Fri Jun 13, 2008 12:35 pm
Executive Mansion
Washington, October 15, 1861
To: Major General Cai
Sir -
I do understand the difficulties you have been facing.
Militia are not the troops for waging an aggressive campaign, their primary purpose is to serve as defensive and garrison troops, freeing other forces from those duties, until such time as they can be provide with adequate training, leadership, and weapons. The western navy is just becoming available. You have inadequate artillery to do what is required. Forces must be moved into position to attack, before they can attack. Supplies must be provided to our front line forces, often over great distances with insufficient security. You will often be given the choice between acting aggressively on inadequate information, or acting defensively. There are difficulties with the terrain and weather, which will be increasing in the months ahead. I repeat my statement that overall I am happy with the conduct of the war, and what has been accomplished given the difficult circumstances.
The cooperative effort which you have demonstrated in Western Virginia to help secure that area, which technically lies outside your jurisdiction, has been exemplary. I have just recently read a newspaper editorial recommending that in addition to maintaining the legitimate Virginia state government there, that we should organize a new state from the western counties with the name 'Cai-nawha'. The thought makes me smile.
My comment regarding Lyon's lack of accomplishments was unfair, and I apologize for it. I very much appreciate your orders for Lyon's recent retrograde movement. That put him in a position from which to launch a surprise attack. I let my concerns for not passing up the opportunities we do get, for securing a critical point prior to its being reinforced or the weather limiting operations, and for finding a way to get additional valuable service from him, to override my better long-term judgement in that regard. We have also had difficult choices to make here. We are supporting you as best we can, given the distances involved and lack of trained field leadership. Given that lack, we must make the best use of what we have available. Men such as Lyon and Grant must act aggressively where it is possible, so that they can complete their objectives and rapidly move on to other opportunities. We are trying to arrange matters so that we will have adequate numbers of trained regiments when we have the generals to lead them.
We must remember that the enemy is facing difficult circumstances of his own with organization. He will not have sufficient intelligence regarding our forces and intentions, especially if our advances are made with alacrity and celerity. Many of the strategic points he must hold are unguarded, or only guarded by militia. Through my discussions with General Scott, I believe that the best way currently available to accomplish our objectives, is to disperse our cavalry across a wide front, using rapid movement to attack the enemy where he is weak, and bypassing his strong positions. General officers are not required for these types of small-scale operations, and having general officers accompany these expeditions would be counter-productive. According to Scott, generals think, colonels act. Concentrations should be saved for critical points which the enemy may not realize we can reach, and which may have inadequate forces to protect them. As a negative example, Scott does not expect a good result at Clarksville, where we have concentrated cavalry to attack a position known to be held by entrenched regular troops. (I do not expect an additional revision of orders in that regard, however). We can use the difficult terrain as a shield, hiding our movements, and any unguarded rivers as highways, even where we do not control the areas along the banks, allowing us additional surprise attacks. Careful attention should be given to widespread destruction of enemy railroads and depots wherever possible, further increasing his difficulties. We can afford to rebuild them later as we secure these areas. These efforts should force the rebels to pull back their front lines so that they can respond. We can then follow up with garrisons where their response is inadequate, and the main bodies of our troops against their stronger positions.
My other great concern in your department is for our western navy. We must not risk losing ships attempting to run past or bombard fortified positions, at least until we have several more ironclads. In the meantime, we should creatively use the naval forces available to enable movements by our land forces where possible, and limit enemy use of the rivers.
Reviews of the overall conduct of the war and of specific actions have been mixed. I personally do not set too much store in what can be read in the newspapers. I simply must respond if the pressure affects politics. I will continue to try limiting the ways in which public pressure affects military operations. I look forward to reading of your future accomplishments, especially if I can read of them in your handwriting.
Your Obediant Servant,
Abraham Lincoln
[color="DimGray"] You deserve to be spanked[/color]