happened, with the war degenerating into pure trench warfare -- extremely unlikely. Take away the newspaper accounts of successes in the Ohio river valley and Mississippi to sustain public support and then perhaps.

[tagwyn]

I beg to differ. Lincoln almost lost the election of 64. A significant southern victory could have tipped the scales. The was was not popular in the north and the war could have ended then. The south did not need to beat the North - just hold their own.

I agree! There were many circumstances whereby the rebels could have one; that one is included. t

[Mangudai]

Remember that when the war started, popular opinion on both sides predicted a cakewalk that would be over in a few months.

[Castel]

The lost cause stuff is really quite exaggerated, of course the south could have won the war.

Just imagine if the southern army had prevailed at Gettysburg, the North would have been in a damn bad situation, in a fatal situation.

Of course the fall of Vicksburg is a major event, in fact maybe even more important than Gettysburg on the long-term, but nevertheless if the south had won this battle and directly threaten, taken, Washington they could have forced the North to negotiate a juicy peace treaty and end the war.

Plus, in the public opinion and maybe even in the army, a defeat at Gettysburg would have been really disastrous for the moral.

At one point, even the tougher soldier has his limits, even the more extreme patriot has his fill of bloodbaths and defeats.

Gettysburg could have been this point of rupture.

[Mangudai]

Hindsight is wonderful.

Nobody could have predicted the battle of Gettysburg.

The Lost Cause interpretation depends on what Confederate officers believed about the future.

[dduff442]

I would think the South's best chance would have been to adopt the same strategy Russia employed with such success for centuries: Skirmish, ambush and delay, giving battle at only the most opportune moments. Arm the population, retreat into the interior, and then counter-attack decisively once the North became over extended. One crushing victory won deep in Southern territory (as with Poltava, Moscow (vs. Napoleon) or Moscow (vs Hitler)).

IMO, any victory could only be temporary. Southern independence would have allowed the European powers to intervene in central and southern America... Germany, France, Britain, Russia. The inevitable friction between the CSA and USA would have meant that WWI would have ended up being fought on both sides of the atlantic simultaneously. Lincoln knew this, so I'd have given the CSA 10-20 years of independence tops before a second, final and decisive war errupted.

Regarding intervention by France, England or both: I can't help but feel that full-scale intervention would have been insane. The politicians in each country could not drag the population into a full-scale war with the US on a whim. Any intervention would IMO have taken diplomatic and economic form.

Regards,
dduff

[Clovis]

I would think the South's best chance would have been to adopt the same strategy Russia employed with such success for centuries: Skirmish, ambush and delay, giving battle at only the most opportune moments. Arm the population, retreat into the interior, and then counter-attack decisively once the North became over extended. One crushing victory won deep in Southern territory (as with Poltava, Moscow (vs. Napoleon) or Moscow (vs Hitler)).



Regards,
dduff

This strategy had a very serious drawback: slavery. Where Union army was present, slavery was gone because slaves fled. That's certainly why local authorities were arguing against any local retreat. This strategy was so endangering the slavery system most Southerners couldn't accept it.

[soloswolf]

I would think the South's best chance would have been to adopt the same strategy Russia employed with such success for centuries: Skirmish, ambush and delay, giving battle at only the most opportune moments. Arm the population, retreat into the interior, and then counter-attack decisively once the North became over extended. One crushing victory won deep in Southern territory (as with Poltava, Moscow (vs. Napoleon) or Moscow (vs Hitler)).


Regards,
dduff

Not to cherry pick your post, but...

The 'interior' of the American South is in no way comparable to the interior of Russia. Another critical point is that the power and atrocities of the Czars and Stalin were the only reason the 'strategy' was implemented or held to. Further, it only worked because of time and exhaustion, not because of great planning or leadership.

Finally, how do you think that meeting would have gone for Jeff Davis?

JD: "So, we are going to subject our people to all the worst parts of war with only a tiny hope of pulling out some miracle victory some months or years down the road."

Cabinet: " "

[dduff442]

Soloswolf, Clovis

I acknowledge your points. Each is valid, though I'm not sure either decisive.

From Houston to Richmond is around 1400 miles. From Saint Louis to New Orleans is around 600. An even greater factor than the dimensions of the area was the state of the communications at the time: unimproved roads (where roads existed at all), insufficient subsistence in many areas for even very small armies, huge areas of swamp and dense woodland.

Certainly, 'Fabian tactics' as they're often referred to would have been a hard sell. I wasn't considering practical matters outside the military sphere when I posted.

Would it have been impossible to sell, though? Some points relevant here:

1) The war ended up being fought in the heart of the confederacy in any case, with considerable repression being employed by both sides as well as partisan warfare. Hunger was widespread by war's end, and many cities lay in ruins.

2) Many nations have empoyed this approach. Not all were totalitarian dictatorships. Rome let Hannibal exhaust himself in the Italian countryside over a period of 10 years.

3) The Boers employed this approach. This was as a last resort admittedly, but, given that they were willing to go to such lengths, wouldn't it have been wiser to start out that way and spare themselves their initial defeats in regular warfare?

4) China employed a similar approach against Japan in WWII. Chiang Kai Check (sp?) certainly did not enjoy despotic powers -- in fact, his grip on the state was soapy at best. The point made about the Boers above is relevant here as well.

The practicalities of implementing such a strategy were not on my mind when I first posted. Certainly there would have been immense difficulties. There were great political risks. However the military risks of alternative strategies were no less grave. To fight in the Confederates' position and attempt to avoid all risk is to guarantee defeat.

So...

Given that the Union armies ended up rampaging all over the South anyway, that broad repressive measures were anyway employed, that the war (quite predictably, whatever the received wisdom at the time) was anyway long and immensely bloody, and, above all, given that they ended up losing, maybe this approach deserved consideration.

From a purely technical standpoint, excluding political considerations, I'd consider an attempt to draw the Union armies deep into hostile countryside before going all-out for a crushing victory in the style of Nanking* (1948), Stalingrad or Moscow.

Of course there were two crushing victories in the war historically, both achieved by the Union. The first was Vicksburg. The second, which is often considered a 'collapse' but was in fact an energetically-conducted campaign of encirclement and destruction, was Richmond-Appomatox.

Regards,
dduff

(* This was an encirclement after an advance rather than a retreat, however the diffuse forces employed and the presence of Maoists guerrillas on Nationalist-controlled ground make it relevant.)