Unwinnable Campaigns?

[Michael Hopcroft]

One thing I'm wondering about the game is whether there are any campaign scenarios that are virtually unwinnable by one side or the other. Napoleon ran into a couple of them -- the Invasion of Russia and the Hundred Days that climaxed at Waterloo (even if he'd beaten Blucher and Wellington he'd have still have the Russians and Austrians converging on him, and sooner or later his force would have been exhausted).

[Sol Invictus]

I also imagine that even if it is winnable, Spain will be a real nightmare for the French Player.

[Walloc]

One thing I'm wondering about the game is whether there are any campaign scenarios that are virtually unwinnable by one side or the other. Napoleon ran into a couple of them -- the Invasion of Russia and the Hundred Days that climaxed at Waterloo (even if he'd beaten Blucher and Wellington he'd have still have the Russians and Austrians converging on him, and sooner or later his force would have been exhausted).

That depence on how you define the victory conditions(VC) i guess.
If the VC is just to beat Blucher and Wellington. Then it is indeed possible to win. This is how most games i've seen on this campaign define the VCs and as far as i know is how its handled in NCP too.



If u look at a bigger picture as u suggest then IMO its a whole other kinda beast.
Also it depence on what exactly u mean by beating Blucher and Wellington.
Less Napoleon was able to pull of a Ulm, Austerlitz or a '06 like pursuit, where he more or less obliterated those forces totally. Considering that he wasnt able to do that in any of his campaigns after '06 not counting Spain. In part to do with Napoleon him self and his over time declining army, but it had as much to do with that the coalitions/allied armies learned too. They didnt make the same fatal mistakes as earlier in the periode.
So if by beaten u mean beaten like the prussian was beaten at Ligny and the lack luster pursuit after Ligny. Supporting the above, that the days of totally destroying his enemies was gone. Then no, in the long run he couldnt win in 1815.

At Ligny the losses wasnt all that different and Napoleon couldnt stand a campaign/war of attrition.
Why?
His Northern army was just around at 115-120k men. On top of that 200-220k french was assempling and training around Paris.

Each of the 4 major powers had promised to send 110k troops to do the job of capturing the "outlaw". Thats 440k troops, but thats not half the story.
Bluchers army of 120k was the prussian contribution of that agrement and Wellingtons was the British contribution. It being decided that the troops u payed for counted too. In case of th british the Belgian-Dutch and a sizeble german contigent counted to make up the full 110k troops(2) of the Wellington army. Less than half of the Wellington army was actually made up of British troops.

Ok lets say Napoleon had won Waterloo and lets say the coaliton forces was split up. Wellingtons army retreating to the channel and the prussians toward Prussia and Berlin. I wouldnt as many historians think, necesarrily assume this would happen. The Britsh might as well have retreated towards Hannover and the ports in North germany could easily have supported supply for such a move.
Hannover was just liberated and sorta a british satelite so they certainly had an interest in defending it. Too boot as said earlier over half of the Wellington army wasnt british. Would the Belgians-Dutch and german contigents accept not keep fighting for their lands. But lets assume the army's indeed do split.

Well some of the french army after Waterloo would have had to follow the Wellington army. That might send 50-70k troops in pursuit of Blücher.

Well the Blücher army of 120k was as said just the prussian contribuation to the coalition army. It wasnt the prussian army. Apart from the 4 prussian corps in the Blucher army, the prussian had 4 more corps at warfooting at this time. 1 at the Rhine(1) and 3 at Berlin for another 140k troops. They just didnt participate as the Prussian alrdy had made a contribution of over the 110k men agreed. So if Napoleon would have pursuited Bluchers army, they without a doubt would have send the rest of their army to reinforce Blucher. Easily making that army 200k+ men strong, even with a depleted Blücher army. 3-4 times that of the remaining french north army. To boot this was just the standing Prussian army. Had they made a 1813 like draft that could add 50-100k more men.

Ofc Napoleon could have drawn on the forces around Paris as they finnished training and organising.
But as u mention the austrains had their 110k men contribution on their way as well as the 110k russian contribuation. One have to assume a sizeble portion of the french troops around Paris would have had to counter those forces. Leaving Napoleons nord army fairly outnumbered.
Just as with the prussians the 110k Austrian and the 110k Russian contributions wasnt their full armies, just their contributions as agreed. So they could have send many more if needed.

The conclusion i draw of this. Is assuming Napoleon would have won Waterloo, that the campaign would have turned into a giant version of the 1814 campaign. Where the very numerical superior Russian, Austrian and Prussian forces would close in on the french, repeating 1814 in some way.

The only concieveble way I see a long term win for Napoleon. Would have been a peace after a won Waterloo, but considering how much the coalition wanted Napoleon out of politics and the length they went too as in the 1814 campaign. I dont really think it was a option.

Kind regards,

Rasmus

Note(1)
Kleist 5th corps at the Rhine could have participated in the campaign but Kleist didnt think it was totally rdy at the out break of hostilities. It was composed of German troops from different north german states mainly and was training so the different contigencies could work better together.

Note(2) Wellingtons army never reached the 110k troops

[Syt]

I may be a bit of a traditionalist in that regard, but in my humble opinion victiory or defeat should be determined by whether or not the player(s) do better than the historic counterpart. If, as Union, I manage to beat the Rebelsat Gettyburg in two days instead of three, it should be a win. If as German player I hold out in Stalingrad till summer 1943, it should be a win. If, as Allies, manage to hold the Germans in France for 4 weeks longer than historical, it should be a win. Etc.

[Jojo le Gouffy]

Il peut y avoir des objectifs geographiques en plus de gagner des batailles.
par exemple , pour Waterloo tenir Bruxelles (l'orthographe est au pif) .

[Syt]

Il peut y avoir des objectifs geographiques en plus de gagner des batailles.
par exemple , pour Waterloo tenir Bruxelles (l'orthographe est au pif) .

Napoléon in Italy le fait - des points pour tenir des cités et des points pour soldats tués.

(Excuse my French. )

Another system I liked very much was in Civil War Generals II. Scenarios had predefined objectives, but during the game more victory hexes would be created at places where fighting was very intense. That way a battle could be lost, even if you took all (original) targets if the opponent managed to bloody your nose sufficiently (kind of a moral defeat/victory).

[Pocus]

Il peut y avoir des objectifs geographiques en plus de gagner des batailles.
par exemple , pour Waterloo tenir Bruxelles (l'orthographe est au pif) .

Yes, it works like that in NC.