Union artillery

[Gray Fox]

Saturday I watched a program on CSPAN from Lawrence Kaplan. He had written a book about the use of artillery in the Union army during the Civil War. He had used eyewitness statements from a senior artillery officer who was involved in the creation of the Union artillery organization. The author noted that over 15,000 books are available on the CW and many hundred about the Union artillery, but only one from an eyewitness account.

At the beginning of the war, the Union army attached one artillery battery to each infantry brigade, or four per Division. Quite a coincidence for some of you! Unfortunately, this practically made the artillery useless, since each battery Captain was mostly forgotten by the infantry Brigade Commander. The Division's batteries were never massed into one solid punch or positioned by artillery officers where the guns would have the best line of fire. In one battle, the guns of a Division just ended up in a traffic jam in a nearby town.

Actually, Kaplan points out that in several early defeats, this disorganization most probably robbed the Union of victory. When the batteries were finally put into artillery battalions at Corps level the Union started winning important battles, like Gettysburg. So the unknown game mechanic governing artillery batteries may not work best when they are kept at stack level, but to be historically correct, perhaps it should.

http://www.c-span.org/video/?320927-1/discussion-union-army-field-artillery

[pgr]

Great topic.

The C-span presentation probably over makes the argument. In terms of the AoP, it really is a story of the trials and tribulations of Henry Hunt. He managed to create the AoP army level artillery reserve as early as the Peninsula Campaign, and used it to great effect at the battle of Malvern Hill (July 1862). In talking about Antietam, the speaker intentionally excluded the artillery reserve, which is a bit odd, considering that the long range rifled guns overseen by Hunt performed very well (to the extent that the battle was known as "Artillery Hell.") In Fredrecksburg, Hunt and the Reserve on Stafford Heights (on the other side of the river) made any Confederate counter attack suicide.

Chancellorsville was a disaster, in great part because Hunt was sidelined, and played no active part in the battle. (Apparently for reasons of army politics. Hunt was close to Mcclellan...Hooker was not.) He was put back in charge of the AoP artillery reserve at Gettysburg, and employed the guns to great effect.

it should also be remembered that long range artillery fire in support of an attack was rarely (perhaps never) effective. Union bombardments at Fredrecksburg are an example, as was the massive barrage Lee's people started before Pickett Charge. It's the defensive fire against massed troops moving in the open that was really deadly, and canister was the real big troop killer. Of course canister is short ranged stuff...which tends to lead to guns needing to be dispersed to get the coverage of the whole area. Over concentrate the artillery, and some part of the line might not have the close fire support when it needs it.

[Gray Fox]

BTW, the C-SPAN series is excellent.