pgr wrote:The situation of defending Vicksburg, is in my mind, completely different. As the CSA, you have a lot of strategic depth, only a narrow front to cover coming south along the rail line to Jackson, and and the ability to concentrate forces at Vicksburg.
I'm only talking about the supply situation when bypassing #10 and Pillow. I've tried this a couple of times and even if I took Memphis quickly you cannot supply your forces there by transports alone. Even if you have Nashville, no supplies will move to there. It's a death trap.
pgr wrote:If Nashville falls to a big force, with lots of transports and supply wagons, it can hold on for a long time. Plus the CSA looses it's supply to Bowling Green and Ft. Donelson. With all those fleets, it is child's play to trap any CSA force that is north of the Cumberland. Heck, Donelson doesn't need to fall, if Bowling Green does, because the union can forward supplies via that point if it sets up a depot.
Memphis is less of an issue...except if Nashville falls. At that point the Union isn't dependent on the Mississippi for supply routes.
If the Union holds Bowling Green with a depot that is enough to support a push on Nashville and Donelson. Once at least Donelson is taken Nashville is fairly easy to take.
I've often taken Paducah early just to deny it to the South, and then BG. BG looks like it's going to be difficult to hold, but I've rarely seen the South put so much effort into holding or retaking it. If they do, I'll take #10 instead and push on Memphis leaving enough force in eastern Kentucky to defend against a push toward Louisville. #10 CAN be taken by brute force rather quickly unless it is massively garrisoned, which then means that BG is not or the South has spread himself out very thinly. In any case I get to pick where to attack and generally where the South is weak and I can create a supply base.
pgr wrote:ASJ tends to get ragged on in the history forum, but I think there was a good reason he evacuated all to Corinth after the fall of Donelson and Island No. 10.
The problem is that the game has, in my mind, an over concentration of VP in Western Tennessee. Nashville and Memphis make sense, but why Island No. 10. and Corinth? As a number have noted, this lets the Union gain a pretty durable VP advantage if they take all...and they aren't really forced to invade and further south. So I feel obligated to defend the area the best I can.
Nashville and Memphis are important for their industries and political values. Corinth, however has far greater strategic values. It's the cross roads of the South west of the Atlanta-Louisville axis. If the Union hold Corinth, Memphis must fall, and with her everything not already taken between Corinth and the Mississippi.
pgr wrote:@ Jim, I tend to agree that one needs at least a division in Memphis and Nashville to guard against a direct landing. Island 10 seems like a death trap. You can't really overland evacuate or re-enforce, plus it's harbor is on the north side, so troops going in or out have to deal with a union fleet going in or out if the place is attacked.
Moving out of swamp is no a hindrance, only moving into it. As long as #10 is not blockaded, supplies and replacements will arrive, but reinforcements will have to come by river and that can be dangerous.
The South needs to garrison strongly anywhere she wants to maintain, and have a mobile force ready to strike back at an invading force. If the South has some luck the Union will get a bloody nose in the first turn of battle and then get hit by the South's Army of the Tennessee or some portion of it. Even if #10 is in Union hands, if the Union doesn't take Memphis rather quickly he'll have no supply base and must break off to build one; and thus his campaign has failed.