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Here's an interesting idea. I've been doing some more reading on the war and from my observation. (mind you along with my prior knowledge )...I think you could arguably call every operation by the Union from north to south...save the Mississippi River campaigns....diversions.

All of the north's major war goals rested on the Confederate coast.

Probably not a popular view point because thousands of lives were spent in the so called "diversions". But as I see it...Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, New Orleans, Memphis, Vicksburg...perhaps Norfolk...they were the economic might behind the Confederacy.....once all of them fell....the CSA was logistically doomed for good.

Funny how politics winds up getting so many guys killed...I suppose it's always been that way though.

Well I don't think you can really call them diversions, at least they were not planned that way. They had a huge advantage at sea and it would be stupid not to take advantage of that. Lincoln thought they could do both at the same time. They had such tremenduos manpower advantage and the early generals were incompetent anyway so I don't think they sacrificed a whole lot with this multi-pronged approach.

New Orleans was the most populous city in the Confederacy at the time I believe and its loss is underestimated. It also completely sealed off the Mississippi. A planter in say Arkansas or Mississippi could no longer send cotton to the nearest river barge and send it downriver and out the Gulf. They would have to divert it to Mobile or Galveston, which had to slow commerce quite a bit.

Banks6060 wrote:Probably not a popular view point

"war is war, and not popularity seeking" - W.T. Sherman

with thanks to CavScout

Jabberwock wrote:"war is war, and not popularity seeking" - W.T. Sherman

with thanks to CavScout

I've come to the conclusion that the South's greatest enemy besides the Union was it's own geography. A bad situation for a country fighting a defensive war.

First, in square miles it was big. Slightly larger than modern Mexico. This would be an advantage is some cases. (Think of all the great armies swallowed up invading Russia) However, the population differential with the Union meant that the North could always conjure up more armies and move against more locations than the manpower-poor South could adequately defend. However, this had it's advantages too as the Union had a lot of territory to garrison and long Union supply lines made massive cavalry raids like the ones Forrest led a lot easier to prosecute.

Rivers. The ones in Virginia mostly run west-east, which aided the Army of Northern Virginia mightily. However, the big ones out west, the Mississippi, the Cumberland, Tennessee were all invasion and supply highways for the North running as they did most south and south east. If Kentucky had solidly joined the Confederacy and they had been able to defend on the broad and mostly east-west Ohio river, it certainly would have aided AS Johnston's predicament in 1862. In reality, once Forts Henry and Donelson fell, Johnston had to pull his whole line back down into Tennessee and Mississippi.

Cities. All the big important ones are near the edges and borders. New Orleans, Memphis, Nashville, the important coastal ports mention above. Richmond only a 100 miles from Washington was always in dire danger. Only Atlanta seems to have been secure for most of the war years tucked safely away in the heart of Georgia.

The coast. As mentioned by Banks, a front onto itself. Normally a secure area if you have a decent navy. The Confederacy, of course had none and as a consequence Union coastal enclaves like Port Royal beginning popping up regularly. The American Civil War was probably America's most amphibious war outside of WW2.

It's interesting to note that Generals Beauregard and Johnston both hatched a plan after Bull Run to invade and divide the North at it's geographical weak point. A thrust up from the Potomac to split the North in two by seizing the strip of territory between Pittsburgh and Lake Erie. Jeff Davis squelched the plan. As always, not enough troops.

I wonder if the game reflects these thoughts that well. I managed to win my last PBEM as Union totally ignoring the CSA ports. One reason for ignoring them was the hit taken from CSA forts moving fleets of Ironclads/Transports along the coast when really they should be able to stay out of range of the guns if they are not making any amphibious landings or entering rivers in that region.

Mainly though I just didn't feel the need. The troops were better used attacking through Virginia. I did make one amphibious landing up the Roanoke into Garys to cut off CSA supply and as it turned out to interdict retreating CSA units but otherwise I hoped the threat of landing would tie down many of his troops without having to take any risks myself.

Maybe the importance of CSA ports is not reflected as well as it could be?
Chris

I think it is reflected very well when they don't have them anymore.

I'm not trying to be obtuse, I just mean that when they no longer have those resources, things can go down hill fast.

Ultimately, I think it just shows that there is more than one way to win this war/game. That's why we keep playin'!

I don't see how a Union player...(playing PBEM)...could possibly dream of winning while ignoring the coast. It's been discussed before, but Winfield Scott...while not the greatest field General, had it right on. Play defense and take or blockade all the major southern coastal cities.

Any military minded person would probably agree that all of the campaigns in Virginia were essentially a waste. The value placed on taking Richmond was astronomically stupid. But it was a different time I suppose.

The same could be said of Tennesse...although there was slightly more military justification due to the fact both Chattanooga and Atlanta were strategically significant targets.

Funny that the North was so pre-occupied with winning a political victory when it was conversly the South that needed one so badly.

National morale is not entirely facilitated when Bobby Lee is resting in the White House and Sidney Johnson is in Cairo, or Cincinnati. Charleston was a death trap for Union Naval forces. However, your point is well taken. apy:

Banks6060 wrote:I don't see how a Union player...(playing PBEM)...could possibly dream of winning while ignoring the coast. It's been discussed before, but Winfield Scott...while not the greatest field General, had it right on. Play defense and take or blockade all the major southern coastal cities.

Any military minded person would probably agree that all of the campaigns in Virginia were essentially a waste. The value placed on taking Richmond was astronomically stupid. But it was a different time I suppose.

The same could be said of Tennesse...although there was slightly more military justification due to the fact both Chattanooga and Atlanta were strategically significant targets.

Funny that the North was so pre-occupied with winning a political victory when it was conversly the South that needed one so badly.

I see your points, I just think your stances are a bit too hard. I do agree that the focus on Richmond was for the wrong reasons.

But, I don't think that the fighting in VA/TN was a waste. If any number of battles had gone differently, we wouldn't be having this conversation.

soloswolf wrote:I see your points, I just think your stances are a bit too hard. I do agree that the focus on Richmond was for the wrong reasons.

But, I don't think that the fighting in VA/TN was a waste. If any number of battles had gone differently, we wouldn't be having this conversation.

They were not a waste at all IMO.

Even if you take the "strategic points" of Richmond, Nashville, Chattanooga, etc. out of the equation, the main Confederate armies resided in these areas. And, as Grant put it in the last year of the war...the Confederacy lived or died on its forces in the field. So, even though many of the battles didn't go as well as they hoped, attrition eventually whittled these armies away, and with them went the morale of the CSA.

I don't think Scott was right, at least not at the time he was proposing his plan. For the federal goverment to just atttempt to passivly starve the population of the South into submission would have been politically untenable. It also had little chance of working. For instance look at the history of strategic bombing, which is significantly more devastating then a blockade. In no case has it won a war or forced a peace in spite of massive commitments of resources (agains German, Japan, and North Vietnam specificly).

The North had to invade and ity had to invade in the East and the West. Strictly it didn't have to carry out the various amphibious operations but it made sense for them to do so since they had the navy and could afford the resource diversion while the South could not.

TommH wrote:I don't think Scott was right, at least not at the time he was proposing his plan. For the federal goverment to just atttempt to passivly starve the population of the South into submission would have been politically untenable. It also had little chance of working. For instance look at the history of strategic bombing, which is significantly more devastating then a blockade. In no case has it won a war or forced a peace in spite of massive commitments of resources (agains German, Japan, and North Vietnam specificly).

The North had to invade and ity had to invade in the East and the West. Strictly it didn't have to carry out the various amphibious operations but it made sense for them to do so since they had the navy and could afford the resource diversion while the South could not.

These are some good points. my hat's off to you sir!

However, I don't believe I ever contended the political necessity of invasions from the north...I just questioned their military application.

I think amphibious invasions to be quite seperate from strategic bombing as well. It puts boots on the ground in the most critical strategic locations. I may not have made myself clear. I don't think the Anaconda plan's slow pace should necessarily have been applied...but a faster paced choking off of the south's economic foundation, through invasion. Winnie's plan was right on the nose for sure...just needed a little acceleration in my book.

It was Sherman's march through the heartland that ended the South's ability to wage war. That couldn't have been safely accomplished until the major rebel armies had been neutralized, even if it was attempted amphibiously. It would've had no line of retreat if something went wrong. People forget what a gamble Grant was taking in the Vicksburg campaign by leaving himself no line of retreat. Even Sherman was against it.

soloswolf wrote:I'm not trying to be obtuse

I am.

Banks6060 wrote:but a faster paced choking off of the south's economic foundation, through invasion. Winnie's plan was right on the nose for sure...just needed a little acceleration in my book.

+1

Looking back on it it's amazing really that the South did as well as they did. In no time flat they conjured up a central government, armies, currency a navy and strategy for survival. I don't think that's an easy task by any stretch.

Dax: You are absolutely correct!! If the South had some form of national government which could regulate production and transportation more efficiently the could have forced their independence IMHO. They were never able to fully mobilize their agricultural strength for their armies. Why couldn' the abundance revealed by Union raids have been made available to Lee and co.?? apy:

tagwyn wrote:Dax: You are absolutely correct!! If the South had some form of national government which could regulate production and transportation more efficiently the could have forced their independence IMHO. They were never able to fully mobilize their agricultural strength for their armies. Why couldn' the abundance revealed by Union raids have been made available to Lee and co.?? apy:

Southerners generally, and Jefferson Davis in particular, discovered that it was extremely difficult to conduct a total war with a system of limited and decentralized government, which is philosophically what they were fighting for. Each governor of a Southern state saw his needs as more important than the nation's as a whole and was inclined to horde goods and troops raised locally accordingly. In the prewar years they had opposed more interstate railroad connections in the South which is part of the reason why General Sherman's troops found hogs, chickens and flour in abundance in Georgia while Lee's veterans were slowly starving up north. Some members of the Southern administration refused to accept that their system did not function efficiently and placed blame for failures on Jefferson Davis. Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia took the government to court to contest the legality of conscription and even Davis' Vice President Alexander Stephens, became a vocal critic of the administration. With internal differences like these it's easy to see why Southern resources were poorly managed.

Each governor of a Southern state saw his needs as more important than the nation's as a whole

I think the North had this problem too. instead of replacing casualties they'd raise new regiments to keep them homogenous from their states.

Daxil wrote:I think the North had this problem too. instead of replacing casualties they'd raise new regiments to keep them homogenous from their states.

The book I am reading right now states that the North was also little "republics", but it then goes on to say that the situation in the Southern states was more extreme.

I'm currently reading an interesting book on a proposed variant strategy written mid-war. I disagree with his proposal, but he has a good way of thinking about geography.

Campaigns of 1862 and 1863 by Emil Schalk

You can say that a strong central goverment would have incresed the South's chances, and I agree, but the same underlying reasons they seceeded is why they were so divided. States rights had been their cudgel for so long they couldn't put it down.

One of the most telling incidences for me in the ACW was when they were debating creating Black regiments in the CSA

"Howell Cobb wrote from Georgia, speaking for many others: "Use all the Negroes you can get, for the purposes for which you need them. The day you make soldiers of them is the beginning of the end of the revolution. If slaves will make good soldiers our whole theory of slavery is wrong."

Now thats irony you can cut with a butcher knife!

[color="Blue"]We're starting to get a good distance from the coast... [/color]

I think its fair to say that the coastal invasions by the North were on the whole successful. They strengthened the blockade, caused various SOuthern governors to retain troops and war materiel for their own defense, and provided victories for the home front when some were badly needed.

A good case could be made that "victory fever" set in and that led to several ill concieved attacks as well. In particular the attacks launchd against Florida, Texas, and especially CHarleston. Charleston, once the outer harbor was held, had little strategic importance. The North became fixated on taking it however and expended a inordinate amount of effort on it.

While taking Charleston might have gained the North a morale boost, not taking it certainly gained the South one. Still . all in all, I would say that the invasions taken together were worth the resources expended and paid off quite well for the North.

TommH wrote:I don't think Scott was right, at least not at the time he was proposing his plan. For the federal goverment to just atttempt to passivly starve the population of the South into submission would have been politically untenable. It also had little chance of working. For instance look at the history of strategic bombing, which is significantly more devastating then a blockade. In no case has it won a war or forced a peace in spite of massive commitments of resources (agains German, Japan, and North Vietnam specificly).

The North had to invade and ity had to invade in the East and the West. Strictly it didn't have to carry out the various amphibious operations but it made sense for them to do so since they had the navy and could afford the resource diversion while the South could not.

With all due respect, you are totally wrong on your conclusion regarding the blocakdes discussed above. A blockade is a much different creature than the strattegic blockade you are comparing it to. I will conceede for purposes of this discussion, that the strategic bombing carried out in WWII and Vietnam did not sufficiently contribute to the ultimate victory so as to justify the resources devoted to it, but it was the blockades of the Central Powers in WWI and Japan in WWII that ultimately won both Wars.

The Central Powers collapsed becuase of the failure of the home front to be able to maintain the war materially (a combination of the losses sustained, disruptiosn to prodictive capacioty caused by material shrotages, and starvation).

With Japan, it was the unrestricted submariein campaign by the United States taht destroyed the merchant marine that compromised the IJN's ability to defend the Empire. The Battle fo Lyete Gulf was brough on becaus the Combined fleet had to be disbursed and home proted close to its fuel production centers in the Dutch East Indies. This led to the piecemeal and overly complicated plan that allowed the USN to cut it up in detail. Moreover, it was the loss of production capacity and the ability to replinish its garrisons (due toe the greatly diminished Merchant Marien) that allowed the Allies to island hop towards the Home Islands.

My point is that through the history of "total war," effective strategic blockades, of teh type first pionered by the Union navy, have been the truly effecitive means of globally reducing the effectiveness of a nations field troops.

The South Collapsed due to the deteriorating logistical situation, leading to starvation on the hoem front that compriomised the Army's Morale and recruiting. Under Gorgias, the Confederate were generally able to keep their field troops supplied with munitions, but that took the enteire productive and trasport capacity of the Confederacy.

The Confederacy was able to grow enough food to feed itself (as demosntrated by the Union Cavalry raids), but it was unable to transport that produce to the field units and the pospulation centers due to the disruption to its population centers caused by the refugee crisis. This loss of transport capacity was brought on by the inability of the Confederay to use costal trade and to trade in Eurpoe. Nearly all of the South's production capacity was devoted to mility supplies, and there was not enough residual capacity to make up for the loss of transport capacity in the form of rails, rolling stock and costal/riverine transport.

In the end, the South collapsed for similar reasons as the Central Powers, a gradual, but inexerable starving off of their productive/logistical capacity.

In short, it was the strategic blockade, more then the combat attritional losses inflicted by Grant et al. that led to the surender of Lee's Army. Rember at Appomatix, the ANV was still organised and well supplied with Munitions, but the troops were starvign and without food/forage due to the breakdown in logistics/production. Had there been food at Appomatix waitign fro Lee rather than munitions, the War would probably have continued, at elast for a while longer.

DIdn't mean to give the impression that I believed blockades to be ineffective, as part of a total war effort they can be quite useful. I just don't think that by themselves they are effective against a determined enemy. The Scott plan was for the North the eschew the offensive and to essentially wait for "the South to come to its senses" . I simply believe no shortage of coffee would have accomplished this.

I'd also say that there were many actions beside the blockade that directly and indirectly effected the Southern logistical situation. The cutting off of the Trans Mississippi, the destruction of various centers of production by advancing Northern Armies, and destruction of much of the South's rr infrastructure. All of these required "boots on the ground"

TommH wrote:For instance look at the history of strategic bombing, which is significantly more devastating then a blockade. In no case has it won a war or forced a peace in spite of massive commitments of resources (agains German, Japan, and North Vietnam specificly).

While airpower alone won’t generally win you wars, it has been successful sometimes. Think Kosovo (1999).

What a blockade of the South would do though, if not force the population to surrender, is hurt the forces in the field. If you can reduce over-all supplies then you indirectly reduce them for the troops in the field.

Like the strategic bombings in WWII… they may not have achieved their goal of breaking the will of the population but they certainly hampered the enemies ability to put new material and supply into the field.

CavScout wrote:While airpower alone won’t generally win you wars, it has been successful sometimes. Think Kosovo (1999).

What a blockade of the South would do though, if not force the population to surrender, is hurt the forces in the field. If you can reduce over-all supplies then you indirectly reduce them for the troops in the field.

Like the strategic bombings in WWII… they may not have achieved their goal of breaking the will of the population but they certainly hampered the enemies ability to put new material and supply into the field.

Bingo

This reduction in war fighting ability was certainly one of the goals of the Northern Blockade but its hard to say how effective it was. The South was able to do surprisingly well in the area of armaments and ammunition. Food and clothing seems to have always been the bigger problem, which was more of a transportation issue.

Its possible that being able to import important technical components (like locomotive driver wheels) would have made a big difference, but infrastructure issues are complex. The south didn't just lack steel and parts for instance, they lacked mechanics and engineers of all types.

One area that we haven't touched on was the economic effects of the blockade. The South's prewar economy depended heavily on the exporting of agricultural products (especeally cotton) for income. The blocade was able to seriously damage the south's economy.

This lead to the goverment running in the red and resorting to the printing of money with the expected result of massive inflation. Not a good thing when your trying to fight a war.

Another problem for the South when you're talkin' transportation....I think I read somewhere that just about each southern state had its own railroad guage? Someone can either back me up or refute me on that....

but yet another example of the the disadvantage of a system of government where states have all the power.

Like the strategic bombings in WWII… they may not have achieved their goal of breaking the will of the population but they certainly hampered the enemies ability to put new material and supply into the field.

I'm guessing that the strategic planners in WW2 actually used the ACW as a model.