Case study I: The attempts to supply besieged Kolberg, Fall 1761
My source for all the following is: Eberhard Kessel. Das Ende des Siebenjährigen Krieges 1760-1763. Torgau und Bunzelwitz, Schweidnitz und Freiberg. Herausgegeben von Thomas Lindner (Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich 2007).
The starting situation in early October 1761 in Pommerania sees the prussian corps under Prince Friedrich Eugen of Württemberg, well entrenched around the port of Kolberg and the Persante-river. This prussian corps was besieged by a russian corps under Pyotr Rumyantsev. Since the besieged got reinforced by a corps under Dubislav von Platen (on September 30th), the russians had no hope to storm the entrenchments, and their own supply-situation was quite dire. On october 9th, the Russian fleet left Kolberg due to bad weather, and took all the heavy siege artillery with it. Nevertheless, Rumyantsev was ordered to keep up the siege at all costs. But the bigger strategical considerations don't need to bother us here. It is enough to say that at this point, both the prussians and russians wanted to hold on to Kolberg.
The prussians in Kolberg were in need of supply, and their situation got worse in the course of October. Between September 11th and October 11th, 716 prussian deserters reached the russian headquarter, and for the rest of the month, the desertion-rate of the besieged prussian forces was about 20-30 men per day. On October 15th, the prussian command sent out major Massow at the head of the Württemberg- and Plettenberg-dragoons to comandeer supplies in and around Greifenberg (one of the many outposts of the Württemberg-corps, a bit east of Kolberg), since the peacefull call on the local population to provide supplies had obviously not brought about the desired results. Moreover, early in November, Württemberg ordered all houses in Kolberg to be searched for food.
The prussian depot (apart from a few supplies in Gollnow) was Stettin, 135 km bee-line away from Kolberg. It was was held by the duke von Bevern. In Stettin, there was enough flour to provide all troops in Pommerania for 2 ½ months, rye for 3 months, straw for 2 months and 20 days, hay for 2 months, but oat for only 2 weeks. Kolberg desperately needed supplies from here. As always, finding enough wagons for the supply-train (ca. 3000 wagons were needed) was a problem, especially because the cossacks of the russian corps under Gustav Berg penetrated to the Oder and made it impossible to acquire wagons in Farther Pomerania. Nevertheless, the first flour-transport was ready to depart from Stettin on October 6th. (Obviously the bakery would be done in Kolberg)
The area between Kolberg and Stettin was threatened by russian raiding parties. Very close to Stettin, cossacks under Krasntoschokow harassed the Prussians, and the light corps under Gustav Berg (in Sargard) forayed north and threatened the communication between Kolberg and Stettin. On October 7th, expecting prussian supply trains, Rumyantsev sent out a rather big detachment under Apatschinin to Gervin.
So, it is quite intersting to note that several smaller detachements acted offside the main armies, in an area that would not represent much more than 1-2 regions in ROP. And we always have to remember that the following actions take place in a very small space, and that time was indeed a matter of hours, not days. We can imagine the area between Stettin and Kolberg as a no-mans-land. The supply train had to be well guarded. Bevern ordered major von Stosch, at the head of ca. 700 men to escort the ammunition-train from Stettin to Gollnow. Moreover, on October 7th, he sent out 2 squadrons and 2 free-companies across the river Oder to reconnoitre the area between Damm and Stargard. The Prussians in Kolberg still held a series of outposts east of Kolberg to keep up communication to Stettin, some of them were even reinforced with some trechworks. Until to October 10th, the besieged Prussians carefully streched out their fingers towards Gollnow, shifting small detachements to the villages on the road. To get an idea of the situation, take a look at the map below (I've not registered the movements). The four days between October 6th and October 10th saw lots of patrouilling and reconnoitering on both sides, and the Prussians established a small network of outposts on the main connection between Gollnow and Kolberg. The troops used for this task were hussars, dragoons, free-companies and also some regular infantry. The only noteworthy engagement was major Eberstein (+ 200 cavalry) reconnoitering towards Gervin, where russian movements had been reported. Eberstein managed to push back some cossacks but then bounced into the large detachment under Apatschinin, which forced him to draw back (with the loss of 11 prisoners and 5 wounded). His retreat was covered by a battaillon of IR Fink and a squadron of hussars from Neumühle (it's a bout 15 km beeline between Gervin and Neumühle). So, losses in this kind of small war were trifling.
The task of taking over the supply train in Gollnow fell to Major von Kleist with the infantry regiment Markgraf Heinrich and a cavalry detachment of 200 troopers. Kleist, originally positioned in Treptow, arrived in Gollnow midday on October 12th and took over the supply train from major Stosch, who immediatly marched back to Stettin. However, Kleist (meanwhile supported by 300 Werner hussars) didn't get very far. Gustav Berg, in charge of the russian detachment in Stargard, got notice of the prussian supply train on October 12th and sent out a serbian hussar-regiment plus two howitzers to Gollnow. On October 13th, before Kleist had had a chance to leave the town, these troops attacked the supply-train. Worried by the howitzer shells that went too close to the ammunition-wagons, Kleist ordered the ammunition wagons back into a wood. There, however, they got attacked by the russian cavalry. Even though the prussian infantry managed to drive them off in the end, the Russians had taken some horses with them, some wagoneers had fled, and some wagons were destroyed. Moreover, the Russians laid fire to the suburb of Gollnow and allegedly occupied the roads to Gülzow. So even though not a lot of supplies had been lost, there was no way to progress to Kolberg. Kleist retreated to Damm.
After some considerations, the Prussians decided to send a quite large detachment from Kolberg that should force its way to the supply train and bring it to Kolberg safely. This detachement was under the command of Platen and consisted of the majority of the cavalry that was left in Kolberg and 7 infantry battaillons, alltogether around 4000 strong. On October 17th, Platen (observed by Krastschonow) departed from Kolberg. At 14.00 the same day, he reached Treptow. On his way, a message reached him telling him that Apatschinin – the russian detachement – was advancing towards Greifenberg, i.e. would cut his way off. Platen immediatly ordered Coubière (who held Greifenberg) to withdraw to Treptow. Then Platen moved on, evading Greifenberg norrth via Stuchow and Schwanteshagen. Treptow was only guarded by the battaillon Braun and 50 hussars.
Indeed the decision to evade Greifenberg had been a good one. On October 17th, Rumyantsev had ordered Apatschinin and Berg to attack Greifenberg. On October 18th, when Apatschinin arrived at Greifenberg, he found the village empty. However, even though the Russians had failed to cut off Platen, they now successfully started to surround Treptow. Krasnotschokows cossacks cut the communication between Kolberg and Treptow. On October 20th, Rumyantsev ordered Apatschinin and Berg to attack Treptow.
Württemberg in Kolberg was aware of the threat to Treptow (which was only held by the above mentioned infantry bataillon and 50 hussars). On October 19th, a messenger sent to Treptow returned without having been able to deliver his message. Obviously he must have found all routes blocked by the russians? Württemberg sent a detachement to reinforce and rescue Treptow. At 19.00 on October 19th, general-major Knobloch departed from Kolberg with IR Knobloch, the Pomeischke dragoons and 100 Malachowsky hussars. He managed to get to Treptow without much resistance, only pushing away some russian cossacks and hussars who withdrew towards Greifenberg. Knobloch reached Treptow at 07.00 on October 20th. However, since he didn't see any immediate danger, he took quite a lot of time in Treptow and planned to start his way back to Kolberg only the next day. This proved to be fatal. Württemberg sent two orders to Knobloch (at 17:30 and at 19:00) that he should make his way back to Kolberg this very night. However, these orders only reached Knobloch at 07:00 on October 21st. Meanwhile, Apatschinin had reached Treptow. His attempts to cross the river Rega and destroy the city gate failed, but nevertheless, Knobloch was now trapped in Treptow. And what was even worse: even though Berg had been successfully distracted by Platen, 4 russian squadrons and 5 grenaider-companies were advancing from Greifenberg to Treptow, so that it could be attacked from two sides – Appatschinin from the eastern side of the Rega, the detachment from the western side.
Things started to get worse for the Prussians when the Russians started to completely cut off Kolberg. On October 21st, Neumühle got occupied by cossacks, who got reinforced by the Tobol-dragoons and 2 unicorns. Rumyantsev then stormed the outpost at Spie, taking 87 prisoners (17 of them wounded).
In this situation, the prussian command sent orders to Knobloch that he should force his way to unite with Platen. The way back to Kolberg was too dangerous for his small detachment, since the prussians outposts were already in the hands of the russians. But this order never reached Knobloch. On October 22nd, he declined Apatschinins request to surrender. So the russians started to fire their artillery at Treptow. In the afternoon of that day, the russian detachment from Greifenberg arrived. Knobloch held out until 25th October, when he finally surrendered. His entire commando (65 officers, 1445 men, 15 banners, 6 battaillon-guns, 1 howitzer + the members of the field hospital (they were supposed to be transportet back to Kolberg as well), 13 "surgeons" and 378 wounded/sick), was captured by Apatchinin.
I'll cut it off here. I think that these short episodes can give us a good idea of what the day to day operations during the Seven Years War looked like. It was a contest of reconnaissance and a fighting for outposts and communication lines. You could easily base whole games around such small scenarios (with turns representing half-days, smaller regions (1 village = 1 region

) etc. etc.), without the need to research all OOBs and produce immense maps with thousands of regions. The troops engaged with these tasks were small detachments of light troops (often 50-200 hussars/dragoons and the like), somtimes supported by some regular infantry. But the transition from such small raiding and reconnaissance-parties to the dispatch of larger detachments (Apatschinin, Platen) was quite fluid.
In my next post, I'm planning to take a look on how light troops work in ROP and compare that to the historical role of light troops, probably in two steps: 1) reconnaissance, 2) small war.
Maps:
Overview Kolberg-Stettin
Positions on October 10th (the russian main army under Buturlin would be to the south)
The region in ROP
