CSA Grand Strategy - tips?

[John Sedgwick]

First, let me introduce myself. I'm new to AGEOD's games. I've been playing wargames for many years, but it's been a long time since I've sunk my teeth into a game as complex as AACW, so I'm a bit rusty. I'm cutting my teeth against the AI, but eventually I'd like to play human opponents. I'm starting my first campaign as the CSA, (and I doubt if I'll ever play as the Union unless it's to better understand my enemy), because I like to play the historical underdog. So with all that in mind, I'd like to present my overall plan for the war in the hopes that some of you might be able to offer some advice or critiques.

Rather than disperse my forces trying to defend every inch of Confederate soil, my general strategy will be to withdraw to more defensible terrain and/or narrower frontlines whenever convenient, focusing on in-depth defense of a few key areas, in the hopes of luring my opponent far from his lines of supply and communication and forcing him into decisive battle on ground of my choosing. This may not be good for morale, but I'm guessing it will give me a better chance of winning in the long run.

In the early war, I will wait for the Union to invade Kentucky, then pump as many units out of KY and MO before they're overrun. I plan on waging an aggressive campaign in the west up to the Missourri river as far as St Louis, then blowing the depots and tearing up the rails in a scorched earth withdrawal to a defensive line in AR and TN. I plan on building a lot of gunboats, coastal artillery, and ironclads to control the Mississippi. Also, fair number of blockade runners. No commerce raiders (don't see much point).

No printing paper money except for emergencies - 6% war bonds and graduated income taxes whenever possible, try to keep inflation low. No embargo unless it looks like I have a decent chance for foreign intervention. Light industrialization in TN and VA to bring supplies closer to the front (or is this too close? VA I will hold at all cost, but TN I will sacrifice if necessary). Also, minor investment in railway and major investment in riverine transport.

As far as battle strategy is concerned, the emphasis will be on interior lines of operation (i.e., set the width of the battle front and operate within it, not without), but I also hope to use numerous small cavalry raids to disrupt enemy transport (is this an effective strategy?). Set ambushes where possible, maybe set up weak corps as "carrots" to invite attack, placing the main battle force "stick" behind them to hopefully join the battle afterwards (will this work?)

Any comments or suggestions will be very much appreciated.

[Fingolfin]

Be very careful when recruiting units in states under ennemy threat, chances are you lose them while in formation if Union forces try to seize cities they are in, which is very painful for your national moral. I would warn against building anything but militia in MO/KY, unless all cities you hold are unlikely to fall anytime soon.

[John Sedgwick]

Thanks for the tip, Fingolfin. Hadn't taken that into consideration - I think I may have lost a unit in MO - will the game notify you if this happens? If so I haven't noticed. Anyway, I seem to have gotten away with raising enough elements for one division in MO, the rest of my KY/MO recruits were militia, currently raising divisions from TN and AR.

[Fingolfin]

Yes, as Federals must assault your cities to get rid of your fresh brigades... Curb stomp battles ensue

[John Sedgwick]

Thanks again for the reply. I actually had to look up the meaning of "curb stomp battle" (although if I'd thought about it hard enough I should've figured it out on my own :-P) , came to tvtropes.org, where I always end up opening a million tabs about other tropes in fiction.

Anyway, this is veering wildly off course. I actually responded mainly to add to my post count. But, here's a relevant update if anyone's interested: my campaign is going about as well as I expected, which is to say not very, but it's a learning experience. I managed to turn Missouri into a scorched wasteland. Price showed up in MO and won several victories with his doughty militiamen, which is more than I can say for Polk and his regulars who were soundly thrashed in KY and withdrew back across the Tenessee river before accomplishing anything of note. Nothing much exciting going on in the east. I think I spent way too much on my navy, I'm strapped for cash and war supplies, and beginning to think maybe ironclads aren't worth the hefty price tag? Unfortunately I have a weakness for all things naval. Now if only I could keep the H. L. Hunley from sinking...

[Pat "Stonewall" Cleburne]

I usually overspend on my navy too. It's nice to have when you need it though.

Against the AI, the war is usually won in the west. Against a human, the opposite is true.

[Jim-NC]

On the embargo front, you need it to get FI. FI can move up to 2 points per turn (depending on who has the lead in NM and VP). There are some scripted events that adjust it as well (Trent Affair, etc). The only way to get FI is to get lucky on your embargo rolls, and the Union getting unlucky on it's Blockade rolls. The net effect of the events is to lower FI, causing it to be less likely. So you have to embargo (it is expensive, but can be worth it).

On the money front, as you have probably already noticed, the 6% war bonds is a bit light, and you will run out of money fairly quickly. You may want to consider the 8% option. You will always run short of one of the 3 commodities (money/conscripts/war supply). So determine which you want to be your limiting factor, and work with it. (mine is almost always conscripts).

Ambushes don't work very well in the game. So watch out for your calvary scouts getting killed by larger union forces (you must have them to scout the enemy, but be careful to not let them get smashed.

[John Sedgwick]

@Pat: navies are indeed a nice if expensive thing to have. I'm a bit paranoid about losing control of the Mississippi (will the AI use the Anaconda strategy?), and I like to use rivers for transport as much as possible (will using up riverine transport detract from supply forwarding like using rail transport does?). Also, about winning against the AI vs a human opponent, maybe you could elaborate on that? I'm guessing that's because the AI is easier to outsmart in the wide open west, while a human player will be much more of a threat in the east?

@Jim: I think I'll try an embargo in my next campaign, right now I'm playing conservatively with the assumption that luck is not on my side. Seems like a lot of money to throw away on a maybe. As for bonds, I will probably switch to 8% from now on. And yes, I am learning that ambushes aren't a very effective strategy. As far as scouting is concerned, I seem to have done fairly well with small cavalry forces on "evade combat" orders, although they sometimes end up in places I don't expect. I've been getting generally very good intelligence on enemy forces, just need to figure out how best to use that information.

Thanks for the replies.

[OneArmedMexican]

I'm a bit paranoid about losing control of the Mississippi.

No need to worry about that. The AI rarely follows along the lines of the Anaconda plan. For example: In all my campaigns I have only once seen the AI conduct an amphibious assault on New Orleans. It was a lacklustre attempt with insufficient forces and aggression.

If you get amphibious operations in the 61 campaigns it will most likely happen in the east (on the Peninsula, Norfolk or in North Carolina).

Also, about winning against the AI vs a human opponent, maybe you could elaborate on that? I'm guessing that's because the AI is easier to outsmart in the wide open west, while a human player will be much more of a threat in the east?

I don't agree with Cleburne's statement completely. But here are my five cents: Contrary to the AI, good human opponents are able to stage viable flanking attempts in the east (most importantly they build depots along the way and establish supply lines. The AI just flanks and storms ahead until its troops starve and become easy targets.

@Jim: I think I'll try an embargo in my next campaign, right now I'm playing conservatively with the assumption that luck is not on my side. Seems like a lot of money to throw away on a maybe.

Smart choice. Usually you only succeed in getting FI if a campaign is going well anyways and you don't need the foreign troops. If the CSA is loosing against a human opponent (meaning NM is low because of some lost battles), there is almost no chance of triggering FI.

As for bonds, I will probably switch to 8% from now on.

I do the same. Go all out on taxes and bonds (while abstaining from printing paper).

[John Sedgwick]

No need to worry about that. The AI rarely follows along the lines of the Anaconda plan. For example: In all my campaigns I have only once seen the AI conduct an amphibious assault on New Orleans. It was a lacklustre attempt with insufficient forces and aggression. If you get amphibious operations in the 61 campaigns it will most likely happen in the east (on the Peninsula, Norfolk or in North Carolina).

All righty. I take it my paranoia might be justified against a human opponent, however? It seems to me like control of the Mississippi could very well be the key to winning or losing the war. Anyway, I'll be sure to leave some fire brigades to respond to any seaborne invasions in the east.

As for things like finances and conscription, I like to roleplay a bit when playing the AI, try to put myself in their shoes and forget what I know about history. So in the early stages I act as if the war will be over soon, and slowly ramp things up as it gets serious. This is also part of the reason for my emphasis on Jominian theory (don't think they were familiar with Clausewitz at the time?).

[Cromagnonman]

How would you employ Jominian or Clausewitzian strategy in this game?

[John Sedgwick]

Well, by bearing certain principles in mind while playing. Most of it is pretty basic and I'm sure anyone who plays these games understands the fundamental premises instinctively - clearly define objectives, prepare uncomplicated plans, determine strategic lines of advance, sieze the initiative, concentrate superior combat forces at the decisive point preferably against a fraction of the enemy force - that sort of thing. Jomini believed war was a science and not an art, almost akin to a sort of deadly geometry, using terms like bases, lines and points. Also, Jomini believed forces should be kept to the minimum necessary to achieve their objective in order to keep things simple and reduce casualties (of course this can actually work against you in combat that favoured the defender so heavily!) Interior lines of operation refers to movement within a battle space defined by you, manoeuvring in such a way as to put your enemy at a disadvantage.

[Ace]

Embargo is a good option not only for the FI (I have never achieved it), but for the NM bonus it gives you. For example, maximum taxes give you -2 NM and at least 500.000 $, even more in later years, while embargo costs you 150.000 $ and gives you +3 NM. If I can spare the money, I always use it regardless of FI.

[Ace]

I haven't seen it in any of the posts, so I ll mention it here. Build up your railroad as much as you can, up to 500 points in the 62, and guard your lines of communication. It is essential for defending, when you can have a whole army redeploying between East and West theater in just 2 turns. Remember, Union forces on foot in that time can travel only approx 4 provinces.

[John Sedgwick]

Thanks for the tips, Ace! Hadn't considered the NM boost from embargo. And I'll be sure to pump more money into my railroads.

[John Sedgwick]

Well, I started my campaign over again to apply some lessons learned, just finished that today. Boy, that was way too easy! The AI presented very little challenge at all, gonna have to crank up the difficulty I guess. I was pretty well prepared for Athena's seaborne invasions in NC and FL. Without really having planned on doing so, I went on the offensive in MO and KY and managed to take over most of the latter. And even on low aggression settings, the AI sent the Northeastern Virginia Army on a foolhardy romp behind my lines in VA, which allowed me to march on Washington almost unopposed, shattering Union morale and winning the war by late Nov, 1861. The CSA never even broke a sweat - only partial mobilization (in response to full Union mobilization), only 2-3% inflation, and I spent a ton of money on a navy I never got to use (actually I lost my entire Chesapeake Squadron in an attempt to blockade Fort Monroe)

Oh well, I guess PBEM is where it's at anyway.

[Cromagnonman]

Well, I started my campaign over again to apply some lessons learned, just finished that today. Boy, that was way too easy! The AI presented very little challenge at all, gonna have to crank up the difficulty I guess. I was pretty well prepared for Athena's seaborne invasions in NC and FL. Without really having planned on doing so, I went on the offensive in MO and KY and managed to take over most of the latter. And even on low aggression settings, the AI sent the Northeastern Virginia Army on a foolhardy romp behind my lines in VA, which allowed me to march on Washington almost unopposed, shattering Union morale and winning the war by late Nov, 1861. The CSA never even broke a sweat - only partial mobilization (in response to full Union mobilization), only 2-3% inflation, and I spent a ton of money on a navy I never got to use (actually I lost my entire Chesapeake Squadron in an attempt to blockade Fort Monroe)

Oh well, I guess PBEM is where it's at anyway.

So you used the strategic defensive to lure the enemy into over-reaching, while using your concentrated force to deliver a decisive counterthrust.

How very Clausewitzian

[John Sedgwick]

So you used the strategic defensive to lure the enemy into over-reaching, while using your concentrated force to deliver a decisive counterthrust. How very Clausewitzian

Hah, actually that would be giving me (and Clausewitz) too much credit in this case. The enemy was over-reaching all on her own (in the east at least), quite without my help! But yes, all considered, I suppose my strategy ended up looking rather more Clausewitzian than Jominian in practice, but perhaps not for the reasons you might think. My original "strategic defensive" war plans were pretty much thrown out the window, as I let my commanders exploit local weaknesses rather than adhere to any overall plan, so I was on the offensive in most places most of the time, relying heavily on militia, cavalry, and a unit of partisans to disrupt enemy supply and communication (i.e., exterior lines of operation, in Jominian terms).

But really, the differences between Jomini's and Clausewitz's military theories are often quite subtle, usually more of a difference in terminology and attitudes rather than in practice. Clausewitz saw war as chaotic and inherently uncontrollable, describing it in terms like friction and fog, so he believed talented field commanders should be given leeway to take the initiative. Jomini thought war could be reduced to scientific principles and that solid staff work could substitute for natural military genius. Most people seem to think Clausewitz is the superior of the two, and not without reason, but in my opinion they both have their strengths and weaknesses as theorists. The US Army, for example, generally presents itself as a Clausewitzian institution, but having studied some of its doctrines, I'd say it's rather more Jominian in character. Its "Principles of War" and the "Military Decision-Making Process" basically boils down Jominian theory to its essence, and despite recent attempts at innovation, most of its doctrines still emphasize interior lines of operation and linear, contiguous battlefields, which can be problematic when dealing with guerrilla warfare, for instance.

Wow, sorry for the wordy response, but I do enjoy rambling about military theory

[OneArmedMexican]

Well, I started my campaign over again to apply some lessons learned, just finished that today. Boy, that was way too easy!

Oh well, I guess PBEM is where it's at anyway.

If you seek a challenge, PBEMs are one way, the other are the 63 and 64 campaigns. The CSA becomes a lot more challenging later in the war. 64 is basically a continuos fight against starvation and huge Union hordes.

As for Clausewitz, I believe he was already outdated during the civil war. It just took a lot of time until commanders realized that the time of bayonette charges and open field-battles was coming to an end and started digging trenches.
Anyways, the man's book is hardly digestible today and I suspect it never really was. It offers some nice quotes, though. And admittedly, a coherent theory on warfare during the Napolenic Age.

[John Sedgwick]

Ah yes, I think I will try the '63 campaign next. '64 sounds almost masochistic - is a CSA victory still possible, do you think? Starving doesn't sound very fun but I'll certainly give it the old college try

Clausewitz' On War is not exactly an easy read, it's true, but there's a much deeper current of thought beneath the better known (and often misinterpreted) quotes. I suspect it has something to do with the German language? I've always found German literature of the period (with the notable exception, perhaps, of Goethe) is often convoluted and pedantic. But I wouldn't say Clausewitz was outdated, I mean much of his theory remains relevant today, for the same reasons we still read Sun Tzu. Put another way, you could say he was the least outdated military theorist by the mid 19th century?

Oh, and I'll have you know that according to the Japanese army at least, the bayonet charge didn't become obsolete until 1945

[SleeStak]

Oh, and I'll have you know that according to the Japanese army at least, the bayonet charge didn't become obsolete until 1945

Based on my limited reading of the Japanese Armies employment of the bayonet charge, they probably should have considered it obsolete after 1942 as their success with it dimished quite a bit as the war went on.

As for its employment in the Civil war, the bayonet charge was, in the correct circumstances, an effective tactical tool (witness Chamberlain's charge at Gettysburg, Upton's charge at Spotsylvania). Paddy Griffin puts forth some interesting thoughts about the role of the bayonet in the Civil War (he contends that the bayonet played a significant role in Civil War battles) in his book: "Tactics of the Civil War". I don't know that I agree with everything he says, but it is food for thought and I think he gets allot of the fighting psychology correct.

[OneArmedMexican]

Ah yes, I think I will try the '63 campaign next. '64 sounds almost masochistic - is a CSA victory still possible, do you think? Starving doesn't sound very fun but I'll certainly give it the old college try

'63 is entirely winnable. '64 is indeed something for masochists. Personally, I tried it twice but gave up both times. I was spending more thoughts on supply problems than on the Union. While realistic, it was just too frustrating.

Clausewitz' On War is not exactly an easy read, it's true, but there's a much deeper current of thought beneath the better known (and often misinterpreted) quotes. I suspect it has something to do with the German language? I've always found German literature of the period (with the notable exception, perhaps, of Goethe) is often convoluted and pedantic. But I wouldn't say Clausewitz was outdated, I mean much of his theory remains relevant today, for the same reasons we still read Sun Tzu. Put another way, you could say he was the least outdated military theorist by the mid 19th century?

Oh, and I'll have you know that according to the Japanese army at least, the bayonet charge didn't become obsolete until 1945

I can't say I disagree. Clausewitz certainly has some meaning left to this day (especially his ideas on friction are still relevant and enlightening). But Clausewitz has also been a trap for military strategist keeping them stuck with an image of war that - at least in part - had become outdated. In the Civil War (and the start of WW I) strategists were still thinking along the lines of maneuveur war while technological advances already favoured a different style of warfare. Sure Chamberlain's charge worked under the specific circumstances and as a last resort, but the next day of the battle of Gettysburg proofed that times had/were about to change.

As for German literature, read Goethe, Schiller or Lessing and compare it to the language of Clausewitz. And you will see a very distinct difference. Clausewitz lacks any literary flair. He shows the precise and exact side of the German language (and its tendency to get over-complicated), not its beauty.

[Ace]

64 Campaign is still winnable, but only on 64´ elections event, do not aspect a total victory.

[John Sedgwick]

Thanks for the replies. Fired up the '63 campaign and having a blast, haven't gotten very far yet but it looks like my original strategic concept will be much better suited to this scenario.

Regarding the bayonet charge: I certainly don't think it was obsolete by the time of the Civil War. Even in Napoleonic warfare, its impact was more psychological than physical, usually employed after achieving fire superiority to force a weakened enemy into flight. Bayonet drill is still practiced in modern armies, if only to inculcate the idea that, at some point, you may be asked to run screaming at your enemy with a knife on a stick. Interestingly enough, I was surprised to learn it has been successfully used as recently as the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

On Napoleonic and Clausewitzian tactics: I think the common conception that Civil War commanders were using Napoleonic tactics rendered obsolete by e.g. the widespread adoption of the rifled musket is an oversimplification. First of all, the tactics weren't very Napoleonic: they rarely employed strong reserves, for instance, or much in the way of combined arms tactics. The rifled musket and minie bullet were evolutionary rather than revolutionary advances, the significance of which I think is easily overstated - among other things, I'd say advances in artillery (longer range, shrapnel rounds) contributed more than the rifle to relegating the cavalry arm largely to a screening role, so when you subtract rapid shock and pursuit from the equation, battles become indecisive and I guess entrenchments are the logical result. To be fair to Civil War commanders, it's easy to find fault with their tactics, but it's harder to suggest ways they might have achieved decisive results. If I were in their shoes, I'd probably employ light infantry a lot more extensively, and give 'em repeaters if possible (easier said than done in the CSA though ). Also, you can't really separate the war from its American context - compare 1861-65 to 1866 and 1870, and you see two very different stories - if the Union were fighting the Clausewitzian Prussians I think they would've been slaughtered. In some ways the ACW was fought along more Frederican than Napoleonic lines. The nature of the American experience (its geography, its aversion to standing armies, for example) did little to prepare it for such a massive, industrialized war, and the high-stakes of the struggle made it particularly brutal even by the standards of civil wars. In other words, a number of factors (besides tactics being outpaced by technology) contributed to it being a very bloody affair.

@OneArmedMexican: Can't say I've read Schiller or Lessing, will have to give them a try.

[Cromagnonman]

As for Clausewitz, I believe he was already outdated during the civil war. It just took a lot of time until commanders realized that the time of bayonette charges and open field-battles was coming to an end and started digging trenches.
Anyways, the man's book is hardly digestible today and I suspect it never really was. It offers some nice quotes, though. And admittedly, a coherent theory on warfare during the Napolenic Age.

Clausewitz isn't even outdated now, much less in the late 19th Century. Clausewitz does spend a lot of space discussing tactics and things like billeting that we would consider out-of-date today, but this is basically to dispense with it as something "everybody knows" and not truly the curriculum for a general officer. Rather, the meat of On War is his discussion of decision making. He points out that due to friction, the general can never know the full truth of what is happening, nor can he expect his plans to remain applicable to the evolving strategic situation. The general must first be student, applying critical analysis to prior conflicts, in order to build a foundation for what is possible and what is likely. Thus prepared, the general aims to piece together reality from the morass of intelligence, and thus to discover and exploit his enemy's weaknesses. Having fought for Prussia and Russia during the Napoleonic wars, Clausewitz recognized the advantages of the strategic defensive, especially with regards to intelligence and moral forces.

These issues of command and strategy are still applicable today, and were relevant in the ACW as well. One can see the strength of the strategic defensive in the campaigns throughout Northern Virginia, as well as in the worsening performance of rebel armies as they moved Northward. Despite the advantages of defending an entrenched position, the rebels were able to win a large number of offensively-fought battles on their home turf, largely due to moral and intelligence advantages derived therefrom.

[OneArmedMexican]

64 Campaign is still winnable, but only on 64´ elections event, do not aspect a total victory.

How did you manage to save your troops from starving? More often than not, I had to abandon positions simply because of pending starvation.

Thanks for the replies. Fired up the '63 campaign and having a blast, haven't gotten very far yet but it looks like my original strategic concept will be much better suited to this scenario.

I truely like that scenario, too. My personal, favorite is the '62 campaign, though. If I want a bigger challenge, I switch to '63.
Defending Mississippi and Louisiana is tough. In Texas I usually switch to hit-and-run tactics. It is very satisfying to see the tide turn eventually.

Clausewitz isn't even outdated now, much less in the late 19th Century.

My original statement was intended to get a rise out of people (which it achieved). I believe however that the deeper thought behind it is valid: Due to the increase in firepower of rifles and guns, Clausewitz' concepts had - at least in part - become obsolete. I agree that many of his general thoughts on warfare (friction, defence, nature of war) kept their validity. But at the same time, Clausewitz's more concrete lessons had become a dangerous trap. The time of advances across open fields in closed formations was over. Defence in trenches, or behind stonewalls (see Fredericksburg) was a lot more powerful and man-power preserving.

As concerns, Clausewitz in todays world. I really can't agree. More than twenty years ago, van Creveld wrote a whole book explaining why Clausewitz' view on armed conflict is outdated vis-à-vis modern warfare. The framework just doesn't fit anymore. War is no longer war between states on open battlefields, but counter-insurgency operations and low-intensity conflicts.

Despite the advantages of defending an entrenched position, the rebels were able to win a large number of offensively-fought battles on their home turf, largely due to moral and intelligence advantages derived therefrom.

Sure, Lee and his Lieutenants won an astonishing series of battles in the East. But those were Phyrric victories. With few exceptions (most notably Fredericksburg which used a stonewall as ad hoc trench), they came at a price the South couldn't afford. Warfare à la Hood was a luxury that eventually doomed the South.

[Ace]

How did you manage to save your troops from starving? More often than not, I had to abandon positions simply because of pending starvation.

I was on defensive on main fronts (Atlanta Richmond), and aggressive on expelling Union pockets from the Atlantic coast. Destroying isolated Union corps brought a NM boost (1.15. version) that pushed Union below the Lincoln election.
The game asked me weather I want to continue, but I had a feeling I could not push on and advance, and in fact had achieved a stalemate. I feel if the game continued to 65´ winter, I would be in trouble with supplies, but it was over before that.

[SleeStak]

My original statement was intended to get a rise out of people (which it achieved). I believe however that the deeper thought behind it is valid: Due to the increase in firepower of rifles and guns, Clausewitz' concepts had - at least in part - become obsolete. I agree that many of his general thoughts on warfare (friction, defence, nature of war) kept their validity. But at the same time, Clausewitz's more concrete lessons had become a dangerous trap. The time of advances across open fields in closed formations was over. Defence in trenches, or behind stonewalls (see Fredericksburg) was a lot more powerful and man-power preserving.

...

Sure, Lee and his Lieutenants won an astonishing series of battles in the East. But those were Phyrric victories. With few exceptions (most notably Fredericksburg which used a stonewall as ad hoc trench), they came at a price the South couldn't afford. Warfare à la Hood was a luxury that eventually doomed the South.

I can't credibly attempt to weigh in on Clausewitz. I find the on going debate very interesting but alas, I have little to add. The increase in defensive firepower in Civil War battles is a subject though that I'd like to drop my 2 cents worth.

It wasn't the increase in firepower that infantry could call on with the adoption of the minnie ball and the standard issue of the rifle that changed infantry tactics. The soldiers were still shooting slow moving ammo into a wall of smoke. They had little opportunity to hone their markmenship and did not typically, as units, judge range or set their sites. As a John Sedgwick described it, their were real advantages to the rifle, but the advance was evolutionary and revolutionary.

The real change was in the size of armies that could be deployed at any one time and their management on the battle field. The challenges of properly committing reserves, timing attacks and providing artillery support while communicating with runners and semiphores doomed more offensive actions than increases in defensive firepower.

Thats not to say that defensive firepower could not be decisive or effective, but that it wasn't the primary reason for the change in tactics.

Needless tangent

These issues increase during the First World War when technology really delivers the defense a big advantage in the field telephone. Now the defense is able to communicate effeciently while the offense is still using runners and semiphores. The defensive advantage disappears in WWII with the adoption of the radio, changes in battle management, etc.

/Needless tangent

The defensive battle was not something that the Eastern Confederates could really take advantage of. Lee writes during the war that his biggest fear is a Northern siege of Richmond. He knows that if the North is able to gain the intiative, march to Richmond, and then beseige the city, it will fall and its fall might certainly spell the end of the war for the South.

Fighting defensively would surrend the initiative to the Federals. Doing so, would allow them to maneuver and concentrate their greater resources on his smaller army. Tactically, that means a field defeat, strategically, the likely fall of Richmond.

The victories of 1862 and 1863 weren't Phyrric, they were the only way that the Southern Army could stave off defeat and a defensive approach would have spelled disaster for the South.

[Carrington]

How did you manage to save your troops from starving? More often than not, I had to abandon positions simply because of pending starvation.



I truely like that scenario, too. My personal, favorite is the '62 campaign, though. If I want a bigger challenge, I switch to '63.
Defending Mississippi and Louisiana is tough. In Texas I usually switch to hit-and-run tactics. It is very satisfying to see the tide turn eventually.



My original statement was intended to get a rise out of people (which it achieved). I believe however that the deeper thought behind it is valid: Due to the increase in firepower of rifles and guns, Clausewitz' concepts had - at least in part - become obsolete. I agree that many of his general thoughts on warfare (friction, defence, nature of war) kept their validity. But at the same time, Clausewitz's more concrete lessons had become a dangerous trap. The time of advances across open fields in closed formations was over. Defence in trenches, or behind stonewalls (see Fredericksburg) was a lot more powerful and man-power preserving.

As concerns, Clausewitz in todays world. I really can't agree. More than twenty years ago, van Creveld wrote a whole book explaining why Clausewitz' view on armed conflict is outdated vis-à-vis modern warfare. The framework just doesn't fit anymore. War is no longer war between states on open battlefields, but counter-insurgency operations and low-intensity conflicts.



Sure, Lee and his Lieutenants won an astonishing series of battles in the East. But those were Phyrric victories. With few exceptions (most notably Fredericksburg which used a stonewall as ad hoc trench), they came at a price the South couldn't afford. Warfare à la Hood was a luxury that eventually doomed the South.

Granted, On War suffers from being a second draft (which his wife had the courage to publish after his death.

Nevertheless, there's a lot of Clausewitz-bashing that is just, simply, wrong: vis. Keegan's History of Warfare, which begins "Clausewitz was wrong," then proceeds to re-argue the points that Clausewitz made.


The idea of the 'Clausewitzian trinity' remains crucial (one application being that wars are fought by people, state, and military in concert).

Grant was, for better and worse, a Clausewitzian -- a butcher, perhaps, a drunk, perhaps -- but he was the one to take Lee's sword at Appomatox.

As to the modern applicability of Clausewitz....
Rumors of his demise are exaggerated. It's ironic that he died of a very 'modern' Prussian deployment. If anything his central point about war as the continuation of politics fits all the better in an age of counter-insurgency and low-intensity conflicts.

[John Sedgwick]

As concerns, Clausewitz in todays world. I really can't agree. More than twenty years ago, van Creveld wrote a whole book explaining why Clausewitz' view on armed conflict is outdated vis-à-vis modern warfare. The framework just doesn't fit anymore. War is no longer war between states on open battlefields, but counter-insurgency operations and low-intensity conflicts.

I respectfully disagree. Counter-insurgency and low intensity conflicts are certainly not recent inventions - the very word guerrilla is of Napoleonic provenance. Clausewitz actually wrote and lectured a great deal on small wars, drawing particularly on his study of the rebellion in the Vendée and guerrilla warfare in Spain. However, very little of this found its way into On War, in fact much of it has yet to be translated into English. Even then, as Carrington pointed out, the main body of his work still has some relevant things to say about low-intensity conflicts (which as a term I think is something of a misnomer!)

The way this thread is going, maybe it should be moved to the history section although I suppose its perfectly on topic in a strategy board too. Not that I mind of course, but does anyone have any tips for the '63 campaign? I'm having a rough time of it in Mississippi and Louisiana! EDIT: I'm thinking I might give up on Vicksburg and withdraw and regroup behind the Alabama and Tombigbee Rivers, tearing up the rails as I go. Or should I try to hold Vicksburg at all costs?