Captain_Orso wrote:As an idea to make the CSA more defensible and and thus flexible, I would agree. But historically it would be totally out of context. Virginia was the heart of the southern political base. Seven of the 16 presidents of the United States elected before the outbreak of hostilities were from Virginia. Richmond was from my understanding also regarded as the social and cultural center of the southern culture. To define Richmond as indefensible and move the capital to New Orleans--indeed much larger than Richmond and with a huge trade economy--would be IMHO akin to moving the US capital to Chicago
Just my $.02
Yes and from my readings, I get the impression that Jeff Davis never remotely considered moving the capital anywhere else, for the reasons you mention.
All the same, there was a war going on, and desperate straits require desperate measures. I'll just reiterate the obvious considerations here:
Virginia was absolutely essential to have onside for the South, the keystone in their arch as it were, and anything needed to placate the state politically was essential. That said, however, there were options—right from the start obviously, though at a political cost, and perhaps it was impossible to
not move the capital to Richmond in '61. But surely the situation has changed by July-August '62 with the peninsula campaign at an end. McClellan pulled back from the gates of Richmond as Lee took over and counter-attacked. With the transfer of the Union army power-center north to the Potomac and the immediate threat to Richmond eliminated, a sound proposal to move the capital South would surely had some support after what was clearly a close call: the South had come within an ace of losing it's capital. Davis was not just the political first choice for the job in the new CSA; it was also well appreciated that he was from the military, and in fact a former US Secretary of War under Pierce in Washington. If he had pushed to have the capital moved to another city in the South, it likely would have occurred, at least at this juncture in 1862. At the very beginning of things in '61 it would have been more difficult.
This move need not result in a huge loss of morale, as in the perception that Virginia was being politically and militarily abandoned. The strongest army the South can put forward will still defend the state in almost all possible contingencies, and the Confederate GHQ for example could remain in Richmond.
The MF Plan (or something like it) recognizes the Mississippi heartland as key to the long-term prosecution of the war. Control of this massive waterway, militarily, economically, and politically, was at least as important as keeping Virginia in the war as long as possible. This is not at all to devalue the importance of Virginia, or to connote a decision not to fight long and hard with a forward defense strategy there; but it is to recognize that in a long drawn out war against the manpower and material resources of the Union, the Old Dominion will likely be lost in the end-game of the war. Virginia is not just a frontier state on the periphery of the confederate land-mass in America, it is also close to the enemy capital in Washington, and dangerously exposed to naval landings and advances facilitated by a Union fleet that will undoubtedly be unstoppable--as the peninsular campaign clearly demonstrated. The MF Plan with a CSA capital in New Orleans, or something like it with a capital moved to Georgia, Alabama, or South Carolina, will make sure that when Virginia does fall, it does not take the administrative center of the Confederacy with it.
The NO option is already in the game--I think adding the other locations would add quite a bit of depth and uncertainty to the game. As it stands now, the Union player is really motivated to capture New Orleans almost at all costs, asap, for the simple reason that the confederate capital will now be forever Richmond.
Whoops, that was a long-winded response.