Army HQs used as Corps

[aryaman]

Hi
I presume that the game is designed to give army HQs an especial role, however I usually end using them as hyperCorps, especially with the good commanders like Grant and Lee, I think it should be changed somehow to avoid that, for instance giving Army HQs a strict limitation in units they can assume direct command, to reduce them to a basic escort.

[McNaughton]

Hi
I presume that the game is designed to give army HQs an especial role, however I usually end using them as hyperCorps, especially with the good commanders like Grant and Lee, I think it should be changed somehow to avoid that, for instance giving Army HQs a strict limitation in units they can assume direct command, to reduce them to a basic escort.

This doesn't really fit their role in many situations. Take the entire period of 1861, and early 1862, where armies did act like corps. Even at Vicksburg, and later in the war, Armies did take the function of Corps commands.

There are already things in place to limit the ability for Army commands to engage in combat.

[Henry D.]

This doesn't really fit their role in many situations. Take the entire period of 1861, and early 1862, where armies did act like corps. Even at Vicksburg, and later in the war, Armies did take the function of Corps commands.

There are already things in place to limit the ability for Army commands to engage in combat.

As a matter of fact, I sometimes wondered if the game shouldn't have a feature (maybe optional) that prevents forming of corps prior to a certain date (say, until sometime in late 1861/early 1862) entirely, to add a lit bit more authenticity in this regard and simulate the cumbersome process of adapting to having "mass armies" both militaries had to go through in the early stage of the war.

I also tend to use Armies as "additional reserve corps" throughout the game and don't think that is too far off from reality, neither...

Regards, Henry

[Prussian Prince]

You could always just use an in-house rule that limits the amount of troops in an Army HQ. I usually only put one division or a couple of brigades with an Army HQ as a guard of sorts.

[McNaughton]

As a matter of fact, I sometimes wondered if the game shouldn't have a feature (maybe optional) that prevents forming of corps prior to a certain date (say, until sometime in late 1861/early 1862) entirely, to add a lit bit more authenticity in this regard and simulate the cumbersome process of adapting to having "mass armies" both militaries had to go through in the early stage of the war.

I also tend to use Armies as "additional reserve corps" throughout the game and don't think that is too far off from reality, neither...

Regards, Henry

Eliminating the option to form corps would not be historically accurate.

Corps were formed as early as 1861 in reality and spirit (the use of Wings were 'temporary' corps, with a general assigned command over a set of divisions, but for specific operations rather than long term command).

During this era, there were examples of troops fighting well, in large numbers with leaders providing effective command.

The problems were generally a chain of command problem. Commanders could lead their own forces effectively (ranging from 10-30 000 men), yet, when these smaller formations were combined with larger ones (ranging to numbers of 80-100 000), this is where things went awry.

Corps are needed, to provide these effective formations of 10-30 000, yet something else should be in place to cause the difficulties of coordinating corps. Otherwize, you end up with numbers playing too important of a role in combat if everyone is experiencing 35% penalties.

[McNaughton]

Forgot this point. At Chancellorsville, the Army of Northern Virginia was effectively a 1.5 corps formation, with Jackson Commanding the bulk of the forces, while Lee led the half of Longstreets forces left behind. So, having forces under direct army command is NOT unhistoric, or gamey.

[Clovis]

As a matter of fact, I sometimes wondered if the game shouldn't have a feature (maybe optional) that prevents forming of corps prior to a certain date (say, until sometime in late 1861/early 1862) entirely, to add a lit bit more authenticity in this regard and simulate the cumbersome process of adapting to having "mass armies" both militaries had to go through in the early stage of the war.

I also tend to use Armies as "additional reserve corps" throughout the game and don't think that is too far off from reality, neither...

Regards, Henry

I envisioned this point ( it would suffice to remove all army Hq until the 1861 autumn) but I've yet to find a reason to do so with the assurannce it would not be an idiocy rule forcing players to repeat the same errors than in reality. Nothing is indicating corps couldn't be formed from the 1861 atumn. McClellan was pressed to do so by Lincoln but was reluctant.

On the contary, I'm yet thinking about removing all army HQ until september 1861. Both eastern armies weren't sufficiently organized to be real armies in game terms.

This change would then delay corps creation until november 1861.

[Pocus]

There are 2 drawbacks in using an army stack as a corps stack:

a) they never initiate combats by themselves.

b) they don't get bonus from the Army commander (and don't get malus either ). So pound to pound, Sherman Corps commanded by Grant (in Army HQ) will perform better than Sherman in his own Army Stack.

[McNaughton]

I envisioned this point ( it would suffice to remove all army Hq until the 1861 autumn) but I've yet to find a reason to do so with the assurannce it would not be an idiocy rule forcing players to repeat the same errors than in reality. Nothing is indicating corps couldn't be formed from the 1861 atumn. McClellan was pressed to do so by Lincoln but was reluctant.

On the contary, I'm yet thinking about removing all army HQ until september 1861. Both eastern armies weren't sufficiently organized to be real armies in game terms.

This change would then delay corps creation until november 1861.

I don't think that this would be correct. Take a look at Bull Run.

Both Commands fought effectively.

Troops went and manoevered where they should have. Nobody got lost, attacked the wrong spot, and the discilpline level during the battle was fairly good. Johnston managed to arrive with his army, organized, on time, and in the place they needed to be which turned the tide of battle (up to this point most likely a Federal victory, based on numeric superiority).

To me, the Command and Control worked fine in this battle. Armies moved where they were directed, and fought how they should. Shiloh is a better example of a confused combat (even though they had better army organization, as well as more experience).

Here are the real problems, and issues, of the day.

#1. Troop training and discipline. The troops in 1861 were not yet the troops of 1863. They marched very slowly, and military discipline in the ranks was not truely formed by this point.

#2. Inexperience. Troops who are not experienced break much faster than those who are. It happened at Bull Run in 1861, and Harper's Ferry in 1862 (and in many other battles throughout the war). Regardless of the experience and competence of the commanders, troops can and will break if they are green enough.

So, it really isn't that there was no effective command structure, but the same thing that plagued the US in the War of 1812, is that green volunteers cannot be relied upon to fight for any long duration.

Eliminating Corps, even Divisions, will only vaguely represent the situation of 1861 or 1862, yet completely miss the point. The real problem was with the troops themselves. Until they were bloodied, they would not have the ability to fight for any extended period of time.

[Clovis]

I don't think that this would be correct. Take a look at Bull Run.

Both Commands fought effectively.

Troops went and manoevered where they should have. Nobody got lost, attacked the wrong spot, and the discilpline level during the battle was fairly good. Johnston managed to arrive with his army, organized, on time, and in the place they needed to be which turned the tide of battle (up to this point most likely a Federal victory, based on numeric superiority).

To me, the Command and Control worked fine in this battle. Armies moved where they were directed, and fought how they should. Shiloh is a better example of a confused combat (even though they had better army organization, as well as more experience).

Here are the real problems, and issues, of the day.

#1. Troop training and discipline. The troops in 1861 were not yet the troops of 1863. They marched very slowly, and military discipline in the ranks was not truely formed by this point.

#2. Inexperience. Troops who are not experienced break much faster than those who are. It happened at Bull Run in 1861, and Harper's Ferry in 1862 (and in many other battles throughout the war). Regardless of the experience and competence of the commanders, troops can and will break if they are green enough.

So, it really isn't that there was no effective command structure, but the same thing that plagued the US in the War of 1812, is that green volunteers cannot be relied upon to fight for any long duration.

Eliminating Corps, even Divisions, will only vaguely represent the situation of 1861 or 1862, yet completely miss the point. The real problem was with the troops themselves. Until they were bloodied, they would not have the ability to fight for any extended period of time.

McDowell was unable to engage more than 2 brigades of his reserve in the last hours....US attacks were made piecemal, regiment by regiment. And the CSA defense wasn't much better...

Anyway, whatever the reasons, in game terms HQ and division formations are giving the same advantage in the first month of the war than in 1865. To get a feeling of the huge inorganization in the first years, we have to cope with these game mechanics. Yes, there were divisions, army HQ and "wings" in the first months, but they worked poorly. AACW doesn't have 2 sort of division formation, one better than the another, the same for army. So the only choice remaining is clearly choosing the right moment, ie when both sides had sufficient ressources and experience, to give players the possibility to build these assets.

Giving division at start is yet leading to gamey tactics ( confederate cavalry divisions raiding from the start, possibility to build under Lyon and Price an excessively large division at start since the removal of Divisional HQ units, to cite a few).

These problems have to be addressed not by thinking in historical terms, but through the prism of game mechanics in AACW. There's no need for example to have Johnston acting as corp leader to get him joining Beauregard at Manassas. And I've yet to find where in reality it is stated that Shenandoah force was a corp of the Beauregard's army.

[McNaughton]

I have read your manifsto for your mod, but I still don't agree on the way that you are implementing things to get the desired result.

Problems were not in command and control, this was evident through the history of American Warfare to this point (Revolutionary and 1812 warfare, as well as Mexican Wars), that the fault lies in the Volunteer system, rather than command and control. American volunteers were exceptionally poor soldiers. In comparison to US Regulars, it is like night and day. The volunteers don't know drill, they don't know discipline, and they break easily. It took years before the US Volunteers were any sort of effective force during the War of 1812, while the US Command system remained generally the same throughout the war.

What should be looked at are the regiments themselves. Lower movement rates, as well as lowered cohesion values for EARLY volunteer regiments should reflect their inability to move quickly as well as to fight for extended periods of time. This means more units will rout, there will be fewer casualties sustained, yet armies will still be effective due to the command/control system.

Realistically, the Divisions of 1861 were the same as those of 1865 (except for some organization of artillery and cavalry, now being attached to corps instead of local command). What changed were the ability of the regiments (thereby larger forces) to be fielded in effective order.

The core of the problem stems with the regiment. They were disorganized, meaning that brigades were disorganized, with divisions disorganized, and corps disorganized. Start here, and you will get the desired result without severley handicapping players by removing armies, corps and divisions.

What will happen without armies and corps is for players to find their best leaders and pack 50 000 men in their commands. Since you will get a 35% penalty with 10 000 men, or 100 000 men, might as well have them under command of generals who have high ratings, and will be activated. This will not solve a single problem of command and control, but, make numbers that much more significant (eliminating any possibility of Confederate quality).

McDowell couldn't get his two reserve brigades in order, because they were sluggish regiments. It took the army two days to march from Washington to Manassas, a deplorable amount of time (troops took breaks whenever they wanted to, without official orders, etc.).

If you are looking for history denoting Second and First corps during First Bull Run, here's one after a quick search. I have found many other colaborations (the unreliable Wikipedia mentions such Corps as well). Technically, Johnston should be the Army commander, as he outranked Beauregard, but, since Beauregard knew the battlefield, Johnston delegated overall command to him.

http://www.firstbullrun.com/shenandoah.html

[McNaughton]

Commands worked during this early era. MacGruder's corps-sized command (Army of the Peninsula) worked perfectly in their delaying tactics (troops obeyed orders, units were where they should have been, etc.).

Jackson commanded his forces brilliantly in the Shenendoah Valley. Outmanoevering Banks and Fremont, and outfighting them as well.

Yet, there were some situations where commands didn't work. The Seven Days battle, showed some previously effective commanders (MacGruder and Jackson) failing. Shiloh was a military disaster of miscommunication and disorder.

Yet, there are plenty of reasons why these situations happend other than 'poor command and control'. The problems faced in early 1862 were that of smaller commands being merged into larger ones in an instant. Jackson's, MacGruder's, Longstreet's and Huger's commands were all merged into the Army of Northern Virginia from their separate independent commands. Sure, generals didn't know how to operate in this new chain of command, but they learned quickly. Soon after the Seven Days Battle, where the Army of Northern Virignia fought relatively poorly, they smashed the Army of Virginia at Second Bull Run.

Why? For one, many soldiers wrote home that most of those without the 'heart for battle' deserted, or left. The remaining troops were bloodied. The commanders had time to work the chain of command, and were experienced working with one another.

You can also find examples throughout the war where divisions were sent piecemiel into battle, got lost, attacked poorly, etc. So, it is not totally limited to the first months of the war.

In the end, I think that the desired effect is...

1. Early Conflict, lower casualties, quicker retreats/routs.
2. Later Conflict, higher casualties, harder to rout

This can be best accomplished by modifying the regiments themselves, rather than attempting to do so through savaging the command system. As I said earlier, it will just turn into a numbers game, if you remove the excellent (and game balancing) command system.

[McNaughton]

Giving division at start is yet leading to gamey tactics ( confederate cavalry divisions raiding from the start, possibility to build under Lyon and Price an excessively large division at start since the removal of Divisional HQ units, to cite a few).

Gamey tactics will exist no matter what you do. A Confederate Cavalry Division raiding the Union will actually be better for Union Forces. Militia reactions are based on the size of force raiding. A large force will result in greater numbers of free troops (Militia, Cavalry and Artillery) that a state will get. Bring on a raiding cavalry division, it just gives me more free troops.

Regarding Price and Lyon, their lack of command ability wasn't the problem, but back again to the soldiers themselves.

About 1/3 of Price's State Guard were unarmed and untrained. Lyon constantly faced overbearing numbers. These factors were what caused the difficulties in Missouri, not that generals couldn't control their forces (in fact, they commanded them fairly well). In my mod, I have increased Price's force substantially, yet virtually all are 'state troops', while Lyon's force has changed to be one of quality (more federal troops). I have had the two face off (either as independent or divisional command) around Carthage, MO, and the battles are pretty historic (50-50 for either side, playing against the AI).

When Price had the time gained to train and better equip his soldiers after Carthage, he rampaged through Missouri. With Divisions enabled, neither Price nor Lyon can operate forces free of command penalties, for the most part, they reduce the penalty to around 10%.

Divisions, in my opinion, out west, make up for the initial total lack of HQs for command and control. Divisions themselves aren't really 'divisions', but more like a command system for the local forces.

[Clovis]

I have read your manifsto for your mod, but I still don't agree on the way that you are implementing things to get the desired result.

Problems were not in command and control, this was evident through the history of American Warfare to this point (Revolutionary and 1812 warfare, as well as Mexican Wars), that the fault lies in the Volunteer system, rather than command and control. American volunteers were exceptionally poor soldiers. In comparison to US Regulars, it is like night and day. The volunteers don't know drill, they don't know discipline, and they break easily. It took years before the US Volunteers were any sort of effective force during the War of 1812, while the US Command system remained generally the same throughout the war.

What should be looked at are the regiments themselves. Lower movement rates, as well as lowered cohesion values for EARLY volunteer regiments should reflect their inability to move quickly as well as to fight for extended periods of time. This means more units will rout, there will be fewer casualties sustained, yet armies will still be effective due to the command/control system.

Realistically, the Divisions of 1861 were the same as those of 1865 (except for some organization of artillery and cavalry, now being attached to corps instead of local command). What changed were the ability of the regiments (thereby larger forces) to be fielded in effective order.

The core of the problem stems with the regiment. They were disorganized, meaning that brigades were disorganized, with divisions disorganized, and corps disorganized. Start here, and you will get the desired result without severley handicapping players by removing armies, corps and divisions.

What will happen without armies and corps is for players to find their best leaders and pack 50 000 men in their commands. Since you will get a 35% penalty with 10 000 men, or 100 000 men, might as well have them under command of generals who have high ratings, and will be activated. This will not solve a single problem of command and control, but, make numbers that much more significant (eliminating any possibility of Confederate quality).

McDowell couldn't get his two reserve brigades in order, because they were sluggish regiments. It took the army two days to march from Washington to Manassas, a deplorable amount of time (troops took breaks whenever they wanted to, without official orders, etc.).

If you are looking for history denoting Second and First corps during First Bull Run, here's one after a quick search. I have found many other colaborations (the unreliable Wikipedia mentions such Corps as well). Technically, Johnston should be the Army commander, as he outranked Beauregard, but, since Beauregard knew the battlefield, Johnston delegated overall command to him.

http://www.firstbullrun.com/shenandoah.html

"Bungled orders and poor communications prevented their execution" from the same source led me to other conclusions about inexperienced units and HQ command control...

[Clovis]

Commands worked during this early era. MacGruder's corps-sized command (Army of the Peninsula) worked perfectly in their delaying tactics (troops obeyed orders, units were where they should have been, etc.).

Jackson commanded his forces brilliantly in the Shenendoah Valley. Outmanoevering Banks and Fremont, and outfighting them as well.

Yet, there were some situations where commands didn't work. The Seven Days battle, showed some previously effective commanders (MacGruder and Jackson) failing. Shiloh was a military disaster of miscommunication and disorder.

Yet, there are plenty of reasons why these situations happend other than 'poor command and control'. The problems faced in early 1862 were that of smaller commands being merged into larger ones in an instant. Jackson's, MacGruder's, Longstreet's and Huger's commands were all merged into the Army of Northern Virginia from their separate independent commands. Sure, generals didn't know how to operate in this new chain of command, but they learned quickly. Soon after the Seven Days Battle, where the Army of Northern Virignia fought relatively poorly, they smashed the Army of Virginia at Second Bull Run.

Why? For one, many soldiers wrote home that most of those without the 'heart for battle' deserted, or left. The remaining troops were bloodied. The commanders had time to work the chain of command, and were experienced working with one another.

You can also find examples throughout the war where divisions were sent piecemiel into battle, got lost, attacked poorly, etc. So, it is not totally limited to the first months of the war.

In the end, I think that the desired effect is...

1. Early Conflict, lower casualties, quicker retreats/routs.
2. Later Conflict, higher casualties, harder to rout

This can be best accomplished by modifying the regiments themselves, rather than attempting to do so through savaging the command system. As I said earlier, it will just turn into a numbers game, if you remove the excellent (and game balancing) command system.

1862 examples. I'm talking 1861 situation.

[McNaughton]

"Bungled orders and poor communications prevented their execution" from the same source led me to other conclusions about inexperienced units and HQ command control...

Removing Corps, Armies, and Divisions won't fix the problem. As I said, it will just make numbers more important (stacks of 50 000 will be common as nobody will get below 35% penalties), and remove the best feature of AACW for the better part of the early game.

The problem is with the Reigments, and also possibly with the leaders themselves, not the command structure.

[Clovis]

Another source, outside Wikipedia.

[CENTER]BATTLE
OF
FIRST BULL RUN[/CENTER]
[CENTER]by[/CENTER]
[CENTER]Ted Ballard[/CENTER]
[CENTER]CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 2004




[/CENTER]
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/StaffRide/1st%20Bull%20Run/Overview.htm#b3


Summary
First Bull Run was a clash between relatively large, ill-trained bodies of recruits, led by inexperienced officers. Neither army commander was able to deploy his forces effectively, only 18,000 men from each side were actually engaged. Although McDowell had been active on the battlefield, he had expended most of his energy maneuvering nearby regiments and brigades, instead of controlling and coordinating the movements of his army as a whole. Other factors contributed to McDowell’s defeat: Patterson’s failure to hold Johnston in the valley; McDowell’s two-day delay at Centreville; allowing Tyler’s division to lead the march on 21 July thus delaying the flanking divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman; and the 2 1/2-hour delay after the Union victory on Matthews’ Hill, which allowed the Confederates to bring up reinforcements and establish a defensive position on Henry Hill.
On Henry Hill Beauregard had also limited his control to the regimental level, generally allowing the battle to continue on its own and only reacting to Union moves.

Johnston’s decision to transport his infantry to the battlefield by rail played a major role in the Confederate victory. Although the trains were slow and a lack of sufficient cars did not allow the transport of large numbers of troops at one time, almost all of his army arrived in time to participate in the battle. After reaching Manassas Junction, Johnston had relinquished command of the battlefield to Beauregard, but his forwarding of reinforcements to the scene of fighting was decisive.
Compared to later battles, casualties at First Bull Run had not been especially heavy. Both Union and Confederate killed, wounded, and missing were a little over one thousand seven hundred each.
Three months after First Bull Run Union forces suffered another, smaller defeat at the Battle of Ball’s Bluff, near Leesburg, Virginia. The perceived military incompetence at First Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff led to the establishment of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, a congressional body created to investigate Northern military affairs. Concerning the Battle of First Bull Run, the committee listened to testimony from a variety of witnesses connected with McDowell’s army. Although the committee’s report concluded that the principal cause of defeat was Patterson’s failure to prevent Johnston from reinforcing Beauregard, Patterson’s enlistment had expired a few days after the battle, and he was no longer in the service. The Northern public clamored for another scapegoat, and McDowell bore the chief blame. On 25 July 1861, he was relieved of army command.30

First Bull Run demonstrated that the war would not be won by one grand battle, and both sides began preparing for a long and bloody conflict. In the North, Lincoln called for an additional 500,000 volunteers with three-year enlistments, and the men with ninety-day enlistments were sent home. In the South, once the euphoria of victory had worn off, Jefferson Davis called for 400,000 additional volunteers. The battle also showed the need for adequately trained and experienced officers and men. One year later many of the same soldiers who had fought at First Bull Run, now combat veterans, would have an opportunity to test their skills on the same battlefield.

[Clovis]

Removing Corps, Armies, and Divisions won't fix the problem. As I said, it will just make numbers more important (stacks of 50 000 will be common as nobody will get below 35% penalties), and remove the best feature of AACW for the better part of the early game.

The problem is with the Reigments, and also possibly with the leaders themselves, not the command structure.

Letting them gives to player organizational power which were beyond dreams of both sides during the firts month. CSA didn't made any advance on Washington after Bull Run because of disorganization, McCLELLAN was at last useful because of this administration skill ( the same for Halleck after Fremont and Corps were offically created by Lee after Peninsula campaign when he took command and realized this was needed because adressing simultaneously several divisions was nearly impossible.

By considering all rule to be at work from the start, you simply give possibility to create a 100,000 army in several corps perfectly coordonating their move under efficient command chain from april 1861.

I myself disagree with your assumption. AACW rules are really good but they remain games rules, ie an intellectual abstraction which for wargame have to try to SIMULATE reality.
So, once again, to simulate reality, we have to wonder if the game rule is in command term adressing the simple fact 1861 armies lacked both experienced officers and structures needed to create efficient Command and Control.

After all, for the units, you're planning too to negate reality of combined arms brigades or legions created in 1861, isn'tit?

[Clovis]

Removing Corps, Armies, and Divisions won't fix the problem. As I said, it will just make numbers more important (stacks of 50 000 will be common as nobody will get below 35% penalties), and remove the best feature of AACW for the better part of the early game.

The problem is with the Reigments, and also possibly with the leaders themselves, not the command structure.

With corps and divisions, stacks of 50,000 will be common too and highly organized. With 3 3 star generals ( BANKS, McDOWELL and Mc CLELLAN,) , a 3 corps US Potomac Army could muster in efficient way 50 to 75,000 men in november 1861.

[Clovis]

Another source HOW THE NORTH WON by Herman HATTAWAY and Archer JONES, page 41


"Also the primitive nature of the staff organization in the American army on the eve of the Civil War caused bungling and confusion. The modern staff basically constitutes the commander's management team, analyzing the situation, recommanding action and supervising personal, intel, operations and logistics. At the outbreak of the Civil War, US army lagged far behind Prussia and France in conceptualizing and developing the staff? This weakness, particularly acute in the operations and intel aera, naturally resulted in a serious lack of seasoned people to occupy staff positions.... An English journalist encountered McDowell himself searching for 2 batteries... "Well, Mr. Russell, I'm obliged to look after them myself, replied McDowell, as I have so small a staff, and they are all engaged out with my headquarters."

[wyrmm]

And does, first thing, every game I play. (Instinct ) A simple way of making 1861 OOB and TO&E fit, would be to limit Generals to commanding only there titular level in 61, i.e. brigades for brigadiers, Divs for Major Gens, Corps (or Army) fot Lt. Generals. Result being Either an army with commanded brigades, or detached service divs being outside the command chain. Should slow down organization, helping provide the confused feeling of 61.

One other note, Green troops DO NOT NESCESARILY rout faster than veterans, there are numerous documented cases of green troops attacking and winning against odds that the veterans refused to attack. (too Green to know you can't win ) As well as cases where they refused to break as they did not know the combat was 'heavier' than normal.

[McNaughton]

One other note, Green troops DO NOT NESCESARILY rout faster than veterans, there are numerous documented cases of green troops attacking and winning against odds that the veterans refused to attack. (too Green to know you can't win ) As well as cases where they refused to break as they did not know the combat was 'heavier' than normal.

Hmm, this is contrary to what I have read about operations during this timeframe... Take the War of 1812, where the American forces were routed time and time again by numerically inferior British professionals who VERY rarely broke, even facing horrendous casualties. Green troops tended to break once they saw the line wavering, or misinterpreted orders (a very common reason for troops breaking), or seeing other forces fall back (even though they weren't broken).

[McNaughton]

Here's an exerpt from the manual (stolen from AACW wiki)

Code: Select all

Strategic rating and activation Important
Each turn, each force’s commanding officer makes a test based on his strategic rating. If he fails (indicated by a brown envelope icon on the force), the leader is deemed inactivated and will suffer the following penalties:

Reduced movement (-35% speed)
Combat penalties in hostile regions (up to –35%).
Offensive posture prohibited (not applicable for admirals).
A leader, which is not activated, can represent delayed orders, over cautiousness, or even incompetence at the operational level or above.

Note: A very cautious army commander can even impact negatively the activation Check of subordinate corps commanders.

Technical Note: You may de-activate this rule in the Options Menu.

Leaderless troops are always activated, as they don’t have leaders, but suffer from movement and combat penalties (by lack of CPs). They are not prohibited from assuming offensive posture (the commanding, unknown colonel is willing to take action but is not the best man for the job).

Now, as far as I can tell, McDowell, and all of the Divisional Commanders in his army, plus those many 3-star generals around him, are of low quality in regards to their strategy rating. This means, they will tend to fail their activation rolls more often than not.

This means, that even though they are organized in Corps and Divisions, they will face combat and movement penalties.

So, why remove the organization already in the game if the end result will be the same on most turns? It isn't broken, so we don't have to fix it.

Generals have low strategic ratings to represent command situations like you have posted in the many citings above. Burnside performed just as poorly in 1864 as he did in 1862.

Facts are, this organization did exist, the game can represent both the correct and poor implementation of this system, so its removal in 1861 is completely unecessary, and unrealistic.

I say, if you are unhappy with the results, work on the regiments and the leaders, not the command system. There are many more possibilities at hand other than scrapping the system.

There were Armies in 1861
There were Divisions in 1861
There were Corps in 1861

[Clovis]

Here's an exerpt from the manual (stolen from AACW wiki)

Code: Select all

Strategic rating and activation Important
Each turn, each force’s commanding officer makes a test based on his strategic rating. If he fails (indicated by a brown envelope icon on the force), the leader is deemed inactivated and will suffer the following penalties:

Reduced movement (-35% speed)
Combat penalties in hostile regions (up to –35%).
Offensive posture prohibited (not applicable for admirals).
A leader, which is not activated, can represent delayed orders, over cautiousness, or even incompetence at the operational level or above.

Note: A very cautious army commander can even impact negatively the activation Check of subordinate corps commanders.

Technical Note: You may de-activate this rule in the Options Menu.

Leaderless troops are always activated, as they don’t have leaders, but suffer from movement and combat penalties (by lack of CPs). They are not prohibited from assuming offensive posture (the commanding, unknown colonel is willing to take action but is not the best man for the job).

Now, as far as I can tell, McDowell, and all of the Divisional Commanders in his army, plus those many 3-star generals around him, are of low quality in regards to their strategy rating. This means, they will tend to fail their activation rolls more often than not.

This means, that even though they are organized in Corps and Divisions, they will face combat and movement penalties.

So, why remove the organization already in the game if the end result will be the same on most turns? It isn't broken, so we don't have to fix it.

Generals have low strategic ratings to represent command situations like you have posted in the many citings above. Burnside performed just as poorly in 1864 as he did in 1862.

Facts are, this organization did exist, the game can represent both the correct and poor implementation of this system, so its removal in 1861 is completely unecessary, and unrealistic.

I say, if you are unhappy with the results, work on the regiments and the leaders, not the command system. There are many more possibilities at hand other than scrapping the system.

There were Armies in 1861
There were Divisions in 1861
There were Corps in 1861

CSA will not. And that's the problem. CSA didn't made better in the first months. In game terms, they will.

And you forget randomized general options which would give better activation for US...

Last, the inactivation penalty isn't affecting defensive stack in non-hostile regions.

So the game system is currently insufficient.

[aryaman]

There are 2 drawbacks in using an army stack as a corps stack:

a) they never initiate combats by themselves.

b) they don't get bonus from the Army commander (and don't get malus either ). So pound to pound, Sherman Corps commanded by Grant (in Army HQ) will perform better than Sherman in his own Army Stack.

Hi Pocus
Regarding a, that could be sometimes an advantage, because you are sure you will not fight unintended battles, you can enter enemy held territory without changing automatically to attack position.
Regarding b, sometimes it is better but poor army commanders give malus rather than bonus.
OTOH my main concern is that you give additional capacity to armies. I don´t know if that is by design, but for instance, an army with a single corps could double its potential to command forces giving the army commander direct control over a Corps size force.

[McNaughton]

CSA will not. And that's the problem. CSA didn't made better in the first months. In game terms, they will.

And you forget randomized general options which would give better activation for US...

Last, the inactivation penalty isn't affecting defensive stack in non-hostile regions.

So the game system is currently insufficient.

Randomization is an option, which means that there is the option to eliminate the command blunders. Not a problem in my opinioin, it is more a 'user beware' option.

The CSA is limited (at least in the leader mod which most use) by the number of generals above 1-star. Currently, Johnston and Beauregard are the only ones out east, and only with effort can you bring others from out west. This means, that the CSA can only field two effective corps, while the USA can field many more. One of the 'corps' is an army HQ, and as Pocus stated, is not as effective as a full corps. The Union could form around 2 Corps and 1 Army HQ, but these will be of sub-par leaders in comparison.

Defensive benefits via the activation rules really don't matter as much, as it kind of balances things out. In no way is the CSA player ready to invade the US in 1861, so chances are they won't attack. The US player, attacking the CS player in 1861 must utilize their entire system to make effect. Their larger force makes up for any command problems even with both sides able to form divisions. With starting forces, I can form 3 strong CSA divisions in 1861, with the US forming around 5 (almost 2-1). Even with command penalties, a concentrated US force could beat one confederate force, but, with both confederate forces together (as at First Bull Run) the chances are more 50-50 given all facts on the board.

Basically, the side that attacks in 1861 better make sure that they organize their forces well given the original system. If you remove the command situation, it would be in the best interest of both sides just to sit and wait until you get armies to build, and divisions to form, making any combat in 1861 totally unrealistic due to a mix of a non-existant command system, plus few high ranking leaders, and those who you have are poorer quality.

This will just result in 1861 being a total bore, with little fear of either side doing anything, thereby you can freely and calmly build up your forces.

If you want total incompetence for leaders in 1861, do what the game already has for Early and Late infantry, having leader models upgrade from 1861 incompetents to 1862 somewhat competents via event and a % chance of triggering.

[McNaughton]

Hi Pocus
Regarding a, that could be sometimes an advantage, because you are sure you will not fight unintended battles, you can enter enemy held territory without changing automatically to attack position.
Regarding b, sometimes it is better but poor army commanders give malus rather than bonus.
OTOH my main concern is that you give additional capacity to armies. I don´t know if that is by design, but for instance, an army with a single corps could double its potential to command forces giving the army commander direct control over a Corps size force.

Regarding A, it states that they never initiate combat, that doesn't mean that your opponent won't initiate. The evasion ability of an army isn't better than that of a corps, but more based upon the internal force composition.

Regarding B, technically the force doesn't double. As Pocus said, the corps attached to the army will gain the benefit of the army commander, plus the corps commander, thereby fights better. It is more logical to have two corps attached to an empty army than one corps and a full army.

I personally almost always have a division in my Army HQ, primarily due to the possibility of the HQ being attacked, plus, the command benefit inherent in an Army HQ makes a lot of sense to use it.

Also, it is historic (see my Chancellorsville example).

[Clovis]

Randomization is an option, which means that there is the option to eliminate the command blunders. Not a problem in my opinioin, it is more a 'user beware' option.

The CSA is limited (at least in the leader mod which most use) by the number of generals above 1-star. Currently, Johnston and Beauregard are the only ones out east, and only with effort can you bring others from out west. This means, that the CSA can only field two effective corps, while the USA can field many more. One of the 'corps' is an army HQ, and as Pocus stated, is not as effective as a full corps. The Union could form around 2 Corps and 1 Army HQ, but these will be of sub-par leaders in comparison.

Defensive benefits via the activation rules really don't matter as much, as it kind of balances things out. In no way is the CSA player ready to invade the US in 1861, so chances are they won't attack. The US player, attacking the CS player in 1861 must utilize their entire system to make effect. Their larger force makes up for any command problems even with both sides able to form divisions. With starting forces, I can form 3 strong CSA divisions in 1861, with the US forming around 5 (almost 2-1). Even with command penalties, a concentrated US force could beat one confederate force, but, with both confederate forces together (as at First Bull Run) the chances are more 50-50 given all facts on the board.

Basically, the side that attacks in 1861 better make sure that they organize their forces well given the original system. If you remove the command situation, it would be in the best interest of both sides just to sit and wait until you get armies to build, and divisions to form, making any combat in 1861 totally unrealistic due to a mix of a non-existant command system, plus few high ranking leaders, and those who you have are poorer quality.

This will just result in 1861 being a total bore, with little fear of either side doing anything, thereby you can freely and calmly build up your forces.

If you want total incompetence for leaders in 1861, do what the game already has for Early and Late infantry, having leader models upgrade from 1861 incompetents to 1862 somewhat competents via event and a % chance of triggering.

I prefer my mod be used with randomization option if I want to get some surprise from time to time and without to play with historical figures.

The new relocation order will ease 3 stars general transfer.

After the first Bull Run clash, it seems most of the battles until 1862, both East and West, were of modest size....What's you're naming total bore is maybe just ...realistical behaviour

There's yet much more batlting to do, with small forces in the West, on the coast, raising forces to keep game interest for the 12-14 first turns of the game ( and in fact really less as both unique armies are released during the 6th turn and new HQ aren't available until november 1861....

[wyrmm]

Hmm, this is contrary to what I have read about operations during this timeframe... Take the War of 1812, where the American forces were routed time and time again by numerically inferior British professionals who VERY rarely broke, even facing horrendous casualties. Green troops tended to break once they saw the line wavering, or misinterpreted orders (a very common reason for troops breaking), or seeing other forces fall back (even though they weren't broken).

Seems to happen 1 or 2 times minimum every war for US forces. Happened at Laurel Hill in front of Spotsylvania for instance. Veteran troops fizzled in an assault, green troops took the trench line, and were destroyed since they were unsupported. I dont disagree that your behaviour is much more likely, I just don't want it to be blanket behaviour. I would like for a small chance to exist for other behaviour.

[McNaughton]

Seems to happen 1 or 2 times minimum every war for US forces. Happened at Laurel Hill in front of Spotsylvania for instance. Veteran troops fizzled in an assault, green troops took the trench line, and were destroyed since they were unsupported. I dont disagree that your behaviour is much more likely, I just don't want it to be blanket behaviour. I would like for a small chance to exist for other behaviour.

True, I didn't say otherwize, just that 9 out of 10 times the result will be regulars hold, while green troops break, but, there still is that 1 in 10 times where the reverse happens.