Game still to unbalanced for CSA

[Nikel]

You can put this on a t-shirt and sell millions:

REAL WARGAMERS ONLY PLAY ONE SIDE


Just kidding, of course, though it is true in my case.

Confederate in the ACW.

White in RUS.

French in the Napoleonic wars.

Peloponnesian if Ageod ever creates the game

...

[Cardinal Ape]

In case someone didn't get it; my previous post about the Russian Navy affecting the election was an April fools joke. There is no ahistorical outcome on that event.

Everybody's talking about balance, but nobody's talking about what balanced is. Aside from my flights into other aspects of the game, I've only talked about adjusting VP's to better reflect the player's progress, or success, in the game. I've said nothing about changing any other parameters, or units, or leaders, or time-frames; only VP's. And practically nobody has mentioned their thoughts on the subject.

In fact the devs are aware of this situation, and have stated that the VP's are not a measure of who is doing better than expected at any given time. VP's are just a vague measure of who won if the game went full length, and because of this, some balancing was done through allocating different VP's for each side at the start of the grand campaigns.

That's a simple solution, but I was thinking about using VP's differently, as I have stated.

The VP system is something I never really payed much attention to. Mainly because it never seemed to make any sense to me as an accurate measure of success., at least not for CW2. The Union only needs to take about 5 cities and they get lead in VP's earned per turn...

If a different approach was taken to represent VP's it could lead to a more rewarding game as the CSA. Instead of it just being whoever has the most VP's at scenario ends wins, it could be more of a measure of how well you did compared to history.

I think there is some inspiration to be found in games from other genres. I'm specifically thinking of the type of game where players fight against imminent doom; no one can stop it, instead it's a competition to see who staves off doom for the longest.

In CW2, if the CSA doesn't go for an early knock-out, instead choosing to play the long war, then there really is no hope of winning by VP's. But that's only if you compare CSA VP's to Union VP's - which I think is the wrong comparison. Forget about Union Vp's, throw them out entirely. Instead, the CSA should be comparing their VP's to what the CSA accomplished historically. The goal being to do better then they did historically.


I thought the idea, posted previously by Orso, about using events to increase VP's for occupying Union territory was kinda cool, but really, if you can take and hold cities in Ohio you probably stand to get a major victory and don't need to worry about VP's. Though, it gave me the thought that using events to increase VP values could be really slick when applied to the CSA's own turf. Specifically, I was thinking of using it up VP values for cities that are held beyond their historical capture dates. For example, if the CSA managed to hold New Orleans for 10 turns beyond the date which the Union historically captured the city, then an event would 'reward' the CSA for doing better than history by doubling the VP value of the city until the Union captured it. Perhaps another event could triple the value if its was held for another 10 turns. Doing so would also help steer the Union on a more historical invasion route.

[DrPostman]

Giving VP for holding cities in the South beyond historical dates sounds good, as is a few
extra VP for the North taking them early. In this thread I've see a wealth of ideas that lead
me to believe we're well on our way to creating concrete goals for CW3. I'm sure that's at
least a few more years away, but one can hope.

[ArmChairGeneral]

So if we could determine how many VPs the CSA would have gotten historically based on the current rules, then we would have a benchmark to compare whether or not the CSA has played well or not....

Then we wouldn't need to change anything, we could simply redefine the victory conditions, which would constitute the simplest house rule/mod possible.

The game as-is invites this already considering how unrewarding the victory splash screens are. It is almost like the devs didn't think their arbitrary definition of victory was particularly important.

[davidmikky]

Common phrase is Union was fighting the war with one hand behind its back and that's true.

[Gray Fox]

So no one sees a problem in a totally scripted game where the Union player must forfeit strategic decisions and instead follow a list of taking location X before the historical date?

The whole point in playing a human being is that your opponent has freedom of choice, just like you do. Live players' actions happen for a reason. I drive down a road at night for the first time and hit a pothole. The next time I drive there, I know to miss it. Doing smart things is basic human nature. Balancing the game by artificially forcing the Union player to have none of the smart choices is not going to improve game play. This is like saying, "Crazy Horse, you still get 5000 Sioux, however, you may only attack Custer with 200 braves at a time." Make all the smart choices as the CSA. Teach yourself to create new smart choices. Play your best game and then switch sides so your opponent can play his best game. The smartest player wins. That's a CW3 I would buy.

[Ace]

So,
in game terms, you know Mac is poor general and you dont give him command of the army.
Lets imagine Lincoln did that. Would he suffer any political and senior problems cor doing so. How the game simulates it?

[Gray Fox]

I have McClellan in command of an army with Division commanders Sigel and Halleck. The Army consists of militia in garrison that they convert to line infantry. It's a smart thing to do.

[Ace]

Yes, it's a smart thing to do and that is why game is unbalanced.
You are evading intended seniority.
The 25 NM penalty if Mac was not in command of the Army was intended to simulate political cost for removing him from command. Be a man and take a hit if you don't want him in command, or try to use imperfections in game design to beat the system, or as you call it play smart.

[aariediger]

So,
in game terms, you know Mac is poor general and you dont give him command of the army.
Lets imagine Lincoln did that. Would he suffer any political and senior problems cor doing so. How the game simulates it?

I like a set of modded generals,, where a the player actively chooses to use a 2-3-0 McClellan because all his other options are absolutely dreadful. 2-0-1 guys all around (Banks, Halleck, Butler, Fremont) and Mac is the only partially incompetent boob you have, rather than the rest that are straight up trash. Then you get Pope/Burnside/Roscrans who are a different flavor of bad, but tolerable, and serve a useful midgame until you can get Sherman/Sheridan and the like. Have Grant as the only solid guy until late 63 or so ideally.

As for game balance, I think the South should "lose" on average, but not necessarily the southern player. If you can do better than they did historically, you win. When people talk about balance, I think what they mean is that it is still very hard for a player to clear even that very low bar of matching/exceeding what happened in real life.

What a guy could do is give the southern player a HUGE lead in VPs to start the game, something dumb like 5,000 points, and the only way the Union player can win is by crashing their moral. Probably just have to capture all the cities that can hold the southern capital to get the fifty point drop. By the way, what cities can be a capital?

[Gray Fox]

Ace, when it comes to Pbem, "you da man". I've always enjoyed your comments. If you have house rules then I'm happy for you. Buuuut...I'm a retired soldier. If the game were "Civil tic-tac-toe II", then I would be okay with your HRs. However, this is kind of what I did for half my youth. If one way for the game to work is for the Union player to wear a dunce cap, then my comment will always be "absolutely-friggin'-no". The men I worked with gave everything their best shot.

For my Union, McDowell commands a real army covering D.C. Banks' army controls all of the locked forces in the Capital with no CP penalty. Butler commands an army dug in along the Potomac. Abe Lincoln can sleep safe, regardless of what he might think. In 1862, McClellan commands the training army in the Midwest, because that is what he does best. I don't pound nails with a screwdriver. His force is still ready to cover KY. Fremont commands another real army in St. Louis. The mobile reserve Corps can be assigned to whomever, depending on where the threat is. Pretty smart, no? Grant is in charge of the eastern assault army (the screwdriver thing). BTW, more than half of my troops are not with Grant, just the best troops (in case you also find that effeminate).

I realize, that some of you just don't want to play a two game match, for whatever personal reason. I personally do not find that the beer and pretzels taste better because my set of HRs totally nerfed any Union opponent. I've posted how to spank an unsuspecting Union player or the hardest setting for Union Athena, by just playing smart. This may not be possible because the Union player has read my posts. In that case, I'm pretty sure if you move the Capital from Richmond to Atlanta, you'll get a long game. It will still be a train wreck, but it would take longer. So dig in your heels and fight to the bitter end. Do your best and there's no dishonor in losing. It's how men do it.

[Nikel]

By the way, what cities can be a capital?

The option to change the Capital can be taken only one time.

New York (from Washington) for the Union and Atlanta (from Richmond) for the CSA.

Also Montgomery for the CSA that will be changed by event to Richmond at the start of the war as historically.

[Gray Fox]

Here's an assessment of the Union military situation at the end of 1860.

Imagine that you and your American friends are at a sports bar. For some reason a Cricket match is on TV. You decide to go out in the parking lot and play the game yourselves. You Google the rules and by default someone eventually wins. Unfortunately, it was filmed and this goes viral. Now, the Presidsent wants you to take several hundred thousand people and create a National Cricket League overnight.

This is basically what Lincoln wanted from his Generals, with the additional kick in the nuts that 2% of all Americans were going to die. No one in the Western Hemisphere had ever led an army of tens of thousands onto a battlefield. Many of the engagements still hold benchmarks that have not been surpassed after 150 years in this half of the world. The States' volunteer units were virtually men's clubs that showed up at parades. West Point was basically an engineering college. The peace time army was not a school for training to fight an enormous total war. Military command was like being the manager at Dairy Queen, only you never actually made any ice cream.

If the game was actually realistic and historical to reflect this, then hardly anyone could even play it.

[Captain_Orso]

Firstly, why McClellan. Why is the player saddled with an army commander, who although he was great at training and instilling pride in his men, and certainly understood military strategy, but was miserable at executing it tactically. Because nobody in Washington really knew him, and he seemed to be competent, judging by his small campaign in western Virginia. He seemed like the logical choice. So... McClellan.

But what about McClellan? If we compare McClellan to Rosecrans, who vexed his superiors, also by not moving when they wanted him to move, once he was ready (and I think the historical evidence supports this) he executed his plan to such a success, that it is still taught in military academies as a landmark in campaigning history. And after the initial success, he continued to move. He took Chattanooga and went on to fight, without hemming and hawing. McClellan and his Peninsula Campaign not so much.

McClellan showed that he would maneuver his army, but believed his opponent would simply give up, because his opponent was simply 'outsmarted' and 'outmaneuvered'. He was counting on his opponent being equally as inhibited to actually fight, let alone to fight hard. He did not understand the Confederate military, nor the southern mentality. Further, McClellan convinced himself that if any tiny thing went wrong, his plans would crumble, his army would be wiped out, the capital would be lost, the war would be lost, and he would go down in history as the man who allowed the Union to be torn asunder. This sounds like paranoia to me; always the greatest and always persecuted.

Once McClellan decided to move, he did, and he could move a huge army very well, as long as it didn't encounter substantial resistance from the enemy. We could argue infinitely on whether his decision to finally move, was actually his decision, or his superior's decision. I think both influenced the outcome, that he moved.

Also, the proximity of the AoP to Washington brought forth much meddling in McClellan's operation of the army. Basically, Washington didn't trust his judgment.

So how does one implement these major factors into the game? On the one side, the Union player, who knows McClellan, and on the other side, a McClellan who doesn't do what the player wishes, when he wants, and then Washington (actually the player, but not in this case), meddling with the plans of McClellan (in this case, actually the player)?

After two hours of trying to wrap my mind around this situation, and put it into understandable words, I'm at a loss as to what to suggest.

[Captain_Orso]

Here's an assessment of the Union military situation at the end of 1860.

Imagine that you and your American friends are at a sports bar. For some reason a Cricket match is on TV. You decide to go out in the parking lot and play the game yourselves. You Google the rules and by default someone eventually wins. Unfortunately, it was filmed and this goes viral. Now, the Presidsent wants you to take several hundred thousand people and create a National Cricket League overnight.

This is basically what Lincoln wanted from his Generals, with the additional kick in the nuts that 2% of all Americans were going to die. No one in the Western Hemisphere had ever led an army of tens of thousands onto a battlefield. Many of the engagements still hold benchmarks that have not been surpassed after 150 years in this half of the world. The States' volunteer units were virtually men's clubs that showed up at parades. West Point was basically an engineering college. The peace time army was not a school for training to fight an enormous total war. Military command was like being the manager at Dairy Queen, only you never actually made any ice cream.

If the game was actually realistic and historical to reflect this, then hardly anyone could even play it.

I understand where you are coming from GF, but..

1. Both sides --both-- started from the same situation.

2. It is not that nobody had any idea how the military worked. It's just that nobody had done it on that scale.

History shows us that on both sides learned quickly how to get the military to function well enough to fight those campaigns that were, and are still, in some cases, historical superlatives.

Just for perspective of the situation, Capt Steven Knott (USN ret., was instructor and academic chair holder at the U. S. Army War College for six years) stated, New Orleans was the largest city in the South. The second largest was anywhere the Union army made camp.

My point is, they did it, so it's not a question of whether they could.

So, instead of vaguely suggesting something, please come out with a direct substantial critique or suggestion.

[Gray Fox]

If you made the Union as incompetent as it was, though not necessarily their fault, then it would probably be unplayable. Union incompetence was magnified because they had to be on the offense.

I've already suggested to leave the game alone and Pbem a two game match.

[Rod Smart]

I don't need to tally up victory points to know how well I did.


As the south, if I win, and hold Kentucky and Missouri and have minimal inflation and a decent navy, then I really won. I have a true country with a bright future.

As the south, if I win, but lost Kentucky and Missouri and most of Tennessee and Arizona and New Mexico and Oklahoma and I'm dead broke and my inflation rate is at 50% and my heartland is devastated and Beast Butler has destroyed my major cities, then yeah, I won, but my country is in terrible terrible shape and the Confederacy doesn't have much of a future.



I don't need a victory point count to know the difference between WINNING! and winning and not losing.

[Captain_Orso]

I think you are forgetting, that once hostilities end, there is no blockade, nor restrictions in trade, and although there will be much to rebuild in the South, cotton will be flowing out, and money and goods will be flowing in; lots of it.

I don't want to trivialize the loss and damage to life and property, which occurred directly. or indirectly, through the war, but before the war, the South was a thriving economy. That cotton fields may have been empty during the war, may actually have helped the South, in the sense that they had a year or more in which to recover--or at least in which they were not used up--from planting. Cotton sucks the nutrients necessary for cotton out of the soil, at least without 'modern' fertilizers. That's why so many plantation moved from the Southern Seaboard, to the Mississippi Valley in the mid Nineteen Hudreds. The land was fresh, and the soil was good.

Anyways, if we start in on, how much devastation the South incurred to measure win or loss, then well have to start keeping track of Scorched Earth and every other kind of destruction, and then the Union player will be spurred on to destroy as much of the South as possible... and I don't want to go there.

[Gray Fox]

Is there a file in the Dbase where you could set the NM value for cities captured to zero. Then just make a HR for Pbem that the Union must clear the Mississippi River, hold all CSA major ports and take Richmond to win. That is approximately the situation at the time Lee surrendered. A smart player might still get a NM victory by winning battles.

[aariediger]

So how does one implement these major factors into the game? On the one side, the Union player, who knows McClellan, and on the other side, a McClellan who doesn't do what the player wishes, when he wants, and then Washington (actually the player, but not in this case), meddling with the plans of McClellan (in this case, actually the player)?

I think you have to decide which part of the Lincoln/McClellan frustration battle you want the player to be. Are you Lincoln, who is desperate for a fighter who will actually take his army to war? Or are you McClellan, whose plans are constantly disrupted by the CiC, to the point where Lincoln actually picks your corps commanders for you, and then holds back McDowell's backdoor attack on Richmond because Jackson gave Lincoln the willies?

The stock game has you role play as Lincoln, dealing with a 1-1-2 disaster of a general who is so bad most players send him to Boston to train troops rather than face the Rebs in the field. But of course, we know he is bad with foresight, no way Lincoln could at the time, so I don't think this is the route to go.

The thing about 1-1-2 Mac is that his best stat is defense, when that was probably his worst attribute! He damn near lost his whole army on the Peninsula, and maybe the war with it. I like making Mac bad in a different way, a 2-3-0, so the player chooses to be super cautious because Lee can flatten him in the open field. Have to move slowly, dig in as you go, always keep a retreat path in mind, because at any point the Rebs might overrun your position. I also like tacking on the Overcautious ability too. Now, the Army of the Potomac isn't completely helpless when attacking, but being active is rare even with 2 strat rating.

[Captain_Orso]

The game has decided for you; you are always Lincoln, you are always Washington.

And you are going off the point.

- Lincoln didn't know how bad McClellan was, so he appointed him commander. (You, on the other hand, as the player know McClellan, and can and may, with hardly a consequence, send McClellan off to Portland, Maine to count Canadian Geese flying south for the winter.)

- Lincoln couldn't control McClellan, because he felt he had no choice but to accept almost any plan McClellan decided on. (You control McClellan, in that you can move McClellan at will, although you cannot make him be active. You can be unhappy with his stats, but never with what he does, because you are doing it.)

- Lincoln didn't trust McClellan, so in the middle of McClellan's campaign, Lincoln ordered McClellan to leave more of his force behind in northern Virginia to cover the capital. (You are McClellan and Lincoln, and trust your own plans, and will not mess with them in the middle of deployment, unless you yourself decide to do it.)

BTW making McClellan 2-3-0 is an horrendous ideal. It's and invitation for attack, versus a defensive rating of 0. It will pull down every corps' defensive rating as well. It would be like Hood on heroin as army commander.

[csiemers]

I think you have to decide which part of the Lincoln/McClellan frustration battle you want the player to be. Are you Lincoln, who is desperate for a fighter who will actually take his army to war? Or are you McClellan, whose plans are constantly disrupted by the CiC, to the point where Lincoln actually picks your corps commanders for you, and then holds back McDowell's backdoor attack on Richmond because Jackson gave Lincoln the willies?

I play neither. I play my way. If a general is available then they go and fight. I rarely, if ever, look at their rating. As the Union player my forces (and generals) are sent to fight to cause casualties to the rebels. If I lose a couple battles, then so be it, but I'm taking the war to the rebels on my terms, not theirs. I've taken Richmond with some of those generals that many look down on.
I also don't over analyze the game. I dive in and play. Got nearby units and a leader, that's a division! I don't make sure the regiment X and Y are paired with artillery A just because their stats say that's the best combination.

[aariediger]

BTW making McClellan 2-3-0 is an horrendous ideal. It's and invitation for attack, versus a defensive rating of 0. It will pull down every corps' defensive rating as well. It would be like Hood on heroin as army commander.

I know! He's just asking to get steamrolled. But, isn't that about right? If the southern player is facing a 1-1-2 general, why would you ever attack him? He's never active to attack you, he'd be bad at it, and he's better defensively anyway.

In real life, Lee thought it would be a better idea to attack McClellan rather than wait him out. Heck, even Joe freaking Johnston thought attacking was the right call! You put a 0 defensive rating on him, and he's got a big freaking target on his back.

[hanny1]

The game has decided for you; you are always Lincoln, you are always Washington.

And you are going off the point.

- Lincoln didn't know how bad McClellan was, so he appointed him commander. (You, on the other hand, as the player know McClellan, and can and may, with hardly a consequence, send McClellan off to Portland, Maine to count Canadian Geese flying south for the winter.)

appointed twice, being the best officer for the post, saving the union from defeat both times according to Lincoln. Lincoln knew Mc was the only commander to inflict more losses on the ANV than his own army suffered in doing so, Lincoln was dead before reading both Lee and Longsreeet write Mc was the abelest commander they faced in the war. Point is Mc in game values in no way whatsoever reflect his effect on the offensive and defensive losses forces under his direction would inflict, nor do grants, who was incometent in the extreme, only achieving success because he was given the resources no other commander was allowed. mc penn campaign had won the war in va in 62, but Lincoln stopped mc from having the 150k he wanted, closed the recruiting offices and then withheld 50k from mc in mid campaign, and then refused him permission to cross the river and come at Richmond from behind its right and be supplied by sea. Grant asked for 300k to do the same and was given them and permission to do what Mc said would take Richmond. Mc was statistically one of the best offensive and defensive army commanders the union had, putting more cs casualties up than anyone else, devised the strategy that would take Richmond, create the army control, medical, etc structures, and had the highest recruitments via vol means of all commanders, it's only northern revisionists writers who claim he was poor, because it's either him or the administration was poor, and they prefer to have the democrats mc as the fall guy rather than write correct history in that mc was only after fighting to maintain the union as it was, and the administration was fighting for something else and was willing to risk defeat to achieve those political aims. Lincoln also wrote he was not strong enough to stand up against mc political opponents who opposed him and his direction of the war. Mike Griffith has a web page with a fairly good explanation of how why and when mc became the fall guy for the adminsistrations failures.

- Lincoln couldn't control McClellan, because he felt he had no choice but to accept almost any plan McClellan decided on. (You control McClellan, in that you can move McClellan at will, although you cannot make him be active. You can be unhappy with his stats, but never with what he does, because you are doing it.)

fact free, Potus acepts rejects or gave specific orders to corps commanders or army ccomanders directly or through Stanton. What you get in game is not a reflection of the effects on combat that the officers had in reality.

- Lincoln didn't trust McClellan, so in the middle of McClellan's campaign, Lincoln ordered McClellan to leave more of his force behind in northern Virginia to cover the capital. (You are McClellan and Lincoln, and trust your own plans, and will not mess with them in the middle of deployment, unless you yourself decide to do it.)

not correct, expecting mc to win, and then have to face a democratic war winning general in th next election, with war winning record, he cut off all replacements, removed 50k from mc control and settled for not winning Richmond, in addition, restoring the union as it was and a constitution as it is, was not what he and the radicals were fighting the war to achieve. The war was fought with one hand for the simple reason that the north was not united in fighting to achieve what the republicans wanted from it, it's that simple, as simple as the in game values do not do what the historical record shows commanders doing with the resources given them in combat. Nor is the relative numbers of formations or manpower an accurate one, so the number of factors being incorrectly used is beyond anyone's modding, as it must be the result of game balancing by the design team for game play.

[pgr]

Ah, I love coming back after a break and seing that the old debates still inspire discussion!

I used to say the CSA had no chance in winning, until some aggressively played PBEM games showed me otherwise, so I'll say the current setup forces a CSA player to play an agressive style early to have any hope. (And really there is not a lot of incentive to go deep into the game.)

In my mind the big problem is that VP values are too heavily weighted in the East so the Union player has little incentive to drive into the heart of the Confederacy. The Mississippi River in particular should have more priority to it, given its importance for Lincoln's political support. (Freeing up the river for commerce from the Ohio river basin was a major issue. It almost lost the Lincoln legislative support for the war in 1862 and would have cost him the election of 1864 if the Union hadn't controlled the river by that point.)

On the simplest level, I'd take some of Richmond's VP and NM weight and give it to Vicksburg. History aside, Vicksburg provides the North quite a strategic challenge given how deep it is in in CSA territory. From a supply perspective, Richmond is easy by comparison. On a more complex note, one could draft a "Father of Waters Unvexed to the Sea" event that fires once all the Mississippi river towns are controlled by the Union giving the Union a significant VP bump or removing some kind of malus (perhaps nerf the Union's NM recovery rate until the event fires). In any event, shifting some of Richmond's VP/NM bang to Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and Atlanta would help shift the fighting over the whole of the map. (In a similar way, take some of DC's mojo and give it to other Northern cities. I have a feeling if a Rebel army had taken Chicago, Philadelphia, or some other major northern city, there would have been political hell to pay.)

As for the 5% retreat rule, that takes me back to the great retreat debates we had on the forum. It is not applied to this game, if I recall correctly, because in original beta testing folks felt it made encirclements too easy and didn't fit the period. It did give rise to odd retreat behavior. So a lot of the retreat code was re-worked so that retreating stacks retreat away from hostile territory and if the retreating stack does retreat to a zone with 0% MC it goes to an attack stance until it gets its 5%. Bottom line, it is possible for CWII retreats to go to 0%MC controlled territory but if enemy forces are present where they arrive, they will have to fight to get in. It's a bit of a convoluted workaround and I tend to prefer the 5% rule, but you can achieve the same effect if you actually surround the stack you are trying to encircle.

[Gray Fox]

Welcome back, pgr!

Speaking of old posts, when players objected to the "all east strategy", we discussed the importance of the Mississippi River to the Union. Everyone seemed to agree that railroads and the Erie Canal had eliminated the need for the Midwest to rely on the waterway. After the fall of New Orleans, it was no longer a commercial highway for the CSA either. After the river was "cleared", I could only find that Union ironclad warships used it to transport wounded and cotton plunder. At least one struck a mine, so it wasn't really open to commerce. In Grant's memoirs, he alluded to the fact that Texas cattle no longer fed the Confederate army for justification of his campaign. Logistically, if a Civil War army moved very far away from a railhead, then it would starve. There weren't enough mules in North America to move supplies to them. Rivers also offerred an easy supply route for military operations. IMHO, that is why the Mississippi and the Cumberland were targets, not for economic reasons.

[hanny1]

Welcome back, pgr!

Speaking of old posts, when players objected to the "all east strategy", we discussed the importance of the Mississippi River to the Union. Everyone seemed to agree that railroads and the Erie Canal had eliminated the need for the Midwest to rely on the waterway. After the fall of New Orleans, it was no longer a commercial highway for the CSA either. After the river was "cleared", I could only find that Union ironclad warships used it to transport wounded and cotton plunder. At least one struck a mine, so it wasn't really open to commerce. In Grant's memoirs, he alluded to the fact that Texas cattle no longer fed the Confederate army for justification of his campaign. Logistically, if a Civil War army moved very far away from a railhead, then it would starve. There weren't enough mules in North America to move supplies to them. Rivers also offerred an easy supply route for military operations. IMHO, that is why the Mississippi and the Cumberland were targets, not for economic reasons.

odd you mention grants memoirs, as in it he recounts by 64 when he lived of the land by abandoning supply from base, to swing around vicks urg,taking what the army needed from a 15 mile frontage, amply feeding the army, he learnt an important lesson of logistics, this policy of living of the land then became national military policy as part of yhe strategy of exhustion, to win militarily coupled with mild political post conflct policy to prevent insurgency, as living of the enemys land ment its civilian population had its food taken to support the passing army, which was why cs desertions went through the roof when all us armies adopted living of the land for food stuff from 64 onward.your mule comment is wrong, but still interesting, cs po of 800k to us 300k, horse 6 million to 1.5 million, gave differnt edges to each side.my guess is your thinking og roth for roman empire and engeles for macedonia using mules as logistic manovering of field forces requirments that show neither empire contained enough mules to do so, being widly used as examples in logistic courses. 1100000 mules has the forward lift capacity of 220 million lbs, which is equal to the requirements of a 200000 man army for a years campaign, having 3000 calories a day per man in its 3lbs daily ration.

[Gray Fox]

The mules pulled wagons. The wagons were loaded with food for the army...and food for the mules. The mules had to eat on the way out and the way back. The longer the journey, the smaller the portion of the load was for the army. At a certain distance, the wagon would only be full of food for the mules. No amount of additional mules changes that.

Sherman didn't march to the sea. He marched to the U.S. Navy and resupply. If he had not taken the fort protecting Savannah and forced the city's surrender, his army would have starved. That's why armies don't live off the land as a rule.

[hanny1]

The mules pulled wagons. The wagons were loaded with food for the army...and food for the mules. The mules had to eat on the way out and the way back. The longer the journey, the smaller the portion of the load was for the army. At a certain distance, the wagon would only be full of food for the mules. No amount of additional mules changes that.

different statement, your first is completely false, this is a different question, 1100000 mules with 6 on a wagon gives me now 183000 wagons each with 2000 lbs forward lift which can now instead provide 2 times the first example, I showed where you have no idea I how the army's supplied themselves. Aparantly you have never how armies marched a certain distance, put the horses mules out to eat grass so as not require grain feed, or if static for a period had to send them further afield to obtain grass, example brags arty horses miles away when attacked and is why so many of his guns could not move or be withdrawn at missionary ridge, this was common practice. and yes the amount of mules does change it when you put them with wagons, it increases forward lift by a factor of 2 or so, either distance or time period goes up by the same ratio.

Sherman didn't march to the sea. He marched to the U.S. Navy and resupply. If he had not taken the fort protecting Savannah and forced the city's surrender, his army would have starved. That's why armies don't live off the land as a rule.

you really have no understanding of the war, Sherman's Qm report shows he arrived with more food stocks than he set out with. setting out with 5000 beeves he arrived in savvanah with 10,000, sending fresh beef to the blockade squadron. He writes his army has abundance of everything except cloths coffe and sugar.Us naval resupplied him with munitions , siege guns, with which he informed Hardee's he would use in the harshest way possible if he did not surrender the city, and medical supply, new uniforms and took back his wounded, they provided no food stocks as they were not required, as Sherman had enough to march to join grant, moving for 50 days and living on new cs land, without resupply from base, with already with him, already having lived of the land for 5 weeks in getting to savannah,
, having more food stocks and more wagons to haul it than he started with. Sherman's report lists he set out with 3 days grain ration for mules What you think he expected them to llive on is not easy to see. Sherman was clear"where a million people live, my army will not starve",But Sherman explain what, he took everything he needed from a 30 mile frontage either side of of a line from Atlanta to savanna, corn, hogs, poultry 10,000 horses,wagons, arriving with more food supply than he set out with, along 500 more wagons than he set out with. And destruction on an epic scale of what he could not carry off. his first message to grant explained his army had never eaten as well as it had for the past month but was looking forward to oysters after somuch pork and beef.qm report shows 9500000lbs corn taken, confiscated,thats 8 weeks supply for 60k men at 3 lbs each.us enters 21 dec, first food resupply ship, rebbeca clyde docks jan 19., with jccotw comitte members to decide who should recieve its foodstuff.

[Gray Fox]

Hanny, you were the one that mistakenly assumed that mules were pack animals in the CW. I'm sure that massive run on posts with even the simplest words misspelled and no concept of official, expert references to back up your claims passes for actual knowledge where you reside. However, I see now that your rants are just trolling. Good day to you, sir!