I don't want to negate the many good arguments before, but I think the South was very close to winning. Opposition to Lincoln existed and if Mclellan had more political talent or the situation had been looking more favorable for the South, it could have meant a completely different ending.
And more decisive victory for the south was a possibility (Shiloh won, Grant discredited or giving in to his self-doubts, New Orleans properly defended, a decisive victory following Chancellorsville, Antietam won, St.Louis campaign properly conducted, Gettysburg won, etc). In hindsight it appears that the war was decided by small accidents: the stupidity of some adjudant (mislaying the complete battle plan of the Marlyand campaign), the two bullet that killed Johnston and Jackson, Bufords cavalry and the 20th of Maine at Gettysburg, the miscalculations at New Orleans, Van Dorn, Bragg, etc.
On the other hand, it could have gone the other way too, meaning an earlier defeat. I think Lee's strategy was extremely risky, he could have run out of luck well before Gettysburg, a more decisive reaction of one of the Northern General could have exploited Lees weakness earlier. It appears Lee's success was mostly psychological, and the rest was luck (initially) and of course guts (but the Norther soldiers had those too). In the long run luck always equals out, so it does not surprise that after 4 years of ther there had been luck and misfortune, on both sides.
But it amazes me that the Northern population upheld the motivation to wage a bloody war when they could have ended it so easily, even if they were not fully aware of the real causes. Let's assume a certain number of key events would have gone the South's way.
"Winning" for the CSA means only a ceasefire, an end of the fighting, and difficult negotiations about border states (would the south for example accept that Missouri and Kentucky remained in the Union), then (complete or partial) recognition of CSA or just individual states rights. Also if the Southern States really must stay completely out of the Union, or if there were circumstances the states could reunite or form a new United States.
If the Democrats get into office, McLellan might recognize the CSA, and start negotiations. In the best case two smaller North American superpowers start to coexist, perhaps they reunite later, perhaps they don't. In the worst case another war erupts one or two decades thereafter, or perhaps a World War starting on NA some time in the 20th century. It's interesting, what this would have meant in WW1/WW2 and beyond. I believe in long terms the two could have remained allies, like Great Britain and USA
South America fell apart into many individual parts so it would not be such a different world today if there was a USA and a CSA.
That's all nice as science fiction, but didn't happen. They tried everything they could on the battlefield and succeeded many times, and it was still not enough. Davis himself said it best: "Died of a Theory!". The CSA won some surprising victories on the battlefied but
failed in politics, both internal and external. Externally, they did not have France as in 1777. Internally it existed on the principal of states rights and that was its doom: selfishness, corruption, lack of coordination, egos etc. And let's not ignore slavery, the South would have been prudent by abolishing slavery (slowly of course), but that would have meant that the CSA would have imploded.
When the South formed black regiments it may have been the first step but much too late, and the Governor of Georgia said something on the lines of "if we arm the negro and later recognize that he can be an equal soldier, everything that our Confederay is based on was a mistake." I think we know today that the "negro" was equal and that it was indeed a mistake.
aariediger wrote:And with reason too. While many people see Grant and Lee as similar generals, they had different styles, and fought different wars. In chess terms, Grant is white, he plays the conventional role of attacker, has ‘tempo’, while Lee is asymmetrical Black, fighting a defensive battle, trying to find an opportunity to steal the initiative. Lee was spontaneous, taking advantage of mistakes and surprising opponents. Grant was methodical, his surprises were planned. For example, my previous post pointed out both Grant and Lee’s use of the central position, but the circumstances were different. Lee finds himself in the central position between McClellan and Pope, and strikes both in turn before they can unite. His defensive and opportunistic usage is contrasted with Grant at Vicksburg.
Rather than simply finding himself lucked into the central position, Grant plans to create the situation. He drives between Pemberton and Johnston, placing himself in the central position from which he will defeat each in turn, and follow through with the destruction of the former. This is the pre-planned, offensive usage of one of Napoleon’s most important tactics. Here we see the difference between Grant and Lee. Both knew how to take advantage of an opportunity, but Grant sets himself apart by creating his opportunities.
You analysis is a very interesting read. But what if the roles were reversed? If Grant would play Black, wouldn't he also have tried longer chances as Foote believes?
Grant had more material, so the style he chose was the blunt attack with rooks and Queen, while Lee had to try different things. but it could have been reversed.
Sherman said about Grant that he did not think much of him as an officer in almost every respect, but that he (Grant) had this "eery ability to not be scared a damn what the enemy does out of his sight, while it scares the hell out of me (Sherman)". But what does this "eerie ability" amount to? isn't it just a way to describe the cold blood of the risk-seeking gambler, to claim the initiative without thinking about the huge risks, don't give a damn what the opponent does and never stop even when things look bad? And isn't this nerve exaxtly what Lee also had (though not a General, even Hitler seems to have had it and had success with it, only until he became completely delusional of course)
In Chess terms, I think you can make an impressive start to every match with that all or nothing attitude, and you can win many times. Many players get too easily impressed if you just show an usual amount of aggression. That was the card both played regularly, because their opponents were not up to it.
So the keys are: aggression, initiative and pressure. I think that both Lee and Grant probably also knew the risks they were taking, they were just confident that 99% of their opponent Generals were cautious, methodical or even timid, and would break psychological if they just put them under constant pressure, and never stop. Lee was playing more on the psychological level it seems, that's what I meant with "had to try different things". but it must have been also clear to Grant that this would be a good strategy, had he needed it.
And with roles revised I am sure if Lee ever had a 2:1 superiority in men, I am sure he would have chosen a frontal assault even if initial losses were 25-50% higher.
By the way, what do you think about Lee's frontal attack in Gettysburg? Was it stupid or an attempt at a complete, psychological victory (they have held the flanks, now we simply overrun them in their centre), that completely misfired? Because I always thought that it could have been another gambling move that turned into his worst. What could have been on his mind when he came up with it, I really want to understand.
Did he already realize after days of inconclusive fighting, that the last thing that could save the last offensive the South could make was a miracle? So like if he was gambling Roulette, he decided to do the last move that he had reserved, to put all his remaining chips on a number? From then on he seems to have lost his psychological advantage, and turn into a pure, methodical defender.
Take note nothing I said was meant to discredit Lee. He developed a brilliant series of surprise moves that will live on for generations to study, but his brilliance could have been more related to that of a poker player, as I wrote above. Whereas Grant, who also neglected enemy counter action (according to Sherman ever) was never putting "everything" at stake, and could rely that if he should run into a trap, some other army would prevent the worst.