A question: Role of cavalry

[Space Otter]

I'm sort of coming back to RUS, and skimming the forum I noticed that a general opinion about cavalry is "you only need it for screening".

Historically, cavalry was tanks of RCW. Both sides relied heavily on it as mobile breakthrough and shock troops. Almost all memoir sources tell about the devastating effect cavalry charges had on low-quality infantry that was commonplace during the war, even if said infantry was entrenched and supported by machine guns. Many battles, in fact, especially for the whites, looked somewhat like "after the initial firefight, cavalry performs a flanking move, the enemy panics, starts running and is ridden down". Both red an white generals recognized the tremendous importance of cavalry. Red military theorists attributed their victory largely to Budennyi's use of large cavary masses, later leading to Tuhachevsky's mobile war doctine that saw use in WW2. And white generals, most notably Wrangel, named a faliure to create proper white cavalry and thus having to depend on unreliable cossack units in critical situations as one of the main reasons of defeat. Even tachanka became legendary and earned it's place in songs due to allowing cavalry to complete it's transformation into an absolutely unstoppable force.

I am curious if RUS really models this.

[Orel]

I'm sort of coming back to RUS, and skimming the forum I noticed that a general opinion about cavalry is "you only need it for screening".

Historically, cavalry was tanks of RCW. Both sides relied heavily on it as mobile breakthrough and shock troops. Almost all memoir sources tell about the devastating effect cavalry charges had on low-quality infantry that was commonplace during the war, even if said infantry was entrenched and supported by machine guns. Many battles, in fact, especially for the whites, looked somewhat like "after the initial firefight, cavalry performs a flanking move, the enemy panics, starts running and is ridden down". Both red an white generals recognized the tremendous importance of cavalry. Red military theorists attributed their victory largely to Budennyi's use of large cavary masses, later leading to Tuhachevsky's mobile war doctine that saw use in WW2. And white generals, most notably Wrangel, named a faliure to create proper white cavalry and thus having to depend on unreliable cossack units in critical situations as one of the main reasons of defeat. Even tachanka became legendary and earned it's place in songs due to allowing cavalry to complete it's transformation into an absolutely unstoppable force.

I am curious if RUS really models this.

During the winter cavalry is worse than tanks. In winter battles, the time until melee combat starts is shortened, thus cavalry can inflict unmeasurable damage.

In every game, I have a cavalry corps. The major problem with raiding is, cavalry carries supplies for 2-2.5 turns: thus you could take a city or area in the rear, but if you want your troops to continue to be capable of fighting you will need to retreat on the next turn. Though if you capture enough supplies in the depot, that could allow you to stay for a few more turns.

The major problem with cavalry is: it isn't as powerful when it comes to ranged combat. It has a smaller chance to achieve a hit and inflicts less damage.

But aside from the ranged damage, I find cavalry very effective in battle, especially in the final rounds when distance is decreased.

[Metatron]

Cavalry is a two egde blade, as orel explained it, it can be really powerfull, but in the wrong situation your going to be exterminated (usually entrenched infantry with artillery support).

Cavalry in single regiments are very usefull for scouting the enemy positions, mouvements etc

Cavalry brigades/small divisions are great for scouting and small raiding and can deal with those anoying little green/red partisans or militia that pop up sometimes

Cavalry division/corps are great raiding forces and very powerfull in some combat situations, and are great mobile forces that don't need train to get very fast from one point to another so you can use them in a operational way in concert with large infantry armies (train bounded for speed). Very effective against green revolts if you want them gone quickly. Very effective in early scenarios against red army wich has a lot of red guards and conscripts.

[le Anders]

Cavalry is a bother when used in single regiments for scouting, as they run out of supplies too fast for them to remain operational in the field long enough. They do, however, excel at hunting partisans of any colour.
As screens, allowing a relatively painless retreat, they are invaluable.
Building a large cavalry army is a gamble; The build time is prohibitive, and the resources could very often be used to better effect in other ways, for other new units or just reinforcements.
But they are very good if they are strong enough to capture cities with depots, as Orel mentions.

[ERISS]

Red military theorists attributed their victory largely to Budennyi's use of large cavary masses, later leading to Tuhachevsky's mobile war doctine that saw use in WW2.

Budenny, for being coward, was the Stalin great friend, so bolshevik theorists had to laud him.
Red large cavalry masses very often flee against all other cavalries (Pole, White, Makhnovist, ..)
Mobile war does not come from Budenny, as it was forbidden by his friend Stalin for very long (who spoiled the bolshevik strategy against Poland in 1920).

And white generals, most notably Wrangel, named a faliure to create proper white cavalry and thus having to depend on unreliable cossack units in critical situations as one of the main reasons of defeat.

Denikin denied critical situations for cossacks:
two times when they could (Shkuro once), Denikin forbid them from entering Moscow for he was jaelous.

[Space Otter]

Mobile war does not come from Budenny, as it was forbidden by his friend Stalin for very long (who spoiled the bolshevik strategy against Poland in 1920).

I may be mistaken, of course, but as far as I know most military historians agree that Triandofillov and Tukhachevsky were inspired by Konarmiya operations, Orel-Kromy, Voronezh-Kastornoe and the subsequent offensive to name a few, when creating the Deep Battle doctrine (which as I'm sure you know shaped the pre-war RKKA as we remember it). Regarding Budennyi's personal merits I am afraid I cannot say anything particular, never having the pleasure to know Semen Mihailovich in person.

Denikin denied critical situations for cossacks:
two times when they could (Shkuro once), Denikin forbid them from entering Moscow for he was jaelous.

I must confess I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. I was referring mostly to the the volunteer-cossack relations that were progressively deteriorating since the deposition of Krasnov and the unfortunate accident with the Kuban Rada, that led, in many cases, to cossack units openly refusing to go into battle. Cossack units being the only available decent cavalry, that quite often led to disaster.


Anyway, thank you everybody, that was very helpful. I think it is time I go and make me a cavalry corps (or two )

[ERISS]

most military historians agree that Triandofillov and Tukhachevsky were inspired by Konarmiya operations, Orel-Kromy, Voronezh-Kastornoe and the subsequent offensive to name a few, when creating the Deep Battle doctrine (which as I'm sure you know shaped the pre-war RKKA as we remember it).

Yes, Budenny is excellent when he has at least a 8:1 ratio or the enemy is already retreating. If you see his WW2 battles, you'll see he can't do anything against germans, he is among the worst Red generals (like Stalin).

Regarding Budennyi's personal merits I am afraid I cannot say anything particular, never having the pleasure to know Semen Mihailovich in person.

Many Whites, Makhnovist, and maybe Pole commandants who battled against him wrote it: Budenny is a coward, he flee easily (letting his troops alone) when he is not overwhelming.

I must confess I'm not entirely sure what you mean here.

Kossacks could enter Moscow 2 times, but White command (Denikin) forbid them this critical situation, for he wanted "true" russians for this victory.
Denikin didn't want victory: he wanted his dreamed absolute victory or nothing about reality.

the volunteer-cossack relations that were progressively deteriorating since the deposition of Krasnov and the unfortunate accident with the Kuban Rada, that led, in many cases, to cossack units openly refusing to go into battle.

That is not the cossack fault: They just don't fit in the White politic of Greater Russia where people belong to Russia tsar/parliament, and that's why cossacks were against Reds too.
"the unfortunate accident with the Kuban Rada": lol, you mean the murder of the ataman going anarchist? it was a bad solution, as it united kossacks in refusing white orders.
Whites were not very hypocrites (they had no politicians in command), that's what lost them against Bolsheviks who had Lenin the great-master politician, and many other liars such as Trotsky.

[Orel]

Yes, Budenny is excellent when he has at least a 8:1 ratio or the enemy is already retreating. If you see his WW2 battles, you'll see he can't do anything against germans, he is among the worst Red generals (like Stalin).

Many Whites, Makhnovist, and maybe Pole commandants who battled against him wrote it: Budenny is a coward, he flee easily (letting his troops alone) when he is not overwhelming.


Kossacks could enter Moscow 2 times, but White command (Denikin) forbid them this critical situation, for he wanted "true" russians for this victory.
Denikin didn't want victory: he wanted his dreamed absolute victory or nothing about reality.

That is not the cossack fault: They just don't fit in the White politic of Greater Russia where people belong to Russia tsar/parliament, and that's why cossacks were against Reds too.
"the unfortunate accident with the Kuban Rada": lol, you mean the murder of the ataman going anarchist? it was a bad solution, as it united kossacks in refusing white orders.
Whites were not very hypocrites (they had no politicians in command), that's what lost them against Bolsheviks who had Lenin the great-master politician, and many other liars such as Trotsky.

There are things you are not aware of Eriss:

There were rumours Mamontov could have entered Moscow but this was prohibited by Denikin. Now not even looking at the possibility of such a march by a relatively small force as the one Mamontov had, if Mamontov was to take Moscow would he be capable of holding it long enough until the main white forces secure the conquest?
Or would he take Moscow for a day or two and run back?

Not event to mention the fact that there was a conspiracy organization called "Moscow Volunteer Army" whose job would be to start an uprising in the Moscow region once the Whites capture Tula, and the appearance of Mamontov could provoke them to start the rebellion too early and be exterminated before they could help the Whites.

Now comes another question: could Mamontov with his 9000 men really even reach Moscow?

[dpt24]

From what I've read, in fairly good books (including one "scholarly" sourced book), I don't think the taking of Moscow by the Cossack Cavalry would have changed much because of the issue of taking and holding the city with so few troops. It's like when the Austrian Hussar's took Berlin in the Seven Years War. Not everyone agrees that the Cossacks could have got to Moscow or taken it, and I'm not sure many really think they would have held it. in RUS terms obviously you wouldn't want Cossack's that far north and I don't think in the game 9000 cavalry are ever going to take Moscow and hold it.

[Space Otter]

Ah, you mean Mamontov. Interestingly enough, I've never heard of Moscow raid being more than a rather daring idea. Of course, we'll never know for sure, but taking into account the way Mamontov operated, I doubt he would have risked something like that.
Here is what Wrangel wrote, for instance: "I considered gen. Mamontov's actions not only unsuccesful, but plainly criminal. Operating in the enemy's rear and having a mass of excellent cavalry at hand, not only he didn't use the benefits of the situation, but clearly evaded combat, actively escaping the enemy. Mamontov's troops returned burdened by huge bonuty - cattle, groceries, dry goods and even church and home silver." Egorov, South Front commander at the time, gave Mamontov more credit, noting the temporary confusion and loss of control by the reds, but also found no operative success of value, not to mention any kind of threat to Moscow. I must agree with Orel and dpt24 here: 9000 cossacks made little difference even if by some miracle they could take Moscow.


Edit: I remembered a rather funny anecdote about Budennyi - one soviet writer once met him on a train, they drank together, and Semen Mihailovich shared what he said was a key to surviving the RCW. "So, you're riding the steppe alone, and see a horseman approaching. It's a moonless night, and there's no way to tell if he's red or white or whatever. Right thing to do? F**king cut him up first, ask later."

[Orel]

Ah, you mean Mamontov. Interestingly enough, I've never heard of Moscow raid being more than a rather daring idea. Of course, we'll never know for sure, but taking into account the way Mamontov operated, I doubt he would have risked something like that.
Here is what Wrangel wrote, for instance: "I considered gen. Mamontov's actions not only unsuccesful, but plainly criminal. Operating in the enemy's rear and having a mass of excellent cavalry at hand, not only he didn't use the benefits of the situation, but clearly evaded combat, actively escaping the enemy. Mamontov's troops returned burdened by huge bouty - cattle, groceries, dry goods and even church and home silver." Egorov, South Front commander at the time, gave Mamontov more credit, noting the temporary confusion and loss of control by the reds, but also found no operative success of value, not to mention any kind of threat to Moscow. I must agree with Orel and dpt24 here: 9000 cossacks made little difference even if by some miracle they could take Moscow.


Edit: I remembered a rather funny anecdote about Budennyi - one soviet writer once met him on a train, they drank together, and Semen Mihailovich shared what he said was a key to surviving the RCW. "So, you're riding along the steppe alone, and see a horseman approaching. It's a moonless night, and there's no way to tell if he's red or white or whatever. Right thing to do? F**king cut him up first, ask later."

The Mamontov raid was a huge success. Wrangel, though I respect him greatly as a person, in this case is not the best source. All I will say, is that during the raid, Mamontov had a Red division join his army(Tula Division), thus he came out of the operation with more troops than he started with. During the raid he handed out weapons to the population, gave out food that was held in depots to the people and demobilized the Red conscripts he captured.

I also have a theory that the raid of Mamontov, and the rifles he handed out to the population during the raid, also fired in 1920 in the Tambov uprising.

From another perspective: how could Mamontov evade combat with the Reds if he was burdened with booty? Would that not make him slower and make him an easy target for the Reds?

[ERISS]

how could Mamontov evade combat with the Reds if he was burdened with booty? Would that not make him slower and make him an easy target for the Reds?

Yes, Mamontov used its cavalry to deceive the Reds: Mamontov makes a show somewhere and attract Reds, then he rush elsewhere.
His raid was a huge success, but not for his horses whom half of them died of exhaustion.

I was talking about:
. Shkuro who wanted to invade Moscow when he was 200km from it, just after the Mamontov raid (Shkuro was told he would been shot as traitor even he would had made a huge success killing the whole Sovnarkom), and
. Wrangel telling to Deninkin the good strategy (Denikin didn't want, for Wrangel using his cavalry would enter Moscow before him) so sorry it was not the 2nd Cossack think I thought.