First a
disclaimer: it was not me who moved this to the "help to improve" sub-forum. I was not suggesting any change, I just found myself puzzled by Halleck's low ratings and thought there had to be a reason on the game mechanics level that I was not aware of. I just took it for granted that he ought to be at least average, and in fact (as my opponent can attest to) I have for several turns tried hard to get rid of Fremont so I could give Halleck an army! Now seeing his stats are what they are, I will of course go with Fremont.

(In fact, I might try "random generals" soon just to experience the uncertainty Lincoln had to deal with.

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On a more general level though, I believe that in designing Civil War or Napoleonic games, we tend a bit to fall for certain nineteenth century perspectives. I.e. we may too easily go for Northern yellow press general-bashing, Southern post war lost cause hero glorification* and generally the popular preference for decisive action over proper planning and administration. The most popular generals of the war for the majority of the contemporaries, and for popular histories ever after, are the men who, if in doubt, charged. Yet excellent scholars like Hattaway and Jones make the convincing argument that it was strategic planning and modern managerial qualities that won the war for the North (while McWhiney and Jamieson argue it was the thoughtless dash embodied in Pickett, Hood and Bedford Forest and the general cult of the offensive adhered to, until Gettysburg, even by Lee, that lost it for the South). And they tend to rate Halleck more highly for his administrative and strategic qualities than the popular disdain for his lack of forward drive will ever allow.
That having said, thinking further I have of course come to realize that the strategic / offensive / defensive ratings in the game are primarily reflections of tactical and, at best, operational rather than planning and strategic abilities - as Gray_Lensman said in this thread too. They measure tactical initiative and leadership qualities. And in this department, certainly, Halleck did not exactly shine. But of course they cannot help but be a general reflection on the man. Furthermore, the higher a general rises, and certainly from the army level upwards, they tend to become of rather less importance compared to, indeed, operational planning and strategic thinking. An army commander, and certainly out West where the spaces are wide, needs to know a hell of a lot more about planning, logistics, coordination and command than about tactical initiative, offensive, defensive. So I do wonder if, for an army commander, the three ratings presently in the game are a relevant reflection of how well he could coordinate his army, or if there should be a fourth, properly "strategic" rating that would reflect say the way in which his subordinate corps are supplied & coordinated.
So in short, I wonder if we don't have a yardstick in the present three ratings under which someone whose
only qualities are managerial and strategic must necessarily appear an outright failure. Now I readily admit that Halleck the man had traits in him that made him perform worse than he could have even in this department.** I still have problems thinking he was worth considerably less for the Northern cause than was Louis Blenker.
(* I do wonder - I had not the time to look it up since I had this thought this morning, and I am at work now - how A. S. Johnston is rated in the game. He tends to be consistently overrated in popular history, based on little more than his contemporary popularity and a much abused Davis quote to the end that "if Sidney Johnston is no general, we have no general". Yet at Shiloh he needed two full days to move his rather small army a distance it should easily have covered in one, then deployed it 18th century style with the corps arrayed in successive lines rather than side by side in separate sectors, so that it was certain to be messed up beyond recognition as soon as it moved forward. He then completely yielded command of the army in order to lead from the front instead, assuming the role of at best a brigade commander, and finally got himself killed with his staff looking on helplessley because not a single of his staffers had the skills or even the initiative to administer a tourniquet. Yet it remains a popular myth that ASJ would have saved the South, had he lived, even though his battle performance provides precious little substance to prove the claim, and only his convenient timely death may have prevented him from proving the full extent of his incompetence for sure.

Tonight I'll look up his ratings in the game.

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(** A fair and decent analysis of Halleck's personality and performance is, I believe, provided in the recent biography by John F. Marszalek, "Commander of all Lincoln's Armies", Harvard UP, 2005.)