Can I turn McClellan into a 6-6-6 ?

[Taillebois]

I know you can randomize stats for generals but is it possible or can it be implemented that you can change a general's stats?

[ajarnlance]

I know you can randomize stats for generals but is it possible or can it be implemented that you can change a general's stats?

Isn't that the 'mark of the BEAST' 666... makes McClellan sound more like the anti-christ... I guess any general's stats can be modded but that's a bit beyond my level of expertise. Interesting that when RE Lee was asked after the war who the best Union general was he answered 'McClellan'... surprised a lot of people...

[Captain_Orso]

I know you can randomize stats for generals but is it possible or can it be implemented that you can change a general's stats?

You can. You just have to edit his model file at the rank you want to change him.

[Jagger2013]

Interesting that when RE Lee was asked after the war who the best Union general was he answered 'McClellan'... surprised a lot of people...

Wonder if Lee was having a laugh at the expense of someone asking him the wrong question at the wrong time.

[Captain_Orso]

I've wondered about this a number of times too. Gen. Lee's reflection might stem from his reflection on all the men killed under his command and on both sides during the war at all, and how Gen. McClellan did little to endanger his troops recklessly.

The only other general who executed a major campaign so carefully was Gen. Rosecrans in his Tullahoma campaign, in which his forces hardly fought the Confederates at all, yet gained all of their objective per his plan. But Gen. Lee never faced Rosecrans, so he might not have considered him in answering that question so enigmatically.

[loki100]

if I recall, Sherman was another who would rather manouver than fight if he had the choice.

To be fair to McClellan, he converted the Army of the Potomac from the disorganised force of 1861 to a very hard to beat (one could say, unable to realise when it was beaten) army that Lee never quite managed to overcome?

[havi]

Lee beated the AoP many times but he didn't have the men's to continue the push. Like in wilderness where gordon rolled up hole army of AoP flank with his brigade only.

[elxaime]

I think Lee realized better than anyone that his two major encounters with McClellan were not anything to boast of.

The Seven Days resulted in a Federal retreat, so the Peninsular Campaign is generally considered a Union setback. However the Confederates took higher losses, which did them no good as they had less manpower to begin with. Lee was aggressive, but in a number of battles his maneuvers were overly complicated and clumsily executed by his subordinates. In an augur of Gettysburg, many historians think he asked too much of his troops, particularly Jackson's Corps just back from the Valley (Jackson was exhausted and not at his best during Seven Days).

Antietam of course led to the failure of the first major Confederate invasion of the north. Granted, it could also have been termed a major raid. Nonetheless, Lee had high expectations for victory and McClellan frustrated him. In fact, Lee escaped from having his army destroyed several times, due to McClellan's caution. Even with the Lost Orders, McClellan couldn't take advantage of his numerical edge.

Second Bull Run was more Pope's fiasco, although many think McClellan and his commanders dragged their feet in helping him.

In 1864, Grant took huge losses to basically get back to where McClellan had taken the Army of Potomac two years earlier. Grant had wanted to repeat the amphibious end around but decided it would look too McClellan-like and also he felt, based on his Western experience, he had the secret to beating rebels. Lee's army disabused him of that notion - Grant hardly won a single battle as he forced his way south. Grant's main achievement was to show a bull-dog tenacity, taking full advantage of the Union superiority in men and material in a manner that the casualty-conscious McClellan shied from.

Whether one agrees with Lee or not, he had a basis for his opinion.

[elxaime]

if I recall, Sherman was another who would rather maneuver than fight if he had the choice.

One of history's great what-if's is what would have happened during the Gettysburg campaign if Lee had followed Longstreet's advice and maneuvered to place himself between Meade and D.C., where he might reasonably expect to be able to play defense. Lee wanted a decisive battle and believed in the offensive, and this led ultimately to the near-wrecking of his army (many historians think Lee was lucky to get his army back south unscathed afterwards).

Ultimately, Sherman and Grant (and for the Confederacy, Beauregard and Johnston) had a better insight into how warfare had changed. But perhaps Lee felt that time was never on the Confederacy's side, so he had to roll the dice.

[Taillebois]

Sun Tzu writes "to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."

"What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins but excels at winning with ease. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. He wins his battle by making no mistakes."

Thank you Grasshopper.



But it would be good if you could alter general stats on screen, editing game files sounds like a recipe for me to wreck the game.


Incidentally, are the generals stats in the game based on perceptions at the time or post war analysis? After all, if X had a great reputation you might seek to avoid battle with him, whereas when it comes down to it he may freeze under pressure and not be so good.

[Captain_Orso]

if I recall, Sherman was another who would rather manouver than fight if he had the choice.

To be fair to McClellan, he converted the Army of the Potomac from the disorganised force of 1861 to a very hard to beat (one could say, unable to realise when it was beaten) army that Lee never quite managed to overcome?

??? Lee beat the AoP numerous times. I do not discount McClellan's affect on the morale of the army. It was unequaled. But McClellan fought with the AoP three times (Seven Days, 2nd Manassas and Antietam). At Seven Days he was pushed back by a smaller force. At 2nd Manassas he performance was questionable and he certainly didn't prevent Lee from nearly destroying the AoP. And at Antietam, while fighting a much smaller force just barely won and completely failed to expand on the minor victory.

Lee beated the AoP many times but he didn't have the men's to continue the push. Like in wilderness where gordon rolled up hole army of AoP flank with his brigade only.

Yes, but the discussion is actually about Gen. Lee's opinion of McClellan and not the AoP.

I think Lee realized better than anyone that his two major encounters with McClellan were not anything to boast of.

The Seven Days resulted in a Federal retreat, so the Peninsular Campaign is generally considered a Union setback. However the Confederates took higher losses, which did them no good as they had less manpower to begin with. Lee was aggressive, but in a number of battles his maneuvers were overly complicated and clumsily executed by his subordinates. In an augur of Gettysburg, many historians think he asked too much of his troops, particularly Jackson's Corps just back from the Valley (Jackson was exhausted and not at his best during Seven Days).

Antietam of course led to the failure of the first major Confederate invasion of the north. Granted, it could also have been termed a major raid. Nonetheless, Lee had high expectations for victory and McClellan frustrated him. In fact, Lee escaped from having his army destroyed several times, due to McClellan's caution. Even with the Lost Orders, McClellan couldn't take advantage of his numerical edge.

Second Bull Run was more Pope's fiasco, although many think McClellan and his commanders dragged their feet in helping him.

In 1864, Grant took huge losses to basically get back to where McClellan had taken the Army of Potomac two years earlier. Grant had wanted to repeat the amphibious end around but decided it would look too McClellan-like and also he felt, based on his Western experience, he had the secret to beating rebels. Lee's army disabused him of that notion - Grant hardly won a single battle as he forced his way south. Grant's main achievement was to show a bull-dog tenacity, taking full advantage of the Union superiority in men and material in a manner that the casualty-conscious McClellan shied from.

Whether one agrees with Lee or not, he had a basis for his opinion.

Gen. Lee was far from a boastful man. He performance in driving McClellan from the outskirts of Richmond to completely off the peninsula with a force of smaller numbers was exemplary. Chiding that his army took more losses in doing so is completely missing the point and beyond any reasonable expectations.

Gen. Lee took the initiative from McClellan and his larger force and never let go of it. The issue that is constantly forgotten or overseen is that Gen. Lee knew that ultimately simply defending Virgina and Richmond from the Union would never win the war. The North would always be capable of providing more troops and resources for its armies while the Confederacy grew weaker. Gen. Lee had to exact a destruction so complete and overwhelming that northern morale would be wrought asunder and northern politicians would sue for peace. This is why Gen. Lee made decisions such as the assault on Malvern Hill and Picket's Charge; not because he was reckless, but because he he knew the only thing that would save the Confederacy from failure and recognized and grasped the opportunity when he saw it.

One of history's great what-if's is what would have happened during the Gettysburg campaign if Lee had followed Longstreet's advice and maneuvered to place himself between Meade and D.C., where he might reasonably expect to be able to play defense. Lee wanted a decisive battle and believed in the offensive, and this led ultimately to the near-wrecking of his army (many historians think Lee was lucky to get his army back south unscathed afterwards).

Ultimately, Sherman and Grant (and for the Confederacy, Beauregard and Johnston) had a better insight into how warfare had changed. But perhaps Lee felt that time was never on the Confederacy's side, so he had to roll the dice.

Gen. Lee's goal was to "destroy" the AoP and nothing less. His plan was based on his expectation that the AoP would still be recovering from Chancellorsville in Northern Virgina while he was moving into Pennsylvania. Once he had taken Harrisburg he counted on Gov. Curtin screaming bloody hell at his party colleague Lincoln to send the army to rescue his capital at all hast and that Lincoln would set the AoP into panic to do that. Gen. Lee expected the AoP to force march from their bivouac in Northern Virgina all the way up to Harrisburg, be strung and worn out so badly that he could destroy them peace meal as they approached.

He didn't know that the AoP was put into motion nearly as soon as he crossed the Potomac because Stewart was off recovering his pride on a march around the now northward moving AoP, which delayed his return to the AoNV more and more having to get around the north side of a northward moving army.

Stewart also left Gen. Lee with only two brigades of irregular cavalry, which Gen. Lee did not trust, while leaving two brigades of regular cavalry in the Valley to guard the lines of communication, because of personal disputes Stewart had with the commanders of those two brigades.

Watch this, it will give you an entirely new perspective on why the Battle of Gettysburg came about and ended how it did: Battle of Gettysburg: why J.E.B. Stuart ends up in Carlisle

[elxaime]

On the Peninsula, although Lee was at a numerical disadvantage, it wasn't that great, especially compared to later battles. The numbers of forces around Richmond in the spring of 1862 were as close to even as they would ever get.

At Second Bull Run, the majority of the beating had been delivered to Pope's Army of Virginia as elements of the AOP began to arrive. So it is hard to chalk this one up as a Lee-McClellan encounter. The AOP was never destroyed, in this or any other battle with Lee.

That comes to the root of it. Lee, in Napoleonic style, looked to a decisive "thunderclap" victory, the sort that had delivered a victorious peace to Napoleon after Austerlitz. However Lee was up against a change in warfare that Longstreet, perhaps, understood better. The adoption of the rifled musket and improvements in artillery and communications made it much harder to deliver such a "thunderclap." Massed cavalry charges and grand batteries made their appearances, but did not have the same effect as they had in the time of Napoleon. Infantry firepower allowed for adoption of much thinner battle lines, hence harder targets for artillery, while the increased range doomed most mass cavalry tactics. Armies of the American Civil War, in defeat, tended to merely retreat. Both sides were battered. Exceptions like the dissolution of Hood's Army after the Battle of Nashville prove the rule.

None of the battles of the Seven Days were significant Confederate tactical victories. And despite what it's own leader himself may have thought at the time, the AOP never dissolved during the Peninsular fighting. A retreat was conducted to the ships and hence the whole thing was a Confederate strategic victory. But the haul of Union prisoners was small, which is a good indicator that they stayed intact as an army.

The AOP believed that, although they had lost battles, it wasn't due to their inferiority as soldiers but rather poor leadership. That was the feeling Grant played on when he took over.

Lee was a great general. But in seeking a Napoleonic victory, he also bled his army to the point where little of it was left. Maybe he had no choice. But arguably he did - and Joe Johnston is an example of an alternative approach. The Confederates never "had" to launch attacks or invasions. As Manstein showed in 1943, a "back-hand" counteroffensive and defense in depth could also have been an option.

[havi]

Germans used the defend deep stragegy because ruskies used human waves and that kind of wave is easier to let them through and consume the energy and cut it in the rear and destroy it in flanks but that's difrent discussion. I think McClellan was a good general but he was afraid to broke what he greated, grant didn't care about that, and Lee was lee he know his army and he know union army and what it can do in long war, that's why he needed great victory and if he had one in Gettysburg there won't be a second season of office for Lincoln. Maybe there would be even independent south maybe!?

[Gray Fox]

McClellan designed the defenses for D.C. These arguably saved the capital from embarassment at the hands of Early in 1864. An army needs lots of different jobs done well to be ultimately successful. It's not exactly the Butterfly Effect, but logistics, intelligence, signal and support don't happen unless many different Generals know what needs to be done and do it. Yet, the actual warfighter gets all the credit. No one ever says, Marshal saved the Battered Bastards of Bastogne because he set up the army that Patton commanded. Someone, buys the chickens, feeds them every day, collects the eggs and proudly brings them to the kitchen. It still takes one guy who knows how to make an omelette. That person wasn't McClellan.

[Mickey3D]

Someone, buys the chickens, feeds them every day, collects the eggs and proudly brings them to the kitchen. It still takes one guy who knows how to make an omelette. That person wasn't McClellan.

very nice metaphor

[Gray Fox]

Thanks, buddy!

[Rod Smart]

McClellan and Lee's first postings were in West Virginia.


Not sure if they actually met on the field, but the Union won West Virginia.

[Captain_Orso]

Someone, buys the chickens, feeds them every day, collects the eggs and proudly brings them to the kitchen. It still takes one guy who knows how to make an omelette. That person wasn't McClellan.

very nice metaphor

More than you think, because you have to break some eggs to make an omelet, and that's the one thing McClellan didn't want to do .

[pgr]

McClellan and Lee's first postings were in West Virginia.

Not sure if they actually met on the field, but the Union won West Virginia.

Their commands met and McClellan's command won... but it was Rosecrans who apparently did most of the planning and work in the field. But Mac got all the credit.

[ArmChairGeneral]

You can. You just have to edit his model file at the rank you want to change him.

Tallebois,

For reference, these are the relevant files, in CW2/GameData/Models:

411USAGeorge B. McClellan
412USAGeorge B. McClellan
413USAGeorge B. McClellan
414USAGeorge B. McClellan
443USAGeorge B. McClellan


The first two are the stats for after he is relieved of the AoP by event, the second two are for before he is removed by the event, and the fifth one is the 2* model.
The relevant lines are at the bottom of each of these text files, just change the numbers after Strategic, Offensive and Defensive to whatever you want.

Changing these lines in the model file will not break the game, and it is simple to change them back whenever you want (he is a 1-1-2 by default in all five files, in case you forget later). If you are worried about it, just back it up elsewhere. The only thing to watch out for is changing the model file names: lots of things point to the model file names as written, so altering them without also changing everything that point to them CAN mess things up until you put the file names back to what the rest of the game expects.

I seem to recall that you also need to delete the cache file (not sure exactly where this is located) or else the game will continue to use the cached (old) stats. If the game does not find a cache file, it automatically generates a new one based on the (new) model files. Someone with more experience will have to confirm this.

Also, unless you edit the events (which is slightly more involved) the event that removes him from the AoP will still fire normally.

[Mickey3D]

More than you think, because you have to break some eggs to make an omelet, and that's the one thing McClellan didn't want to do .

I was thinking to this, it's a very common french expression.

Note that there is an interesting article taking the defense of McClellan here and a mail exchange about it here.

[Jagger2013]

(he is a 1-1-2 by default in all five files, in case you forget later).

No one should have a strategic ranking of 1. Much better to make him a 3 or 4 but when his troops do move, have them move much slower than if they were under an energetic general. No one in their right mind would put a 1-1-2 anywhere near command of a mobile column.

[Taillebois]

Tallebois,

For reference, these are the relevant files, in CW2/GameData/Models:

411USAGeorge B. McClellan
412USAGeorge B. McClellan
413USAGeorge B. McClellan
414USAGeorge B. McClellan
443USAGeorge B. McClellan


The first two are the stats for after he is relieved of the AoP by event, the second two are for before he is removed by the event, and the fifth one is the 2* model.
The relevant lines are at the bottom of each of these text files, just change the numbers after Strategic, Offensive and Defensive to whatever you want.

Changing these lines in the model file will not break the game, and it is simple to change them back whenever you want (he is a 1-1-2 by default in all five files, in case you forget later). If you are worried about it, just back it up elsewhere. The only thing to watch out for is changing the model file names: lots of things point to the model file names as written, so altering them without also changing everything that point to them CAN mess things up until you put the file names back to what the rest of the game expects.

I seem to recall that you also need to delete the cache file (not sure exactly where this is located) or else the game will continue to use the cached (old) stats. If the game does not find a cache file, it automatically generates a new one based on the (new) model files. Someone with more experience will have to confirm this.

Also, unless you edit the events (which is slightly more involved) the event that removes him from the AoP will still fire normally.

Thanks, I will see if I'm brave enough to try. I've said elsewhere that I think it would good if AGEOD made an easy to use editor - it might encourage more what-if scenarios.

[loki100]

I seem to recall that you also need to delete the cache file (not sure exactly where this is located) or else the game will continue to use the cached (old) stats. If the game does not find a cache file, it automatically generates a new one based on the (new) model files. Someone with more experience will have to confirm this..

you do, the 'models' cache is in gamedata\models - safe to delete as it will recalculate (but never a bad idea to back up just in case). If you don't delete this then changes to the actual model files won't take effect - the game itself reads from the cache

[ArmChairGeneral]

Thanks loki100!

[Taillebois]

Ok guys thanks for trying.

I altered McClellan, no effect. Tried to alter McDowell too. No effect. Deleted models cache and game failed to start, with nasty error message. Restored models cache from re-cycle bin and game seems ok with old values. Think I'll stick there.

[Merlin]

That's odd. Killing the cache files is SOP for mods.

[ArmChairGeneral]

Yeah, weird.

I just altered Theo Holmes to a 5-1-1, deleted the cache file and fired it up with no problems, and the change was right there. The loading took longer than normal while it rebuilt the cache file, but I had no problems at all.

You deleted the "Models" file in the models directory, and not "mdl_Alias" right?

[Taillebois]

Yes it was at the bottom of the list of files pretty much - presumably because most of the others started with a number.

Thanks again for your help and ideas. I'll try again another day.

[Merlin]

Did you get the right file?

Mine is: C:\Games\Civil War 2\CW2\GameData\Models\Models.Cached