Cry me a river

[Straight Arrow]

Here’s the situation; the questions follows:

As the Southern player, I recently learned the hard way what it means to lose control of my rivers.
It’s Early Spring 1863 and my opponent, a cigar chomping, killer of exception skill, forego the tradition drive to Richmond and chose to conduct massive landings in South Carolina and Georgia. He’s occupied Charlestown and Savanna and their forts, then used overpowering forces to drive inland along the rivers and take Atlanta. I had two armies on either side of this force, one under Lee and the other under Jackson, but a clever, interlocking, diamond shape formation of adjacent corps has prevented counterattacks from pinching off the intrusion or halting its growth. Attacks on Federal supply lines by swarms of partisans and independent cavalry divisions have only slowed him down, and supply shortages have failed to materialize. The intrusions are now so large that I’m the one with supply problem. It is no longer possible to attempt penetrations deep enough into Yankee held territory to hit his river based, inland depots. The chance of encirclement and starving is too great.

A huge part of my problem in countering this invasion is due to the fact the Carolinas are laced with rivers. My foe has placed swarms of brigs up and down the waterways to shut off Southern cross river movement. This resulted in Lee’s army being trapped several times, and he had to resort to some fancy dancing to escape the cage.
To combat the loss of my waterways, I have tried to reposition ironclads from the Mississippi fleet and other sites to key rivers, but I was a dollar short and a day late. My arriving naval forces found the river mouths blocked by large and powerful fleets of seagoing vessels.

Through this massive, water born invasion: the heart of Dixie has been ripped out, my nation’s rail system was cut in half, and the loss of key cities has severely damaged the national cash flow. To boot, a well lead, 8,000 power Federal stack is starting to work its way into North Carolina.

All is not lost; strong Southern armies are still in the field; I hold Texas, part of Missouri, New Orleans, Memphis, Mobile, Nashville, Wilmington, Richmond, Manassas and Harper’s Ferry. The NM for both sides is around 100 and manpower loses have not been excessive.


Question: How in the world does one retain freedom of movement and control of the local waterways in the face of such overwhelming power?

Is it possible to protect key rivers in Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina from Yankee control and intrusions?


Any insights would be most welcome.

[Durk]

The problem you define is one which appears when players play the game rather than the history. All ocean going ships should be limited to the fall line or head of navigation. River going ships were special built to traverse shallow waters. I am not a big fan of House Rules, but this is one I would use for this game: no ocean going ships in rivers, except the Mississippi up to Baton Rouge and Richmond as a sea port. It is actually not as bad as in AACW, but close.

That said, you are absolutely correct about what can happen. Why did the Union historically not make this move. The Peninsula Campaign is well known to players as well as Lincoln's injunction to protect Washington. Why does the game not reward a CSA attack on Washington when the Union takes a Carolina strategy? Actually, one answer to your question is an attack on Washington/Baltimore. Atlanta is much further for the Union than Baltimore is for the Rebels.

The Southern leaders well understood the problem you are experiencing. This is part of why the Charleston command was one of prestige and not a backwater. I am not certain the game as configure has an answer. Because of the essential need of a supply network of sufficient size to maintain viability, it might make sense to head to Atlanta early on.

My way of saying, smart Union game move, but not a possible historical move. While the Union could and did support an army out of New Orleans and City Point, this would have been an impossibility out of Charleston and Savannah until about 1864.

[Captain_Orso]

A couple of point:

To block a section of river from being used to transport supplies you must simply be able to bombard into it with any artillery at all--I believe any.

Ocean going ships on rivers is probably questionable in many cases, but for example Farragut took his fleet all the way up to Vicksburg, not just Baton Rouge. The rules are very generic and don't cover low or high water levels.

Also, the North should be able to requisition and convert any hypothetical local riverboats and convert them into gunboat, plus--at least in fair weather--they should be able to send northern gunboats down to Charleston and Savannah fairly quickly to fill the southern rivers pretty effectively.

--

Honestly, without seeing the situation in detail, just trying to imagine it, I'm guessing the North is supplying Atlanta with only the Ocmulgee River with a supply base in Macon and by rail from Savannah. Being in that position would make me rather uncomfortable.

What bugs me about controlling a river like that and using it for supplies is that it is too difficult to prevent, while I feel that--without knowing any details on these southern rivers--it should in reality be not too difficult to disrupt traffic on the rivers with just a few well placed batteries, which could bug-out with the approach of northern troops. If the banks of the river are not secure, then it's not really a viable supply route.

Anyway, having a salient like that is generally not a good situation. That the North can control river crossings, I agree with. That the South cannot retaliate by attacking Union gunboats without having to take a couple of turns stationary to get to entrenchment level 3 to be able to bombard is just to restrictive to me. I'd rather like them to be able to gun it out and see who can control the rivers.

[Cromagnonman]

Most sea-going vessels cannot, in game, enter rivers. Brigs and trabsports can, but they are not warships. In my experience (having not played for a few weeks), the Union navy's big ships are ahistorically limited in how far up rivers they can sail. The fall-line of the Mississippi is damn-near in Minnesota, and the entire Ohio is navigable. That doesn't mean they are necessarily deep enough to accomplish New Ironsides, but Farragut was only stopped at Vickburg by Rebel batteries, not the river itself.

The peculiar effect is the inability of land forces to bombard stationary naval forces that are not set to bombard. A stack of 4 brigs may stop 100,000 men from crossing a river without firing a shot. However, should that army be caught in a battle while moving and the brigs bombard it, the brigs would be smashed to the bottom. So an battery must be entrenched to fire on passing ships, but can still be quite effective against the ships if the ships fire first. No doubt this was programmed to keep land forces from attacking and sinking ships at sea. Perhaps a solution would be to require ships to bombard to prevent a river crossing...

[Captain_Orso]

Most sea-going vessels cannot, in game, enter rivers. Brigs and trabsports can, but they are not warships.

Brigs most definitely are war ships. Have a look at their element detail window.

In my experience (having not played for a few weeks), the Union navy's big ships are ahistorically limited in how far up rivers they can sail. The fall-line of the Mississippi is damn-near in Minnesota, and the entire Ohio is navigable.

Riverboats are specially built to sail shallow waters. One cannot compare them to ocean going vessels.

That doesn't mean they are necessarily deep enough to accomplish New Ironsides, but Farragut was only stopped at Vickburg by Rebel batteries, not the river itself.

Farragut stopped at Vicksburg in June '62--actually north of Vicksburg, after running the Vicksburg batteries--to meetup with the Western Flotilla--the ironclad fleet first commanded by Foote--, combine with it, and take Vicksburg. Lacking infantry to actually take the city, Farragut had to leave Vicksburg unscathed when he was recalled to New Orleans later in the month. How far he could have actually steamed up the Mississippi, I have no idea.

I also imagine it to be quite difficult to find information on the rivers navigability during the war, or at all. I spent many hours trying to find resources on the navigability of the Columbia up to Nashville during the war as part of research into Forrest's Johnsonville Raid. I was trying to figure out the necessity of the Johnsonville depot at all. I mean Nashville is already on the Columbia, a major river in its own rights. Why send you supplies a longer route up the Tennessee, only to have have to transport them from Johnsonville to Nashville by rail. That makes no sense unless the Columbia route is unreliable. But I could find no information on this what so ever.

The peculiar effect is the inability of land forces to bombard stationary naval forces that are not set to bombard. A stack of 4 brigs may stop 100,000 men from crossing a river without firing a shot. However, should that army be caught in a battle while moving and the brigs bombard it, the brigs would be smashed to the bottom. So an battery must be entrenched to fire on passing ships, but can still be quite effective against the ships if the ships fire first. No doubt this was programmed to keep land forces from attacking and sinking ships at sea. Perhaps a solution would be to require ships to bombard to prevent a river crossing...

The question of bombarding from the shore is a very difficult and extensive one. I know of no historic examples of a land force defeating, or even trying to defeat, a river flotilla, in order to be able to cross the river safely.

I can however find a lot of writings about commanders avoiding crossing rivers guarded by gunboats and taking desperate measures to avoid being trapped by gunboats on the wrong side of the river.
.
That being said, there's a big difference between denying the use of a river for commerce--or the transportation of supplies--and actually controlling it enough to put a force across and keep it supplied.

[Gray Fox]

I posted last year that I had moved Athena's capital to Atlanta before taking Richmond in one game. The CSA forces lost any purpose while Grant was sent up the rivers to Mecum and then Atlanta. So this is not a surprise strategy to me. If the Union used and maintains "overpowering forces" along these rivers, then you should have an easier time taking D.C. Indeed, if you maintain a viable threat to the Union capital from 1861, then he will be less adventurous.

[Cromagnonman]

A brig may be a vessel used in war, but it's no war-ship. For example (because Wikipedia is easy), the USS Niagara draws 9 feet of water, just a few more than the ironclad Carondelet's 6 feet, and barely half of the draft of true warships such as USS Hartford and Minnesota. A brig is at best a scout and commerce enforcer. I do not see how 4 such vessels alone could oppose a crossing by an army (or even a corps) with 100 guns. If the argument is that the artillery of a field army is simply too light to damage a sea-going vessel, then why allow entrenched field gun to bombard?

[Captain_Orso]

I posted last year that I had moved Athena's capital to Atlanta before taking Richmond in one game. The CSA forces lost any purpose while Grant was sent up the rivers to Mecum and then Atlanta. So this is not a surprise strategy to me. If the Union used and maintains "overpowering forces" along these rivers, then you should have an easier time taking D.C. Indeed, if you maintain a viable threat to the Union capital from 1861, then he will be less adventurous.

Yes, if Richmond is still the capital basically the South could pull all it's forces out of the deep south and march on Washington. The Union can either follow and abandon all it has gained or spread itself so thin that it is also in danger of being destroyed piece-meal.

[Captain_Orso]

A brig may be a vessel used in war, but it's no war-ship. For example (because Wikipedia is easy), the USS Niagara draws 9 feet of water, just a few more than the ironclad Carondelet's 6 feet, and barely half of the draft of true warships such as USS Hartford and Minnesota. A brig is at best a scout and commerce enforcer. I do not see how 4 such vessels alone could oppose a crossing by an army (or even a corps) with 100 guns. If the argument is that the artillery of a field army is simply too light to damage a sea-going vessel, then why allow entrenched field gun to bombard?

The thing is, once you start crossing your troops, will your batteries on the shore be able to stop gunboats from running past them and attacking your bridge/ferries/what-every loaded down with your defenseless troops? Is it worth the risk? If it is feasible, why has it never been done? Hood, hypothetically, could have done this while marching on Nashville by forcing a crossing at Decatur and taking a much quicker and shorter route to Nashville, but instead he opted to cross at Tuscumbia/Muscle Shoals, where Union gunboats could not get at him from either up nor down river.

Also, even if you could force a crossing, how would you maintain a line of communications/supplies unless you maintain a sizable force to control a bridgehead? The game is actually very, very generous in allowing you to stockpile and carry amounts of supplies which had little to do with the reality of maintaining a constant flow of supplies to an army.

Also, the location of shore batteries will influence their effectiveness greatly. Vicksburg and Island Number 10 were considered so formidable, because from their positions they could fire many hundreds of yards up and down the river from their vantage point at the sharp bends they overlooked. Such positions cannot be found everywhere where you can actually place enough artillery to be effective. Even with these optimal positions for shore batteries, the Union managed to run past them practically unscathed. You also have to remember that army artillerists were not trained nor had they practiced firing on moving gunboats.

[Cromagnonman]

Hood's invasion required speed and stealth that would have been compromised by shooting his way across the river.

If the impediments to field artillery taking on ships are so great, why then are armies so capable when being bombarded by ships? I parked a large naval force to support my Norkfolk garrison, but it was wmashed when it tried to interfere in an attack from Suffolk. My experience has been that a bombarding naval force in this game is basically toast. How then can they prevent a determined force from crossing?

[hanny1]

A brig may be a vessel used in war, but it's no war-ship. For example (because Wikipedia is easy), the USS Niagara draws 9 feet of water, just a few more than the ironclad Carondelet's 6 feet, and barely half of the draft of true warships such as USS Hartford and Minnesota. A brig is at best a scout and commerce enforcer. I do not see how 4 such vessels alone could oppose a crossing by an army (or even a corps) with 100 guns. If the argument is that the artillery of a field army is simply too light to damage a sea-going vessel, then why allow entrenched field gun to bombard?

USN termed them as Brigs of war, classed /crewed them as warships, exactly the same as did the French and UK.

[hanny1]

Brigs most definitely are war ships. Have a look at their element detail window.



Riverboats are specially built to sail shallow waters. One cannot compare them to ocean going vessels.



Farragut stopped at Vicksburg in June '62--actually north of Vicksburg, after running the Vicksburg batteries--to meetup with the Western Flotilla--the ironclad fleet first commanded by Foote--, combine with it, and take Vicksburg. Lacking infantry to actually take the city, Farragut had to leave Vicksburg unscathed when he was recalled to New Orleans later in the month. How far he could have actually steamed up the Mississippi, I have no idea.

I also imagine it to be quite difficult to find information on the rivers navigability during the war, or at all. I spent many hours trying to find resources on the navigability of the Columbia up to Nashville during the war as part of research into Forrest's Johnsonville Raid. I was trying to figure out the necessity of the Johnsonville depot at all. I mean Nashville is already on the Columbia, a major river in its own rights. Why send you supplies a longer route up the Tennessee, only to have have to transport them from Johnsonville to Nashville by rail. That makes no sense unless the Columbia route is unreliable. But I could find no information on this what so ever.



The question of bombarding from the shore is a very difficult and extensive one. I know of no historic examples of a land force defeating, or even trying to defeat, a river flotilla, in order to be able to cross the river safely.

I can however find a lot of writings about commanders avoiding crossing rivers guarded by gunboats and taking desperate measures to avoid being trapped by gunboats on the wrong side of the river.
.
That being said, there's a big difference between denying the use of a river for commerce--or the transportation of supplies--and actually controlling it enough to put a force across and keep it supplied.

Try S for Foote for Battys preventing ship movement, or any acount that dealls only about the naval river warfare, examples are not hard to find, and why 15% of Va field guns were situated to control rivers in 62. i think its a pathing issue for supply thats not going to satisfy everyone, as its a boardgame mechanic of control of hexside by land forces to allow movement/supply thats been impemented.Did you look for a Staff Ride at CARL or Leavenworth for the Nashville question of supply?

* CARL here http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/

[Captain_Orso]

Hood's invasion required speed and stealth that would have been compromised by shooting his way across the river.

If the impediments to field artillery taking on ships are so great, why then are armies so capable when being bombarded by ships? I parked a large naval force to support my Norkfolk garrison, but it was wmashed when it tried to interfere in an attack from Suffolk. My experience has been that a bombarding naval force in this game is basically toast. How then can they prevent a determined force from crossing?

Not from what I remember. IIRC after he left Sherman behind, because Sherman stopped chasing him and turned to Georgia, he stopped at Tuscumbia for nearly 3 weeks.

[Captain_Orso]

Try S for Foote for Battys preventing ship movement, or any acount that dealls only about the naval river warfare, examples are not hard to find, and why 15% of Va field guns were situated to control rivers in 62. i think its a pathing issue for supply thats not going to satisfy everyone, as its a boardgame mechanic of control of hexside by land forces to allow movement/supply thats been impemented.Did you look for a Staff Ride at CARL or Leavenworth for the Nashville question of supply?

* CARL here http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/

You mean Shelby Foote for batteries preventing ship movement? I've read Foote twice, but I honestly cannot remember any specifics, but that doesn't mean much . If you could point me in the correct direction I'd be much obliged

I'll check the CARL; many thanks

[Straight Arrow]

* CARL here http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/

An excellent source that is new to me.

Thanks.

[grimjaw]

Naval warfare is one of the most poorly simulated things in the game. It's best just to think of it as completely divorced from history and reality.

[kc87]

Although the AI is less likely to test you in the Carolinas, historically the Confederates kept around 6 divisions around Charleston because of amphibious invasions as early as 1861 which resulted in the capture of Forts between Savannah and Charleston and other vital areas to resupply the Atlantic Fleet and mount future attacks in the area. The Federals sent X Corps to South Carolina along with portions of the Atlantic Fleet and also in 1862 Burnside lead an expedition in North Carolina which consisted of a division to capture Forts there.

It might be too late for you now but I always keep a few divisions around Charleston that can easily railroad in to meet any amphibious invasion forces in the Carolinas and Georgia. I would start forming a new Army to give to Beauregard to try and liberate Charleston while trying to make them pay elsewhere with Lee by threatening Maryland and D.C. I'd also include supply wagons, engineers, pontoon boats and plenty of Artillery considering the dire logistical situation, maybe increase your rail pool and try create a feasible supply situation for yourself to start recapturing territory behind their advance. If he is focused on securing all the rivers you should focus on keeping a rail line open from the Carolinas to Virginia.

[Captain_Orso]

Well, I did find out one thing, the Cumberland River has rapids near Clarksville, which are impassible during low-water, which happens twice a year; in mid-winter and late summer. So twice a year Nashville only got supplies by rail from Johnsonville, which was much more economical than sending them by rail from Louisville.

[Cardinal Ape]

I ended up doing some reading on Port Royal Sound because of this. It is fairly interesting, I have not looked too much into naval action of the ACW previously. After learning about it I wish it in the game. Having a naval port half way between Savannah and Charleston that can refit Union monitors sounds convenient to say the least.

Anyhow, back to the OP. The only Union ships that can get into the rivers of eastern seaboard are brigs. There are two river ironclads that could be built in Baltimore but they would have to sail past the coastal forts to get south, you'll see them coming. I guess, technically, the Union player could move a Mississippi river force through the great lakes and down the Hudson to New York but that is probably a step too far and you may be right to call BS on that.

So contesting rivers against brigs should be feasible for the South. When ships are interdicting they have to be in offensive posture, each turn they do so their cohesion will fall. Time your attacks to take advantage of this.

While brigs have slightly better combat stats than gunboats it is still a fair match. Really, both ships suck at combat and they are very likely to waste all their ammo on missed shots - bring a transport with extra ammo if you can. But still, it very unlikely that ships from either side will be sunk. Chances are the Union ships will have to sail for home to regain cohesion.

I know I have preached against buying brigs as an economic tool for the South, but if you do need to build gunboats as the South then I would guess that building brigs for 10$ more would be a better option instead. Once you win or lose the river the brigs can go make money while the gunboats would just sit idle.