I was wondering how the AI would handle a hard cap. It would most likely result in some wierd things going on with the AI player.
Man power does need to be balanced but you can't really lock the game into only what happened historically either. I mean, if you did why would anyone even bother playing the CSA ;-) As long as the game itself gives a player the ability to play as historically as possible but allow me, or someone else, the ability to play as unhistorically as we wish in a somewhat realistic way concerning manpower and what have you it is perfect.
Balancing probably is needed but not to the extreme.
I have been looking at the manpower issues and wanted to develop a better feel for what is required to create good battle odds in terms of equivalent divisions.
First I created a hypothetical situation. It is March 62 or maybe 64. The Union has 18 divisions in 6 corps deployed in Alexandria and Loudon, Virginia. The rebs have 6 divisions in 2 corps with one corps each deployed in Manassas and Clarke, Virginia and connected by railroad. The rebs have had all winter to entrench and are at level 8 entrenchment. The Union decides to use every available division to attack one of the reb corps at Manassas after the snows have melted in their spring offensive.
This is a fairly realistic situation except the Union rarely, if ever, develops a 3-1 odds advantage in divisions on a front.
First factor: In creating this battle, the Union has to activate corps to attack.
1861/62--Average Union corps strategic leadership of 2. Thus 2 of 6 corps available at any one time or 6 divisions can launch an attack.
1863 onwards--Average Union corps strategic leadership of 3. Thus 3 of 6 corps available at any one time or 9 divisions can launch an attack.
1861/62--Attack launched with 6 Union divisions vs 3 CSA divisions.
1863/on--Attack launched with 9 Union divisions vs 3 CSA divisions.
Second factor: The attacking units must march into the region before attacking the CSA divisions. Assume 10-20% cohesion loss prior to combat in good to average ground/weather/terrain conditions. I will use the midpoint of 15% resulting in a 15% reduction in combat ability prior to battle. Cohesion loss is going to vary substantially with greater loss with poorer ground/weather/terrain conditions. The CSA does not suffer cohesion loss prior to battle as they are stationary. (I have not found the modifiers for cohesion loss. So my numbers are roughly based on a number of test moves. If you test, remember that if the formation does not march the entire 15 days, some cohesion recovery occurs.)
1861/62--5.1 Union divisions vs 3 CSA divisions
1863/on--7.6 Union divisions vs 3 CSA divisions
Third factor: Infantry in defense uses DEFFire while attacking infantry uses OFFFire. In early war, DEFFire is 16 and OFFFire is 10. So units on defense are 1.6 times stronger than units on offense. Later war upgrades give DEFFire of 20 and OFFFire of 11. So units on defense are approximately 2 times stronger than units of offense. Thus 3 CSA division are equivalent to 4.8 divisions early war till later war upgrade which makes them equivalent to 6 divisions.
1861/62--5.1 union divisions vs 4.8 CSA divisions
1863/on--7.6 Union divisions vs 6 CSA divisions
Fourth factor: Defending infantry in level 8 entrenchments receive a 40% bonus to their DEFFire hit effectiveness. So I am assuming a 40% increase in total combat effectiveness.
1861/62--5.1 Union divisions vs 6.7 CSA divisions
1863/on--7.6 Union divisions vs 8.4 CSA divisions
Fifth factor: Basically 100 percent of the time, reinforcements will arrive via railroad using March to the Guns by round one or two of a battle. So those three divisions in Clarke will arrive in Manassas as "march to the guns" reinforcements. Those reinforcements should not receive entrenchment benefits but should receive DEFFire benefits---so equivalent of 4.8 divisions early and 6 divisions late war.
1861/62--5.1 Union divisions vs 11.5 divisions
1863/on--7.6 Union divisions vs 14.4 divisions
I am guessing the early war CSA leadership advantage is worth an additional 5-20% increase in combat effectiveness of CSA divisions but I am not going to include those modifiers. The leadership will vary battle by battle. Overall, the CSA will receive whatever CSA advantage they have as a whole. And periodically, the Union will have leadership advantage. Also CSA leaders have substantially more special abilities than US leaders.
Now some other factors are not included in my calculations. For example, each reb element lost in battle results in a greater combat effectiveness loss than a union element lost. Also I am not certain that a DEF/OFFFire difference of 11 vs 20 is really a 100% increase in combat efficiency but I suspect it is close. And I may have missed some factors having an impact on battle effectiveness but I don't think so. Someone let me know if I have missed any significant modifiers or if you have a better calculation of impact of modifiers. Any errors of any sort, let me know. But my guess is the numbers do give us a good ballpark idea of the effectiveness of offense vs defense.
So what is my conclusion from these ballpark numbers? Defense is immensely powerful. A Union force of 18 Union divisions wanting to attack 3 CSA divisions converts into a battle with negative 5.1-11.5 odds early war or negative 7.6-14.4 odds late war favoring the confederates. Basically a 6-1 force odds converts into 1-2 odds with 18 available divisions vs 3 divisions.
Actually a very powerful defense is probably a good influence on the game when you are playing the AI-whether a person plays the Union or CSA side. The AI receives substantial help when defending against those very powerful attacks which humans can consistently put together.
However I am not convinced this type of powerful defense has such a good impact between two humans in a PBEM game. Basically the offense is shut down for both the CSA and the Union player unless one side does have a massive manpower advantage. Or the engine is tweaked to increase the effectiveness of the offense.
And the engine can be tweaked. Many of the factors I have listed can be easily modified. Entrenchments, march to guns, command control, entrenchments, DEFFire/OFFire and possibly cohesion loss can be modified if we wish to open up the offensive side of the game for both the CSA and US player. In addition, manpower and numbers of divisons per side can be adjusted.
I suspect a tweaked engine could be very useful purely for enhanced PBEM play if a proper balance is achieved. And I think it is probably needed for PBEM play.
So any thoughts? Any comments? Any major errors in my process?
First I created a hypothetical situation. It is March 62 or maybe 64. The Union has 18 divisions in 6 corps deployed in Alexandria and Loudon, Virginia. The rebs have 6 divisions in 2 corps with one corps each deployed in Manassas and Clarke, Virginia and connected by railroad. The rebs have had all winter to entrench and are at level 8 entrenchment. The Union decides to use every available division to attack one of the reb corps at Manassas after the snows have melted in their spring offensive.
This is a fairly realistic situation except the Union rarely, if ever, develops a 3-1 odds advantage in divisions on a front.
First factor: In creating this battle, the Union has to activate corps to attack.
1861/62--Average Union corps strategic leadership of 2. Thus 2 of 6 corps available at any one time or 6 divisions can launch an attack.
1863 onwards--Average Union corps strategic leadership of 3. Thus 3 of 6 corps available at any one time or 9 divisions can launch an attack.
1861/62--Attack launched with 6 Union divisions vs 3 CSA divisions.
1863/on--Attack launched with 9 Union divisions vs 3 CSA divisions.
Second factor: The attacking units must march into the region before attacking the CSA divisions. Assume 10-20% cohesion loss prior to combat in good to average ground/weather/terrain conditions. I will use the midpoint of 15% resulting in a 15% reduction in combat ability prior to battle. Cohesion loss is going to vary substantially with greater loss with poorer ground/weather/terrain conditions. The CSA does not suffer cohesion loss prior to battle as they are stationary. (I have not found the modifiers for cohesion loss. So my numbers are roughly based on a number of test moves. If you test, remember that if the formation does not march the entire 15 days, some cohesion recovery occurs.)
1861/62--5.1 Union divisions vs 3 CSA divisions
1863/on--7.6 Union divisions vs 3 CSA divisions
Third factor: Infantry in defense uses DEFFire while attacking infantry uses OFFFire. In early war, DEFFire is 16 and OFFFire is 10. So units on defense are 1.6 times stronger than units on offense. Later war upgrades give DEFFire of 20 and OFFFire of 11. So units on defense are approximately 2 times stronger than units of offense. Thus 3 CSA division are equivalent to 4.8 divisions early war till later war upgrade which makes them equivalent to 6 divisions.
1861/62--5.1 union divisions vs 4.8 CSA divisions
1863/on--7.6 Union divisions vs 6 CSA divisions
Fourth factor: Defending infantry in level 8 entrenchments receive a 40% bonus to their DEFFire hit effectiveness. So I am assuming a 40% increase in total combat effectiveness.
1861/62--5.1 Union divisions vs 6.7 CSA divisions
1863/on--7.6 Union divisions vs 8.4 CSA divisions
Fifth factor: Basically 100 percent of the time, reinforcements will arrive via railroad using March to the Guns by round one or two of a battle. So those three divisions in Clarke will arrive in Manassas as "march to the guns" reinforcements. Those reinforcements should not receive entrenchment benefits but should receive DEFFire benefits---so equivalent of 4.8 divisions early and 6 divisions late war.
1861/62--5.1 Union divisions vs 11.5 divisions
1863/on--7.6 Union divisions vs 14.4 divisions
I am guessing the early war CSA leadership advantage is worth an additional 5-20% increase in combat effectiveness of CSA divisions but I am not going to include those modifiers. The leadership will vary battle by battle. Overall, the CSA will receive whatever CSA advantage they have as a whole. And periodically, the Union will have leadership advantage. Also CSA leaders have substantially more special abilities than US leaders.
Now some other factors are not included in my calculations. For example, each reb element lost in battle results in a greater combat effectiveness loss than a union element lost. Also I am not certain that a DEF/OFFFire difference of 11 vs 20 is really a 100% increase in combat efficiency but I suspect it is close. And I may have missed some factors having an impact on battle effectiveness but I don't think so. Someone let me know if I have missed any significant modifiers or if you have a better calculation of impact of modifiers. Any errors of any sort, let me know. But my guess is the numbers do give us a good ballpark idea of the effectiveness of offense vs defense.
So what is my conclusion from these ballpark numbers? Defense is immensely powerful. A Union force of 18 Union divisions wanting to attack 3 CSA divisions converts into a battle with negative 5.1-11.5 odds early war or negative 7.6-14.4 odds late war favoring the confederates. Basically a 6-1 force odds converts into 1-2 odds with 18 available divisions vs 3 divisions.
Actually a very powerful defense is probably a good influence on the game when you are playing the AI-whether a person plays the Union or CSA side. The AI receives substantial help when defending against those very powerful attacks which humans can consistently put together.
However I am not convinced this type of powerful defense has such a good impact between two humans in a PBEM game. Basically the offense is shut down for both the CSA and the Union player unless one side does have a massive manpower advantage. Or the engine is tweaked to increase the effectiveness of the offense.
And the engine can be tweaked. Many of the factors I have listed can be easily modified. Entrenchments, march to guns, command control, entrenchments, DEFFire/OFFire and possibly cohesion loss can be modified if we wish to open up the offensive side of the game for both the CSA and US player. In addition, manpower and numbers of divisons per side can be adjusted.
I suspect a tweaked engine could be very useful purely for enhanced PBEM play if a proper balance is achieved. And I think it is probably needed for PBEM play.
So any thoughts? Any comments? Any major errors in my process?
Pocus wrote:As a side, personnal note, I don't believe in game mecanism which caps in a hard way, manpower in games. Show me a country at war who was not able to find meat shield for armies, even if the soldiers we teenage or sixty years old (Germany in 44-45 and CSA 64-65).
So you should get a diminished return in quality and quantity, but an hard cap is both irrealistic and very 'screwy' for the AI.
From my prespective, the more choices the better. Especially against the AI, manpower choices are a useful option. I can select volunteers only if I want a more challenging game. Or full draft, full manpower, if I want an easier game.
The difficulties arrive in PBEM games. In every game, but possibly one, my opponents have always gone full manpower. Which left me with only one choice. Which was also go full manpower or lose the game. And I did lose my first 2 PBEMs badly and very quickly when I choose the historical options vs CSA choices of full manpower.
Basically options disappear because the CSA player with enough reb manpower combined with their leadership advantage can win the game in the first year or two if the Union player doesn't select max manpower as well. The penalties for choosing max manpower are not enough to negate winning the war quickly or surviving. And most CSA players want to win. The many options against the AI, collapses into a single option in a PBEM.
So in PBEM games, multiple options are reduced to a single option unless both sides agree to historical options. And unfortunately, the single option is the non-historical maximum manpower from day one. Which results in a game with ahistorically large armies which clog up the map frontage, end manueverability and stagnant both the eastern and western fronts very early in the game.
My initial thoughts are that reduced manpower, possibly less variance in manpower options and/or real penalties for extreme manpower options might provide a more enjoyable and historical PBEM experience.
I'm not really a 'numbers guy' so I'm not going to comment on your analysis of entrenchments.
I will say however that the lesson of Gettysburg, Fredericksburg, Cold Harbor, etc, indeed the overall theme of the entire Civil War, is that defensive fire is more powerful than offensive fire, and attacking entrenchments is always going to lead to heavy casualties.
As such, the acme of skill is getting your opponent to attack you in a strong position, not to deliver such an attack. Maneuver is the key, and that's what is wholly missing from your analysis.
I have an uncomfortable feeling that you are looking to rebalance the game so that you can smash into entrenched positions and still come out ahead, instead of learning to maneuver your opponent out of a position.
That said, I do think there is some virtue to making 'march to the guns' more unpredicatable. There shouldn't be a guarantee that spread out corps will always be able to reinforce a threatened point. If there is even say a 25% chance that an attacked corps will not be reinforced, the player will, on the margin, be somewhat more disinclined to disperse corps over several regions, and an attacker will always have a chance to hit a single corps to some advantage.
I will say however that the lesson of Gettysburg, Fredericksburg, Cold Harbor, etc, indeed the overall theme of the entire Civil War, is that defensive fire is more powerful than offensive fire, and attacking entrenchments is always going to lead to heavy casualties.
As such, the acme of skill is getting your opponent to attack you in a strong position, not to deliver such an attack. Maneuver is the key, and that's what is wholly missing from your analysis.
I have an uncomfortable feeling that you are looking to rebalance the game so that you can smash into entrenched positions and still come out ahead, instead of learning to maneuver your opponent out of a position.
That said, I do think there is some virtue to making 'march to the guns' more unpredicatable. There shouldn't be a guarantee that spread out corps will always be able to reinforce a threatened point. If there is even say a 25% chance that an attacked corps will not be reinforced, the player will, on the margin, be somewhat more disinclined to disperse corps over several regions, and an attacker will always have a chance to hit a single corps to some advantage.
runyan99 wrote:As such, the acme of skill is getting your opponent to attack you in a strong position, not to deliver such an attack. Maneuver is the key, and that's what is wholly missing from your analysis.
I have an uncomfortable feeling that you are looking to rebalance the game so that you can smash into entrenched positions and still come out ahead, instead of learning to maneuver your opponent out of a position.
No absolutely not trying to make entrenchments useless. You are missing my point.
I would like to see room for maneuver more than anything else. If sides have to move, then they will fight without large entrenchment benefits.
As I said in an earlier post, I am seeing long lines of entrenchments, well manned which are suicide to attack in my current PBEM. Neither side attacks at all on the Eastern Front. No dash by Lee for Gettysburg as he can't get through my entrenchments. A few massive concentrated attacks in the west at weak points in the trenchline. Absolutely no attacks by the CSA in the west at all. Forget Shiloh. All maneuver is in the gulf with sea invasions followed by quickly created trench lines during every pause in the action. Eventually, the CSA may thin out the East in response to actions in the Gulf but till then, nothing is happening in the East. I can't remember the last time, the CSA has attacked anywhere.
These are very ahistorical situations which is more reflective of WW1 than the Civil War due, IMO, to the extreme power of ACW defense, spread out forces and large manpower pools.
The combination of quantity and ratios of manpower plus powerful defense is fine against the AI but not so good in PBEMs, IMO.
Also you may want spend the time to understand the numbers provided. They make a reasonably good case for the offensive/defensive balance.
runyan99 wrote:Sometime soon, you and I should play a PBEM, and we'll see if you can form a defensive line that I cannot flank.
When I have time for another game.
Of course, regardless of a regular game or not, the numbers remain the same, the map has too many troops and you can't attack entrenched lines directly without heavy, heavy losses.
And show me how Lee is going to make a dash at Gettysburg in 63. He can't...period.
One other factor is the number of ** generals floating around, particularly early in the game. After all, if you don't have ** generals, you cannot form corps, and if you cannot form corps you cannot form a long defensive line that is mutually supporting.
This is why I have been trying to get extra ** generals who never commanded corps, like Bonham, Edward Johnson, Charles Hamilton, etc. demoted to * status for some time now, but AGEOD wants plenty of corps early in the game for the benefit of the AI.
I would certainly like to see AGEOD form a new scenario with some leader reform along these lines.
This is why I have been trying to get extra ** generals who never commanded corps, like Bonham, Edward Johnson, Charles Hamilton, etc. demoted to * status for some time now, but AGEOD wants plenty of corps early in the game for the benefit of the AI.
I would certainly like to see AGEOD form a new scenario with some leader reform along these lines.
runyan99 wrote:One other factor is the number of ** generals floating around, particularly early in the game. After all, if you don't have ** generals, you cannot form corps, and if you cannot form corps you cannot form a long defensive line that is mutually supporting.
This is why I have been trying to get extra ** generals who never commanded corps, like Bonham, Edward Johnson, Charles Hamilton, etc. demoted to * status for some time now, but AGEOD wants plenty of corps early in the game for the benefit of the AI.
I would certainly like to see AGEOD form a new scenario with some leader reform along these lines.
I agree. Often, I think features which improve play against the AI, can have a negative impact on PBEM play.
I am a big believer in scenarios designed specifically for either play against the AI or play between humans. I think it is very difficult to design a scenario which is equally good whether played against the AI or as PBEM.
Well Jagger, the good news is that a modder like you who knows how to compile a scenario from the database could create a new scenario with more historical leader ranks and arrival times without too much of a problem.
In fact, if you didn't change any leader attributes, and didn't add any new leaders (or maybe added just a handful) you might well be able to persuade AGEOD to include such a new scenario as an official part of the AACW package.
In fact, if you didn't change any leader attributes, and didn't add any new leaders (or maybe added just a handful) you might well be able to persuade AGEOD to include such a new scenario as an official part of the AACW package.
runyan99 wrote:Well Jagger, the good news is that a modder like you who knows how to compile a scenario from the database could create a new scenario with more historical leader ranks and arrival times without too much of a problem.
In fact, if you didn't change any leader attributes, and didn't add any new leaders (or maybe added just a handful) you might well be able to persuade AGEOD to include such a new scenario as an official part of the AACW package.
One problem is that I will be using modified files which would impact all scenarios-not just PBEM designed scenarios. If I change the March to Guns or command control files, those changes impact all scenarios whether best for AI or PBEM games.
That has always been a difficulty with modding for AGEOD games. The good part is we are given access to modify parts of the game which most companies would never provide. But then, the modded files impact all scenarios instead of restricted to a specific scenario. And I am definitely not complaining at all as I really appreciate the access to the files.
Myself, I usually have two copies of ACW. One is for unmodded games and the other is for modded games. Sometimes I even have three copies with two for two differently modded versions of the game.
I don't think it would be too hard to make a good scenario specifically for PBEM. The drawback is it takes lots of time to test in PBEM. Also it requies someone willing to mod during the game and analyze the game as it is playing. It isn't a pure competitive game but also a testing of processes and ideas. It could be called a collaborative, competitive game.
For those who only play PBEM games, a single modified ACW would be fine. But not good, for those who regularly or primarily play against the AI or play both AI and PBEM games. They would definitely need two copies of ACw on their computer.
PS--I am not that interested in the leader ratings. I usually play with slightly modified values anyway. If there was some consensus, it would be very easy to modify leadership values. Although I definitely think the tactical prowness of both Grant and Sherman are overrated. Strategically, yes they are strong. Tactically, IMO, they were very average. It just they never quit and had lots of men to fill the holes.
Right, but we could use a new version of the April scenario with fewer corps commanders and leaders that show up at the proper times. I've been trying to make that happen for a long time. Changing other variables is a whole different and seperate issue.
Tell you what. If I work on a new scenario with some modified leader ranks, will you help me compile the .xls files into a new scenario?
Tell you what. If I work on a new scenario with some modified leader ranks, will you help me compile the .xls files into a new scenario?
runyan99 wrote:Right, but we could use a new version of the April scenario with fewer corps commanders and leaders that show up at the proper times. I've been trying to make that happen for a long time. Changing other variables is a whole different and seperate issue.
Tell you what. If I work on a new scenario with some modified leader ranks, will you help me compile the .xls files into a new scenario?
Yes, I can do that. Just let me know when you have the data.
I am calling it a night. Getting late here.
runyan99 wrote:Well Jagger, the good news is that a modder like you who knows how to compile a scenario from the database could create a new scenario with more historical leader ranks and arrival times without too much of a problem.
Point.
Totally disregarding his examination on numbers that surely comes out of long hours of studying and calculating, i think this with the Corps being harder to form due to lack of ** generals is a good idea that would contribute to a more accurate simulation.
The problem of manouvering and how it simulated in the engine is a little more complex...technically a trench is a line...it may have bends but the object is to focus all of the troops' firepower on a single direction. Your troops are in trench, their troops are in the open. The goal of the attacker is to manouver so the attack comes from the side where you hit the trench from the side, not from the front.
Attacking from the direction of Washington towards Alexandria, would find the trenchline, but attacking from the direction of Port Tobacco to Alexandria for example, would NOT find such line....(it's an example, u wouldn't need to change region actually)
Problem is right there...
[SIGPIC][/SIGPIC]
We ain't going down!
We ain't going down!
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McNaughton
- Posts: 2766
- Joined: Wed Mar 21, 2007 8:47 pm
- Location: Toronto, Canada
You don't even need specific scenarios to have the AI have promoted leaders while human players will not. The event system can have automatic promotions specifically for the AI (let alone a specific difficulty of AI), that will not happen for players. Therefore, a PBEM game played by two players will have very few 2-star generals, while, the same scenario played against the AI will have the AI benefit by having 2-star generals.
It is possible to have the same scenario played by a Human, and having just a bunch of 1-star generals, while the same scenario played by the AI has these generals promoted via event.
Also, these aren't "Trenches" in the Great War sense. They are "fortified positions", of fortresses and mutually supporting strong points. That's what a Civil War fortification is. In most cases, you cannot 'out flank it', unless you capture a key fortification (See Winchester II, attempts at Petersburg and Vicksburg) or threaten to cut off its supply line. In the civil war, there was no way to turn a flank of a fort, as it was not a trench line (as people are saying), but strong points of 360 degree protection (so you have to target their supply lines). There is discussion of corps lined up as a 'trench line', but in reality they are in fortifications that control the region (that's the job of a fort/castle, to control vital aspects of a particular region).
Also, the concern really should not be a major lowering of all manpower to reach an arbitrary number or unit build, but, to increase the distance between the USA and CSA. It may be, for game playability, to have the ratio to become 2:1 in manpower, and see how it plays out until you try and go for something like 3:1. I say, slightly increase the USA manpower, and slightly decrease the CSA manpower, then the ratio should be better without completely messing up the game's balancing.
It is possible to have the same scenario played by a Human, and having just a bunch of 1-star generals, while the same scenario played by the AI has these generals promoted via event.
Also, these aren't "Trenches" in the Great War sense. They are "fortified positions", of fortresses and mutually supporting strong points. That's what a Civil War fortification is. In most cases, you cannot 'out flank it', unless you capture a key fortification (See Winchester II, attempts at Petersburg and Vicksburg) or threaten to cut off its supply line. In the civil war, there was no way to turn a flank of a fort, as it was not a trench line (as people are saying), but strong points of 360 degree protection (so you have to target their supply lines). There is discussion of corps lined up as a 'trench line', but in reality they are in fortifications that control the region (that's the job of a fort/castle, to control vital aspects of a particular region).
Also, the concern really should not be a major lowering of all manpower to reach an arbitrary number or unit build, but, to increase the distance between the USA and CSA. It may be, for game playability, to have the ratio to become 2:1 in manpower, and see how it plays out until you try and go for something like 3:1. I say, slightly increase the USA manpower, and slightly decrease the CSA manpower, then the ratio should be better without completely messing up the game's balancing.
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McNaughton
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These statistics do not take into account that Union Artillery (which is better than their CSA counterparts) has a greater rating than 10 or 11 for attack. Artillery makes up about 1/3-1/4 the size of an army, meaning that this element has a much greater punch while attacking. So, rating combat power purely on Infantry statistics is missing an entire aspect of combat.
Without any goals to attack, the CSA will not do so. I am designing a sub-mod for my mod to address the issues of manpower and 'drive' and 'goals' for sides in the Civil War which should effectively address most of the problems posted in this thread.
It deals with manpower issues, as I have added attrition. The attrition drain is pretty significant, requiring a certain amount of resources to keep your forces at strength (I am even thinking of decreasing its effect). Whether or not players like it is a matter of opinion. To me, it is historic, if someone doesn't want to play historically that is their choice.
Also, having goals for capturing and/or raiding certain areas at certain times, with facing a constant reducing National Morale will get player to actually do things.
You simply won't be allowed to sit, as the Confederates, in your defensive fortresses as your NM will be decreasing at a rate that you lose the game by inactivity. Both sides will have offensive goals, meaning that in order to keep your NM stable you must raid and capture (at least temporarily) certain territories.
Fighting a purely defensive war is a major morale shock. By losing the initiative you are constantly responding to enemy actions, and having to fight at your farms and in your cities. Taking the war to enemy territory is the goal in every combat engagement. Eventually, even if they win all of their battles, the CSA would be more war weary than the USA purely on the basis that their farms and towns are getting burned and pilliaged, while the North only experiences casualty lists (with their land intact).
Fighting, and winning, in enemy territory is much more significant than fighting and winning in your territory, as after your victory, you wait for the next assault, and so on, with no end in sight. If you fight and lose in enemy territory, you can retreat and fall back, as you have room to manoever, and regroup. Some say the CSA was foolish for attacking, I say they would have definitely lost fighting a defensive war, and gambled with an offensive war to shock the North into peace talks.
Without any goals to attack, the CSA will not do so. I am designing a sub-mod for my mod to address the issues of manpower and 'drive' and 'goals' for sides in the Civil War which should effectively address most of the problems posted in this thread.
It deals with manpower issues, as I have added attrition. The attrition drain is pretty significant, requiring a certain amount of resources to keep your forces at strength (I am even thinking of decreasing its effect). Whether or not players like it is a matter of opinion. To me, it is historic, if someone doesn't want to play historically that is their choice.
Also, having goals for capturing and/or raiding certain areas at certain times, with facing a constant reducing National Morale will get player to actually do things.
You simply won't be allowed to sit, as the Confederates, in your defensive fortresses as your NM will be decreasing at a rate that you lose the game by inactivity. Both sides will have offensive goals, meaning that in order to keep your NM stable you must raid and capture (at least temporarily) certain territories.
Fighting a purely defensive war is a major morale shock. By losing the initiative you are constantly responding to enemy actions, and having to fight at your farms and in your cities. Taking the war to enemy territory is the goal in every combat engagement. Eventually, even if they win all of their battles, the CSA would be more war weary than the USA purely on the basis that their farms and towns are getting burned and pilliaged, while the North only experiences casualty lists (with their land intact).
Fighting, and winning, in enemy territory is much more significant than fighting and winning in your territory, as after your victory, you wait for the next assault, and so on, with no end in sight. If you fight and lose in enemy territory, you can retreat and fall back, as you have room to manoever, and regroup. Some say the CSA was foolish for attacking, I say they would have definitely lost fighting a defensive war, and gambled with an offensive war to shock the North into peace talks.
I wanted to add one factor I missed which impacts offensive/defensive balance. And modify a second factor.
I did not factor in the difference between Union/CSA infantry. In looking closely at units, the early war Union infantry/cavalry are both significantly weaker than comparable CSA infantry/cavalry. Typical, early war union infantry has lower initiative, TQ, assault and cohesion values than CSA infantry. The cohesion difference is appoximately 12% (85-70). This would be approximately 12% plus reduction in Union attacks with early war infantry. However, this would be an increase in the effectiveness in CSA attacks. So a new modifier consider offense/defense balance is the 12%+ effectiveness advantage to CSA attacks and a negative 12%+ modifier to Union early war attacks.
Late war infantry have the same 80 cohesion value. As late war CSA infantry/cavalry are reduced in effectiveness and late war US infantry/cavalry are increased in effectiveness.
This is a factor I would not want to touch although still important in considering the balance between offense/defense. I think these data ratings are a very historical reflection of the differences between the two armies. Although I am curious as to the transition point between early war and late war troops of both CSA and Union troops.
Second, a correction to cohesion impact. My cohesion calculations did not consider the cost of cohesion loss at 3x during movement into enemy terrain. I used 1x instead. So the cohesion loss during approach to battle is substantially higher than the 10-20%.
So a 5 day approach march in the ideal conditions of clear terrain and clear weather will produce a 15 point cohesion loss. Average early war Union troops at cohesion 70 will be reduced to 55 cohesion before the battle starts or 78% combat effectiveness. CSA troops drop to 75 cohesion from 85 or 88% combat efficiency. Late war CSA/Union troops drop from 80 to 65 cohesion. Thus late war troops would be at 81% battle effectiveness.
Meanwhile, defensive troops remain at 100% cohesion as they have not moved.
A ten day approach march in less than ideal conditions of clear terrain and mud will produce a 30 point cohesion loss. Average early war Union troops at cohesion 70 will be reduced to 40 cohesion before the battle starts or 57% combat efficiency. CSA troops drop to 55 cohesion before battle or 64% combat efficiency. Late war CSA/Union troops drop from 80 to 50 cohesion or 62% combat efficiency.
Meanwhile, defensive troops remain at 100% cohesion as they have not moved.
I see a minimum reduction of 28% in early war Union troops and a worse case (14 day march) reduction of 60% in combat efficiency of early war Union troops. Those are very large reductions in attack power without any impact on defensive power.
So instead of the 10-20% cohesion reduction in combat power during approach to battle, the combat effectiveness loss would be between 28% to 60% for early war Union infantry. Early war CSA would suffer a 12% to 50%. Late war infantry would suffer a 19% to 53% loss in combat effectiveness.
For PBEM play, I think we need to look closely at cohesion loss due to movement. In particular, the 3x modifier when moving into enemy controlled terrain.
Anybody know where the 3x modifier is located for movement in enemy terrain? It has a significant impact on the offensive/defensive balance. Or we could play around with the 100% cohesion modifier for clear terrain.
Good point, McNaughton. I will see how easy it is to calculate the impact. But definitely, a plus for the Union side.
I did not factor in the difference between Union/CSA infantry. In looking closely at units, the early war Union infantry/cavalry are both significantly weaker than comparable CSA infantry/cavalry. Typical, early war union infantry has lower initiative, TQ, assault and cohesion values than CSA infantry. The cohesion difference is appoximately 12% (85-70). This would be approximately 12% plus reduction in Union attacks with early war infantry. However, this would be an increase in the effectiveness in CSA attacks. So a new modifier consider offense/defense balance is the 12%+ effectiveness advantage to CSA attacks and a negative 12%+ modifier to Union early war attacks.
Late war infantry have the same 80 cohesion value. As late war CSA infantry/cavalry are reduced in effectiveness and late war US infantry/cavalry are increased in effectiveness.
This is a factor I would not want to touch although still important in considering the balance between offense/defense. I think these data ratings are a very historical reflection of the differences between the two armies. Although I am curious as to the transition point between early war and late war troops of both CSA and Union troops.
Second, a correction to cohesion impact. My cohesion calculations did not consider the cost of cohesion loss at 3x during movement into enemy terrain. I used 1x instead. So the cohesion loss during approach to battle is substantially higher than the 10-20%.
So a 5 day approach march in the ideal conditions of clear terrain and clear weather will produce a 15 point cohesion loss. Average early war Union troops at cohesion 70 will be reduced to 55 cohesion before the battle starts or 78% combat effectiveness. CSA troops drop to 75 cohesion from 85 or 88% combat efficiency. Late war CSA/Union troops drop from 80 to 65 cohesion. Thus late war troops would be at 81% battle effectiveness.
Meanwhile, defensive troops remain at 100% cohesion as they have not moved.
A ten day approach march in less than ideal conditions of clear terrain and mud will produce a 30 point cohesion loss. Average early war Union troops at cohesion 70 will be reduced to 40 cohesion before the battle starts or 57% combat efficiency. CSA troops drop to 55 cohesion before battle or 64% combat efficiency. Late war CSA/Union troops drop from 80 to 50 cohesion or 62% combat efficiency.
Meanwhile, defensive troops remain at 100% cohesion as they have not moved.
I see a minimum reduction of 28% in early war Union troops and a worse case (14 day march) reduction of 60% in combat efficiency of early war Union troops. Those are very large reductions in attack power without any impact on defensive power.
So instead of the 10-20% cohesion reduction in combat power during approach to battle, the combat effectiveness loss would be between 28% to 60% for early war Union infantry. Early war CSA would suffer a 12% to 50%. Late war infantry would suffer a 19% to 53% loss in combat effectiveness.
For PBEM play, I think we need to look closely at cohesion loss due to movement. In particular, the 3x modifier when moving into enemy controlled terrain.
Anybody know where the 3x modifier is located for movement in enemy terrain? It has a significant impact on the offensive/defensive balance. Or we could play around with the 100% cohesion modifier for clear terrain.
These statistics do not take into account that Union Artillery (which is better than their CSA counterparts) has a greater rating than 10 or 11 for attack. Artillery makes up about 1/3-1/4 the size of an army, meaning that this element has a much greater punch while attacking. So, rating combat power purely on Infantry statistics is missing an entire aspect of combat.
Good point, McNaughton. I will see how easy it is to calculate the impact. But definitely, a plus for the Union side.
Fighting, and winning, in enemy territory is much more significant than fighting and winning in your territory, as after your victory, you wait for the next assault, and so on, with no end in sight. If you fight and lose in enemy territory, you can retreat and fall back, as you have room to manoever, and regroup. Some say the CSA was foolish for attacking, I say they would have definitely lost fighting a defensive war, and gambled with an offensive war to shock the North into peace talks.
I definitely would like to see attractive incentives for the CSA to launch invasions. Although I wouldn't want to see the CSA lose the game if they didn't launch invasions or their invasions are unsuccessful.
Of course, we have to provide the maneuver space which will allow CSA invasions in the first place.
BTW, is anybody actually looking at the numbers? I noticed several people commenting that they aren't. I understand it takes a bit of time to comprehend them but they do make a very compelling case as to the offensive/defensive balance of the game.
Those numbers produce results on the battlefield. Also if you understand the numbers, they will allow you to use your troops to meet their maximum potential within the game.
It really helps your game performance to take the time to try to understand them. My two cents worth of advice.
apy:
Those numbers produce results on the battlefield. Also if you understand the numbers, they will allow you to use your troops to meet their maximum potential within the game.
It really helps your game performance to take the time to try to understand them. My two cents worth of advice.
apy:-
Jabberwock
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Jagger wrote:For PBEM play, I think we need to look closely at cohesion loss due to movement. In particular, the 3x modifier when moving into enemy controlled terrain.
Anybody know where the 3x modifier is located for movement in enemy terrain? It has a significant impact on the offensive/defensive balance. Or we could play around with the 100% cohesion modifier for clear terrain.
I don't know where the modifier is located, but I would like to point out that if that is all that is adjusted, I will be sorely tempted to return to my ahistorical deep raiding ways (both in PBEM and against the AI). Perhaps if this penalty was cut back, and another small penalty was added that applied to a stack (same penalty no matter the size) and then distributed evenly to all the units in the stack, that might accomplish what you are looking for without setting regions near the Canadian or Mexican borders on fire.
[color="DimGray"] You deserve to be spanked[/color]
Jabberwock wrote:I don't know where the modifier is located, but I would like to point out that if that is all that is adjusted, I will be sorely tempted to return to my ahistorical deep raiding ways (both in PBEM and against the AI). Perhaps if this penalty was cut back, and another small penalty was added that applied to a stack (same penalty no matter the size) and then distributed evenly to all the units in the stack, that might accomplish what you are looking for without setting regions near the Canadian or Mexican borders on fire.
Outside of my first two PBEM's, I have never had a serious problem with raids. Usually I use rails and track down raiders with cavalry while militia holds down cities. I always create large numbers of cavalry from day one.
I think the 3x cohesion loss helps but am not certain it is the dominant factor in halting raids. Perhaps it is. I know my Union cavalry is almost worthless in raids because cohesion is gone after a turn of movement.
Although I suspect the model spreadsheet could be used to mod out the 3x modifier for infantry/artillery only. Changing the 100% cohesion modifier to 33% would cancel out the 3x modifier for infantry/artillery while the 3x modifier for cavalry in enemy terrain would remain. That might work.
That change would make infantry/artillery suffer less cohesion loss in all situations. Cavalry might be fast but far less durable in long marches than infantry/artillery. Cavalry would still have severe cohesion problems in enemy territory. Although if you wanted to launch raids with infantry/artillery, they would actually maintain cohesion better than cavalry in enemy terrain. Unrealistic but how often would a human player launch a railroad cutting expedition with a brigade of slow infantry?
I have always felt the cohesion loss was too high for what appears to be simple marches. As the Union, I always use railroads rather than march and I usually have the railroads to do just that.
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Jabberwock
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Jagger wrote:This is a factor I would not want to touch although still important in considering the balance between offense/defense. I think these data ratings are a very historical reflection of the differences between the two armies. Although I am curious as to the transition point between early war and late war troops of both CSA and Union troops.
You've got me thinking about specific battles where historians have noted improvements in troop discipline, particularly for the federal AoP.
The first significant one would be the Seven Days (overall the commanders weren't great, but the troops were much improved).
Gettysburg was definitely a turning point. Before Gettysburg was Fredericksburg & Chancellorsville, after was the Wilderness & Cold Harbor. It wasn't just command changes that made the difference - it was not the same army it had been.
Around the time of Cold Harbor, Grant started bringing in the "heavies" as replacements. Some historians think that was a step backward, as far as troop quality, but they did fairly well around Petersburg.
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Jabberwock wrote:You've got me thinking about specific battles where historians have noted improvements in troop discipline, particularly for the federal AoP.
The first significant one would be the Seven Days (overall the commanders weren't great, but the troops were much improved).
Gettysburg was definitely a turning point. Before Gettysburg was Fredericksburg & Chancellorsville, after was the Wilderness & Cold Harbor. It wasn't just command changes that made the difference - it was not the same army it had been.
Around the time of Cold Harbor, Grant started bringing in the "heavies" as replacements. Some historians think that was a step backward, as far as troop quality, but they did fairly well around Petersburg.
Time and experience makes the difference in transition from conscripts to regulars. Militia rarely made that transition as they lacked both.
We see this transition in the game through battle star experience. Battle experienced regulars are significantly more combat efficient than non-battle experienced regulars.
I think entrenchments are another example of combat experience and changes in doctrine as the war progressed. Early and mid war entrenchments of armies on the march were completely different from the entrenchments created from 1864 onwards. The 1864 entrenchments sound like something straight out of World War I. Very highly evolved and created the moment a formation halted after a days march. Very different from the quality and priority placed on entrenchments created by armies in the field earlier in the war. At Gettysburg in 63, not much there in terms of entrenchments which I suspect might have been far more extensive in 64.
Jagger wrote:
I have always felt the cohesion loss was too high for what appears to be simple marches. As the Union, I always use railroads rather than march and I usually have the railroads to do just that.
It's too low...Stragglers were everywhere during the war, for both sides... I suspect the current value to be a compromise for avoiding AI to be blended and to simulate some stragglers came back to their units.
Clovis wrote:It's too low...Stragglers were everywhere during the war, for both sides... I suspect the current value to be a compromise for avoiding AI to be blended and to simulate some stragglers came back to their units.
One thing to bear in mind is that stragglers often returned to their formations at the end of the day. Within the game, you do not recover from cohesion loss until you halt. So your stragglers are lost for the entire 5 or 14 days or however long until you halt. And if you end your 10 day march in battle, those stragglers are still lost in terms of cohesion for battle purposes. When in reality, many of those stragglers would be available again the next morning after each days march.
Another point, does an army lose 20% of its combat effectiveness after a regular normal march (non-force march) of 5 days on good ground and clear terrain even in enemy terrain? My first thought is it sounds too high to me. I could understand in bad weather such as mud or snow or say in a forced march but not a normal march with regular halts, etc.
Also I am only looking at changes for PBEM play. I actually want to remove or adjust factors that provide AI benefit but negatively impact human PBEM play.
What is this x3 modifier? There are two costs when a unit move:
a) the cohesion per day loss, in 1/100 of pts
b) the cohesion loss because of lack of military control, which is 1.5 pts if no control at all (from memory)
a) the cohesion per day loss, in 1/100 of pts
b) the cohesion loss because of lack of military control, which is 1.5 pts if no control at all (from memory)
Hofstadter's Law: "It always takes longer than you expect, even when you take into account Hofstadter's law."
Pocus wrote:What is this x3 modifier? There are two costs when a unit move:
a) the cohesion per day loss, in 1/100 of pts
b) the cohesion loss because of lack of military control, which is 1.5 pts if no control at all (from memory)
I believe Jabberwocky mentioned the 3x loss while in enemy terrain. I also remember that change to reduce the effectiveness of raids from two or three months back. Perhaps it is mentioned in the patch changes?
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Jabberwock
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Jagger wrote:Outside of my first two PBEM's, I have never had a serious problem with raids. Usually I use rails and track down raiders with cavalry while militia holds down cities. I always create large numbers of cavalry from day one.
I think the 3x cohesion loss helps but am not certain it is the dominant factor in halting raids. Perhaps it is. I know my Union cavalry is almost worthless in raids because cohesion is gone after a turn of movement.
Although I suspect the model spreadsheet could be used to mod out the 3x modifier for infantry/artillery only. Changing the 100% cohesion modifier to 33% would cancel out the 3x modifier for infantry/artillery while the 3x modifier for cavalry in enemy terrain would remain. That might work.
That change would make infantry/artillery suffer less cohesion loss in all situations. Cavalry might be fast but far less durable in long marches than infantry/artillery. Cavalry would still have severe cohesion problems in enemy territory. Although if you wanted to launch raids with infantry/artillery, they would actually maintain cohesion better than cavalry in enemy terrain. Unrealistic but how often would a human player launch a railroad cutting expedition with a brigade of slow infantry?
I try to fill up on sharpshooters and marines once the cavalry is filled out. The ones that don't go into divisions and corps get used for raiding. I think marines would suffer less cohesion loss, but those small sharpshooter regiments are another matter.
Jagger wrote:I have always felt the cohesion loss was too high for what appears to be simple marches.
Marching a cohesive force from point a to point b was never simple. Especially in hostile territory. When the hostile territory penalty was raised, I didn't like it, and said so. After a few months experience, I think it is more realistic for small forces than it was before. However, you are correct in pointing out that it is a big problem for the AI (which doesn't use rail correctly) and large forces. This is similar to my complaints about the shore bombardment fix - maybe too much of a good thing.
Jagger wrote:As the Union, I always use railroads rather than march and I usually have the railroads to do just that.
Rails and rivers. As the Union, I still do plenty of small deep raids, but it is mostly based from brigs and transports in accessible rivers (the ones that dont have forts guarding them). As the CSA, I still occasionally use the Hudson & the upper Mississipi for "suicide highways" with riverine movement.
There are some good starting point ideas here. A little of this, a little of that, and teach Athena to use the rails.
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McNaughton
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Clovis wrote:It's too low...Stragglers were everywhere during the war, for both sides... I suspect the current value to be a compromise for avoiding AI to be blended and to simulate some stragglers came back to their units.
I have a concern with the way cohesion is being modelled.
In my opinion, it represents a units ability to sustain combat. It represent's a units will and ability to fight for a duration of time. I understand the concept, that units reduce cohesion while on the march, but, I find that it does not necessarily represent history.
Marching, in AACW terms, is seen as a 'sustainable march', meaning that troops can march at a rate where they can still immediately fight at their top effectiveness. Marching, as in a regular march, means that troops move for so many hours a day. They really aren't pressing themselves or pushing the formations to move as quickly as possible. That aspect is represented by a 'forced march'. Looking at any campaign, and troops partake in sustained periods of marching and fighting, with very little loss of effectiveness in battle.
Even when a unit force marches, such as AP Hill during his reinforcement of Lee at Antietam, many men were lost as stragglers, but, the unit as a whole fought very effectively after it arrived, and the stragglers themselves tended to catch up.
Currently, Cohesion is lost too easily in non-combat situations, meaning that the AI (which is not resting its troops as much as a player) ends up being at a disadvantage. In order to stop raiding, I think that a greater deployment of 'actual force' guarding important bases such as depots should be deployed (I Personally believe that local state troops are under-represented in the game, in both numbers and ability).
(It seems that Jagger and I came to similar conclusions here!)
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