pgr wrote:Just a quick comment. Thomas didn't lead the attack at Chattanooga. He was with Grant during the whole attack and had only ordered a demonstration. His troops, after overrunning the first line of rifle pits decided, on their own initiative, to keep going. Thomas was as supersized as Grant that they kept going...good thing for the both of them that it worked out in the end.
Otherwise, I agree that Sherman is a mixed bag as a commander.
Captain_Orso wrote:I have no intention of getting into a big discussion, but there are a couple of points I'd like to make.
Sherman's single regiment attacks at First Manassas was conform with the tactics the army used at the time. In fact, William Franklin was the only brigade commander to have committed 2 regiments simultaneously to an attack during the entire battle. It was considered not tactically practical for a brigade commander to control more than 1 regiment on the attack at a time. It makes no sense to criticize Sherman for following standard tactics.
Sherman was NOT relieved of command at all after Chickasaw Bluffs. He was in command of his corps a the Battle of Arkansas Post only a couple of weeks later.
You state that "Halleck, Grant and Sherman all believed the true confederate force to be 130,000 men" at Corinth, as evidence of Sherman's being overrated. Without even looking into the facts, holding Sherman personally responsible for this shows a personal bias, which does serious investigation of history an injustice.
1stvermont wrote:Captain_Orso wrote:I have no intention of getting into a big discussion, but there are a couple of points I'd like to make.
Sherman's single regiment attacks at First Manassas was conform with the tactics the army used at the time. In fact, William Franklin was the only brigade commander to have committed 2 regiments simultaneously to an attack during the entire battle. It was considered not tactically practical for a brigade commander to control more than 1 regiment on the attack at a time. It makes no sense to criticize Sherman for following standard tactics.
Sherman was NOT relieved of command at all after Chickasaw Bluffs. He was in command of his corps a the Battle of Arkansas Post only a couple of weeks later.
You state that "Halleck, Grant and Sherman all believed the true confederate force to be 130,000 men" at Corinth, as evidence of Sherman's being overrated. Without even looking into the facts, holding Sherman personally responsible for this shows a personal bias, which does serious investigation of history an injustice.
Thanks for post and comments. I think if the standard tactic is wrong, and you go along with it, than you are also to blame. Its part of why I love Jackson/forrest/ lee/ grant , they changed warfare. I would have to reread but I thought multiple times entire brigades were thrown in the battle on both sides, but I could be wrong. Either way, not a good idea.
Thanks for noticing the mistake. He was superseded by Mcclerand not replaced. My apologizes i will edit my op.
Please provide some support. Sherman was part of the group deceived, that is all i was saying.
Captain_Orso wrote:1stvermont wrote:Captain_Orso wrote:
It seems you are expecting a brigade commander, who's only combat experience was as a 2nd lieutenant during the 2nd Seminole War, to throw military doctrine to the wind during the first major engagement of the war and devise his own tactics on the spot. That is far from a realistic expectation, in my opinion.
If you would like an historic account of the First Battle of Bull Run/Manassas I can recommend The Early Morning Of War Bull Run, 1861 by Edward G. Longacre. I found his analysis and account very enlightening.
McClernand outranked Sherman already before Chickasaw Bluffs and Arkansas Post. Without contradictory orders he was obliged to follow McClernand's orders, although I'm sure the situation was not that simple; it never is.
If you wish to hypothesize Sherman should have, or even could have, had a better estimation of the CS forces at Corinth, you will have to show evidence for that.
Actually everyones book training was to assault with half the elements in the Brigade, with the remander forming to the rear to support the attack and or explot initial success. Sherman failled to attack with more than 1 regiment for the entire engagment, so your dislike of the point is based on not what Sherman was trained to do, as the author you citied explains that Sherman did not apply how a Brigade should attack, but went in piecmeal.Captain_Orso wrote:Yes, Longacre in full hindsight knows that through Franklin's example it could have been possible to commit 2 regiments to an assault at one time. That is however not the question. Sherman did not have the luxury of this knowledge, so he conducted his assault per the standing doctrine. That cannot be held against him.
except your problem is one of contradicting the author. the next problem is how come Jackson used every Reg when he assaulted at Bull Run and their are many examples of this at Bull run.To understand history, you must first ignore what you already know of history, and look at the situation through the eyes of those involved at the point in time in question. Only then can you understand the most important question of history, why people did what they did.
1stvermont wrote:No I was looking more for common sense. Like I said, if common thought is wrong, dont follow it if you want to be considered great. That is why men like Grant/Lee/Jackson etc are great. Jackson at bull run in many ways did not follow standard tactics, and it made him great at bull run. Its not like the textbooks said you can only attack one regiment at a time, look at the mexican american war, see what Scott did with great success. With your expectations we would still be fighting with swords/shields as nothing new can be tried. Also please show me where the tactical books changed during the war so that generals could than change how they fight. Otherwise where did they learn? by experiences. However if i am not mistaken men like Burnside and porter and the fighting around matthews hill was mostly entire brigades in attack. Than in the counter attack from Henry hill.
The book i was working off was highly recommended called John J Hennessy The first battle of Manassas Stackpole Books 2015 I promise you it was a historical book using only first hand historical accounts. Not sure if you were confused i was using a fantasy book.
Corinth, he was deceived along with the other generals I was not saying he was responsible. My evidence is the csa force was less than half what was thought to be. If we are to be critical of generals like McClellan for this [being deceived] we should other generals as well.
hanny1 wrote:Captain_Orso wrote:Yes, Longacre in full hindsight knows that through Franklin's example it could have been possible to commit 2 regiments to an assault at one time. That is however not the question. Sherman did not have the luxury of this knowledge, so he conducted his assault per the standing doctrine. That cannot be held against him.
Actually everyones book training was to assault with half the elements in the Brigade, with the remander forming to the rear to support the attack and or explot initial success. Sherman failled to attack with more than 1 regiment for the entire engagment, so your dislike of the point is based on not what Sherman was trained to do, as the author you citied explains that Sherman did not apply how a Brigade should attack, but went in piecmeal.
hanny1 wrote:except your problem is one of contradicting the author. the next problem is how come Jackson used every Reg when he assaulted at Bull Run and their are many examples of this at Bull run.
Captain_Orso wrote:1stvermont wrote:No I was looking more for common sense. Like I said, if common thought is wrong, dont follow it if you want to be considered great. That is why men like Grant/Lee/Jackson etc are great. Jackson at bull run in many ways did not follow standard tactics, and it made him great at bull run. Its not like the textbooks said you can only attack one regiment at a time, look at the mexican american war, see what Scott did with great success. With your expectations we would still be fighting with swords/shields as nothing new can be tried. Also please show me where the tactical books changed during the war so that generals could than change how they fight. Otherwise where did they learn? by experiences. However if i am not mistaken men like Burnside and porter and the fighting around matthews hill was mostly entire brigades in attack. Than in the counter attack from Henry hill.
The book i was working off was highly recommended called John J Hennessy The first battle of Manassas Stackpole Books 2015 I promise you it was a historical book using only first hand historical accounts. Not sure if you were confused i was using a fantasy book.
Corinth, he was deceived along with the other generals I was not saying he was responsible. My evidence is the csa force was less than half what was thought to be. If we are to be critical of generals like McClellan for this [being deceived] we should other generals as well.
I believe what you are calling "common sense" is simply looking back at what you have read and then introspecting your feelings on it, It sound like:After reading it, it's obvious to me that committing 2 regiments abreast was the better tactic. So those who didn't do this at the time are just not good leaders, because the tactic is obvious to me.
Measuring the quality of leadership by looking for the deduction and successful use of new tactic, before all others, is in my opinion, not viable.
Expecting those on the battlefield to have the insight gained only through the experience of others, and passed on through time, is ridiculous.
The study of history is a scientific study. Statements require evidence to be considered an hypothesis. Without evidence, they are simply conjectures, which are meaningless. There are no arguments based on "common sense".
This is exactly why I said I don't want to get into a discussion on this, because I'm not interested in discussing opinions based on "common sense", which is actually just your feelings. Fine that those are your feelings, but I have no interest in discussing them.
DrPostman wrote:Yet Forrest's tactics at the Battle of Brice's Crossroads is still taught at West Point.
Captain_Orso wrote:
In his opinioning Longacre stated that Sherman's assault was doomed from the start, but also "The red-haired Ohioan cannot be faulted for a lack of tactical vision". He writes further, "The war now beginning marked the first time in American history that sizeable bodies of infantry had become available to a field commander. In Mexico, the only operational proving ground in national memory, most of the fighting had been accomplished in regimental and small-unit strength. This mid-nineteenth-century infantry-assaults tactics (most of them predicated on attacking fixed works rather than an enemy force in line of battle) suggested that larger formations would prove unmanageable, exceeding the control of a single commander. Military theory also limited the size of an attacking force by recommending that fully half of it be assigned to the reserve rather than to the front line."
Captain_Orso wrote:I have no idea what you are talking about. Jackson arrived with his brigade on an Henry Hill devoid of an enemy presence, and refused to move down to the defensive line on the Young's Branch manned by the remnants of Bee's, Bartow's, and Evans' brigades; he never assaulted Henry Hill.
He did assault Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries near the Henry House, but never with even half of his brigade at one time.
IIRC all the Union brigades which actually fought on the west side of Bull Run committed all of their regiments to an assault at one time or another.
Given that your the one contradicting their written word, and all of history no wonder your so confused.I, in no way, disagree with Longacre nor Hennessy. I disagree with yours and Vermont's interpretations of their writings.
Yes, Longacre in full hindsight knows that through Franklin's example it could have been possible to commit 2 regiments to an assault at one time. That is however not the question. Sherman did not have the luxury of this knowledge, so he conducted his assault per the standing doctrine. That cannot be held against him.
csiemers wrote:DrPostman wrote:Yet Forrest's tactics at the Battle of Brice's Crossroads is still taught at West Point.
They have to teach something.
1stvermont wrote:I can see what your saying but the fact is as I stated, many commanders used more than one regiment at bull run and all generals would still be using swords/ shields if nothing new was done or tried. If standard doctrine defies common sense, if you wont to be considered great, don't follow it. If Lee/ Grant/Jackson/Forrest all followed standard doctrine, they would have never been great. Maybe part of what makes forrest so great, he used common sense and not textbooks. It is common sense in warfare since the beginning of time.
csiemers wrote:Not everyone finds Lee, Jackson, Grant, or Forrest "great."
Lee was good at retreating warfare. On the offensive he wasn't so great.
Jackson was good as he was going up against some of the worst Union generals. Would he have done as well against the better Union generals that came along later? We'll never know.
Grant was good at attacking. He was willing to do something that most Union generals weren't willing to do . . . send men to their deaths in battle. Grant was "bloody" in that regard.
Forrest was good at guerilla tactics. Hit and run. Again against marginal Union generals.
So would any of them be in my classification of "greatness"? No, none would. They were each good in their own way, but overall "great", no not at all.
Captain_Orso wrote:1stvermont wrote:I can see what your saying but the fact is as I stated, many commanders used more than one regiment at bull run and all generals would still be using swords/ shields if nothing new was done or tried. If standard doctrine defies common sense, if you wont to be considered great, don't follow it. If Lee/ Grant/Jackson/Forrest all followed standard doctrine, they would have never been great. Maybe part of what makes forrest so great, he used common sense and not textbooks. It is common sense in warfare since the beginning of time.
This is ridiculous. What you are talking about has nothing to do with "common sense". There's a saying in Germany, "you think they should smell the knowledge". That is how I see you acting, and that makes it pointless for me to discuss this with you.
1stvermont wrote:I wonder who you would consider "great" and just what you meant by the word. But i think this all off topic.
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