Ageod American Civil War 2!

[DrPostman]

At the very least, the "Seahawk of the Confederacy", Charles W. Read, should be represented
along with George Holins and James Waddell, all 3 of which should start as 1 star (1 anchor).
Perhaps even James Montgomery with low stats to represent his poor command (at the Battle
of Memphis). More than once I've played a game where I've poured more money into ships
than historically (I really want that option preserved too) and wished I could have more
than just 2 commanders. By the same token the 2 "Liverpool Rams" ought to require payment
in order to have the event even happen (make them an option perhaps) with at least a 50%
chance of them being seized by the British, if not higher.

[Ace]

Campaign points would be a new rule which would only complicate campaign managing. Imagine, you are at the gates of Richmond, but have to stop because you expended your campaign points. I do not want that. But, imagine, you have to stop because your troops are exhausted and you are in need of rest, that I can imagine and handle. If you are worried about loads of activity being unhistorical, just tone down the cohesion recovery while out of depot a little down. It would bring the desired result with a logical feel to it.

I see you are worried about armies spread out holding a front line instead being in their depot waiting for the opponent's move. Heightened attrition, if out of radius of mayor depot (a x province radius from the mayor depot-the exact number should be tested in gameplay) had crossed my mind. It would force the armies to stick to their supply source and not spread out in ww1 style frontline.

Another point regarding entrenchment. As it is now, it is possible for a militia to build and guard entrenchments which can later be occupied by an merging Army. While playing as CSA, I used to have a bunch of cav and milita with cheap art behind the frontline making and guarding entrenchments which can be occupied if my front line is being pushed back. I had multiple lines of defence this way. This is unhistorical, and could be prevented. When merging units, the entr lvl should be average of 2 merging stacks, not the entr lvl of the stack being merged to.

(Possible formula:

unit A entrenchment*unit A weight + unit B entrenchment*unit B weight) / Unit (A+B)weight =

New unit entrenchment)

This way if a lone cavalry joins entrenched big army stack, no entenchment would change, but if a moving army joins entrenched cavalry, enrenchments would be reduced to 0. If two stacks of equal size (one entrenched to lvl 8, and one to lvl 0) should merge, new entrenchment would be 4.

I hope I formulated this clearly, English is my foreign language after all.
Cheers!

[DrPostman]

I don't know if it's all that unhistorical. There are several examples of defensive works being prepared way
behind the front line before being occupied by the main army. Richmond/Petersburg is one example, so
is Atlanta, IIRC.

[caranorn]

That Campaign Point idea sounds interesting, but I'm pretty sure not implementable, at least not for release. This would also give army commanders a bigger role I think...

Army Intercept I find even more important as it's essentially the reason for the front lines we have to form in the game now. If armies could intercept in a reasonable radius corps could be kept more concentrated near the depots. This might also be easier to implement, though I expect still not in time for release...

As to the running out of CaP (to differentiate from Command Points CP) in front of Richmond. You'd have the options to a) try and attack anyhow with an exhausted army, b) build a new major depot close to Richmond and thereby maintain your army in the field but static for a few turns, or c) return to your original depot and prepare for a new campaign along the same lines as the previous one. In a way the Confederate Maryland Campaign might be an example of an army running out of CaP before achieving it's objective (campaign cost could be variable, for instance operating in friendly territory less costly than in enemy or neutral, in this case Lee was gambling that Maryland was friendly when it really turned out as neutral, other factors could be weather, subordinate officers (positive as well as negative) etc.), where Lee chose d) go on the defensive while pondering the other alternatives, as McClellan still had CaP he could assault Lee's position finally forcing him to return to his depot...

So I like those ideas, but I think they'd be more for an AACW-III or a DLC thazn AACW-II at publication as I expect Pocus would have to change a lot of code and afterwards it would have to be thoroughly tested...

[Stauffenberg]

As a future AACW2 player (though I did not play the first one), and as a player of everysingle other AGEOD game, I am not too much in favor of this, which is in my opinion simulated as a proxy by supply / ammo level.

Indeed it is but not so effectively in my view. It is one of the main reasons I only play with hard activation / maximum delayed commitment (both checked off far right in other words). In some situations this results in an exaggerated effect of course, but far less than one might expect and the overall effect adds much needed uncertainty.

If you want to fine tune, wouldn't that be better simulated by tying better the level of cohesion, supply & strategic rating. For instance :
- A good strategic rating would allow commander to have more supply/munition than the "normal" maximum, [say up to 200% for a level 6 strat general] provided they get from one of those major depots.
- In addition to allowing to hold longer, having more than 100% of the maximum supply / ammo would give a combat bonus
- Having less than 75% of the "normal" maximum would give a cohesion malus. Currently, a player only has a malus when the supplies reach 0.
You would have to take the supply wagons out of the equation, though.

Still not in favor. Would be in favor of having [current ammo / total ammo] have an impact on combat efficiency.

It may well be that the adjustments you suggest would be enough. Historical armies in this period were far more restricted by their depots than is modeled in AACW as it stands now. "Campaign Points" seemed to me a good starting point for a discussion on fine-tuning things.

"Intercept" => I am in favor in theory, but I see so many issues with it. The worst issue would be how to determine how strong a force should be intercepted. If the enemy tries to sneak some light cavalry, or some partisan, should you all army follow suit and lose its better position.

Actually (I didn't make it clear I see) I envisioned this as very similar to MTSG, the main difference being that selected stacks[I][/I] with at least a division, corps, or army command present, can be selected to march and intercept adjacent enemy forces attempting to move past their position, after which they return to their original position as with MTSG. A great touch here would be a special exception for pure cavalry stacks--if activated for interception they will only attempt this against enemy pure cavalry stacks.

[Stauffenberg]

Campaign points would be a new rule which would only complicate campaign managing. Imagine, you are at the gates of Richmond, but have to stop because you expended your campaign points. I do not want that. But, imagine, you have to stop because your troops are exhausted and you are in need of rest, that I can imagine and handle. If you are worried about loads of activity being unhistorical, just tone down the cohesion recovery while out of depot a little down. It would bring the desired result with a logical feel to it.

I would not envision anything stopping with an army that has expended all it's CPs, just a very diminished performance, especially with attacks. Again, I got thinking along these lines with the historical dynamic of armies "sallying forth" from their depot areas after resting, equipping, and planning out a campaign. It could be a very simply way of modeling things.

I see you are worried about armies spread out holding a front line instead being in their depot waiting for the opponent's move. Heightened attrition, if out of radius of mayor depot (a x province radius from the mayor depot-the exact number should be tested in gameplay) had crossed my mind. It would force the armies to stick to their supply source and not spread out in ww1 style frontline.

True, but tying this in with minor or major supply depots would allow for situations like the prolonged siege of Petersburg/Richmond to realistically occur. I'm not suggesting WWI style frontages shouldn't happen, it should just be much more difficult than it is to effect. Armies still campaigned in this time period and the establishment of an extensive front required an exceptional depot establishment behind it. It's for this reason any history of Grant's Petersburg and Richmond siege late in the war, quite rightly emphasizes the acute importance of his huge supply nexus at City Point on the James, behind the entire extended front.

Supply carts are a simple and useful method to allow substantial forces to move away from their depots but their effect is very much exaggerated here. Depots are very nicely handled already--without wishing to introduce unrealistic changes to the system I hoped some tweaks might make it all work more historically.

Another point regarding entrenchment. As it is now, it is possible for a militia to build and guard entrenchments which can later be occupied by an merging Army. While playing as CSA, I used to have a bunch of cav and milita with cheap art behind the frontline making and guarding entrenchments which can be occupied if my front line is being pushed back. I had multiple lines of defence this way. This is unhistorical, and could be prevented. When merging units, the entr lvl should be average of 2 merging stacks, not the entr lvl of the stack being merged to.

(Possible formula:

unit A entrenchment*unit A weight + unit B entrenchment*unit B weight) / Unit (A+B)weight =

New unit entrenchment)

This way if a lone cavalry joins entrenched big army stack, no entenchment would change, but if a moving army joins entrenched cavalry, enrenchments would be reduced to 0. If two stacks of equal size (one entrenched to lvl 8, and one to lvl 0) should merge, new entrenchment would be 4.

I hope I formulated this clearly, English is my foreign language after all.
Cheers!

Or allow only engineers to act as *markers*. Or perhaps allow an entrenchment level of 5+ to become permanent in a region if an engineer is present and some WS and money is spent--requiring some sort of graphic addition like permanent fortresses. I don't consider the use of small units to hold fortifications in place as such a huge issue. Campaign dynamics and interception are far more important.
Your English is fine.

[Stauffenberg]

That Campaign Point idea sounds interesting, but I'm pretty sure not implementable, at least not for release. This would also give army commanders a bigger role I think...

Army Intercept I find even more important as it's essentially the reason for the front lines we have to form in the game now. If armies could intercept in a reasonable radius corps could be kept more concentrated near the depots. This might also be easier to implement, though I expect still not in time for release...

As to the running out of CaP (to differentiate from Command Points CP) in front of Richmond. You'd have the options to a) try and attack anyhow with an exhausted army, b) build a new major depot close to Richmond and thereby maintain your army in the field but static for a few turns, or c) return to your original depot and prepare for a new campaign along the same lines as the previous one. In a way the Confederate Maryland Campaign might be an example of an army running out of CaP before achieving it's objective (campaign cost could be variable, for instance operating in friendly territory less costly than in enemy or neutral, in this case Lee was gambling that Maryland was friendly when it really turned out as neutral, other factors could be weather, subordinate officers (positive as well as negative) etc.), where Lee chose d) go on the defensive while pondering the other alternatives, as McClellan still had CaP he could assault Lee's position finally forcing him to return to his depot...

So I like those ideas, but I think they'd be more for an AACW-III or a DLC thazn AACW-II at publication as I expect Pocus would have to change a lot of code and afterwards it would have to be thoroughly tested...

I expect you are right but you never know--some things can be surprisingly simple to tweak into shape; others of course can end up as exceedingly difficult to implement and time-consuming to properly test.
I was curious to hear how people felt about the issue of interception and some sort of campaign dynamic more realistic than "add a supply cart and you are good to go."

[khbynum]

At the very least, the "Seahawk of the Confederacy", Charles W. Read, should be represented
along with George Holins and James Waddell, all 3 of which should start as 1 star (1 anchor).
Perhaps even James Montgomery with low stats to represent his poor command (at the Battle
of Memphis). More than once I've played a game where I've poured more money into ships
than historically (I really want that option preserved too) and wished I could have more
than just 2 commanders. By the same token the 2 "Liverpool Rams" ought to require payment
in order to have the event even happen (make them an option perhaps) with at least a 50%
chance of them being seized by the British, if not higher.

I agree completely. I'll also make one more plea for giving the CSA player the option to build ironclads, and instead use that war supply, etc to do something else such as building coastal artillery, improving railroads or building wooden gunboats in larger numbers. I've always regarded the South's fascination with ironclads as equivalent to Hitler wasting money on rocketry when he should have been building u-boats and Panther tanks (no other historical comparison implied or intended). Other than the Arkansas and Albemarle, I can't think of a single case where CSA ironclads made a tactical difference. Virginia, and later the Richmond squadron made an operational difference in that theater, appropriate to the level of this game, but I'd like the option to try something different.

[Wraith]

I agree completely. I'll also make one more plea for giving the CSA player the option to build ironclads, and instead use that war supply, etc to do something else such as building coastal artillery, improving railroads or building wooden gunboats in larger numbers. I've always regarded the South's fascination with ironclads as equivalent to Hitler wasting money on rocketry when he should have been building u-boats and Panther tanks (no other historical comparison implied or intended). Other than the Arkansas and Albemarle, I can't think of a single case where CSA ironclads made a tactical difference. Virginia, and later the Richmond squadron made an operational difference in that theater, appropriate to the level of this game, but I'd like the option to try something different.

Honestly, though, there are so many of those enforced things that I'd rather just get something else for; namely, most of the "raiders" or militia units I'd rather just get the WS and CC, as opposed to so many free reinforcements into a section that I might not even use all that often.

[DrPostman]

I agree completely. I'll also make one more plea for giving the CSA player the option to build ironclads, and instead use that war supply, etc to do something else such as building coastal artillery, improving railroads or building wooden gunboats in larger numbers. I've always regarded the South's fascination with ironclads as equivalent to Hitler wasting money on rocketry when he should have been building u-boats and Panther tanks (no other historical comparison implied or intended). Other than the Arkansas and Albemarle, I can't think of a single case where CSA ironclads made a tactical difference. Virginia, and later the Richmond squadron made an operational difference in that theater, appropriate to the level of this game, but I'd like the option to try something different.

Ironclads and their small retenue tended to operate as a "Fleet in being" presenting
a threat more than a real danger, and it's an apt comparison to Hitler's wonder
weapons. Also, it would be nice to build a sub and let it have some effect. Had
the Hunley survived it's first real mission and didn't kill off it's 3rd crew it would
have done much the same. Putting more money and WS into a small sub program
would be interesting. There were several attempts to build and use subs against the
Union, but the Union should also have the option to build a big sub, just to represent
the USS Alligator.

The one big thing I look forward to is the ability to build railroads. From what I
understand railroads will be modeled very differently in the next game and allow
players to build more, which was going on a lot in the Union and should have in
the South.

[DrPostman]

Honestly, though, there are so many of those enforced things that I'd rather just get something else for; namely, most of the "raiders" or militia units I'd rather just get the WS and CC, as opposed to so many free reinforcements into a section that I might not even use all that often.

Raiders can be very useful for messing with the supply of both sides. I use them to great
effect for that. The thing I think is most useless is "ambush". Even a combination of light
infantry and partisans in a strength bigger than the units that encountered them I have
never seen a "successful" ambush take place. Against a larger force it's a simple waste of
time and resources when the unit could be raiding instead. Larger forces just walk right over
them as if they weren't there. Which, of course, happened a lot during the war.

[Ol' Choctaw]

Raiders are not near as useful as they were, however. And they did some fantastic things during the war.

Both McNeil and Mosby captured generals in the field. Jackson’s train raid was awesome. They tied down huge amounts of troops to protect infrastructure. Raiders also captured shipping on waterways and cannels.

Ambush should work much better for partisan units too. They often eluded large forces sent after them and killed or captured much larger units sent after them.

McNeill led a charge of his 50 men that routed and captured a force 5 times their size. In the west, whole areas were just given up on as too costly and difficult to control. The Union resorted to reprisals against civilians in an effort to stop it. Needless to say that only made things worse. Burning towns and hanging innocent people has a way of even turning supporters against you.

The extent of the guerrilla war in the west is lacking in the game. Missouri and Arkansas were more guerrilla theaters rather than of organized armies. Not that there were no organized CS troops from the states, they were just sent east.

http://www.harding.edu/jndockery/Harding/HIST_402_files/SUTHERLAND%20GUERRILLAS.pdf

[chainsaw]

Building forts was a major undertaking, just hitting the button and deducting from your stockpile wouldn't simulate time and effort for building it. Building supply wagons and artillery and moving it to the location somewhat simulates it.

I'm all for anything that reduces my micromanagement and increases my enjoyment of the game. Why make the player plan and implement 6 steps to achieve one goal: a new fortress at point X on the map? Can't we all agree that it costs a lot of material, artillery, war supply, money, etc and requires labor and time but that making it easier to actually do that as the player is a good thing?

I don't have to dig the coal, mine the iron ore, shear the sheep, hire the labor to make the rifles, ammo and uniforms for a new infantry brigade.

[Stauffenberg]

Raiders are not near as useful as they were, however. And they did some fantastic things during the war.

Both McNeil and Mosby captured generals in the field. Jackson’s train raid was awesome. They tied down huge amounts of troops to protect infrastructure. Raiders also captured shipping on waterways and cannels.

Ambush should work much better for partisan units too. They often eluded large forces sent after them and killed or captured much larger units sent after them.

McNeill led a charge of his 50 men that routed and captured a force 5 times their size. In the west, whole areas were just given up on as too costly and difficult to control. The Union resorted to reprisals against civilians in an effort to stop it. Needless to say that only made things worse. Burning towns and hanging innocent people has a way of even turning supporters against you.

The extent of the guerrilla war in the west is lacking in the game. Missouri and Arkansas were more guerrilla theaters rather than of organized armies. Not that there were no organized CS troops from the states, they were just sent east.

http://www.harding.edu/jndockery/Harding/HIST_402_files/SUTHERLAND%20GUERRILLAS.pdf

All excellent points, and a great link thanks.

Rather a good description taken from there, of what motivated guerrillas in the conflict out West:

"George T. Maddox of Madison county left regular Confederate service after the battle of Prairie Grove. “That kind of warfare did not suit me ,” explained Maddox, “I wanted to get out where I could have it more lively; where I could fight if I wanted to, or run if I so desired; I wanted to be my own general.” Maddox, and men like him, were fighters not soldiers, and they acknowledged no formalities of war or restrictions on how, when, or where they might strike the enemy."
[RIGHT]Arkansas Historical Quarterly VOL. LII, No. 3 (Autumn 1993) p. 262[/RIGHT]

Would it be difficult to add a "Partisan Level" (CSA or US) to select regions? (eg. along the Appalachians and Ozarks, most of Arkansas for the South, and E. Tennessee and W. VA for the US).
Same effect as epidemics but targeting specific units in these regions with attrition. Loyalty changes under occupation at a much slower rate in very active enemy partisan regions.

At the very least one hopes to see the ambush function for partisans working.

[Stauffenberg]

I'm all for anything that reduces my micromanagement and increases my enjoyment of the game. Why make the player plan and implement 6 steps to achieve one goal: a new fortress at point X on the map? Can't we all agree that it costs a lot of material, artillery, war supply, money, etc and requires labor and time but that making it easier to actually do that as the player is a good thing?

I don't have to dig the coal, mine the iron ore, shear the sheep, hire the labor to make the rifles, ammo and uniforms for a new infantry brigade.

The short answer to your question is that the level of detailing in this model absolutely requires a certain level of micro-management. For those with a fond eye for historical detail, this "chrome" is an essential element, right up to the level of personality traits and political baggage General X manifests. A matter of taste of course.

[Captain_Orso]

I'm all for anything that reduces my micromanagement and increases my enjoyment of the game. Why make the player plan and implement 6 steps to achieve one goal: a new fortress at point X on the map? Can't we all agree that it costs a lot of material, artillery, war supply, money, etc and requires labor and time but that making it easier to actually do that as the player is a good thing?

I don't have to dig the coal, mine the iron ore, shear the sheep, hire the labor to make the rifles, ammo and uniforms for a new infantry brigade.

Although I understand the complaint about Micro Management (MM) I also know that in some places there is no good way around it. With Forts for example, which should actually be called fortifications IMHO, if you only had to point to a region and pay a certain amount of certain resources it would leave the door open for complaints that the opposing side has no way to disrupt the building short of capturing the region and location where the fortification is being built. One would have to automate a large number of factors which would need a large number of indicators describing if building can begin or is progressing. In other words, it would require another amount of MM to control the abstract automation of building fortifications.

Personally I would rather manage things that I can easily grasp which for me means things I can control and guild, such as the building of the resources, transporting them to their destination and executing the building. It could be done more realistically, but that would mean possibly even more MM. It will have to be weighed between some management and what it brings.

[Boomer]

I have to agree with Chainsaw on this one. Like the supply issue, the building of forts require their own artillery and supply units, which also have to be built. I love the AGE engine, but I think it could use some tweaks to bring out the fun factor and reduce MM. I gotta say, there's times when a game of ACW or AJE sounds fun, but then I remember all the MM and logistics that are involved and sometimes it turns me off from even playing. We don't all have time to spend 4 hours a day sitting in front of the computer deciding where to build that one very important fort, or worrying over loyalty rates in Missouri. We've already seen some very heavy MM complaints over PON, and I think some of us are concerned that ACW 2 would run down that same path.

At the end of the day, the level of MM doesn't bother me so much as options being available to expand or limit it according to the player. The naval options in ACW 1 is a perfect example. The game can't be all things to all people, but certainly some tradeoffs can be made to decrease in-game workloads.

[Captain_Orso]

I've been monitoring this thread waiting for some, so-to-say, Meat-n-Potatoes™ arguments for Campaign-Points, but I'm sorry to say that I just don't see any. The 4 factors I see in preparing a campaign are

1. Planning: just your mental exersize in thinking out what you want to do.
2. Gathering the resources: getting the troops--special troops including (cavalry, engineers, supply and other support units, ships, etc.)--in addition to the military forces in place.
3. Insure supplies: make sure that your suppy-lines are working and that all of your force has the supply required for the efffort.
4. Insure readiness: insure that all your troops are rested and ready to march when the order is given.

Steps 1. and 2. are pretty much common between the game and the Real-World and I don't think there is much to discuss about them.

In the game, steps 3. and 4. are nearly completely abstract, in that there are no special orders to gather supplies or rest and ready your force. Supplies are distributed automatically and there is little to no MM in assuring that your troops are rested; you just don't have them marching around like fools just before their jump-off.

The complaint that it is too easy, with a force under a leader with a high strategic rating, to just move from one campaign to the next without, or with little, pause may have some justification. But I don't think that some abstract value such as CaP's has anything to do with it, especially because what the CaP is abstracting is Supplies and Cohesion, which are already represented in the game.

Armies of the time didn't go into camp because it would take weeks and months to gather supplies again and to rest the troops. That could be done in a matter of days and weeks at the most as long as a depot was nearby. Mainly they went into camp because the weather was or had turned bad. With the poor condition of the roads there was little to no point to campaign during late fall, winter an early spring. You would just run down your troops to get them moving at a snail's pace. And in general, since you had to maneuver around your enemy they had less marching to do that the attacker, so it was seldom an option.

And no, the troops did not camp on the depots either. That would be a grave strategic error, for any movement of the enemy forcing your army to react and leave the depot would leave the depot unprotected. Depots were generally not on the front in the battlefield, but in the hinterland. Exceptions are when the battlefield moved to the depot.

Also it does not take weeks and months to recover from march and battles--I'm not talking about the wounded here. Unless a force has exhausted itself so greatly that a large number of the troops are ill and/or injured from the effort--this would be covered by the attrition rules--they would not need weeks and months to recover.

What might be questioned is if recovering losses is working too fast. If I'm not entirely incorrect, I believe that if you win a battle you get a bonus on regaining lost hit-points, plus there is a greater rate of recovering cohesion, which also may be a bit too high; although in many hard fought battles I've had I know that there is a limit to this too.

The three things that I can think of that might be tweaked would be

1. Slowing down the recovery of lost hit-points if the force is not stationary for at least one turn.
2. Reducing the difference in cohesion recovery between the winning and the losing sides of major engagements. Some advantage for the winning side I think should be in order to represent the higher morale of the troops after having won.
3. Slowing and restricting supplies traversing regions not 100% under the control of that side. This would prevent supply-lines from just popping up in areas where they did not previously exist. Also more restrictions on the amount of supply that can be transported by roads alone. The importance of railroads and harbors for transporting supplies cannot be emphasized in the game enough.

These would not make a great difference in campaigning, but would slow it down some. These tweaks would have to be tested thoroughly though to still allow at least historical actions likes Lee's invasions of the North after major battles.

[DrPostman]

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I think his account got hacked.

[aryaman]

As an Historian focused on premodern military history I would like to clarify the point of campaigns in winter season. There are multiple examples of those campaigns, however it is true that most of the time it was avoided. The reason for that is not the weather in itself, it is the lack of green fodder for the horses and mules. Fodder was the largest supply item for any army, a horse requirement being more than five times the weight of what a soldier required (and taking still much more room in cart). If an army moved out of camp in winter season, aproximately between December and April/May it would find very little green fodder, and could not supply itself while in the march, so that the supply required for the army from a his supply depot would be greatly increased, and since the extra supply required would be carried in carts, any extra cart would add to the supply requirement. To add to this, the condition of the horses would deteriorate fast. For all this, armies that elected to campaign in winter were exposed to suffer a very high attrition.
That in the game should be translated into a high attrition/loss of cohesion for armies moving not just in bad weather, but in the time period in which green fodder was not available in the field. Bad weather will add misery but it is not the main factor itself.

[Stauffenberg]

I've been monitoring this thread waiting for some, so-to-say, Meat-n-Potatoes™ arguments for Campaign-Points, but I'm sorry to say that I just don't see any.

Armies of the time didn't go into camp because it would take weeks and months to gather supplies again and to rest the troops. That could be done in a matter of days and weeks at the most as long as a depot was nearby. Mainly they went into camp because the weather was or had turned bad. With the poor condition of the roads there was little to no point to campaign during late fall, winter an early spring. You would just run down your troops to get them moving at a snail's pace. And in general, since you had to maneuver around your enemy they had less marching to do that the attacker, so it was seldom an option.

And no, the troops did not camp on the depots either. That would be a grave strategic error, for any movement of the enemy forcing your army to react and leave the depot would leave the depot unprotected. Depots were generally not on the front in the battlefield, but in the hinterland. Exceptions are when the battlefield moved to the depot.

Also it does not take weeks and months to recover from march and battles--I'm not talking about the wounded here. Unless a force has exhausted itself so greatly that a large number of the troops are ill and/or injured from the effort--this would be covered by the attrition rules--they would not need weeks and months to recover.

I would be a fool to argue specific game points with you, so in large measure I won't.

I did not suggest armies historically sit on their depots: they don't, but we are dealing with fair sized regions in any case.

I was looking at the issue of depots, the idea of major depots, the possibility of stack interceptions and "Campaign Points" as some sort of simple dynamic that could be used to refine all the other elements already in play (effective elements too, as you point out). It may be that in just refining the elements you target, as opposed to adding some sort of over-arching rubric like CPs, would do this. I tend to think it would not.

In the first instance I have to disagree with your views on how long it took an army after an intense campaign to recover. Army morale and overall proficiency are at issue here, not just beans, bullets and bodies, and the game touches on this in different ways.

Porter Alexander in his memoirs notes that after the Sharpsburg and Gettysburg campaigns Lee put his army into camp for 5 weeks or longer. The weather was not bad after Gettysburg, and the time was used, "overhauling, refitting & drilling." (FftC, p.285)

Earlier on after the Sharpsburg campaign, Lee's army with Alexander settled in near Winchester for over a month, again for "much needed rest & recruiting & drilling" and he had this to say about the time spent:

It was really wonderful how our numbers increased during this month. Brigades which had been reduced until they only looked like only small regiments began again to look like brigades. Not only did the tens of thousands of stragglers left along the roadsides in our marches come back, but a good many fresh men from home came on, & were incorporated in the old regiments, & we began to feel that we again had an army.... McClellan sat quietly on the north side, likewise employed in getting reinforcements & supplies & getting his army in the best possible shape. He must be credited for knowing how to do that, even if he never learned how to fight it.

Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander (The University of North Carolina Press, 1989) pp 155-56

All well and good as the game models most of this in recovery times of 2-3 turns; note however that the issue of CPs focuses upon what Alexander alludes to--army morale and high command efficiency. The game targets this not with supplies, cohesion, troop losses and reinforcements etc, but with the Game Setting Options, Activation Rule and Delayed Commitment as held up against the strategic value of the commanding general. I'll lay them out here for others following this.

Activation Rule (three boxes left to right):

--can always move even if leader is unactivated
--large movement & combat penalty if leader is unactivated
--high chance of not being able to move at all if leader is unactivated

Delayed Commitment (four boxes left to right):

--units will engage enemy as soon as they meet them
--small delay from 1 hour to days depending on leader strategic value
--medium delay, as above
--long delay, as above

This is left to player choice and I gather that while some prefer to play with hard activation and long delay (right checked box for both) the majority prefer something less drastic. In playing this out extensively for a year now I find the far right settings the most historical, also injecting some very interesting uncertainty into gameplay as you can never be sure every stack of units you have will in fact be able to move next turn.

CPs I saw as a way to fine-tune this, or at least open a discussion on the intangibles of commander expertise (or lack of), army morale, and its overall ability to march and fight an intense campaign of some 6-8 weeks in duration.

Alexander in other passages also alludes to the pride the ANV had, as an element in it's regaining its strength and confidence after a hard campaign and the game attempts to cover this somewhat with unit and leader "Experience" although I do not see it working so very realistically. I've had brigades and leaders that have fought and won battles for years still show only one or two stars of experience. This is an area that might also be fine-tuned. As well, the transition from militia-conscript-infantry-elite models unit strength, as well as improved unit initiative and movement speed coefficency. I was really out to focus on the highest strategic level where the issue of army initiative and morale resides, to look at how it is directly and indirectly dealt with for now, and how it might be effectively improved without undue complications injected.

The three suggestions you make are good ones of course; I'm not convinced they are enough (assuming at some point these issues will be reexamined before a new game release).

[DrPostman]

As an Historian focused on premodern military history I would like to clarify the point of campaigns in winter season. There are multiple examples of those campaigns, however it is true that most of the time it was avoided. The reason for that is not the weather in itself, it is the lack of green fodder for the horses and mules. Fodder was the largest supply item for any army, a horse requirement being more than five times the weight of what a soldier required (and taking still much more room in cart). If an army moved out of camp in winter season, aproximately between December and April/May it would find very little green fodder, and could not supply itself while in the march, so that the supply required for the army from a his supply depot would be greatly increased, and since the extra supply required would be carried in carts, any extra cart would add to the supply requirement. To add to this, the condition of the horses would deteriorate fast. For all this, armies that elected to campaign in winter were exposed to suffer a very high attrition.
That in the game should be translated into a high attrition/loss of cohesion for armies moving not just in bad weather, but in the time period in which green fodder was not available in the field. Bad weather will add misery but it is not the main factor itself.

I never thought of that. I always assumed it was the weather. I agree with factoring that in. It would be nice to have
some breathing space to build up and refit too.

[Ace]

It was really wonderful how our numbers increased during this month. Brigades which had been reduced until they only looked like only small regiments began again to look like brigades. Not only did the tens of thousands of stragglers left along the roadsides in our marches come back, but a good many fresh men from home came on, & were incorporated in the old regiments, & we began to feel that we again had an army.... McClellan sat quietly on the north side, likewise employed in getting reinforcements & supplies & getting his army in the best possible shape. He must be credited for knowing how to do that, even if he never learned how to fight it.

Just make replacements rate slower at a depot, and at a snail's pace when out of depot, and you will get the desired effect. In your quote, the armies where resting because they were receiving and training their replacements.

I was always amazed how fast the regiments would show up at full strength anyway. The time for regiment refitting should be near the time needed to build a new one (little faster than building a new one when using replacements on a depot, and slower when out of depot).

[aryaman]

Just make replacements rate slower at a depot, and at a snail's pace when out of depot, and you will get the desired effect. In your quote, the armies where resting because they were receiving and training their replacements.

I was always amazed how fast the regiments would show up at full strength anyway. The time for regiment refitting should be near the time needed to build a new one (little faster than building a new one when using replacements on a depot, and slower when out of depot).

I agree.
Historically, the way depots worked to improve the condition of an army was double. Because armies were allowed to stay in a place for a long period, (unlike when in campaign, that they had to move once they exhausted the green fodder available in an area, every few days).
1) This allowed time for stragglers and replacements to catch up, and units to reorganize and drill.
2) Since supply requirements had not to be transported to a moving army, but still they could be picked up by the soldiers themselves, replenish equipment and ammunition could be done faster and more completely. It also allowed rest to horses and the chance to upkeeping the supply train, that suffered a considerable deterioration in campaign.
Since the regions in the map are large, I would also recommend that forces in a region with no depot to suffer a loss of cohesion even if not moving, because they would be moving within the region looking for new forage areas.
The net result would be to force a Union player to move slowly and mainly along regions with railways and to build depots every 2 regions, and to detach forces to garrison his supply line, much like Halleck moved down to Corinth, or Buell through Tennessee, allowing the CSA player to stage quick counterattacks from his armies well rested in his supply depots.

[DrPostman]

There is a small problem with supply, when I see union armies spend several months away from a depot I can't help but
wonder. I do like the options to be as historic as possible, but don't forget the "what if" guys like me who want to see
what would have happened had the South done many things that they had the potential to do but didn't. It might be too
much to ask to have a game that can be played with very little concern for supply for some, but very detailed logistics
options and conditions that would have to be paid attention to for the players who want that level of realism. Lets face it,
most of war is logistics and the fighting is just a brief episode between meals. But sometimes I like a game that can be
played with simplified control conditions.

[Ol' Choctaw]

As an Historian focused on premodern military history I would like to clarify the point of campaigns in winter season. There are multiple examples of those campaigns, however it is true that most of the time it was avoided. The reason for that is not the weather in itself, it is the lack of green fodder for the horses and mules. Fodder was the largest supply item for any army, a horse requirement being more than five times the weight of what a soldier required (and taking still much more room in cart). If an army moved out of camp in winter season, aproximately between December and April/May it would find very little green fodder, and could not supply itself while in the march, so that the supply required for the army from a his supply depot would be greatly increased, and since the extra supply required would be carried in carts, any extra cart would add to the supply requirement. To add to this, the condition of the horses would deteriorate fast. For all this, armies that elected to campaign in winter were exposed to suffer a very high attrition.
That in the game should be translated into a high attrition/loss of cohesion for armies moving not just in bad weather, but in the time period in which green fodder was not available in the field. Bad weather will add misery but it is not the main factor itself.

I think you are missing that the war was fought in the southern US. The weather determines grass growth. If it is too hot or too cold you have the same problem.

Grass will grow from about 56°F to about 88°F. Water levels are also a factor but mainly in summer.

If it is just a matter of green forage than July to September are also a great problem in those regions as that is when grass goes dormant due to the heat.

Late February to June and October to mid November is when there is the most forage but of those months before May are also some of the wettest of the year, making campaigning difficult. That only leaves two months of prime campaign weather by your standards.

Of course in the more southerly regions grass and fodder would grow almost the year round.

The game’s weather model is also on the severe side. Even though it was a cold period of history there were not long periods of freezing weather and deep snow. The lower Ohio, the Arkansas, middle and lower Mississippi, and the lower Missouri Rivers did not freeze during the years of the war. The Appalachian and Ozark Mountains are not prone to blizzard conditions. Those are rather found on the plains from Kansas northward with the occasional blizzard reaching into Texas, mostly in the west and north west of that state, and the Great Lakes region where lake effect snow is always possible during cold periods.

Here is a link that will give a bit of information on horses in the ACW:

http://www.reillysbattery.org/Newsletter/Jul00/deborah_grace.htm

Pasturing horses was avoided when possible. Horse fodder was a commissary item.

[aryaman]

I think you are missing that the war was fought in the southern US. The weather determines grass growth. If it is too hot or too cold you have the same problem.

Grass will grow from about 56°F to about 88°F. Water levels are also a factor but mainly in summer.

If it is just a matter of green forage than July to September are also a great problem in those regions as that is when grass goes dormant due to the heat.

Late February to June and October to mid November is when there is the most forage but of those months before May are also some of the wettest of the year, making campaigning difficult. That only leaves two months of prime campaign weather by your standards.

Of course in the more southerly regions grass and fodder would grow almost the year round.

The game’s weather model is also on the severe side. Even though it was a cold period of history there were not long periods of freezing weather and deep snow. The lower Ohio, the Arkansas, middle and lower Mississippi, and the lower Missouri Rivers did not freeze during the years of the war. The Appalachian and Ozark Mountains are not prone to blizzard conditions. Those are rather found on the plains from Kansas northward with the occasional blizzard reaching into Texas, mostly in the west and north west of that state, and the Great Lakes region where lake effect snow is always possible during cold periods.

Here is a link that will give a bit of information on horses in the ACW:

http://www.reillysbattery.org/Newsletter/Jul00/deborah_grace.htm

Pasturing horses was avoided when possible. Horse fodder was a commissary item.

Thanks for the link, very interesting source!
I admit I am not familiar with the weather in America, the period I talked was in Western Europe, so I stand corrected and I thank you for the information.
However my main point I think it is still valid, although changing the period of the year. It is true that pasturing was avoided when possible, but the link you propvided also says that Nevertheless, pasturage was used widely, either as a supplement to the regular ration or as the primary source of nutrition for short periods, if hay and grain were not available The problem for the armies was that when they were moving without a supply source nearby, either railway or a port, feeding the horses without pasturing became an enormous logistical burden, that is why in the game I think the regions without the supply depot should be considered in that way.

[challlenge]

On Matrix web site I can read :

Battlefield Tactics allow the player to make decisions that can turn the tide of battle

What that mean ?
Tactical game like Forge of Freedom ?

[DrPostman]

On Matrix web site I can read :

Battlefield Tactics allow the player to make decisions that can turn the tide of battle

What that mean ?
Tactical game like Forge of Freedom ?

Is that in reference to ACW in some way?

[Pocus]

where did you get the link that hinted we bought Creative Assembly?

(I'm joking guys, sorry, but where is the link though?)