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I am currently in a game where my opponent simply loves to block every possible river crossing whenever possible. He has ships pushed up the river to block the rail-link at Richmond, and at Fredricksburg. It was a real pain in the behind, but I worked around it as best possible without moaning. However now he is also created a string of single gunboats along the whole length of the Tennessee to prevent my units from withdrawing my units north or the river back to Chatanooga while his force closes in south of the river. Clever move, granted, but highly annoying and I believe a little bit 'rule exploitive' I think for the following reasons:

I understand the historical precedence, and the application of the game concept but obviously It is highly annoying to be on the other side of the river and simply be unable to cross several division due to a single warship in each stretch or river. I have resisted calling it a gamey tactic, as said above I can see the reasons behind the tactic and the logical practical applications (though obviously in my head I cant help thinking bad thoughts). We could read this as a group of union ships patroling the entire length of the 6 or 7 river sections they occupy.

But it does seem a bit wrong that these 6/7 ships can totally prevent 2+ divisions of troops moving from 1 rebel controlled river back to the other rebel controlled river bank. They instead have to march 75 days right up to the end of the river and back again the other side. There is no option to force a crossing and try to fight across despite several batteries of artillery and engineer units in the corps.

I think this is a concept that needs some looking into. Either 1) each section of river needs a certain amount of boats to 'blockade' to prevent a crossing rather than just 1 element. or 2) gunboats should only be able to block if they own one or both side of the river to prevent these deep territory cutting incursions, or 3) bridges should not be blocked as a comprise

or my favorite option 4) units should have an option to try to fight their way across the river, or maybe the gunboats cause cohesion and hit loses if the unit tries to cross from harrassment. That way a significant force of gunboats becomes a true deterent, but a single gunboat is just a harassment.

I think I prefer the later, though I imagine the first is easier to impliment. And 2 & 3 are arguable historically I can see.

However otherwise then I do find it a bit ridiculous that my corps has to march for almost 3 months to get 1/2 a mile to the other side because of one gunboat. In reality then would the General in command a) march 3 months or b) find a way force accross? I believe the game mechanism needs to find a way to allow the historical solution to be an option, because (I'm sure my opponent will be happy to hear) at the moment the mechanism is being used to prevent me from doing what I need to do moreso than I think it should.

Or is it just gamey and need house rules? I must admit I really like to play historically myself and would prevent myself from using this tactic as being unrealistic in this scenerio. I might use to screen of gunboats to patrol in front of a defensive position for a few turns while I dig entrenchments, thats about the only time I try to block a river. This just seems too much though.

So many other game concepts have it pretty much spot on when it comes to re-creating historical precedents which is why the game is so great, but this one, though a nice idea, is a little oversimple. If there is a single gunboat you simply cant cross. Period. That seems a little wrong. I appreciate that AGEOD are busy folk, but if there is a chance that there is a change that is relatively easily implimented then that would be great.

Thoughts anybody?

In the meantime I have some decisions to make as to what to do next... ideas?

Hi!
In case you don’t know, you will be able to cross the river if you "contest" the control of the river zone with some of your ships.
You don’t need to battle or destroy the enemy gunboat. A lone gunboat of yours sitting on the zone with evade combat will be enough for your corps to cross.
Another option (i'm not sure about it, but you can try) is to use riverine movement with that trapped stack to move it to an adjacent river zone and then to the other side of the river, instead of trying a direct crossing. I think it could work on a gamey kind of way

This single gunboat tactic is useful (and probably pretty historic) to impede small units to cross an raid your side of the river.
The systematic use your rival does of this tactic looks a little gamey, but not much… as you should be able to have little a fleet which could contest the crossing for just once or two turns.
Or better still, a fort/entrenched guns which did not let your opponent to deploy single gunboats on your back.
If you don't, campaigning on the wrong side or the river seems too risky...
Look at history: once Fort Henry/Donelson was taken, the CSA knew they should retreat from Bowling Greene area or be trapped there. And they did retreat!

Just my 2 cents

We confess that the extensive usage of this tactic is seen as gamey by us, and derives mostly from the fact that the rule (and code done) was not polished as much as we wanted by lack of time.

My first reaction would be to check the number of elements indeed, and only prevent crossing if say 4 elements are patrolling the river. Veterans modders can react (and others too), we are not adamant on the fix, as long as it is realistic and simple to code

Thank you for your feedback anyway, Skibear. Several already complained on that, and it is only by lack of time that we have not fixed it yet...

Sure, I agree with most of that, effectively its early63 now. I built a fort in 61 at Nashville and Beauregard is still holding on there long after Henry and Donelson fell early62. I have kept a few divisions south of Nashville to protect the supply, but now the river patrols have cut between my two sides of the river and are preventing my retreat. Smart move within the game mechanism as said, but as said seems a little too effective for just a handful of ships over several hundred miles of river.
I think it should cause hits and cohesion to units crossing, but not block them entirely. That way its possibly to stand a chance to wipe out or damage smaller raiding units if they are unlucky to get caught, but should be harrassment to larger units.
Given that its deep down the Tennessee stretch of the river I have no ships there, and if I try to build some then likely they will randomly turn up in exactly the wrong place anyway.
Totally agree on the historical precedences as you say Arsan, but single gunboats in enemy territory shouldnt stop 20,000 men crossing the bridge at chatanooga when the town is still safely in my hands. And also the 3 stretches to the east all the way to knoxville too! As said, the little voice at the back of my head is saying gamey, but to keep the game friendly I havent mentioned it to him.

just partly this seems to be creating a particularly non-historical result where a line of gunboats

Merci for the response Pocus. As said the concept is a great addition to the flavour of the gameplay in principle, and I suspected time constraints were the reason it wasnt as polished as some of the others.
I can restrain myself from exploiting it and only use it where I think it would make sense. But I might mention it to opponents before game from now on to make sure its not an issue in future.

While Pocus fixes the thing with the 4 elements per zone fix...
Try using gamey tactic againts gamey tactic and try the rivering movement trick. I´m not sure at all, but i think it could work
Regards!

arsan wrote:While Pocus fixes the thing with the 4 elements per zone fix...
Try using gamey tactic againts gamey tactic and try the rivering movement trick. I´m not sure at all, but i think it could work
Regards!

I prefer to try to keep the moral high ground if at all possible
Not sure this would work anyway if he has a string of boats along the whole stretch. It certainly shouldnt I think. I try to only use intrinsic river transport in my own territory... but then I suppose I am actually in my own territory! I do need to get back though as he has Sheridan safely shielded on the south bank now and most probably about to march on Chatanooga. I cant move my corps south or as he has 1 boat at knoxville too re-inforcements from Virgininia are cut off too.

The more I think about it the more gamey it does seem. But it has been a generally interesting and challenging game with him so dont want to create an argument with him, just re-assure myself that I'm justified in being a little bit pissed off. I'll deal with it somehow... The British are 4 points from intervening. And I am sure he is re-acting to the frustration of still not having been able to take Nashville by early 63 and an admittedly horrible run of bad luck in the FI. Like pretty much every one has gone against him! So maybe that why he's sunk to this tactic (He'll no doubt start a thread soon that the FI odds are screwed! ) But as said it was already featuring heavily in blocking Richmond and Fredricksburg as well.

Just seems a single gunboat at the moment can do a disproportionate amount of influence on movement. I still think the answer is to allow units to cross, but slower, with a chance of losing cohesion and taking hits. Totally blocking movement seems the wrong extreme though.

One solution maybe that instead of a straight 4 element blockade then a single gunboat increases the time it takes to cross by (x) days and then each subsequent extra element increases the time it takes to cross further? This might be easier to code maybe and would simulate that it would take longer for scouts to find a safe spot to cross along the riverbank (remembering that each section is say 20/30 km long or whatever scale and impossible for a single gunboat to cover completely at all times).
If as a bonus it could be coded that there was a chance of inflicting hits on the units crossing too then that would seem ideal to me.

The riverine movement trick won't work if there is also a gunboat in the adjacent river section.

I'd like to also see the possibility to bombard ships that are not moving. Otherwise, the gunboats or other ships can just sit tight in defensive posture for a good long time.

In my current PBEM, my confederate opponent is doing this all along the Cumberland River, even though I have batteries on the north bank, and I don't have the strength yet to push into or past Donelson.

I am using the same tactic to blockade Richmond, even though the rebs have set up some big batteries all around the area. I know that if I just don't move, I can't be shot at. I also know I will eventually have a price to pay, if I haven't done something else about those batteries. Since I included some transports and brigs in my James River fleet, it will be a while ...

I would like to understand some history of the situation before making any change to the rules. A quick search revealed several books on river gunboats; anyone read any of them?

Within my own limited reading, I don't find any attempted crossings by division, or even regimental, sized units when the river was "in enemy hands".

Conceptually I can understand why a commander would be reluctant to risk a defenseless, slow, transport to making x number of trips, with troops crowding around a riverbank; all perfect targets for the warship.

Basically I'd just like to be convinced that the current rule is really ahistorical...

..and keep in mind, that although a 'river area' may represent 20-30 miles, how many fords were actually useful? How many decent roads leading to fords? I don't think it's inconceivable that a 'gunboat' [which may actually be 2 boats or more' could patrol the stretch and inhibit crossings.....

inhibit, not prevent is the key word. Was the commander willing to try it? Is the crossing unopposed [opposite bank]? Can you even see the gunboats when you decide to go? Is the river in flood or low? Is it raining? How far have we marched to get here?

With all this: I'll 'vote' for: slow down the crossings, cause cohesion losses, and perhaps even force a leader to inactive after crossing..... [remember the old wargame rule: you could only cross a river if you started adjacent to it, and expended all your movement to cross]

Hey Skibear,

There are some fellows out there who avoid using gamey tactics. Why don't you play with them instead?

What is contestable is that a single ship (a gunboat) can patrol effectively a river over 100 kms. So the need of more elements. 4 seems fair...

I won't (and can't, I don't have historical facts) contest that even a single gunboat can prevent a regiment from crossing. Although I would find logical to have a division set some batteries on a river to protect the crossing of the soldiers. That is what I would do as a commander, if I knew a little crappy gunboat patrol the area to sink my barges

edit: if only from a gameplay purpose, I think an amendment should be done though.

Pocus wrote:What is contestable is that a single ship (a gunboat) can patrol effectively a river over 100 kms. So the need of more elements. 4 seems fair...

I won't (and can't, I don't have historical facts) contest that even a single gunboat can prevent a regiment from crossing. Although I would find logical to have a division set some batteries on a river to protect the crossing of the soldiers. That is what I would do as a commander, if I knew a little crappy gunboat patrol the area to sink my barges

edit: if only from a gameplay purpose, I think an amendment should be done though.

Well, in this case, the batteries of the forces trying to cross the river should be enough to protect the forces (depending on the gunboat number though). I don't think we also need additional artillery batteries entrenched in the area.

One of the principal problems here is the ease by which gunboats can push deep into enemy territory and effectively stop troops crossing bridges in there own town in which a divison is on the south bank and two divisions are on the north bank, and both are powerless to cross because of a single gunboat in each of the stretches of river. I havent got the map here at work, but its 240miles from decatur AL to Knoxville TN by road and probably further by river. At present 6 or 7 boats have that entire stretch totally locked down so that even if I control both side of a bridge with a division at each end then I cant cross except to march 3 months round.

Thats the a-historical situation that I think maybe needs a better solution to. I can see that its an important part of the gameplay that boats can interdict movement, but at present i believe that they can do too much harm to movement out of proportion to their size. Thats why I like the idea of them slowing and damaging units trying to cross. Cavalry raiders could slip past, but if caught by a gunboat could be wiped out. Whole divisions would be slowed down, but ultimately if prepared to take the risk they would find a bridge, or ford, or would secure both banks with protective artillery and pickets and get across.

Evren wrote:Hey Skibear,

There are some fellows out there who avoid using gamey tactics. Why don't you play with them instead?

Haha, yes, you are a good opponent Evren. The only gamey think I can think to accuse you of is taking New Orleans in Sept61 before the European brigade event! That definately caught me offguard and such behaviour must be eradicated!! I'm going home now and after I've had a little cry I'll send you the next turn...

Pocus wrote:What is contestable is that a single ship (a gunboat) can patrol effectively a river over 100 kms. So the need of more elements. 4 seems fair...

I won't (and can't, I don't have historical facts) contest that even a single gunboat can prevent a regiment from crossing. Although I would find logical to have a division set some batteries on a river to protect the crossing of the soldiers. That is what I would do as a commander, if I knew a little crappy gunboat patrol the area to sink my barges

edit: if only from a gameplay purpose, I think an amendment should be done though.

So.. how about making gunboats able to impede crossing of rivers to stacks without guns but not to stacks with batteries they could set up to protect the crossing?
Maybe each gunboat element would need a battery element to be neutralized. So a normal gunboat unit (2 element) could impede crossing of raiders, an even small stacks like cavalry/inf+arty but not divisions, corps and the like.
If you manage to put 8 or 10 gunboat elements per river zone (a sizable fleet), only big corps will be able to force the crossing...

Sound good? Will it be too difficult to program?

Regards!

arsan wrote:So.. how about making gunboats able to impede crossing of rivers to stacks without guns but not to stacks with batteries they could set up to protect the crossing?
Maybe each gunboat element would need a battery element to be neutralized. So a normal gunboat unit (2 element) could impede crossing of raiders, an even small stacks like cavalry/inf+arty but not divisions, corps and the like.
If you manage to put 8 or 10 gunboat elements per river zone (a sizable fleet), only big corps will be able to force the crossing...

Sound good? Will it be too difficult to program?

Regards!

I think you are getting closer. Some ratio of the number of elements to the number to batteries would seem to be good.

lodilefty wrote:..and keep in mind, that although a 'river area' may represent 20-30 miles, how many fords were actually useful? How many decent roads leading to fords? I don't think it's inconceivable that a 'gunboat' [which may actually be 2 boats or more' could patrol the stretch and inhibit crossings.....

inhibit, not prevent is the key word. Was the commander willing to try it? Is the crossing unopposed [opposite bank]? Can you even see the gunboats when you decide to go? Is the river in flood or low? Is it raining? How far have we marched to get here?

With all this: I'll 'vote' for: slow down the crossings, cause cohesion losses, and perhaps even force a leader to inactive after crossing..... [remember the old wargame rule: you could only cross a river if you started adjacent to it, and expended all your movement to cross]

I think this pretty much sums up why it never happened in the ACW. It only took one gunboat to blast away at a brigade and chase them away. There are several instances of this through the entire war.

Add to this that it takes the better part of a day to get a regiment or large across a major river...and that is under optimal conditions (like no gunboats firing on you).

Assuming you do make it across the river you then have the problem of having severed your supply line (unless you have a large force stationed on that river to protect the supply trains). No general in his right mind would cross a major river, with a large military force without a working source of supplies.

Add all these various factors together and you can see how a river crossing without control (or atleast neutralization) on the river is not a realistic option.

Of course, if your argument is more one of CAN it be done I suppose it could, but at what cost? And who is to say you will be able to get back across when you need to?

AndrewKurtz wrote:I think you are getting closer. Some ratio of the number of elements to the number to batteries would seem to be good.

Seems from my reading that in small fights, 1 gunboat generally beats 1 battery outside of a fort. 3 batteries generally beat one gunboat. 2 batteries vs. 1 gunboat is a toss-up. Of course there were many variables ... the size of the river, the surrounding terrain, the suprise factor, presence of supporting troops on either side, the size of guns used, etc. It's just a suggestion for a general rule.

Skibear wrote:One of the principal problems here is the ease by which gunboats can push deep into enemy territory and effectively stop troops crossing bridges in there own town in which a divison is on the south bank and two divisions are on the north bank, and both are powerless to cross because of a single gunboat in each of the stretches of river. I havent got the map here at work, but its 240miles from decatur AL to Knoxville TN by road and probably further by river. At present 6 or 7 boats have that entire stretch totally locked down so that even if I control both side of a bridge with a division at each end then I cant cross except to march 3 months round.

Notes:

1. One of the first missions of gunboats in enemy territory was knocking down all the bridges. Unless there was constant artillery protection for the bridge in question, this was considered easy work.

2. We haven't figured out a good way to represent Muscle Shoals (west of Decatur) on the map yet. Boats could sometimes get past there, but usually not (depending on the water level).

3. I'd guess about 20 usable fords/ferries/bridges between Decatur and Knoxville. Is that too many for a dozen gunboats to patrol?

4. Divisional artillery should have no problems dealing with two gunboats (each game squadron is 2, unless it has lost 1).

I'm not making an argument yet. I'm looking for commentary on my assumptions before I decide what argument I want to make next.

Jabberwock wrote:Notes:

2. We haven't figured out a good way to represent Muscle Shoals (west of Decatur) on the map yet. Boats could sometimes get past there, but usually not (depending on the water level).

There were several attempts at channelling the river before the war and a canal was built in the 1830's but it wasn't very successful and never really opened up traffic like they thought it would (plus you still had the Tennessee River west of Chattanooga to deal with, which was about as bad as Muscle Shoals). I think between that and railroads in the area which moved cargo between boats above and below the shoals you could have a minor slowdown in traffic going up/down river. There was a reason the U.S. built Wilson Dam there as soon as they could.

Jabberwock wrote:3. I'd guess about 20 usable fords/ferries/bridges between Decatur and Knoxville. Is that too many for a dozen gunboats to patrol?

If that is Decatur in Alabama then you probably need to up the number a bit. I can think of about 20 places you could cross the river between Decatur, Tennessee (or Washington, the closest place on the river to Decatur, TN) and Knoxville without even looking at period maps. Although at this time the Tennessee River didn't actually make it up to Knoxville. The Tennessee at the time was formed by the junction of the Holston and Little Tennessee Rivers at Lenoir City. When the govt. founded TVA and put the headquarters in Knoxville the start of the Tennessee River was moved upstream to the junction of the Holston and French Broad rivers east of Knoxville because the TV people thought it odd that the headquarters of the TENNESSEE Valley Authority was not located on the Tennessee River.

LMUBill wrote: When the govt. founded TVA and put the headquarters in Knoxville the start of the Tennessee River was moved upstream to the junction of the Holston and French Broad rivers east of Knoxville because the TV people thought it odd that the headquarters of the TENNESSEE Valley Authority was not located on the Tennessee River.

Ha! Great historical tidbit! The stuff I learn from reading the forum...

Originally Posted by Jabberwock
Notes:

2. We haven't figured out a good way to represent Muscle Shoals (west of Decatur) on the map yet. Boats could sometimes get past there, but usually not (depending on the water level).

Hmmm. maybe we could do something with a transition jumplink to allow slow travel past there.....

Or make that part non-navigatable to gunboats? At present you can sail an army deep into that mountain territory when it sounds like it would have been difficult or impossible to achieve logistically, especially going upstream.

It would still be a defence feature, but not blockable which from local knowledge seems unlikely.

However I suspect as the artwork is hardcoded to show a wide river this could cause problems.

The quest for the perfect game continues. Close. Very close....

Evren wrote:Hey Skibear,

There are some fellows out there who avoid using gamey tactics. Why don't you play with them instead?

FWIW, I don't believe it is a gamey tactic. It's the mechanism in place to have gunboat control a river. Otherwise, we have to micromanage groups of them moving up/down river. I view it as that entire group is effectively patrolling the river.

I think gunboats are modeled fairly well in simulating river control right now. The small amount of supply carried by gunboats and their extreme vulnerability to guns, makes their use behind enemy lines both extremely dangerous and limited to short time frames.

Ironclads are much more effective as a blockade ship due to their protection but the Union has too few to waste on blockading huge sections of rivers. Not to mention, if there is any sort of rebel river navy in existence, combined with a few field artillery batteries, columbiads, coastal artillery emplaced at strategic points, forces the Union to operate in concentrated fleets except in very safe areas. It is very risky to operate single Union ironclads or gunboats behind enemy lines until they destroy the reb river navy and often the reb emplaced guns.

Gunboats are also the best preventation of rebel raids behind the lines. Without easy gunboat blockades, the Union would constantly have to chase down rinky dink raids in the North.

Gunboats are very easy to counter with a few emplaced guns. They are extremely vulnerable to emplaced guns and sink easily.

I personally don't think gunboats are over effective as a generic blockade mechanism-especially against a human player that creates a reb river navy and uses emplaced artillery at strategic points. As it is, I cannot blockade the Tennessee River, even after the fall of Fort Donelson, without using ironclads because my opponents emplace guns along the Tennessee that sink gunboats. I rarely devote a fleet of ironclads to blockade the Tennessee because my opponents also have a serious reb river navy that needs the attention of my ironclads. Finally, reb players usually have a couple of gunboats strategically placed along the Cumberland and Tennessee which can contest a river crossing for the one turn required to cross the river.

Increasing the number of ships required to blockade a river section really isn't going to change anything except to make things worse. It is already very difficult for the Union player to blockade river sections in hostile rivers against an experienced reb player. This change will just make it much more difficult than it already is.

Gunboats represent 2 boats covering a 20 to 30 mile strech of river. Bridges have been knocked down by the boats heavy guns. So how does an army receive large amounts of supply every day over that strech of river. How would 30-50,000 men get across a 1/4 mile or 1/2 mile wide river on small boats in the face of two gunboats? Without someone to drive off the gunboats, neither supply nor troops are crossing that river.

I think for river blockade purposes, the game requirements are fine now.

arsan wrote:So.. how about making gunboats able to impede crossing of rivers to stacks without guns but not to stacks with batteries they could set up to protect the crossing?
Maybe each gunboat element would need a battery element to be neutralized. So a normal gunboat unit (2 element) could impede crossing of raiders, an even small stacks like cavalry/inf+arty but not divisions, corps and the like.
If you manage to put 8 or 10 gunboat elements per river zone (a sizable fleet), only big corps will be able to force the crossing...

Hm, but on the other hand one could argue that especially small forces should have a better chance to slip through patrols.
They can split up into small groups and/or use the night etc.
However it would take longer and they surely would lose cohesion.

Given that things work fairly well as they are, it'll have to be a very good and very well thought through solution to warrant time being spent to implement it. It also needs to be kept in mind that more complex does not necessarily mean better

Rafiki - your 'given' is debatable.

If the rebs post a division (or corps) at Donelson, and get just four gunboat squads into the Cumberland River, those gunboats can just sit. They can use the gunboats they start with and get them there before any Union shore batteries are set up.

They can't be bombarded if they don't move, and they never have to move because they draw supplies from Nashville. This is gamey (not that I won't do the same thing, unless it is fixed). Combine it with slightly too much mud in the hills and mountains to the east, and you can have a beautiful static line, even without corps marching to guns. Throw in some more gunboats on the Tennessee, and there are only three possible axis of attack - through the Great Confluent directly into Donelson, from eastern Tennessee, or by running an ironclad fleet past Donelson. In my current PBEM, I expect to get past this defense sometime in late '62 or early '63.

This is an example of why I think the primary issue here is the inability of land forces to bombard non-moving fleets.

Another example is what I am doing by sitting in the James River to blockade Richmond, although that involves the occasional supply run past the batteries. My opponent should be able to attack the non-moving ships if he wants to.

My bad, that one is pretty gamey. However, having forts and entrenched stacks being able to fire on stationary fleets should be a very small and therefore feasable change (I imagine). MY post referred to the suggestion of having more batteries than naval elements to be able to cross and that kind of thing, though.