[USA War room] Washington Telegraph Office

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 13, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major Generals Cai & Kurtz

Sirs -

I am issuing specific orders to the garrison commanders at Chicago, St Louis, Lewisburg, and Philadelphia in regards to the enlistment activities of several regiments. Please note what I am doing and the effect that it has on getting these troops operational quickly and at full strength, so that you may follow the same procedures in the future.

In addition, I have ordered General Banks to immediately begin recruitment activities upon his arrival at New York, skipping the social rounds. General McClellan has been ordered to use any available transport on his journey to Alexandria. This will speed his arrival by several days, at the expense of his delicate digestive system ... His arrival is now expected before the middle of next month.

Your Obedient Servant,
Winfield Scott

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 13, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Cai

Sir -

As the citizenry of Louisville, Kentucky have shown overwhelming loyalty, it is no longer judged necessary to station military police there. The 23rd Pennsylvania Zouaves in Pittsburg was recruited for that express purpose. They are accordingly being reassigned to your command, and ordered to rendezvous with the 3rd Naval regiment at St Louis. You may modify those orders upon your return from Grafton if necessary.

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 14, 1861

From: Sec. Welles
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

I have received several queries from naval commanders in regards to orders received directly from you. In all of these cases, I have informed them that they are at your disposal. With the two transports currently at Fort Monroe, you will have eight transports available there upon the arrival of troops from Philadelphia and New York. This should provide more than ample capacity to meet any needs in that area. If some of this capacity could be put to other uses, please let me know.

In the future please send any such requirements directly to me or to Assistant Secretary Fox, so that we can avoid any misunderstandings.

Respectfully,
Gideon Welles

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 14, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

The cavalry regiment at Liberty, VA has been ordered to Greensboro, NC - arriving on the 26th. Intelligence received in this office indicates that there are no supplies available at Greensboro. They are likely to starve if the order goes through as is. May I please have your permission to order them to push onward through Lexington towards Salisbury from that point? They would arrive at Lexington on the 29th, and not arrive at Salisbury until the 2nd of next month. We should be able to have a courier meet them at Lexington with new orders if the situation requires it. In the event that they find opposition at Lexington, they can evade contact, and they may still be able to find supplies at Charlotte or Camden (SC), where an amphibious assault is planned for early next month. May I also please have your permission to order them to destroy additional rail prior to their departure from Liberty? That measure would be expected to delay enemy pursuit.

Please reply at your earliest convenience.

Your Obedient Servant,
Winfield Scott

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 14, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

Reassessing intelligence information, the report of enemy cavalry passing through Moorefield was incorrect. The cavalry that was at Romney (1st VA) has joined General Jackson at Harper's Ferry. We have identified seven independent enemy cavalry regiments in Virginia, not eight. Their locations are:

Harper's Ferry - 1st VA
Manassas - 3rd VA
Fredericksburg - 4th NC
Salem - 2nd VA?
Lynchburg - 1st, 2nd, & 3rd NC

[AndrewKurtz]

Alexandria, VA
September 13, 1861

From: General Kurtz
To: General Scott

Cavalry order modification approved.

General Kurtz

[johnnycai]

West Theatre HQ.
St. Louis, Sept3, 1861

From: Major General Cai
To: President Lincoln, Lt. Gen. Scott & Maj. Gen. Kurtz

Mr. President, General Scott, General Kurtz,

Have received no communiques since leaving Cincinnati, will rail thru to Grafton if able to advance.

General Kurtz:
Ohio troops are at your leisure as needed.

regards,
General Cai

[AndrewKurtz]

Alexandria, VA
September 16, 1861

From: General Kurtz
To: General Scott

Submitting plans for your review.

1. We have had success throwing the enemy out of Grafton. Believe, based on current intelligence reports, that General Wallace and his troops can be released back to General Cai. There is enemy cavlary in the area and we will dispatch troops immediately to eliminate this threat. Additional troops will be moved into Grafton to help maintain security and also to prepare for future operations against enemy communication and supply lines.

2. Cavalry raiders are approaching Salisbury. Should arrive in two days. Running very short on supplies. They also report sighting vulnerable enemy artillery on trains. Please advise as to your thoughts on the best course of action. These troops can continue a rapid run toward the ships awaiting them and safety. However, a riskier yet more rewarding alertnative would be to order them to subsists off the land while capturing the enemy artillery and tearing up the enemy rail in Salisbury. Unless you see any significant reason to do otherwise, I plan to order the later course of action.

3. General Mansfield is delayed in arriving in Ft. Monroe and General Meagher is having difficulty preparing a division for operations against the enemy. Plan is for General Meagher to build and train a division to assault Norfolk from the west, however, this attack may be delayed a few weeks to give the troops proper planing time.

4. Forces along the Potomac will continue to entrench further. Please advise as to the best course of action during the coming winter months. Are these troops expected to stay in entrenchments throughout the winter? If so, should supply wagons be disributed to such troops to help them survive the potentially harsh winter? Or do you recommend that these troops leave their entrenchments for the saftey of our cities?

5. Planned cavlary raid to be launched against enemy communication and supply lines south of Richmond. Potentially vulnerable artillery on trains also may be captured.

I await your advice and counsel.

Humbly yours.
General Kurtz

[johnnycai]

Grafton- Temporary West Theatre HQ.
St. Louis, Sept17, 1861

From: Major General Cai
To: President Lincoln, Lt. Gen. Scott & Maj. Gen. Kurtz

Mr. President, General Scott, General Kurtz,

Our forces, under Wallace and with the rail line uncut, were able to induce the rebs to assault us at Grafton. We beat off the enemy and reclaimed the town but are unsure of where the remnants have retreated. Wallace and I will leave immediately for Cincinnati with all the Ohio/Indiana troops not needed to remain at Grafton.

Our position at Louisville is under threat, I request immediate formation of a division under Porter to better arrange the defences. I am most worried by the lack of regulars amongs our Louisville regiments. This upcoming fight may be more than they can handle.
Gunboats will need to cover the Ohio river in case the rebs attempt to go for Cincinnati or Indianapolis.
Our raids in the West have gone well so far.
The West Theatre will need more ironclads to be able to support and shield our upcoming amphibious operations.
A revision in our immediate Western objectives may have presented itself. With Grant soon to be deployed in West, I will begin logistics planning for a strike at Bowling Green where our objective will be cutting off Johnston's Corps and perhaps forcing major battle at our terms within Kentucky. Fremont could be assigned to lead this.
When will the next Army HQ be assigned Mr. President?

Faithfully yours,
General Cai

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 20, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

It does appear that the 6th Division can be released back to General Cai. He could use those troops at Louisville. I would like to see enemy raiders completely destroyed or driven out of the immediate area prior to the departure of those troops. That will leave the rebels with the impression that the 6th division remains at Grafton, until it arrives at its next destination. If you do immediately release that force, please pass that information along to General Cai. The reports of troop movements through Moorefield were apparently General Smith's force. We have received a report from the same source of additional troops now moving through the town, we assess this to be General Smith's troops returning towards the Potomac. We were fortunate that the enemy, for whatever reason, did not immediately destroy the rail or depot at Grafton. I would like to express my appreciation and congratulations to both you and General Cai on your prompt cooperation and response.

I doubt that the raiders at Lexington can live off the land. Since the enemy have garrisons at both Hillsboro and Lexington, I would suggest that the raiders do what they can to damage rail near the Lexington Depot, attack the artillery at Salisbury, and continue on to your choice of the Middle or Lower Santee River. The transports can be waiting there for them, and would have boats available to pick them up. The 2nd Sailors will simultaneously assault Camden (although success there is by no means guaranteed), so there is no longer a need to conceal those transport ships. (Additionally, "showing" the transports right now may help deceive the enemy as to our ability to conceal them.)

Continue with preparations at Fort Monroe. There have apparently been some problems lately with communication between the War Department and the Navy Department. The troops you assigned to Fort Monroe are still in Maryland, General Mansfield is delayed, and the California Brigade was apparently rerouted to Savannah. There is no plan I am aware of, for an attack on Savannah at this time. I have asked Sec. Welles to investigate the situation, and make sure that all the commanders that are supposed to be at your disposal are informed or re-informed of that status. If any of the problems originated in this office, I apologize, and I assure you that if that was the case, it was unintentional. Please reroute the California Brigade as you see fit. If you would like to send them somewhere other than Fort Monroe, we can discuss possibilities.

We do not expect many additional troops will be made available for the Eastern Theater before December, except in an emergency situation. If we could retain some of the less trained and valuable volunteer units in the Maryland area, they could either replace some cavalry that is currently holding the flank trenches, or replace more powerful units that are defending in depth, allowing those units to either join the front line or be reassigned to Fort Monroe. If you choose that option, I would prefer if the smaller forces modified existing trench lines, rather than preparing new ones. I leave it to your discretion.

Please do send supply trains out to the major forces that will remain in trenches along the Potomac. Their proximity to the depot at Washington should keep them well supplied, but we should take every step to ensure that they have adequate provisions and ammunition. Most of the smaller forces should be able to receive adequate supplies via rail.

The enemy left flank is apparently 'in the air'. The return of General Smith to the northern Shenandoah Valley, and impending weather conditions, make it less so now than previously. Please inform me if it would still be possible to send some cavalry rapidly around that flank to destroy rail along the Orange & Alexandria line before winter. This would delay enemy reinforcements and supplies to the area, further limit the possibilities for raids or a major attack, and complicate enemy reaction to planned raids and amphibious attacks.

General Magruder may be commanding the enemy reaction force, but his current location is not known.

Apparently General Beauregard is nervous about the possibility of an assault on Fredericksburg. Counter-intelligence operations have reported rebel sympathizer activities at Port Tobacco. A courier was intercepted crossing the Potomac, but that does not mean additional messages did not get through. Since current weather conditions prevent our raiders from immediately targeting Hanover Junction north of Richmond, the suggested raid south of Richmond is approved. Will that force also be stopping at Fort Monroe for additional supplies, or will it proceed directly to its destination? Please note that enemy battery positions along the James River are expected to be prepared for river interdiction within the next month. Do you have a plan to deal with the enemy battery at Hampton Roads?

I would suggest using the rivers and estuaries as a route for additional diversionary raids at Warsaw, Tappahannock, and West Point. Intelligence reports the formation of five new enemy cavalry regiments forming near Richmond under Colonel Ashby, in addition to the other forces at that location. Diversionary raids could keep that force on the defensive and out of position for any mischief.

Please use your discretion as to McClellan's immediate assignment. If you percieve a threat to General Hooker's Division, he should be assigned there, and could then be reassigned to Alexandria next month.

Please identify resources and present plans for a raid on the Valley Railroad, as a prelude to or simultaneous with the planned attack on Covington.

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 20, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Cai

Sir -

General Kurtz should be contacting you shortly to discuss which troops should leave Grafton, and which troops should stay. According to current intelligence estimates, General Smith's force has apparently retreated to the east/southeast, towards the north end of the Shenandoah Valley. I would like to express my appreciation and congratulations to both you and General Kurtz on your prompt cooperation and response to this threat.

Your request for a division at Louisville is approved, and additional staff officers will be assigned for that purpose.

The lack of regulars at Louisville is worrisome. The best suggestions I have for the immediate situation are to consolidate the forces at Louisville after the new division is formed (one force in the city, and one fortified nearby), similarly consolidate the forces at Cincinnati into two positions, and then forward some some selected "Light" Ohio and Indiana brigades from Cincinnati to Louisville (using the fastest combinations of transportation) in anticipation of Wallace's arrival in the area. Several of those brigades have one or two regiments of regular troops.

Now that the rail line is damaged near Joe Johnston's position south of Louisville, you may at your own discretion choose to repair rail closer to the city, as that would speed reinforcement of the area, or a possible counter-offensive if neccesary. An additional raid by either cavalry or infantry down the Green River to damage rail north of Bowling Green and further isolate Johnston is suggested. Is it possible for the 7th Indiana at Mercer to attempt an immediate forced march and assault on either Huntsville or Livingstone?

Your suggested change of objectives is heartily approved. This is an excellent opportunity for destroying the enemy forces in Kentucky in detail, and not having to face those forces in other locations. However, the immediate weakness of the enemy forces at Donelson should not be ignored; the enemy is apparently relying on his river fleet for security in that area. When our first ironclads become available, you should be able to push a significant force through at that location as well.

Please do what you can to reorganize the forces in eastern Kentucky after taking Clarksburg. Supplies at Prestonburg may be limited by winter weather in the next few months, and small cavalry forces will have an easier time negotiating the mountains to the south and east. Volunteer troops should be adequate to hold the town. The 2nd Ohio brigade could reinforce your efforts in another location.

Sec. Welles assures me he will continue the program to build additional gunboats and ironclads, and we are immediately organizing the nucleus of an Army headquarters which will be sent to you (estimated arrival towards the end of November).

The Missouri Cavalry Brigade should probably continue down the White River to Bolivar rather than assaulting Madison, as the Bolivar position has no rail connection (limiting enemy reaction), is likely to be undefended, and commands the confluent of the Arkansas River (giving many further offensive possibilities in Mississippi and Arkansas, and hopefully causing the enemy to divert troops to several different locations). I leave the final decision to you.

The regular cavalry in the Indian Territories should probably attempt to avoid a confrontation with hostiles while choosing another location as a temporary supply base. If they are not able to assault Fort Smith, and are not able to secure adequate supplies in the Indian Territiories, then a withdrawal towards General Sumner's forces is advised. The President continues his development initiative in the New Mexico territory. Additional forces from Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas appear adequate (from this distance) to handle the Indian problem.

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 21, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

I believe now, prior to the completion of the assault forces, would be a good time to clarify your plans as to assaulting Suffolk/Norfolk. Do you intend to use local ships or long distance naval transports? If the latter, where will the ships be stationed when landings are made? This also relates to my question of yesterday regarding the 1st NC at Hampton Roads.

Also, I have reconsidered my request as to sending cavalry past Jackson's flank. I do not believe current weather patterns and enemy dispositions make it a good risk at this time. I believe we should completely ignore that vulnerability, not drawing the enemy's attention to it, while raiding from the Chesapeake. When additional forces are available, we can look at that situation again.

Magruder is with Holmes in Fredericksburg.

[AndrewKurtz]

Alexandria, VA
September 21, 1861

From: General Kurtz
To: General Scott

Sir,

Request permission to create a division under General Keyes with improve command and control within the Army of the Potomac. This division will be assigned to stay wit hthe Army.

General Kurtz

[AndrewKurtz]

Alexandria, VA
September 22, 1861

From: Major General Kurtz
To: General Cai

Sir -

The 6th Division is now released to be used at your discretion. If you see fit, please ask General Wallace to help dispose of the remaining enemy cavalry prior to leaving.

Best regards,
General Kurtz

[AndrewKurtz]

Alexandria, VA
September 22, 1861

From: Major General Kurtz
To: General Scott

Sir -

Requesting a naval recon of the Suffolk area to ascertain enemy troop strength prior to finalizing invasion plans.

General Kurtz

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 22, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

Request for General Keyes to form a division is approved.

Request for naval recon has been forwarded to the Navy Department.

[Jabberwock]

Navy Department
Washington, September 22, 1861

From: Sec. Welles
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

I believe I may owe you an apology for some mixed up orders. The commander of the 11th fleet transporting the California Brigade from Philadelphia apparently received a duplicate copy of the orders addressed to Captain Lowe's squadron. That copy was not specifically addressed to Captain Lowe, and the officer in question properly (under the circumstances) interpreted those orders as addressed to him. He has been intercepted and told to reroute to Fort Monroe, pending any contrary orders directly from you.

Transport Squadron #15 at Ocean, NJ has been temporarily placed at your disposal for rapid redeployment of artillery batteries.

Your requested recon of the James Estuary will be performed by Transport Squadron #6, currently off the coast of North Carolina. It is intended that the enemy will take the recon for merely another diversion. Anything that you could do to remove the enemy batteries at Hampton Roads prior to their becoming operational will increase the chance of successfully completing this mission, as well as reducing the risk to other naval assets in the area.

[AndrewKurtz]

Alexandria, VA
September 22, 1861

From: Major General Kurtz
To: General Scott

Sir -

Believe launching cavalary raid should be postponed due to poor road conditions. Concerned that the raid will ot advance fast enough with the severe mud on the ground, risking our forces. Plan to postpone until the roads are sufficient to allow rapid movement unless otherwise ordered.

General Kurtz

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 22, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

Is this in regards to a raid around Jackson, a raid on the Valley Railroad, a different raid, or all offensive cavalry operations in Virginia?

[AndrewKurtz]

Alexandria, VA
September 22, 1861

From: Major General Kurtz
To: General Scott

Sir -

Planned to launch raid from Port Tobacco against the rail lines south of Richmond and towards the Weldon lines. This is to support the planned invasion of Suffolk and in accordance with your communication dated September 3, 1861.

Believe we can currently launch a limited raid around the Valley and posible reach west of Charlottesville before October 1. Suggest launching this limited raid and holding the larger raid for better road conditions.


General Kurtz

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 22, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

Conditions have changed somewhat in the last few weeks. The optimal campaign season is drawing to a close in central Virginia. Information received here indicates the current condition of roads to the west of the Blue Ridge may make the Valley Railroad an easier (although slightly less valuable) target at the moment. The Manassas Gap Railroad west of the Blue Ridge is a lower value target than either of the other two rail lines. The final choice of targets is left to your discretion.

The Chesapeake and the estuaries remain all-weather avenues for raiding.

I believe all strategic-level commanders should have had an in-depth discussion of cavalry doctrine earlier in the year to clarify any issues, but that opportunity is behind us.

I would like to take this opportunity to inform you of a new development on a more personal level, before it reaches you from any other source. The President has expressed concerns regarding my health, and asked me to limit my in-depth reviews of the operational situation, while still providing some oversight and providing information that may not be immediately apparent from your field headquarters. Once my concerns about the immediate defense of the Capitol have been met, I will be taking a different opportunity to serve my country. I have proposed to the President that we form two new military institutions, with the purpose of providing specialized training to both cavalry and amphibious officers. If he accepts this proposal, I intend to supervise the amphibious academy personally.

Your Obedient Servant,
Lt. Gen. Scott

[Jabberwock]

Executive Mansion
Washington, September 24, 1861

To: Major Generals Cai & Kurtz

Gentlemen -

There will not be a detailed proposal for new recruitment this fortnight. Unless some overriding priority is pointed out to me, I will attempt to provide one riverine asset and some army staff for General Cai; one volunteer regiment and possibly a cavalry regiment for General Kurtz. The rest of our resources wil be split between replacement troops for our current units, additional staff officers, the ongoing investment in New Mexico, and improvements to our transportation infrastructure.

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 24, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Cai

Sir -

The 23rd Pennsylvania apparently did not receive the orders to report to St. Louis. They are still at Pittsburg. That being the case, I would suggest that you temporarily use them as additional reinforcements for Louisville.

[johnnycai]

West Theatre HQ.
St. Louis, Sept3, 1861

From: Major General Cai
To: Lt. Gen. Scott
CC: President Lincoln, Major General Kurtz,

Greetings General Scott,

I have been made aware of your personal condition. You have served your country beyond mere blood and sweat. I pray for your quick recovery.

Regarding the brigade at Pittsburgh. My understanding was Pennsylvannia troops were to be under General Kurtz, while Ohio troops would be under my commands. I will gladly order them west should you grant them to me.
Please clarify this for me.

Respectfully yours,
General Cai

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 25, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Cai

Sir -

Thank you for your kind words.

The 23rd PA was recruited specifically for your use. There is no place within your theater of operations to recruit that specific type of brigade, therefore it was recruited in Pennsylvania.

[AndrewKurtz]

Alexandria, VA
September 25, 1861

From: Major General Kurtz
To: General Scott

Dearest General Scott,

It has been a pleasure serving, and learning, under your command.

Best regards,
General Kurtz
__________________

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 25, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

Thank you for your kind words. I should be able to continue to serve in my current capacity for several more weeks.

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 28, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Cai

Sir -

Please find a circumspect way to ask General Porter to give greater heed to the advice of his engineering officers. I have received an out-of-channel report that troops were consolidated into the weaker of the available lines.

[Jabberwock]

War Department
Washington, September 28, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major Generals Cai & Kurtz

Sirs -

I have noticed a disturbing tendency to ignore enemy raiders once they have been weakened and are retreating. We need to start killing or capturing these units, otherwise they will rest and return, or be formed into divisions that will give us no end of trouble.

On a related note, our cavalry in enemy territory should be operating as independent regiments to cause widespread damage where possible. Until such time as we can form cavalry divisions, the purpose of cavalry is not to directly confront enemy formations. Cavalry objectives should be to destroy infrastructure (this is of primary importance) and capture undefended or weakly defended places, forcing the enemy to divert forces away from his main efforts. They should rely on mobility rather than force, and use rivers to increase that mobility.

[Jabberwock]

Navy Department
Washington, September 29, 1861

From: Sec. Welles
To: Major General Cai

Sir -

Please inform General Halleck that he is not to interfere with the shipbuilding activities of the Eads company. Consolidating all shipbuilding activities at a single dock may seem like a good idea from a security standpoint, but it is counter-productive in the long run.

Suppose we have two ships. One is almost complete, and will become operational tomorrow. The other will become operational in three weeks. If they are using the same dock, activities of the first ship will interfere with the construction of the second ship, delaying its completion.