On Grande Strategies

[Gray Fox]

Winfield Scott's famous Anaconda Plan has a revered place in the history of the Civil War. It seems to be a favorite of the veteran's here and their CW made it the choice of a Union Athena. So what exactly was this plan?

"Headquarters of the Army
Washington, May 3, 1861
Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan,
Commanding Ohio Volunteers, Cincinnati, OH
We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with such blockade we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points, and the capture of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip; the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the sea-board, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan. I suppose there will be needed from twelve to twenty steam gun-boats, and a sufficient number of steam transports (say forty) to carry all the personnel (say 60,000 men) and material of the expedition; most of the gun-boats to be in advance to open the way, and the remainder to follow and protect the rear of the expedition, &c. This army, in which it is not improbable you may be invited to take an important part, should be composed of our best regulars for the advance and of three-years’ volunteers, all well officered, and with four months and a half of instruction in camps prior to (say) November 10. In the progress down the river all the enemy’s batteries on its banks we of course would turn and capture, leaving a sufficient number of posts with complete garrisons to keep the river open behind the expedition. Finally, it will be necessary that New Orleans should be strongly occupied and securely held until the present difficulties are composed.
With great respect, yours, truly
Winfield Scott

"Scott's Great Snake" as the northern papers named it was ridiculed as slow, armed diplomacy.

The Anaconda plan was actually not adopted until 1864.

The Confederate war plan was quite simply to break Union morale.

Sooo...

Implementing the Anaconda plan by the Union prior to 1864 is ahistorical, while a Confederate attack on Washington to detroy Union morale in 1861 is not.

Submitted for your discussion.

[khbynum]

With the fall of Port Hudson and Vicksburg in Summer of 1863, the Anaconda was essentially in place. Charleston, Mobile and Wilmington were still open to some commerce but closely blockaded. By that time the South was self-sufficient in war supplies except iron and showed no signs of giving up or being defeated. It took the Grant's Overland Campaign and Sherman's Atlanta campaign to break the back of Southern armies. The Anaconda would never have done it alone. The South was an agrarian nation and "land power" and could get by, if necessary, with much less than pre-war levels of foreign trade.

As for a quick capture of Washington, it can be done in the game but I don't think could have been done in reality, so I've not given much thought as to how it might have been attempted. I'll leave that hypothetical to others.

[tripax]

Implementing the Anaconda plan by the Union prior to 1864 is ahistorical

Before 1864 Vicksburg had fallen and the blockade had become somewhat effective. The Union grand strategy after March/April 1864 was decided in train car meetings between Grant and Sherman, I think, and didn't look much like an anaconda.

Regardless of what you call it, I think Lincoln liked the anaconda plan; a Union Blockade was proclaimed in 1861, although it was weak. Union movements on Atlantic forts guarding ports proceeded quickly enough, as well. On the other hand, I agree that early in the war a march down the Mississippi was not a priority. There was pressure to march towards Richmond and later (after neutrality was broken) to protect Unionists in Kentucky. Fremont had a free-ish hand to try to control Missouri (and protect Unionists as well). Forcing a march down the Mississippi would have led to an interesting power struggle between Halleck and Fremont (Buell and Grant seemed to get along better, but they weren't senior enough to have affected this sort of move), and would have meant ignoring the chance to give hero of West Virginia McClellan a chance at a campaign on Richmond. Anyway, a Union Athena, a Union human player, and the real Union all put a lot of troops in Missouri, Kentucky, and Western Tennessee in 1861-1863 as opposed to sending troops straight down the Mississippi.

[GraniteStater]

We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence.

One of the very first things Lincoln did, IIRC.

In connection with such blockade we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points, and the capture of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip; the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the sea-board, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan. I suppose there will be needed from twelve to twenty steam gun-boats, and a sufficient number of steam transports (say forty) to carry all the personnel (say 60,000 men) and material of the expedition; most of the gun-boats to be in advance to open the way, and the remainder to follow and protect the rear of the expedition, &c. This army, in which it is not improbable you may be invited to take an important part, should be composed of our best regulars for the advance and of three-years’ volunteers, all well officered, and with four months and a half of instruction in camps prior to (say) November 10. In the progress down the river all the enemy’s batteries on its banks we of course would turn and capture, leaving a sufficient number of posts with complete garrisons to keep the river open behind the expedition.

This is what Grant was trying to do after the securement of Corinth; not unnaturally, an overland approach to Vicksburg was appealing. The demonstration of the insecurity of the supply lines moved them to reconsider the approach and try the river.

Finally, it will be necessary that New Orleans should be strongly occupied and securely held until the present difficulties are composed.

May, 1862.

Indeed, the Union had secured the Mississippi by the late spring of 1862, with the exception of Vicksburg. Try accomplishing that in the game by June 62.

Incidentally, if I have my facts straight, Scott did not conceive the Anaconda Plan entirely on his own. It was suggested to him, at least in part, by a lady he knew - it's been years since I read this and would have to dig up the source(s), but I believe that's true.

[GraniteStater]

BTW, in the game, there's another, quite viable, strategy for the Union - call it the 'Steamroller'. I'm sure more than a few playing the Union have deliberately employed it or fell into it through circumstance - just push south, from the Kansas line to the Atlantic seaboard - try to inflict as much pain as possible.

Quite viable in AACW - Athena would usually quit at a certain casualty threshold, though I'd say that's not the sole determinant in the surrender algorithm.

In my PbeM, havi is being very stubborn - now, KY did secede in the summer of 61, which makes a difference, but it's Late July 63 and we're still boxing around Nashville.

I have landed near Charleston; have Norfolk, Petersburg and NoVa; have secured MO and taken Fayetteville, Ark.; and that's about it, other than Tucson and the Western Boxes.

[Gray Fox]

Athena's gameplan and most of the human player AAR's I've read seem to indicate that the defense of Washington is covered under the "magic wand plan". Attacking D.C. to crush Union morale is not an attempt to annex the District of Columbia into the Confederacy. This isn't a "hypothetical" plan for the CSA if the Union player is just plain lax. People seem to be in a hurry to invade NO, attack down the Mississippi valley, reinforce Fort Monroe and build a huge blockade fleet because that is how they have played for years. The fact is that the Anaconda Plan wasn't the initial plan. The Union most likely defended D.C. to such an extent in RL that Lee knew better than to go there. If the Union player does something different in the game, then the CSA player should punish him accordingly.

[GraniteStater]

I would say you seem to have a larger context here - I was just trotting out the calendar from RL.

Against the AI, a lot of different things can happen, although Athena is obsessed with Monroe as the CSA.

[Durk]

Nice thread. Seems to me that the Grand Strategy is to do the Anaconda Plan, as you suggest, with a bit of just plain marching South.

[pgr]

Athena's gameplan and most of the human player AAR's I've read seem to indicate that the defense of Washington is covered under the "magic wand plan". Attacking D.C. to crush Union morale is not an attempt to annex the District of Columbia into the Confederacy. This isn't a "hypothetical" plan for the CSA if the Union player is just plain lax. People seem to be in a hurry to invade NO, attack down the Mississippi valley, reinforce Fort Monroe and build a huge blockade fleet because that is how they have played for years. The fact is that the Anaconda Plan wasn't the initial plan. The Union most likely defended D.C. to such an extent in RL that Lee knew better than to go there. If the Union player does something different in the game, then the CSA player should punish him accordingly.

You are basically right about the Anaconda plan. It never really was the policy of the Union. Scott proposed it, but it was rejected and McClellan in his time as general-in-chef (who advocated for a "Richmond First" strategy). Scott's proposal got a lot of traction with historians after the war because the ultimate disposition of forces looked a lot like what Scott proposed. Really though, Scott's idea was pretty minimalist (as your above quote illustrates).

Somebody on this forum mentioned JFC Fuller's analysis on Grant, and so I went out and started reading it. I think Fuller's analysis is pretty accurate when he says that the definitive war strategy didn't really develop until 1863 and that effectively it became a huge right turning movement over a 1000 mile front. The AoP was the holding point while the Western armies swung from Kentucky through Georgia and then up through the Carolinas. The whole thing grew out of the fact that Northern Va was too narrow to maneuver AND the rebels were constantly threatening Washington every time the AoP attempted to go down the coast. The big swing allowed Washington to be covered while Lee's rear was attacked.

So I'd agree that the first priority for the Union should be a build up in DC and a direct approach on Richmond, both to prevent a Rebel rush and to keep as many CSA troops tied up as possible. The West (I'm talking the Appalachians to the Mississippi) should have room to maneuver if there is enough pressure in the East. I am a believer in the blockade. It will take time to get going, but the potential economic squeeze would be well worth it I think.

My big question would be, is it worth it to fully secure the Mississippi? In history, yes. Economically, civilian trade from the Mid-West could be shipped out of NO, while the South was cut off from manpower and supplies from Texas. In the game, it's not like St-Louis gets a boost when the full river is controlled all the way down to NO. In terms of supplies, I'm not quite sure how critical the Vicksburg link is for the total CSA supply picture. The rail pool limitations in the South would seem to prevent transfers of Texas beef to Lee's army (or all the war supplies that came via un-blockaded Mexico.) Finally, since there is a national man-power pool, folks are just recruiting troops in VA anyway...

Beyond securing NO, I figure it might be a waste of time trying to secure the whole of the Mississippi. Why not drive from Nashville to Savanna, and then have everyone converge on VA?

[Q-Ball]

The Anaconda plan was merely the first plan, Scott didn't have the opportunity to update it with later iterations. I think it was a good plan for 1861, and certainly a blockade was a no-brainer idea

One thread that unifies Scott, Grant, and all Union strategies: They were meant to attack the economic underpinnings of the South. By restricting external and internal trade, and attacking sources of supply, they looked to starve the South. Defeating her armies was important, but just a supporting objective

In-Game, I think the Union player should similarly seek to attack the economic underpinnings of the CSA. Under the newer versions, the limitations are WSU and Money. Look at those places on the map.

[GraniteStater]

For something that "never really was the policy of the Union", it sure seemed to have been executed quite a bit.

Whether some officially approved memo existed or not, the idea of blockade and secure the Mississippi was followed. My word, they had every important point on the river but Vicksburg by late June 1862!

Do not impose twentieth century planning and staff work on mid-nineteenth century structures - they did not exist as we think of them. The German General Staff wasn't created until after the American Civil War if I have it right.

Read Maps & Mapmakers of the Civil War for a very illuminating and eye-opening perspective on actual practices. Here's a paraphrase from a Confederate general about the Peninsula campaign:

"...an area that was less than a day's ride from Richmond, that had been known to John Smith and the first British settlements...might as well have been in central Africa for all anyone knew of features and terrain..."

Both sides were woefully unprepared for what it would require to prosecute war on the scale needed. The Union had the resources to adjust and compensate and implement - the South never really did, although they tried very hard and ameliorated their situation to a degree.

[GraniteStater]

Some thoughts on Union game strategy per my PbeM with havi:

* I anticipated that by mid-game (it's now Late Sept 63), serious fighting would preclude Reinforcements and call for more Replacements. How much more, with the campaigning in summer 63 we have had, I did not anticipate. I have built no Reinforcements at all for two, three Turns now. And I'm still "in the red". I didn't "buy" any chits directly the first go-round - probably a mistake. I have bought some now and shall see how it goes - I bought quite a few, quite a few.

* Going for the Serious Blockade and taking some coastal Forts might be a really good strategy. Even being fond of the navy in AACW, I didn't get down & dirty that much. I haven't taken New Orleans, nor have tried yet, against havi, going for the Sea Island landings in SC instead, with Charleston as the objective. This is a much more modest effort than my usual NO Exp Force. The point is, a human player gets no advantages like Athena dos - it's a level field for Cohesion recovery, unit speed, etc. Reducing CSA economic prowess might be a preferred strategy. Translation - yer gonna need a bigger boat, and lots, lots more of 'em, if you want to do this. I have a fair sized effort against havi, particularly riverine craft, but I am far, far from Outright Superiority - Buchanan and Hollis are pesky and I have taken Norfolk and landed in SC, but that's it.

* havi is using all the game's tools well - now, I'm starting to 'get' Cards. Taking a page from another thread, I've slapped quite a bit of Habe on grumbly places which produce $$ (the bottleneck).

* I haven't Mobilized at all, not once, and have had plenty of Men after the EP. Did about three rounds of Heavy Industry and I have 1500 - 2000 WS. The constraint is $$ - built more TPs for the Shipping Box for this, also.

* Trying to move havi outta places he wants is Not Easy at All - I'm starting to look for atomic crowbars. The numbers are starting to tell, starting to...it has taken a long. long time to persuade him to move against his will.

[Gray Fox]

In 1861, the Union must first defend Washington or lose instantly. I have demonstrated that a real possibility is for the CSA to attack the Union capital with an elite army stack of 2500 power (with a reserve army stack of about 2k) as early as October. When I play the Union, I can put together one army with some Divisions and the static units with approximately 1k power and McDowell's army stack with another group of Divisions and artillery with perhaps 2-3k power entrenched in the capital. I'm reasonably sure that my Union defense might stop my CSA assault most of the time. I would recommend doing this before you build more blockade ships, take out coastal forts or invade NO, or open a second front in any part of the west.
Of course, CSA Athena will never try this, so players can ignore D.C.'s defense and just not play me, ever.

[GraniteStater]

Yes, but, but, but...

The DC defenses aren't as shabby as you might think. No, one should not rely on the static units solely, especially in the face of a determined attack. However, between the free fortifications and the free units now, one can have static units of about 800 Pwr behind level 3 or 4 fortifications by the time you mention. A 2000 Pwr stack, no Corps to cooperate, just Divs, may very well get hung up on those - might very well. Any decent sized mobile force in the vicinity can work with this to kick out an invader, much faster than you might think, and with more than a few redded out units. If that is so, the attacker is now the prey and is just ripe for a riposte.

I am very impressed by what you have done on Colonel, both ways, very impressed.

Now, let's see what you do in the tournament. Humans are a whole 'nother ball game.

[pgr]

Some thoughts on Union game strategy per my PbeM with havi:
* I haven't Mobilized at all, not once, and have had plenty of Men after the EP. Did about three rounds of Heavy Industry and I have 1500 - 2000 WS. The constraint is $$ - built more TPs for the Shipping Box for this, also.

here is a quick question, do extra tps in the shipping box increase $$$, or do they just boost your sea supply limit?

[tripax]

I'm pretty sure that it just boosts sea supply limit. This can reduce attrition (and thus save you money), but I don't think there is international trade income anymore (I think there was in AACW).

[GraniteStater]

AFAIK, they increase money received from "your overseas shipping has brought in XX money and YY WS." It's a little bit of a dice roll, but they bring in the most of what you need the most. It's not huge, but not small, either. It helps. The amortization is very low, though - best not to look at it that way, it'll take the entire game to pay for itself on a per-element basis. But it helps.

[pgr]

AFAIK, they increase money received from "your overseas shipping has brought in XX money and YY WS." It's a little bit of a dice roll, but they bring in the most of what you need the most. It's not huge, but not small, either. It helps. The amortization is very low, though - best not to look at it that way, it'll take the entire game to pay for itself on a per-element basis. But it helps.

Here I thought it was just the merchants that brought in extra WS and money... so this means I should be spamming transports in the shipping box to alleviate my cash flow crunch?

[GraniteStater]

AFAIK, they'll do what I described. You might get $50 or so with four - I don't really know. 'Course, you need TPs for Other Things, too. "Spamming"? I wouldn't go too nutty, I would say; it's your call on resource management - build some and see what the difference is, I would suggest. I look at it as an alleviation, not a Solution.

I have recently learned that building more Industry might help with $$ production in the cities selected - I think it might be just a few bucks in each instance, though.

Money does seem to be the issue, at least for the Union at a certain point. Might get some relief in the next patch.

[Aurelin]

BTW, in the game, there's another, quite viable, strategy for the Union - call it the 'Steamroller'. I'm sure more than a few playing the Union have deliberately employed it or fell into it through circumstance - just push south, from the Kansas line to the Atlantic seaboard - try to inflict as much pain as possible.

Quite viable in AACW - Athena would usually quit at a certain casualty threshold, though I'd say that's not the sole determinant in the surrender algorithm.

In my PbeM, havi is being very stubborn - now, KY did secede in the summer of 61, which makes a difference, but it's Late July 63 and we're still boxing around Nashville.

I have landed near Charleston; have Norfolk, Petersburg and NoVa; have secured MO and taken Fayetteville, Ark.; and that's about it, other than Tucson and the Western Boxes.

Some, either side, put *everything* in the east and head for the capital.