I noticed that Militia has exactly the same fire effectiveness modifier (ATKFire2 vs DEFFire2) whether attacking or defending when in mountains regardless of weather.
Yet, all other combat type units, regulars, irregulars, artillery and cavalry, have stronger defensive (DEFFire) effectiveness modifiers than offensive (ATKFire) in mountains. This is logical as defending is much easier than attacking in mountainous terrain.
So is DEFFire effectiveness modifier of milita in mountains an error or intentional? I am guessing it is an error. If so, what should be the correct defender effectiveness modifiers for militia when firing in mountains?
Well here are my thoughts for what they are worth.
When I think of mountains, I think lightly settled and heavily forested. So first, similiar to fighting in forests.
Second, due to extreme elevation changes, I see the avenues of advance as limited, channeled and slow which makes defense stronger than forests but perhaps not as much as wilderness.
Third, I suspect command and control is easier in mountains than in wilderness due to greater visibility in mountains. I would think wilderness as easier to defend than mountains primarily because of the severe loss of offensive command and control by attacking forces in wilderness.
Fourth, exposed flanks to higher elevations increase the vulnerability of the slow, channeled attacking forces especially to light, mobile troops such as milita.
Considering the above factors, I would think militia should be stronger defensively in mountains than they are in forests but probably not as strong as wilderness.
If we examine militia DEFFire in both forests and wilderness, militia are equal to regulars in DEFFire in forests and have a 10 percent advantage in DEFFire in wilderness. I would split the difference and give militia a DEFFire 5 percent advantage over regulars in mountains.
Since regulars have the following DEFFire Values: 95/85/80/75/50 dependent on ground conditions/weather, I would consider giving militia the 5% advantage in all conditions except blizzards resulting in 100/90/85/80/50. I probably would not give the 5% advantage in blizzards due to limited visibility placing a premium on the discipline of regulars.
If militia have equivalent DEFFire as regulars in forests and significantly better DEFFire than regulars in wilderness, I think giving militia slightly more effective DEFFire than regulars in forested mountains would be justified.
I suspect most would not be critical of seeing the rough terrain of forested mountains as a potential equalizer similiar to forests/wilderness when militia are under attack by regulars.
Anyway, my two cents worth...
I would be interested in hearing others opinions as well.
When I think of mountains, I think lightly settled and heavily forested. So first, similiar to fighting in forests.
Second, due to extreme elevation changes, I see the avenues of advance as limited, channeled and slow which makes defense stronger than forests but perhaps not as much as wilderness.
Third, I suspect command and control is easier in mountains than in wilderness due to greater visibility in mountains. I would think wilderness as easier to defend than mountains primarily because of the severe loss of offensive command and control by attacking forces in wilderness.
Fourth, exposed flanks to higher elevations increase the vulnerability of the slow, channeled attacking forces especially to light, mobile troops such as milita.
Considering the above factors, I would think militia should be stronger defensively in mountains than they are in forests but probably not as strong as wilderness.
If we examine militia DEFFire in both forests and wilderness, militia are equal to regulars in DEFFire in forests and have a 10 percent advantage in DEFFire in wilderness. I would split the difference and give militia a DEFFire 5 percent advantage over regulars in mountains.
Since regulars have the following DEFFire Values: 95/85/80/75/50 dependent on ground conditions/weather, I would consider giving militia the 5% advantage in all conditions except blizzards resulting in 100/90/85/80/50. I probably would not give the 5% advantage in blizzards due to limited visibility placing a premium on the discipline of regulars.
If militia have equivalent DEFFire as regulars in forests and significantly better DEFFire than regulars in wilderness, I think giving militia slightly more effective DEFFire than regulars in forested mountains would be justified.
I suspect most would not be critical of seeing the rough terrain of forested mountains as a potential equalizer similiar to forests/wilderness when militia are under attack by regulars.
Anyway, my two cents worth...
I would be interested in hearing others opinions as well.
Jagger wrote:Well here are my thoughts for what they are worth.
When I think of mountains, I think lightly settled and heavily forested. So first, similiar to fighting in forests.
Second, due to extreme elevation changes, I see the avenues of advance as limited, channeled and slow which makes defense stronger than forests but perhaps not as much as wilderness.
Third, I suspect command and control is easier in mountains than in wilderness due to greater visibility in mountains. I would think wilderness as easier to defend than mountains primarily because of the severe loss of offensive command and control by attacking forces in wilderness.
Fourth, exposed flanks to higher elevations increase the vulnerability of the slow, channeled attacking forces especially to light, mobile troops such as milita.
Considering the above factors, I would think militia should be stronger defensively in mountains than they are in forests but probably not as strong as wilderness.
If we examine militia DEFFire in both forests and wilderness, militia are equal to regulars in DEFFire in forests and have a 10 percent advantage in DEFFire in wilderness. I would split the difference and give militia a DEFFire 5 percent advantage over regulars in mountains.
Since regulars have the following DEFFire Values: 95/85/80/75/50 dependent on ground conditions/weather, I would consider giving militia the 5% advantage in all conditions except blizzards resulting in 100/90/85/80/50. I probably would not give the 5% advantage in blizzards due to limited visibility placing a premium on the discipline of regulars.
If militia have equivalent DEFFire as regulars in forests and significantly better DEFFire than regulars in wilderness, I think giving militia slightly more effective DEFFire than regulars in forested mountains would be justified.
I suspect most would not be critical of seeing the rough terrain of forested mountains as a potential equalizer similiar to forests/wilderness when militia are under attack by regulars.
Anyway, my two cents worth...
I would be interested in hearing others opinions as well.
I think that a distinction needs to be made between the skirmisher type militia and the line militia.
The skirmisher type militia is represented by the frontier settlers, mountain men and the like who had regular weapons practice and would use terrain effectively in defence. These people generally were good shots anyway. IMO if they are not already all represented as light troops/irregulars then they should be and would agree that their performance against regulars in all difficult terrain should be better, reflecting their historical success.
The line type militia was generally a different animal altogether compared to the skirmisher. The line militia was drawn from people of all walks of life, many of whom would have little weapons handling experience, let alone combat experience. Their fighting style was similar to regulars: fighting in line, volley firing and assault.
Most firing by line militia would be volley fire at relatively close range, one line of closely packed men firing at another. There was not the individual aimed fire that you got with the skirmisher, but in a sense it didn't matter so much at close range because of the closeness and target density. Fire superiority after the first volley (leaving aside the numbers involved) then largely turned on rate of volley fire. A demoralised enemy would usually then get assaulted in melee.
Here I think you need to look at the comparison with regulars. Line militia generally compared to regulars had less weapons handling experience and fire discipline meaning that in many cases line militia volley firing was often ragged or reduced in effectiveness compared to that of regulars. Where the rate of volley fire could break a line this is a vitally important point. For that reason I do not think that the DEF fire nor ATT fire of line militia should be better than regulars - indeed I think that it should be worse than regulars to reflect this.
Obviously as line militia remained in the field they became more proficient, but this is reflected in the game whereby elements upgrade to Provincials, Regulars etc within a militia unit.
Skirmisher type militia should be represented as Irregular (preferred choice - reflecting the individual fighting skills/lack of unit cohesiveness) or Light elements (where not already) and these should do better in difficult terrain compared to regulars as they did historically.
Boggit wrote:I think that a distinction needs to be made between the skirmisher type militia and the line militia.
The skirmisher type militia is represented by the frontier settlers, mountain men and the like who had regular weapons practice and would use terrain effectively in defence. These people generally were good shots anyway. IMO if they are not already all represented as light troops/irregulars then they should be and would agree that their performance against regulars in all difficult terrain should be better, reflecting their historical success.
The line type militia was generally a different animal altogether compared to the skirmisher. The line militia was drawn from people of all walks of life, many of whom would have little weapons handling experience, let alone combat experience. Their fighting style was similar to regulars: fighting in line, volley firing and assault.
Most firing by line militia would be volley fire at relatively close range, one line of closely packed men firing at another. There was not the individual aimed fire that you got with the skirmisher, but in a sense it didn't matter so much at close range because of the closeness and target density. Fire superiority after the first volley (leaving aside the numbers involved) then largely turned on rate of volley fire. A demoralised enemy would usually then get assaulted in melee.
Here I think you need to look at the comparison with regulars. Line militia generally compared to regulars had less weapons handling experience and fire discipline meaning that in many cases line militia volley firing was often ragged or reduced in effectiveness compared to that of regulars. Where the rate of volley fire could break a line this is a vitally important point. For that reason I do not think that the DEF fire nor ATT fire of line militia should be better than regulars - indeed I think that it should be worse than regulars to reflect this.
Obviously as line militia remained in the field they became more proficient, but this is reflected in the game whereby elements upgrade to Provincials, Regulars etc within a militia unit.
Skirmisher type militia should be represented as Irregular (preferred choice - reflecting the individual fighting skills/lack of unit cohesiveness) or Light elements (where not already) and these should do better in difficult terrain compared to regulars as they did historically.
Hi Boggit,
IMO, the British army had a distinct difference between line and skirmishers. The great mass of regular line British troops were capable of performing very well in line. But I seriously doubt if the level of initiative and training amonst the troops, or even the officers, could consistently meet the unique demands of wilderness fighting. Only small numbers of special troops were selected and trained to perform in the skirmisher order needed in wilderness or rough terrain fighting.
In contrast, the militia had an "institutional" history of fighting both the Indians and the French in their backyard wilderness since the establishment of the colonies. Skirmisher style fighting was appropriate to fighting in the backcountry and the mainstay of the militia-rather than fighting in line. The experience of the militia relied on the initiative and loose discipline necessary for Indian fighting. Not exactly what was needed for fighting in close order line. Of course, they did train and fight in line but considering their performance, line was not their strength.
I find comparing the performances of Braddocks regular troops at Monongahela versus the performance of Herkimers militia at Oriskany very interesting. The battles were very similiar. Each was fought in wilderness. Braddock was surprised in a meeting engagement while Herkimer was caught in a classic, U-shaped killing ambush. Yet Braddocks regulars were completely routed by a smaller force of Indians with a handful of French. In a much more difficult tactical situation, Herkimers militia suffered horribly but held the field in a truly hard fight. Herkimer's recently raised, 800 local NY milita fought extraordinarily well in a far more difficult situation than the situation that routed Braddocks regulars.
And then there is the Lexington debacle for the English. Lacking centralized command, townsmen militia seriously hurt the English while functioning as pure skirmishers which the English were unable to counter.
Then we could look at the battle of Kings Mountain as a typical battle of militias fought basically as skirmishers on both sides. Classic Indian fighter style.
Another interesting battle to look at is the destruction of Burgoynes German regulars by New Hampshire and Massachuetts militia at the Battle of Bennington.
I think American militia was primarily light infantry with a skirmishing style of fighting as their inherent strength. Unfortunately, militia was often used as line because militia was available in numbers and much of the fighting was in open, settled parts of the colonies. Not because line was their strength. Militia didn't have the discipline, the skill in drill, the quality of command or the mental preparation for the type of demands required for classically European warfare. So they performed poorly in line. But the simpler the demands, the better the performance. Defense was a simpler task than offense. Thus we would expect a better performance in line by militia in defense than offense-such as at Breeds Hill or Cowpens. Cowpens is particularly interesting because Militia started as line and then later, primarily contributed as light skirmishers.
I definitely agree with the strength of the irregulars, mountain men, etc over standard militia. They were far superior to any regular line infantry or militia in the back country. But then I suspect, even regular, hastily raised militia, such as Herkimers New Yorkers or Starks New Hampshire Militia, was a serious fighting force in the backcountry forests, wilderness, mountains and swamps-at least the equal, if not superior to regular troops.
IMO, We tend to remember the many disasters of the militia while fighting in line while forgetting their successes when using their strength-fighting as light infantry.
Don't forget something: the militia in the game already has a lower firepower than the regulars, as well as lower troop quality and morale. In effect, the bonus to the militia in rough terrain will even up things and made them equal, if not superior, to regulars in special environments...
Of course, in a clear open field, it would be another stroy
Of course, in a clear open field, it would be another stroy
I am persuaded to a large extent by Jagger's and PhilT's argument regarding improving militia DEF Fire in difficult terrain, despite poor line fighting ability.
I think there is a potential problem though as rebel militia elements that upgrade (representing increased efficiency) to (continental) regulars could then come off worse against Tory militia (and vice versa) when fighting in difficult terrain, despite their earlier proficiency in fighting in difficult terrain. it may not be so much a problem in the sense that they gain in other areas such as TQ etc. and the tendency towards fighting less cohesively might be accepted by the troops as part of regularisation.
We seem to be in agreement that when fighting regulars in line in open terrain militia will likely do badly for reasons of fire discipline etc.
I think there is a potential problem though as rebel militia elements that upgrade (representing increased efficiency) to (continental) regulars could then come off worse against Tory militia (and vice versa) when fighting in difficult terrain, despite their earlier proficiency in fighting in difficult terrain. it may not be so much a problem in the sense that they gain in other areas such as TQ etc. and the tendency towards fighting less cohesively might be accepted by the troops as part of regularisation.
We seem to be in agreement that when fighting regulars in line in open terrain militia will likely do badly for reasons of fire discipline etc.
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anarchyintheuk
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Minor point but I think you're attaching too much importance to how brit regulars faired at Monongahela and Lex/Concord. In the former the two regiments had been doing garrison duty in Ireland before being transported to Virginia. Additionally, they had only been brought up to strength by recent enlistments. All in all, garrison training in Ireland and raw recruits making up 1/3 to 1/4 of your strength is not a good combination for taking the offensive in unfamiliar territory. There also isn't much documentation that shows that the Colonial militia performed any better than the regulars. The blame for poor route security is on the officers. The lack of discipline and disintigration shown by the troops following the ambush isn't surprising. Once brit commanders and troops became familiar w/ operating in the terrain nothing simliar to Monongahela occured again. Herkimer's militia at Oriskany took severe casualties and were most likely saved by the sortie of Stanwix's garrison. The militia, although recently raised, was from an area familiar w/ Indian fighting and should have had at least some officers w/ FIW experience. How they managed to get themselves ambushed is a bizarre enough story in itself.
As for Lex/Concord, some of the above also applies. After achieving their objective and burning whatever of military value at Concord (not much as it turned out) it became pretty obvious that they were outnumbered and had to move quickly to reach their relief force or Boston. Unless the brits moved they would have been cut off. Speed of movement and necessity prevented the deployment of adequate skirmishers and flank guards, not a lack of tactical ability.
In both cases the battles were the first of their respective wars and the first actions seen by those regulars for years. After those first battles, most, if any, lessons had been learned.
At Bennington, Baum's force was significantly outnumbered even after reinforced by Brayman (sp?) who was too late to add to anything other than casualties. Baum had fatally split his forces above and below the river. Taking up a defensive stance allowed Stark to concentrate and flank his main position at the redoubt and overwhelm it. More impressive that how Baum lost the battle was how good Stark was. The Canadian and tory militia weren't particularly impressive at this battle.
As for Lex/Concord, some of the above also applies. After achieving their objective and burning whatever of military value at Concord (not much as it turned out) it became pretty obvious that they were outnumbered and had to move quickly to reach their relief force or Boston. Unless the brits moved they would have been cut off. Speed of movement and necessity prevented the deployment of adequate skirmishers and flank guards, not a lack of tactical ability.
In both cases the battles were the first of their respective wars and the first actions seen by those regulars for years. After those first battles, most, if any, lessons had been learned.
At Bennington, Baum's force was significantly outnumbered even after reinforced by Brayman (sp?) who was too late to add to anything other than casualties. Baum had fatally split his forces above and below the river. Taking up a defensive stance allowed Stark to concentrate and flank his main position at the redoubt and overwhelm it. More impressive that how Baum lost the battle was how good Stark was. The Canadian and tory militia weren't particularly impressive at this battle.
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