Best general in the war

[jason_r]

Just wonderin who people think was the best general in the war ?

[rattler01]

Oh yeah, I'm going to follow this thread. I think a poll would be interesting.

My vote is for Stonewall. His valley campaign is one of the best of the war.

[Durk]

Besides the obvious, I favor Joe Johnston. So overlooked and so talented.

[Longshanks]

Lord Roberts, commander-in-chief of the British armies in the early twentieth century, said, "In my opinion, Stonewall Jackson was one of the greatest natural military geniuses the world ever saw. I will go even further than that--as a campaigner in the field, he never had a superior. In some respects, I doubt whether he ever had an equal." However, Jackson never applied his skills toward Grand Strategy.

As a strategist, it's hard to beat Grant who understood his advantages vs the South's. Yes, he bludgeoned his way to victory, but he won. Would he have won if the roles were reversed? No, Lee would have, and probably more quickly. So there's a case for Lee.

As for me, the one guy I would not want to have in my theatre of operations would be Nathan B. Forrest. Native genius. He went where he wanted, when he wanted. The highest praise for him came from the primary participants: Grant, who said this was the cavalryman he most feared, and from Lee and Jeff Davis who said after the war that NBF was the most under-utilized.

[Ol' Choctaw]

Lord Roberts, commander-in-chief of the British armies in the early twentieth century, said, "In my opinion, Stonewall Jackson was one of the greatest natural military geniuses the world ever saw. I will go even further than that--as a campaigner in the field, he never had a superior. In some respects, I doubt whether he ever had an equal." However, Jackson never applied his skills toward Grand Strategy.

As a strategist, it's hard to beat Grant who understood his advantages vs the South's. Yes, he bludgeoned his way to victory, but he won. Would he have won if the roles were reversed? No, Lee would have, and probably more quickly. So there's a case for Lee.

As for me, the one guy I would not want to have in my theatre of operations would be Nathan B. Forrest. Native genius. He went where he wanted, when he wanted. The highest praise for him came from the primary participants: Grant, who said this was the cavalryman he most feared, and from Lee and Jeff Davis who said after the war that NBF was the most under-utilized.

There is not much I could add to that. It mirrors my thoughts to a ‘T’.


Lee was an Operational Arts genies and master of maneuver as was Jackson.

Grant’s attrition strategy was employed by the US Army all the way into the 1970s. It was unimaginative but effective so long as you outnumbered the enemy.

Forrest was one of those rare men who instinctively understood the demands of war and tactics. He raised his own Battalion and equipped it. He brought 50 of his slaves to war, and freed them, not as body servants or menial labors but as his logistical staff and soldiers and brought 48 of those men home again, the two others bing KIA. When he lost the battalion he raised a regiment.

His battles were long taught at West Point.

‘The Wizard of the Saddle’, enough said.

[George McClellan]

I have 3! Me, myself, and I!

[John Sedgwick]

Well I haven't studied the war enough for my opinions to carry any weight, but as for the best general, I'd probably pick Jackson, followed by Cleburne.

But my favourite Civil War general is John Sedgwick (big surprise there) - because of the ironic circumstances of his death, but also because I imagine he's the kind of leader I might've been had I led troops in that conflict - a team player well liked by his superiors and subordinates, reliable, methodical, and perhaps a bit too cautious.

[GraniteStater]

OK, buckle in.

IMHO:

* Grant was the best commander in the Civil War. Right away, the comparison to Lee comes up. Let me make an analogy - by a thin, very debatable margin, Ted Williams was a better hitter than Ruth, mostly based on consistency and let's not forget Ruth could whack around .335 himself. If - if - Williams was not deprived of some of his best years due to military service, there would be no dispute, Williams would have been at, or over, 600 HRs and a .340ish career average. However, we cannot judge by what could have happened, however likely or not, only by what did happen. Thus Ruth and Williams are neck and neck. Back to Grant:

> The Vicksburg campaign is not mentioned enough. That was one courageous decision. A number of things could have been disastrous. The transport fleet could have been shot to pieces running the batteries. Once on the left bank of the Mississippi, he could have been isolated and destroyed, with 60,000 men. He ran a risk of running low on supplies. The Rebs could have opposed the river crossing. A huge risk to run, but a calculated one. Once landed, he wisely did not attack his objective right away, but isolated the battlespace on his terms by seizing Jackson and turning on Vicksburg, using Jackson as what Liddel-Hart terms a strategic barrier. A brilliant campaign, to rank with Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon. This is where Grant comes to the fore - he had already demonstrated his generalship at H&D and Shiloh, at the former he moved with alacrity and foreshadowed his grasp of combined arms and at the latter, he rallied from a mistake and won. Vicksburg demonstrates all these qualities.

> Chattanooga was a battle largely won by the corps commanders and individuals, but Grant first relieved what was, in effect, a siege and then drew up the plan of attack. The relief of Chattanooga should not be underestimated - Grant turned that entire situation around, inspiring everyone by his competence and confidence. Again, the fundamentals - logistics are critical and indispensable.

> The Overland campaign was a masterpiece, blotted only by an unnecessary attack at Cold Harbor and marred by the dilatoriness of subordinates at the gates of Petersburg. Had P-burg been contested right away, the ANV could well have been forced out of the Richmond area in the late summer of 1864. He then settled down to a siege - unglamorous, but he knew his opponent. In effect, it was a case of driving the fox to his hole - where are your tricksy maneuvers now, Mr. Fox? When, the following spring, he resumed the attack, it was over in less than two weeks.

* Lee - few people stop and reflect that his entire reputation rests on the space of twelve months. From mid-62 to mid-63, his string of victories rallied the South and gave its military effort a credibility that had the European powers take notice. There is no doubting his exceptional capabilities and his judicious use of audacity - Chancellorsville is one of the most daring maneuvers in history, he threw the book out and gambled and won, at a price he could not foresee paying (Jackson). However, the aftermath of Chancellorsville starts to show the cracks in the legend, to my mind. First, Chancellorsville was his last victory. To continue, he should have refused Jeff Davis's request to 'do something'. By mid-May 63, there was no way the South could affect events on the Mississippi in Vicksburg without marshaling a major effort against Grant and they couldn't do it fast enough - Grant, had, in effect, won when he invested the city. To propose an invasion of the North in September 62 before the North's cause became fused with emancipation was one thing - foreign recognition was concievable, if a slim possibility (very slim, IMO), there was a possibility to change the war then. Not in the summer of 63. Even a colossal victory at Gettysburg or somewhere else would not have destroyed the AoP and rendered it a nullity. Even the ANV at the gates of DC would not have succeeded, the ANV was in no position to take the most heavily fortified city on earth and it could not siege it succesfully, supply and semi-hostile ground would have put paid to that notion. Taking the strategic offensive militated against the South's interests, miltarily and politically - destroying three Federal armies north of the Potomac still wouldn't have won the war. IOW, by May 63, it was nigh impossible for the South to win on points. The CSA would've been better served to make the contest so bloody for the North they would quit. Losing 20,000 in a campaign that couldn't produce a decision didn't help. Furthermore, he gets drawn into a fight where (a) his recon is gone and doesn't have a clear idea of what he could be getting involved in, and (b) the re-org after Chancellorsville meant that he had two relatively inexperienced corps commanders out of three, instead of two who knew his mind very well. Once committed, it was difficult to disengage without risking the AoP descending on him. Gettysburg is a very questionable decision, IMO. Not only that, it cost the South the war in the East - they would never be able to take even the tactical offensive again. To finish, I think Antietam is actually Lee's and the ANV's finest hour - have you ever been to that ground? Absolutely amazing, there's no ground to defend well on the left. Only McClellan could fail to crush the ANV on that ground that day, attacking piecemeal.

* I rate Grant a notch above Lee. As for the rest, Sherman and Thomas stand out for the North; Hancock wasn't called "the Superb" for nothing; Sheridan was very good, if not excellent. Forrest is no doubt an untutored genius - if he'd gone to the Point and been given an army, there's no telling wht could have happened. I find it interesting that more than one Union general thought Joe Johnston was better than Lee, at least on defense. Jackson - undoubtedly a general of the first rank, but, as Grant wrote in his Memoirs, he was against Banks, McDowell and Fremont in the Valley - if he been opposed by Sheridan or some others, it could well have been a different story.

I agree with Fuller that Grant is one of the Great Captains of history - maybe not quite the equal of Napoleon (who changed warfare in his day), but he deserves a place on the stage with the Emperor, Caesar, Alexander, Hannibal, Wellington and MacArthur.

[Ethan]

Amén!

[Longshanks]

"Jackson - undoubtedly a general of the first rank, but, as Grant wrote in his Memoirs, he was against Banks, McDowell and Fremont in the Valley - if he been opposed by Sheridan or some others, it could well have been a different story."

and if Ruth and Williams had faced Gibson, Koufax, R.Johnson and N Ryan whose knows what they would have done. He played against the team they brung. Ain't his fault they were the jv.

As for MacArthur.....I can't believe he's on the list. He was nearly as pokey and pig-headed as the other Mac. Moral: keep generals named Mac out of command.

Luv ya' G-S. He's a good opponent too!

[GraniteStater]

"Jackson - undoubtedly a general of the first rank, but, as Grant wrote in his Memoirs, he was against Banks, McDowell and Fremont in the Valley - if he been opposed by Sheridan or some others, it could well have been a different story."

and if Ruth and Williams had faced Gibson, Koufax, R.Johnson and N Ryan whose knows what they would have done. He played against the team they brung. Ain't his fault they were the jv.

As for MacArthur.....I can't believe he's on the list. He was nearly as pokey and pig-headed as the other Mac. Moral: keep generals named Mac out of command.

Luv ya' G-S. He's a good opponent too!

Jackson was a general of the first rank, without question. Grant was merely pointing out that it could have been different (in the Valley) against the Union leaders who rose to high command by the close of the war.

MacArthur - "...of all Allied commanders, the one who was head and shoulders above the rest is Douglas A. MacArthur." - Encyclopeadia of Military History, the DuPuys

Don't want to go off topic, but let me put it this way: as a lad, I read a book about Rommel. I told my father, who had served on MacArthur's staff in the Pacific and Korea, that Rommel probably did the most with the least of all generals in WW2. He just looked at me and stated flatly, "MacArthur defeated two Japanese field armies with two divisions."

Mac had fewer casualties in the entire war than were suffered at the Bulge alone. He can rightfully be criticized for his strange non-response on 7 December (the fault may be Gen. Sutherland's, but it is difficult to pin down and the commander is responsible, no matter what). However, once in command in Australia, he adapted quickly. He brushed aside Australian plans for defending the continent and took the offensive in New Guinea, a task, geographically, equivalent to having your HQ in New Orleans and stopping the enemy in Hudson's Bay. He made only one stubborn decision, one that fortunately, was a victory, Buna, a head on attack. After that, he saw the key - logistics, starve 'em; landing at points where the IJA was not, he took New Guinea with very few casualties and no pitched battles.

MacArthur's conception of Inchon and its execution is nothing less than the most brilliant and daring operation of the twentieth century and quite courageous - it was risky, very risky, but his gut told him the Norks wouldn't be expecting it at all.

And all of this occurred when he, by all rights, should have been retired. He was more imaginative and audacious than men half his age. A most remarkable officer - perhaps the single greatest commander in American history.

[gchristie]

Just wonderin who people think was the best general in the war ?

Might be useful to distinguish between best strategic general and best tactical general.

For strategic, I'd choose Grant - though he did enjoy the "full" backing of his president (to a point) which freed his hand considerably.

For tactical I'd choose Winfield Hancock or N. B. Forrest.

Stonewall, when he brought his A Game, was awesome, but he could be mysteriously sluggish other times. The man was a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, as they say. So I don't think he was consistent enough to get my top mark, nor did he campaign long enough to sell me.

If only John Reynolds and Albert Sydney Johnson had survived this would be an even more interesting discussion.

[GraniteStater]

Strategic and tactical is a good distinction.

[wsatterwhite]

* I rate Grant a notch above Lee. As for the rest, Sherman and Thomas stand out for the North; Hancock wasn't called "the Superb" for nothing; Sheridan was very good, if not excellent. Forrest is no doubt an untutored genius - if he'd gone to the Point and been given an army, there's no telling wht could have happened. I find it interesting that more than one Union general thought Joe Johnston was better than Lee, at least on defense.

I think generals generally place a greater emphasis on the ability to manage an army and keep it intact- if I'm not mistaken, Lee also always seemed to have a high regard for McClellan for this very reason. The killer instinct that separated men like Grant and Lee from men like Johnston and McClellan also caused them to appreciate those kind of officers- since Grant and Lee at every available opportunity wanted to destroy the enemy armies opposing them (or at least badly cripple them), they had a special appreciation for those officers who excelled at preventing just that from happening.

I have a somewhat unconventional (and perhaps controversial) view on Forrest as well as generals like Jackson and Sheridan- I think the fact that they never had to deal with the logistical responsibilities of managing large independent forces or, in Sheridan's case, face an opponent on a level approaching parity, helps to elevate their stature. While Jackson's Valley Campaign was masterful, his forces there never amounted to more than a small corps- how would he have done on all of those lightning marches if tasked with the responsibility of feeding and maintaining a force 2 to 3 times larger? Same goes for Forrest, if anything, keeping his forces small and light played into his strengths as a tactical genius. As far as Sheridan goes, I've always wondered how he would have fared in the Shenandoah against the Confederate armies of 1862-63 when they still at the top of their game.

[GraniteStater]

Good observations.

[Fingolfin]

Forrest would certainly NOT have liked the prospect of being far from the front, but his genuine understanding of ennemy supply disrupting would certainly have had some uses at a higher level of command, such as how to handle logistics, in my opinion.

Also, let's not forget how he succeeded in evacuating Nashville's heavy machinery after the fall of H&D.

[Ol' Choctaw]

I found this yesterday.

It is an interesting address, delivered some two years after Forrest’s death.

Much of it was fought over in country I have seen first hand.

I think it is a good read.

http://www.civilwarhome.com/forrestcampaigns.htm

[Stauffenberg]

I found this yesterday.

It is an interesting address, delivered some two years after Forrest’s death.

Much of it was fought over in country I have seen first hand.

I think it is a good read.

http://www.civilwarhome.com/forrestcampaigns.htm

Thanks much for that excellent link, I enjoyed reading that. I've read Forrest's memoirs and you can feel the mettle of the man, clearly. The fact that his cavalry was often used as battlefield dragoons as opposed to the more popular image of cavalry charges is an important element to appreciate in his flexible deployment of cavalry. He was able to operate intuitively and effectively, from small tactical engagements to large strategic operations aimed at dismantling the entire supply and logistics network of an enemy theatre of war.

I would argue that if you want to name the best general of that conflict you could do no better than examine who it was that Sherman and Grant feared the most--and it was Forrest. Davis realised, too late, that he had a Lee in the West who was possibly even better than Lee in out-psyching and out-performing his adversaries. Forrest understood perfectly well the larger strategic issues of the western campaign with its many setbacks and failures for the South. It is for this reason he almost added one Confederate general to the list of 30 yankees he personally dispatched during the war. I refer of course to his confrontation with Bragg, having witnessed the man's appalling failure of nerve or insight, in not pushing on to completely smash and capture Rosecran's army at Chickamauga.

[RELee]

Have you ever wondered how the war would have actually turned out if Jackson had been at Gettysburg?

I've often wondered about it. The question for me revolves around the team of Lee and Jackson, rather than an individual general. Lee grieved over losing Jackson, referring to him as his "right arm", which I've always thought a significant admission.

Jackson was his sword. Longstreet was his shield. I've always seen them this way under Lee's guidance. Gettysburg was a disaster because Lee was forced to try and use his shield as a sword.

Just a thought.

[Stauffenberg]

Have you ever wondered how the war would have actually turned out if Jackson had been at Gettysburg?

I've often wondered about it. The question for me revolves around the team of Lee and Jackson, rather than an individual general. Lee grieved over losing Jackson, referring to him as his "right arm", which I've always thought a significant admission.

Jackson was his sword. Longstreet was his shield. I've always seen them this way under Lee's guidance. Gettysburg was a disaster because Lee was forced to try and use his shield as a sword.

Just a thought.

Yes I've always wondered how Lee could so badly misjudge the situation with Longstreet who simply loathed frontal charges and was proven right in his assessment of things in the end. Perhaps Lee thought Pickett would rise to the occasion and somehow be filled with the ghost of Jackson and prevail against all odds.

Stuart failed him as well, but Lee could and should have reigned him in earlier on. Lee was not up to his usual level of inspired greatness in that campaign, and the final assaults at Gettysburg seem strangely unimaginative.

Not sure Jackson could have saved Lee's bacon in that fight; however, just maybe, old Blue Light would have swept around further to the right and launched an all-out night assault, sweeping the Round Tops and Cemetery Ridge "with the bayonet."

[gchristie]

Longstreet could be remarkably effective on the offensive, at times, so he could be the sword too. I wonder how things would have turned out if Lee had listened to Longstreet and "gone around to the right."

Old Pete loathed frontal assaults for good reason, having dished out so much punishment at Fredericksburg and other fights when the Yankees tried them.

[wsatterwhite]

I don't think it should be a question of Jackson versus Longstreet at Gettysburg but rather Jackson instead of either Ewell or A.P. Hill. Longstreet accomplished all that could have been hoped for on his sector of the battlefield. Any hope the Confederates had of winning Gettysburg occurred came and went on July 1st when they should have established control of the high ground on either Union flank. By the 2nd, the Army of the Potomac was too strongly positioned to have any real hope of dislodging it- remember, if Sickles is where he was supposed to be, their line should have extended down to the Round Tops with the 5th Corps in reserve to guard against any daring flanks attacks on that front.

Something else to consider at Gettysburg- this wasn't a Yankee army in the middle of Virginia or Tennessee where a retreat just meant giving back a block of the enemy's own territory, they were on Northern soil and I believe would have defended any attack with the ferocity that the rebels defended on their soil. For that reason, I have never believed that Gettysburg could have ever ended up as anything other than a Confederate defeat outside of following Longstreet's advice and turning it into a defensive battle.

[Stauffenberg]

I don't think it should be a question of Jackson versus Longstreet at Gettysburg but rather Jackson instead of either Ewell or A.P. Hill. Longstreet accomplished all that could have been hoped for on his sector of the battlefield. Any hope the Confederates had of winning Gettysburg occurred came and went on July 1st when they should have established control of the high ground on either Union flank. By the 2nd, the Army of the Potomac was too strongly positioned to have any real hope of dislodging it- remember, if Sickles is where he was supposed to be, their line should have extended down to the Round Tops with the 5th Corps in reserve to guard against any daring flanks attacks on that front.

Something else to consider at Gettysburg- this wasn't a Yankee army in the middle of Virginia or Tennessee where a retreat just meant giving back a block of the enemy's own territory, they were on Northern soil and I believe would have defended any attack with the ferocity that the rebels defended on their soil. For that reason, I have never believed that Gettysburg could have ever ended up as anything other than a Confederate defeat outside of following Longstreet's advice and turning it into a defensive battle.

I believe it was Longstreet himself who wrote about Lee's fateful decision to go ahead with the last attack, noting that "his [Lee's] blood was up....", the inference being that emotions were clouding a clear appraisal of the situation. Lee was so good at divining what the other side was likely to do, and would know that any and all union assaults on his lines were likely to end in ruin... why didn't he therefore heed Longstreet and wait for these, and then launch his own attacks? How likely was a union assault if he sat back and waited? I wonder...

[GraniteStater]

Several reasons why the ANV couldn't camp in Gettysburg, PA and hope for an assault by the AoP.

* In hostile country; thus supplies questionable and not to be had for anything less than forced expropriation, waiting for Meade to do s. t. couldn't last more than a few days, a week at most.

* Same again, the AoP could bring up reserves and reinforcements, some rather quickly, and the existing 3:2 advantage would swell for Meade.

* Again, Meade could cut off ANV from VA and then the game would be over.

So Lee had to attack or withdraw, essentially - a disengagement to flank around, incidentally, was not without hazard; Lee's back was to hills and mountains west of Gettysburg, if he tried a flanking movement with the entire army, Meade could detect it and crush him en enfilade (pardonnez moi mon Francais).

My active duty station was in Frederick, MD, BTW, I am very, very familiar with the land around there; from Gettysburg to Frederick the ground is rather more flat, but even a few miles to the west, anywhere in there, means hills and rough terrain. We moderns also forget that the wagons were essential for food, provender for horses, ammo and other supplies - Lee needed passes that were manageable by a train several miles long.

[SleeStak]

GraniteStater has the right of it. There is alot of ink spilled on Lee's decision to attack on day three of Gettysburg and a look at the battlefield can make you question Lee's decision. But Lee couldn't really disengage and move on the flanks of Meade as Longstreet councels.

First, he had been concentrated and fighting for three days, his guys had to resupply. Digging in somewhere in Pennsylvania and awaiting the North's attack would likely end up in the North following the ANV and waiting for it to starve. There was no magic place that Lee could have gone that would have resulting in an automatic attack unless Lee could camp at the White House.

That style of fighting is very challenging too. Hooker tried manuevering aggressively and then falling back on the defensive at Chancellorsville. The problem he faced was that, when he fell back on the defensive, he lost the initiative and the ability force the action. Instead of a frontal attack, Jackson concentrated his entire corps on Hooker's flank and routed him. It is likely that had Lee tried the same tactics, Meade would have returned the favor.

Finally, a number of southern generals have questioned Longstreet's post war writings. Gordon, in his memoirs, is critical of Longstreet and many of the claims he makes. Certainly, Lee's decision to attack at Gettysburg, as related by Longstreet, sure sounds to me like 'I tried to tell him but he just wouldn't listen'. I don't know of another version of Lee's decision and its impossible to know if Longstreet isn't remembering events in the best possible light for himself, but it seems like he might be. Of course, no one wants to take the blame for that attack (Poor Pickett, a division commander, got it named after him) and maybe Longstreet is relating the events verbatim, but I can see why he might be fudging the facts.

As army commander, the attack was Lee's responsibility, I just suspect that the nay-sayers didn't appear until after the attack had failed, and Longstreet's advice of moving on Meade's flank and digging in is just bogus.

[Stauffenberg]

Yes it's pretty clear Lee did not have the luxury of digging in and waiting and that, even if he had, it would likely not have been to his advantage in any case. I had thought therefore, that Lee's attack was really made out of a sense of honour, of not losing face in simply packing up and heading south without a fight. There has to be some truth to that; however one might also argue that it was in Lee's interest to shake up Meade and put his army into disorg, allowing his own army to disengage and retire south across the Potomac with a minimal chance of interdiction from Meade who had just taken over the AotP 3 days prior in any case. In this light, Pickett's charge was more of a "soaking off" attack than anything else.

I wonder what the statistics are on tons of ordinance fired off by Lee before he left the Gettysburg area. That much less weight to pull with you heading south after the battle....

[wsatterwhite]

I never hold Pickett's Charge against Lee or anyone else for that matter, after what happened July 1st and especially July 2nd, Lee really had no choice but to test the Union center which had been legitimately weakened in order to strengthen the flanks.

I disagree though about Lee not being able to dig in and force a union assault (predicated of course on securing at least Culps and Cemetary Hills- in essence, Gettysburg could only have been won by the South on Day 1, after that, everything is mute). While it's true that Lee would likely only be able to hold out for about a week at most, it's important to remember that Lincoln and his cabinet and the Northern press would most definitely not allow Meade to allow Lee to camp out at Gettysburg (or anywhere in Pennsylvania) for a full weak. Most of the reinforcements that Meade could count on receiving would be garrison troops whose ability on the offensive would be dubious at best- again, the benefit goes to a Union army defending, not attacking.

I think Longstreet's primary point about Lee's strategy at Gettysburg was that Lee needed to take advantage of the main things that had won them their biggest victories- using the ANVa's superior maneuverability to secure and fight on ground of their choosing as the opposition is eventually forced to do something at some point due to political pressure. George Meade may not have been a John Pope or Ambrose Burnside or Joe Hooker but I think Longstreet's point was that Lee nevertheless needed to force Meade at some point to prove that he wouldn't the same fate as those men.

Even without the Culps and Cemetery Hills or the Round Tops, I've always understood that Semetary Ridge itself made for a great defensive position. If Lee pulls back on July 2nd instead of attacking and goes on the defensive, how long would Meade have had before Washington forced him to attack? The idea of simply waiting for Lee to starve is great but how would that really fly in Washington?

[SleeStak]

Certainly, Lincoln, the congress, and all of the rest of Washington's political players attempted to exert pressure on Meade, but they were notoriously unable to force the general to act. Witness Meade's pursuit of Lee after the battle. Lee even stood on the defensive on the 4th hoping (or maybe fearing) that Meade would attack, but Meade did not oblige. Then, he did not try to catch Lee and destroy him in pursuit. It seems that he was happy to let the ANV go back to Virginia.

The ANV was at its best when it captured the initiative by going on the attack. Just about every battle they won up to that point featured a major assault (except Fredricksburg). At Gettyburg, I think Lee was trying to capture the initiative by hitting what he thought would be a weakend center and the assault just came up short.

Longstreet's account of the decision making process always rankles me though. Its not that I think Lee was infallible, or even ultimately not responsible for 'Pickett's Charge'. It just seems that if Longstreet had had as many misgivings about the attack that he claims to have had, he should have more forcibly voiced them in the discussion he had with Lee. As the corps commander, it was his duty and, I think, he had the discretion. Maybe I'm giving him too much latitude in interpreting his orders and he really was rubber stamping orders that came down from Lee, but that wasn't how Lee delt with his corps commanders generally. The account just smells of CYA to me.

[Stauffenberg]

Whether or not Lee could have waited longer without launching Pickett, and whether Meade would have obliged Lee by finally attacking him, the fact was Lee had not used the ANV's mobility and initiative to set up a battlefield of his own choosing and had been drawn into Gettysburg, and Stuart's failure looms large here.

Longstreet made a big mistake after the war in attempting to shift the blame entirely to Lee for Gettysburg which made him seriously unpopular in the South. I think it is doubtful Longstreet would even have attempted this northern invasion had he had commanded the ANV at that juncture. He was certainly able to attack offensively when he wanted to, but his forte was defense and in the game the CSA player will find himself thinking like Longstreet in that sense. But his failure at Knoxville in particular clearly justifies his reduction from a 2-star 5-3-6 to a 3-star 3-2-6 I think, and he therefore was not the best general of the war.

[Krec]

I would say Grant. Right man at the right time. Took the hand he was dealt and kicked the snot outta the south. Thats what he was assigned to do and thats what he did. He applied pressure when others wouldn't. He also helped keep the country together by being gracious in victory, thats probably his best act.