How can river crossings and the blocking of them best be portrayed in AACW?

[Turbo823]

This has already been discussed in considerable detail. Consider the scale of the game and two week turns. If the rebels decided to force a crossing into union controlled areas think of the quick reaction that the bluebellies would have. The best way to simulate this is to have boats able to block the crossing. How else would you model union control of the rivers? Seriously...

You can build your own river fleet and challenge their boats to force a crossing. Besides I have noticed some SERIOUS game balance issues when this rule is not in place especially in the April '61 campaign.

Well, regardless of previous discussions, this function makes no sense. I applaud the developers for their response to community requests but this function is unrealistic and ill-conceived.

I am more concerned about the impact this function has on the lesser rivers. These lesser rivers should be fordable in many areas. Both Hood and Price crossed many of these lesser rivers despite 100% naval superiority by Union gunboat control with little impact.

With this function, you can wall-off whole areas of a lesser river which could be easily cross via ford by creating a naval "berlin wall". As Berto points out, in the later stages of the game you can essentially shutdown confederate raids that occured historically. How is that realistic?

Another question I have is how does the AI deal with this? I see no evidence that the AI uses this function and I suspect it can't deal with it.

Your suggestion to build a fleet to fight a naval battle so that you can cross a generally fordable river makes no sense from a realistic, logical perspective. Even if it made sense, the game does not allow you select the specific location of a reinforcement but rather randomly selects cities within an entire region.

[W.Barksdale]

How does the AI deal with this?

This is the least of the AI's problems. EDIT: besides I don't even bother with building ANY boats against the AI. The game is over before '62 even starts.

With this function, you can wall-off whole areas of a lesser river which could be easily cross via ford by creating a naval "berlin wall".

That's why they must be in offensive posture. They can't sit there forever.

When you boats blocking river crossing don't just think of it as those single squads. Remember the scale of this game. I believe it represents the entire river fleet with army support patrolling both the river and the banks.

Without this rule there is a serious game balance issue that HEAVILY shifts the advantage in Union favour in the first few months in MP.

[Turbo823]

This is the least of the AI's problems.

Breaking something further doesn't repair it. Adding even minor problems to the AI is going to make the AI worse, not better.

[berto]

This is the least of the AI's problems.

Maybe, but that shouldn't rationalize a game rule that makes for totally ahistorical game play. Across-the-map Berlin Wall, indeed.

[Jabberwock]

In the central theater, I don't know that--in general--the Confederates ever worried that Union gunboat interdiction would thwart a determined attempt at crossing the Tennessee or Cumberland (or other) Rivers. Hindered a bit by gunboats--maybe--but stopped cold--no. In Hood's 1864 Franklin campaign, for instance, I'm not aware that the Rebels fretted about Union gunboats preventing their crossing the Tennessee, even though by then Union gunboats on that river were undoubtedly ubiquitous.

From Sherman's Memoirs pp. 638-39:

I also rested much confidence on the fact that the Tennessee River below Muscle Shoals was strongly patrolled by gunboats, and that the reach of the river above Muscle Shoals, from Decatur as high up as our railroad at Bridgeport, was also guarded by gunboats, so that Hood, to cross over, would be compelled to select a point inaccessible to these gunboats. He actually did choose such a place, at the old railroad-piers, four miles above Florence, Alabama, which is below Muscle Shoals and above Colbert Shoals.

So Hood's ability to cross the Tennessee was due to the non-navigability of the shoals, which is being worked on.

The Mississippi, on the other hand, is so vast and wide that interdiction should be possible, and exceptional rules for that river (and perhaps also the Ohio and several obvious wide rivers (coastal waters and estuaries) to the east--the Lower James, for instance?) should apply.

I agree that there needs to be more differentiation between rules for coastal and shallow regions. Also, I think that the Mississippi should be considered coastal up to the Yazoo Confluent, which is as far as Farragut could get with his blue-water ships.

[runyan99]

Also, Bragg's ability to cross the Tennessee in 1862 was due to a summer drought which lowered the river to a point where Union gunboats/supply ships could not navigate the river.

[Jabberwock]

Maybe it's an empirical question then. Whether 4, or 6, or 8, or whatever--with enough gunboat resources, maybe it should be possible to totally block any given river region, but it should be beyond the Union's resources to employ the strategy of purchasing a massive gunboat fleet to garrison each and every river region anywhere on the map and throttle absolutely all Confederate river crossings up and down the entire length of all rivers.

Otherwise, if this were a historically viable strategy, why wouldn't the Union high command have seen the solution to their "Forrest Problem" (and the vulnerability of Sherman's supply lines)--swarm the Tennessee River with gunboats, thereby blocking all Confederate penetrations into the state of Tennessee?

By 1863 or 1864, posting lines of 4 brigs or gunboats (rather than 2) wherever they are wanted should not be a big issue for the Union. I don't think its a strictly empirical question. I think crossings should be contested, with a massive advantage in favor of naval forces. The gunboats should be able to interdict supply.

[berto]

Taking into account Jabberwock's Sherman quote, and after looking up Forrest's October 1864 Johnsonville, TN Raid, I modify my stance: With certain exceptions, yes, it should be able--with sufficient Union riverine forces--to generally thwart Confederate river crossings.

At Johnsonville, the wily Forrest created those exceptional circumstances by capturing two Union gunboats. Stationing the captured Union vessels on the Tennessee River above and below Johnsonville, he was able to shell the Johnsonville supply encampment to smithereens unmolested from the far (west) side of the river. But interestingly, even though he had seized control of that short stretch of the river, he did not risk an actual crossing, although he certainly could have tried it.

So, I'm changing my mind. Yes, in general, maybe the Union--with sufficient forces--should generally be able to interdict Confederate river crossings. Are 4 gunboats per river region enough? Again, an empirical question.

But, as in the Muscle Shoals (Hood 1864 Franklin Campaign) example at least, there should be some (but probably very few) exceptions.

[Jabberwock]

Hmmm, means supply during supply phase will probably go thru also.

I still think what you've done here is a significant improvement. Maybe it's not perfect, but in the longer term, a little bit of supply trickling across is not a big deal.

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[Brochgale]

The yanks could always genetically modify super hungry gators with steel teeth - or maybe suicide jumping crocks with explosives attached to operate in Mississippi.

Ask the question about yank strategy first - Could they win war without splitting Confederacy or was Vicksburg merely a political and not a military objective?

[Jabberwock]

I take it you have not been able to "break" the "Muscle Shoals" rework?

Not with gunboats, ironclads, or brigs. Supplies seem to get across and troops using riverine movement can do as they please.

[lycortas]

That reminds me of Roman Flaming Pigs tm. as a weapon of war against Pyrus' elephants.

About rivers, the Ohio is pretty much as big of a problem as the Mississippi for crossing purposes. I simply do not know how a force could cross it without riverboats. There is no ford across the Ohio, and this bothers me in the game watching Confed cavalry unit after Confed cavalry unit cross the Ohio to raid Chicago etc.

I have lived along the upper Potomac and i would like the Potomac to be tougher to cross as well. The Potomac has huge bluffs along both banks for much of it's length. The few fords are the only real way to cross the navigable sections. River gunboats could patrol all the way up to Western Port (one region west of Cumberland, Maryland) so the river should be more navigable than it is now. To the west of Westernport the river is smaller and shallower but with huge bluffs making it difficult to cross at all. Till modern highway and railroad bridges.

[pepe4158]

I still think what you've done here is a significant improvement. Maybe it's not perfect, but in the longer term, a little bit of supply trickling across is not a big deal.

Hmm would it be possible to cause a chance of interaction between the two forces, resulting in some type of combat resolution...which would seem more likely IMO?

[Turbo823]

Normally I am pretty stubborn but after reading a thread that covered this issue in great detail, I have to concede the point. At the very least the gunboats should block supply and retreat.

[Jabberwock]

Hmm would it be possible to cause a chance of interaction between the two forces, resulting in some type of combat resolution...which would seem more likely IMO?

That's what I'm lobbying for.

[pepe4158]

Would be interested to know what thread Turbo....I am not tottaly familiar with all the details (every possible relative historical occurance), but Im still NOT convinced lol...perhaps this thread would change my mind?
I am actually basing my opinions on arms of the day and their common usage, because a lot of times here we are dealing in speculation...the what if? question.

[Pocus]

Normally I am pretty stubborn but after reading a thread that covered this issue in great detail, I have to concede the point. At the very least the gunboats should block supply and retreat.

They will, once the bug is removed. This in effect cut the link between the 2 land regions, so nothing can pass, supply or troops.

[Turbo823]

Would be interested to know what thread Turbo....I am not tottaly familiar with all the details (every possible relative historical occurance), but Im still NOT convinced lol...perhaps this thread would change my mind?
I am actually basing my opinions on arms of the day and their common usage, because a lot of times here we are dealing in speculation...the what if? question.

Its actually in this forum. Most of the historical concerns were addressed. I did my own research and I could find anything that would cast doubt on this. It does look like gunboats were fairly effective in their interdiction.

http://www.ageod-forum.com/showthread.php?t=8240

[berto]

Okay about the gunboat river interdiction, but the empirical question is still open: how many gunboats should be sufficient to block a river region? To block all river regions?

If we set the number too low, one Union strategy--presumably an ahistorical one--would be to build massive numbers of gunboats early on and block all rivers as early as late 1861, say, or by mid 1862.

Would you like to play a game where the standard Union gunboat strategy locks you, the Confederate, out of central Tennessee, western Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, northern Missouri, the Trans Mississippi, etc. by 1862? (Assuming the capacity to build that many gunboats that early, and assuming away supply and other considerations.)

Set the number too high, and the Union might not be able to achieve this by 1864 if ever.

Are 4 gunboats too high? Too low? Just right?

This is all in relation to Union capabilities to build gunboats and the tradeoff between building gunboats versus land forces, of course.

Does anybody have a reference that would indicate how many gunboats the Union had by 1862? 1863? 1864? Then you could divide those gunboat census figures by the number of river regions in the game and come up with a rough idea of whether 4 or 6 or 8 or whatever figure might be a good number that enables this kind of strategy but not too early.

[soloswolf]

I agree that there are a lot of questions to be awnsered, but how will we know if we have the right awnser?

The 'Total-River-Blockade' you are trying to calculate never happened, so how will we arrive at the right number? I'm not trying to be a stick in the mud... I completely agree that research into the # of existing boats should be a solid reference, but is there something wrong with the four element rule?

It's not like the Federals can just throw those ships into every section, rotate them due to orgainzation loss and still compete in other areas all without risking themselves in other areas. And regarding many of the places you said would be completely blocked off: There are points the Confederates can defend, they can bombard from shore, they can launch their own boats, etc. It's not like they are just going to let all of that happen in that way.

[berto]

By whatever means, and whatever the numbers, it seems like the Union achieved this--effectively interdicting all rivers--by 1864. I'm just concerned that, in game, the Union can't achieve this by 1863, certainly not by 1862. If ahistorical, if a gamey exploit, that would kill good portions of the game, wouldn't it?

[soloswolf]

It certainly would not be very fun to play under those conditions.

But, I don't think it is a fair assessment to assume that it was strictly boats on the rivers that did this. You can't seperate the armies present in the field as part of the equation.

I'm not saying that you said it was all boats, what I am saying is that control over key areas by land forces made it possible to patrol other areas with boats. So, it is unfair to allow a curtain of boats to be erected that would independently achieve this total blockage without concert from land forces.

Whatever number/posture is settled on, as well as available ships in the Federal pool, ought to take this into account.

[pepe4158]

AS Jabber seemed to endorse me on, would love to see an interaction and combat resolution at some time (in regards to gunboat crossing)...I understand that Pocus has a full plate so to speak though.

I dont agree with just some I-WIn-Button cuz they put up a few gunboats.

Look I agree they are an obstacle.

Insurmountable if you are Morgans militia Cavalry which consists mostly of farmhands...theyd scare the He$$ outta ya

Hmm if you are a brigade strength confederate force...hmmm maybe less so, especially if you had a battery of 20lb parrots

A whole divison blocked...hardly, I think if Sherman thought his gunboats alone would stop Hood he had another thing comming, I suspect he was using them mostly as a first warning alert that Hood was up to something and they were more intended to slow Hood down untill he could bring the bulk of his forces up to engage Hood head on and out in the field on terrain of his choosing. Remember this is latter in the war when Hood has very limited resources, Grant surely didnt think this could work against Sidney early on when the south was in a better position logisticaly as far as their army.

Still all in all its hard to complain about what uses they have in the game...their #1 function used by the confederates, was to attack union transports ferrying troops----that I can do.
#2 Seems to be they can bombard forts, as Grant used them to do---again that I can do in the game as it allows that.
The third though I cant do and wish I could, when Grants infantry was hard pressed he intended to use them as support artillary to his infantry...hmmm cant do that, n I think having them interact at river crossing with land forces would start to simulate that.

[berto]

AS Jabber seemed to endorse me on, would love to see an interaction and combat resolution at some time (in regards to gunboat crossing)...

I dont agree with just some I-WIn-Button cuz they put up a few gunboats.

I would love to see it as a combat resolution, too, even if--depending on the circumstances and number of gunboats--it's heavily stacked in favor of X number of gunboats (where X is some significant or large number).

None of us wants a sure-thing "I-Win-Button".

If Pocus & co. can program this so that it's not a hard-and-fast, absolutely certain interdiction, great! The more nuances, the better.

[W.Barksdale]

We haven't even got to test out whether 4 boats in OFF works well so let's chill out until Pocus can patch up the patch.

[pepe4158]

lol true ,,,,but ya cant blame us for getting our wishes in early eh?

[denisonh]

Instead of combat or "all or nothing", why not tie to evasion?

If undetected, you can cross the river, and if detected halted.

[Jabberwock]

My reasoning is that gunboats didn't physically stop troops that were crossing rivers, but canister, grape, case, and shell sure did. Also, bombardment with reversed odds (or combat) allows a sufficiently powerful force, which may not be able to evade, to cross a river in the face of gunboats, and possibly drive them out of the area. I think that the possibility of being on the wrong side of a river and facing whatever is there, after dealing with gunboats in their native environment, would be a strong deterrent in most situations.

Not that evasion shouldn't come into play at all ... It should.

[pepe4158]

Agreed---I think its certainly a matter of what and who is trying to cross and how determined the body of troops are to cross (also their evasion possibility), not to mention will the gunboats at some time recieve support troops and are more of a first alert system, many cases of the war when
a body of troops marches to the sound of guns which I would suspect thats what Sherman was counting on that you quote Jabber...that he actually expected gunboats alone to finish of Hood or even repluse him alone seems far-fetched.